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ABSTRACT 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
The protection of British interests in the Pacific was the basic reason to 
detach a number of Royal Navy's vessels to that Ocean during the Nineteenth 
Century. There were several British interests in the area, and an assorted number of 
Britons established in Spanish America since the beginning of the struggle for 
Independence. Amongst them, merchants was perhaps the most important and 
influential group, pressing on their government for protection to their trade. As 
soon as independence reached the western coast of America, a new space was 
created for British presence. First Valparaiso and afterwards Callao, British 
merchants were soon firmly established in that part of South America. As had 
happened in the Atlantic coast, their claims for protection were attended by the 
British government through the Pacific Squadron, under the flag of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station, until 1837, when it was 
raised to a separate Station. 
During the period covered by this research (1808-1839), Peru came 
through three crucial moments: the Wars of Independence, the initial years as a 
republic, and its confederation with Bolivia under the rule of Santa Cruz. 
Accordingly, the country shifted from being ruled by a strong authority, as the 
viceroy; to became a highly unstable republic, first because the War of 
Independence itself, and afterwards by reason of internal disputes amongst the 
military. 
British merchants already established in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and 
Valparaiso, considered Peruvian as a very profitable market, and consequently 
tried by every possible way to open it to foreign trade. Following the 
independence, in 1821, this market was officially opened, but it did not matched 
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what British merchants expected. Potential buyers were too small in number and a 
reaction from local merchants proved efficient enough to maintain a high taxation 
on foreign goods. Even when British merchants reacted against these official 
policy, namely Protectionism, they were unable to obtain a more aggressive 
support from their government. Other British interests in Peru were built around a 
loan granted by a number of British investors in 1822, and some further 
investments on mining. Even when this time was a period in which Great Britain 
had achieved a paramount position in industry, commerce, naval and several other 
fields, its government maintained its policy of "free hands" towards the new 
republics in America. Consequently, British consular agents, as well as British 
Captains, devoted their mains efforts to kept British trade as safe as possible, and 
to protect their national from abuses committed by local authorities. 
This thesis aims to study how well the Royal Navy, through the Pacific 
Squadron and afterwards the Pacific Station, protected British subjects and 
interests in Peru, between 1808 and 1839. The research focused in the 
effectiveness of that naval presence, discussing how it was affected by local 
circumstances, the number of vessels available, the urgencies of transport of 
treasure and the limitations associated to operate without a shore base. 
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Introduction 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
Shortly after the South America British Naval Station was established at 
Rio de Janeiro, some of its vessels were send round Cape Horn to be stationed on 
the Pacific. Even when their initial duty was to chase U. S. vessels, during the War 
of 1812, as soon as Wars of Independence opened the West Coast markets, that 
mission focused on the protection of British trade, citizens and their interest along 
that coast. First acting as the Pacific Squadron and from 1837 onwards as a 
separate station, British naval presence on the western coast of Spanish America 
lasted until the first years of the present century, exerting a variable degree of 
activity in respect to each country on its jurisdiction. 
Along its almost centenary existence, several complains were made against 
the British naval forces stationed on the Pacific both by British consular agents and 
merchants. An example usually quoted was Consul General in Lima Belford 
Wilson's letter to Lord Palmerston, on 15 January 1834, stating that British 
captains were "too much occupied with the business of `freight hunting' to be of 
much service to the various British communities. "' This sort of complains had been 
taken at its face value for the current historiography, giving a general idea of a 
relative passive and underemployed British naval force, who hardly could provide 
an efficient protection to their countrymen interest along the area under its 
responsibility. 2 
W. M. Mathew, "The first Anglo-Peruvian Debt and its Settlement, 1822-19". Journal of 
Latin 
. 
American Studies, U. of Cambridge, 2,1 (1970): 85. 
.- 
Idem. 
Viii 
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The fact is that most of the works approached this issue only in a collateral 
form, and has been made heavily based on Foreign Office papers. From our point 
of view, the lack of use of Admiralty papers helped to create such an idea, which 
did not reflect the effectiveness of British naval activity in the West Coast of South 
America. 
To obtain a more balanced view of it, we should first analyse the difficulties 
of running a naval force in those waters, whose nearest base, at least in the first 
half of the Eighteenth Century, were either in Brazil or in Australia, with a variable 
degree of autonomy due to the difficulties of communications, and facing a 
complex and variable reality in each one of the countries were it was due to act. 
Moreover, such an activity was framed in the British foreign policy towards Latin- 
American countries, which left very much in hands of private initiative. 
As could be easily suspected, British captains faced a number of problems 
to fulfil their duties. In some cases they succeed, in others they failed, as is usual in 
any human activity, but in general terms I will try to prove in this research the 
following points: 
a) The passiveness and underemployment of British Naval Forces on the 
Pacific accepted by current historiography, should be reviewed; 
b) The number of vessels destined to the Pacific was increased accordingly to 
the importance of the trade; 
c) "Freight hunting", being important as it was, could not be generalised as the 
main concern of British captains in the Pacific. 
For this purpose, I had choice the case of Peru and the British Naval 
Station from 1808 to 1839. In this period, Peru experienced fundamental changes: 
its independence from Spain, the initial struggle to create a Republic, and the 
attempt to rejoin Alto and Bajo Peru by a confederation between Peru and Bolivia. 
Great Britain's attitude respect Latin America also suffered some changes 
during this period. Learning from its failure on Buenos Aires, 1806-1807, the 
British government recognized that the only possible way to gain a legal entry in 
the Spanish American market was by encouraging a substantial change: the end of 
the Spanish monopoly. The Wars of Independence provided the proper answer and 
:f 
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soon those markets were legally opened to British merchants, who despite the risk 
and heavy local taxes managed to established a relatively important trade. The next 
and inevitable step was to recognize the new states, which for some time suffered a 
tremendous political instability, threatening British local interests. 
In order to provide a suitable division for the history of this particular 
British-Peruvian relationship, this work had been divided into six chapters. The 
first concerns the relationship between the British naval forces and the Peruvian 
Viceroyalty in the years in which the latter was fighting back revolutionary 
movements in other parts of the continent. During these years some attempts were 
made to obtain permission from the Peruvian Viceroy for British merchant vessels 
to trade with Peru. For part of this time Great Britain and United States were at 
war, and a British squadron was sent to the Pacific, being followed by other men- 
of-war until the end of the war. 
Second chapter describes those difficult years of the independence wars in 
Peru. These wars involved three main campaigns. The first one was the 
privateering campaign sent out by the governments of Buenos Aires and Chile 
against Peruvian seaborne trade, and the response by the Peruvian Viceroy. The 
second campaign was in charge of Lord Cochrane, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
newly formed Chilean Navy. Finally, the wars ended with the arrivals of Generals 
San Martin and Bolivar. During this period British trade was allowed in Peruvian 
ports as soon as the Spanish naval forces lost the control of the sea. British naval 
presence was soon required to protect the merchants against both opponents, and 
it was increased in direct proportion to British trade itself. In the final stage of this 
period, the Peruvian Navy appeared as a new agent in the west coast of South 
America. Along these years, British captains played quite a complex role, since 
Britain was both at peace with Spain and anxious to gain the market offered by her 
colonies in America. 
Next chapter covers the years between the end of the independence wars 
and the preliminary stages of the Confederation of Peru and Boiivia. During this 
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time, internal struggles between military leaders brought the country to a very 
unsettled condition, affecting maritime trade both through naval campaigns and by 
fluctuating and sometimes capricious taxes on foreign goods. British consular 
action was not always carried out in harmony with naval interest, and difficulties 
arose between him and the Naval Senior Officer. This was the period when a very 
serious incident between Peru and Britain took place. H. M. S. Sapphire and 
H. M. S. Tribune seized the Peruvian sloop-of-war Libertad, when the latter arrived 
at Callao, and a considerable amount of money belonging to the Peruvian 
government was taken from her to compensate a British merchant. This incident 
damaged relations between both countries, and is currently known in Peruvian 
historiography as the brigantine Hidalgo's incident. 
The fourth chapter deals with General Santa Cruz's attempts to confederate 
Peru and Bolivia. Ruling Peru during this period, Santa Cruz provide some stability 
to the country after several years of civil war, gaining the respect of both the 
British Consul General and the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron. As the 
Chilean Government considered that such a confederation could be dangerous for 
their own national aspirations, they declared war on Peru and Bolivia, and finally 
defeat Santa Cruz in Yungay, north of Lima. In his retreat, Santa Cruz reached 
Islay, the sea-port of Arequipa, where a party of British marines and sailors landed 
to protect his life and to give political asylum on board H. M. S. Samarang 
Fifth chapter was devoted to discuss the matter of "freight hunting", and in 
which degree British captains put this consideration above their duties or not. This 
chapter was made using considerable data of places, dates, names and amount of 
bullion exported or transported from one port to another. This information could 
be useful for those economic historians and for this reason it was included as an 
appendix. 
The last chapter deals with the development of the Pacific Squadron and 
afterwards the Pacific Station itself, covering a variety of aspects, such as the area 
under its responsibility, the number of vessels destined to it, the frequency of their 
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calls at Peruvian ports, and the logistic of "baseless" operations. This chapter 
includes an appendix providing a complete list of those British warships stationed 
or calling at the West Coast of South America during the period under research, 
and other with the list of those who commanded British naval forces destined to 
the Pacific. 
British trade in Peru, incipient at the beginning of our research and 
important enough at the closing date, specially as carriers of foreign goods, was 
the main reason for the presence of a British Squadron in the West Coast of South 
America. In the exercise of their function several incidents arose, some concerning 
blockades established without proper forces and some referred to claims presented 
by British merchants against the Peruvian government. 
Until 1824, the senior naval officer in the Pacific was the only British 
authority in this quarter of the world, having to represent and inform his 
government about the countries on the west coast of South America at the time 
when they were fighting for their independence from Spain. Those reports were the 
main means of providing guidance to the British government in decisions on policy 
towards the new republics in South America. They were usually addressed to the 
Secretary of the Admiralty, whose task was to put the matter before the relevant 
authority. ' The Admiralty in this period comprised six or seven admirals, under the 
presidency of the First Lord, who was a politician. After the Napoleonic wars, in 
which French and Spanish naval power were defeated in a decisive manner, this 
group of admirals were in command of the most powerful navy. More than one 
hundred ships, one fourth of the total list, were normally in commission in several 
' Three secretaries were part of the Admiralty during the period covered by our research, 
the First Lord's private secretary, the first secretary, and the second secretary. Usually, 
the correspondence was addressed to and relayed by the first secretary, whose duty was 
to direct each matter to the member of the Admiralty concerned with it. Those first 
secretaries mentioned in this thesis are: H. W. W. Pole (1807-1809), John Wilson Croker 
(1809-1830), G. Elliot (1830-1834). G. R. Dawson (1834-1835); C. Wood (1835-1839); 
and More O'Ferrall (1839-1841). In absence of the first secretary, the correspondence 
was addressed to the second secretary, who was John Barrow from 1807 to 1835 [J. C. 
Sainty (compiler) "Admiralty officials. 1660-1870". O1fice-/folders in modern Britain, 
London, The Atholone Press. 1975, vol. IV]. 
\;. 
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stations around the world, and the other three fourths were keep in "ordinary" or 
reserve. This hemispheric distribution lasted for almost one century, and is usually 
known as the period of the Pax Britannica. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, 
British naval forces were placed in the following stations: Mediterranean, North 
America and West Indies, Pacific, East Indies, China, Australia and Africa. 
In addition to the general function of the Royal Navy, certain ships were 
commissioned under the Hydrographic Office exclusively to make surveys of the 
several seas of the world. Amongst the most remarkable was H. M. S. Beagle, 
Captain Robert FitzRoy, who visited Callao in 1834. The importance of these 
surveys has already been pointed out by scholars both in Britain and Peru, ' and for 
this reason we shall make little mention of them. Similarly, we shall not attempt to 
go deeply into the subject of land expeditions carried out in Peru by Royal Navy 
officers, such as Lieutenants Brand (1827), Maw (1827), Smith and Lowe (1836). 
Primary sources for this subject were basically found at three archives: the 
Public Record Office (quoted onwards as PRO), at Kew Gardens, London, Great 
Britain; the Archivo-Museo "Don Alvaro de Bazän" (quoted onwards as AAB), at 
El Viso del Marques, Ciudad Real, Spain; and the Archivo Histörico de Marina 
(quoted onwards as A. H. de M. ), at Lima, Perü. 
The Admiralty Papers of the PRO are by far the most useful source for this 
research, and to avoid a continuous repetition, we quote these papers as ADM 
followed by the series number. For instance, Admiralty 1, the Secretary's 
Department, in-letters, which contains the correspondence from the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Brazil or South American Station, and afterwards the Pacific 
Station, are quoted as ADM 1. Even when we reviewed entirely this series for the 
period under research, those letters included in R. A. Humphreys and Gerald S. 
Graham's, The Navy and South America (London, Navy Records Society, 1962), 
L. S. Dawson.. Memoirs of'Hidrograpnv. (London. Cornmarket Press. 1969) [1885]. Felix 
Denegri Luna, `'La Republica 1826 a 1851", flistoria afaritima del Perü, (Lima. 
Instituto de Estudios Histörico-Maritimos dei Per-6,1976). 
°: ý. i 
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will be referred in its printed form. Journals and logs kept by admirals, captains, 
lieutenants, and masters of ships serving in the area, were also a valuable source. 
Official records, private correspondence and journals were also abundant, both in 
manuscript or printed form. The most valuable private papers collection is in the 
National Maritime Museum, at Greenwich, London. 
Every reference to a document, along the footnotes, start with the names of 
the signatory and the addressee, followed by the place and the date (day/mon- 
th/year) the document was written. The reference ends with the name of the 
archive where the document is housed. 
A grant given by the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister allowed me to use 
the Spanish Navy archive, the already mentioned AAB, where I found very valu- 
able information for the first part of this research, covering the period until 1821. 
From thence onwards, the A. H. de M. was quite useful, specially for the 
information copied on thick books which were kept by the Peruvian Navy's 
Commander-in-Chiefs Secretary. 
This research has been helped and inspired by earlier works, which despite 
partial treatment of the subject suggest how rich this topic could be. Amongst the 
most important are the volumes written by Jose de la Puente, "La Independencia - 
1790 a 1826", and Felix Denegri, "La Republica -1826 a 1851 ", both for Historia 
Maritima del Perü (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Histörico-Maritimos del Peru, 
1976); the already mentioned R. A. Humphreys and Gerald S. Graham, The Navy 
and South America (London, Navy Records Society, 1962); and Celia Wu, 
Generals and Diplomats, Great Britain and Peru, 1820-40 (Cambridge, Centre of 
Latin American Studies, 1991). Were also valuable Barry Gough's "Specie 
conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico, in British Warships, c. 1820-1870: An 
Aspect of the `Pax Britannica", The iv1ariner'5 Mirror (1983): 419-433; and his 
book Northwest Coast of North America (1810-1914) (Vancouver, University of 
British Columbia Press, 1971); as well as John Bach, "Maintenance of the Royal 
::: -ý 
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Navy vessels in the Pacific Ocean, 1825-1875", The Mariner's Mirror (1970): 
259-273. 
General background was provided by several authors, amongst whom Jorge 
Basadre, Historia de la Republica del Perü (Lima, Editorial Universitaria, 1968), 
remains as the most important Peruvian source. For the British background we 
basically relied on John Lynch, Las revoluciones hispanoamericanas 1808-1826 
(Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 1989); D. C. M. Platt Latin America and the British 
Trade 1806-1914 (London, Adam and Charles Blake, 1972); and several articles of 
W. M. Mathew and Paul Gootenberg. 
I will like to express my gratitude to several historians and naval officers, 
Peruvians, Spaniards and British, as well as librarians and archivist of various 
institutions. Their help was invaluable. My family deserves a very special thanks, 
particularly my wife Nora, and my daughters Dafne and Brenda, whose 
encouragement and patience helped to keep me in this project over the years. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Initial Approaches 
(1808-1816) 
The embarrassing defeat suffered by British forces at Buenos Aires and its 
retirement from Montevideo helped to modify the British government attitude 
towards Spanish America, and from thence onwards it became an official policy 
not to interfere in their affairs. Subsequent transference of the Portuguese Royal 
Family from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, under British naval protection, and British 
alliance with Spain, following the capture of the Spanish Royal Family by 
Napoleön, increased the possibilities to open Spanish American ports to British 
trade, a trade which already existed since late Eighteen Century but only with 
special permission. Moreover, shortly after these changes, Spanish Americans 
began to designate its own authorities, a decision initially taken in the name of the 
absent king but which soon became the first step for independence. But not all 
Spanish America was evolving in the same way. The Peruvian situation was 
different, as Viceroy Abascal fully recognized the authorities established in Spain 
to replace the king, and was unwilling to open Peruvian ports to British vessels. 
His attitude led to some conflicts both with British vessels sailing on the Pacific 
with trade purpose and with the authorities appointed by Cabildos and Juntas in 
other parts of South America. 
From a naval point of view, even before Trafalgar Britain was able to exert 
an efficient control on the sea routes from Spain to America, to a point that trade 
between both sides of the Atlantic was almost non-existent for Spanish vessels by 
1806. For this reason, and due to the influence of some important members of the 
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Spanish bureaucracy, some permissions were given to a few British merchants to 
trade directly with Spanish American ports. During the period covered by this 
chapter, it is possible to distinguish two different moments in naval activity on the 
west coast of America. The first one, 1808 and 1809, saw some actions between 
Spanish and British privateers, unaware that they were already allies. The second 
moment is between 1812 and 1814, when the Pacific became another scenery of 
the war between United Sates of America and Great Britain. Due to the alliance 
between Spain and Britain, the Peruvian Viceroy provided certain facilities to 
British men-of-war arriving at Peruvian ports. 
Framed by this general situation, we are going to analyse the attitude of 
British captains, both in respect of their general naval duties and with regards to 
the Peruvian Viceroyalty. By this way, we should find the first elements who 
served to the British Admiralty to establish a long term policy which was to be 
observed by their captains in respect to Peruvian internal affairs and on the 
protection of their nationals. Particularly important on this issue were the attitudes 
adopted by Rear-Admiral Smith, Captain Fleeming and Captain Hillyar. 
It should be mentioned that during the period covered by this chapter 
(1808-1815), transport of bullion on board British ships from Peruvian ports was 
very limited, since it only became a regular system of shipping back treasure during 
the war of Independence (1816-1824). Moreover, as the main reason of British 
naval presence on the west coast was referred to the war with the United States, its 
logistic aspects were as those squadrons operating in distant waters. This situation 
will change from 1817 onwards, when the protection of British shipping demanded 
a new approach on the deployment of the squadron and the length of time they 
were commissioned to the Pacific. 
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The South American Station 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
Since 1796, following the French Revolution and Napoleon raise, Europe 
had been in permanent war until 1802, when a Peace Treaty was signed at Amiens. 
Fourteen months later hostilities renewed between Britain and France. Soon after 
that Spain, Holland, Italy, Portugal and other continental kingdoms became under 
Napoleon influence, and a Continental blockade was established to any British 
goods or vessel. As a response, Britain declared a general blockade to European 
ports, and deployed its fleet before Brest, Toulon and Cadiz. In 1805 a new 
coalition was made against Napoleon, this time between Britain, Russia, Austria 
and Sweden, but it was almost destroyed within a few months, leaving Britain once 
again alone in its struggle. The naval part of the war was defined by Nelson's 
victory at Trafalgar, October 1805, but despite this fact, in the following two years 
it appeared that continental blockade was about to achieve its goal to ban British 
exports and goods. 
The war will lasted another ten year until the final defeat of Napoleon at 
Waterloo, but in 1807, Britain exporters sought for the expansion of its traditional 
markets: United Stated and "all parts of the world", which include Spanish 
America. Foreign trade with them was forbade by old Spanish colonial laws, but 
British merchants found their way to introduce their goods in that market by re- 
exporting from Spain, or by contraband through the British West Indies and Brazil. 
Conditions to smuggling British goods in Spanish colonial ports had improved 
after the treaty of San Lorenzo ei Real, signed on 27 October 1790 to put and end 
to the incident on the Northwest coast of North America usually known as the 
Noutka Sound crisis. Accordingly, British vessels sailing in Spanish American 
waters were no longer to be considered enemies, provided they restricted them- 
selves to fishing outside a ten leagues limit from the coast. Despite containing an 
explicit prohibition on British ships to enter and sustain trade in the ports of that 
coast, the treaty allowed their entry for refreshments, and for repairs only in case of 
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emergency. Soon after this treaty, the whaling grounds around the Galapagos 
islands began to be visited by an increasing number of British vessels, and from 
1795 onwards by North-American whalers too. As could be easily suppose, their 
presence brought a considerable increase in smuggling along the coast, and 
consequently drastic measures were adopted by the Spanish authorities. ' 
In the case of the Peruvian viceroyalty, its naval defence relied on a small 
number of men-of-war coming from Spain and eventually stationed at Callao. The 
worrying increase of smuggling, towards the end of the century, led the Spanish 
Government to create a small but permanent naval establishment in Peru. 
Therefore, in 1793 one frigate and two brigs were sent to spend their working life 
as coast guards based in Callao, where some facilities to support them were built. 
These vessels, helped by a good number of locally owned privateers and some 
ships commissioned in Peru, were involved in several actions against British ships 
reaching the West Coast of South America after the Treaty of 1790 and during the 
European wars since 1796 until 1809. 2 
In the context of these wars, some plans were made in Britain to open a 
diversionary theatre of war in Spanish America, but for a number of reasons they 
were abandoned until 1806, when a decisive step was given at Rio de la Plata. On 
27 June 1806, Buenos Aires was captured by an unauthorised expedition leaded by 
Commodore Sir Home Popham and General Beresford. For a few weeks the port 
l. - Here we must face a semantic problem. North-Americans or U. S. citizens are commonly 
referred in English as "Americans", however, this terms comprises all those living in 
America. which includes North. Central and South American. This dissertation will 
distinguish between them. refering U. S. citizens as North-Americans instead of only 
Americans. 
A good account of smuggling was recorded in John Nicol, The Life and Adventures of 
John Nicol, Mariner, London, 1937: 153-156. His whaler visited Paita shortly after the 
treaty of 1790 was signed. 
2. - Only one British man-of-war was reported cruising along the West Coast of South 
America during the last part of Napoleonic wars, it was H. M. frigate Cornwallis, 
Captain Charles James Johnstone. who captured a considerable number of vessels [ADM 
51/1777. AAB, Exnediciones de Indias. legajo 41. carpeta 1904: legajo 43, carpeta 1853, 
legajo 44. carpetas 1991 and 16/2/18091. 
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remained open to foreign trade, but by mid-August the British garrison was 
defeated and surrender. Its temporary success was warmly received in Britain, 
moving the government to send reinforcements under General Whitelocke destined 
to the conquest of Chile and to prepare new plans to send other expeditions to 
Venezuela and Mexico, while scores of British merchant vessels departed for 
Buenos Aires. In February 1807, on the arrival of the reinforcements to the Rio de 
la Plata, Montevideo was captured and opened to British trade. Six months later, a 
considerable British force failed in a new attempt to capture of Buenos Aires, being 
forced to abandon Montevideo and to leave a considerable number of prisoners in 
Spanish hands. 
As some scholars had pointed out, one of the reasons of the British failure 
at Rio de la Plata was its lack of a clear policy respect the people of Spanish 
America, who were unwilling to accept a British rule instead of independence. The 
lesson was clear, Britain would only succeed in that continent with a policy of 
emancipation, which will deprive Spain and France of vital resources and provide 
important markets. 4 
That was the general situation in November 1807, when a French army 
invaded Portugal, forcing the Portuguese government to flee from the country to 
avoid capture. Consequently, Dom Joao, the Prince Regent of Portugal, his 
demented mother, Queen Maria I, his wife, Carlota Joaquina, daughter of Carlos 
IV of Spain, and the rest of his family and court, sailed to Brazil in the Portuguese 
fleet. ' The British squadron stationed in the river Tagus, under the flag of Rear 
Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, had to convoy them according to the 
3. - John Lynch. "British Policy and Spanish America. 1783-1808", Journal of Latin 
.1 merican . 
Studies. 1 (1969). U. of Cambrigde: 19-20. 
ý. - Lynch (1969): 21-22. 
5. - The Portuguese fleet, of thirty-six vessels, departed the Tagus on 27 November 1807, 
with almost 15.000 "passengers" on board [Rudy Bauss. "Rio de Janeiro: Strategic Base 
for the Global Designs of the British Royal Navy. 1777-1815" in Craig Symonds (ed. ) 
Vetiv. lspects of Naval History. Annapoiis. Naval institute Press. 1981: 75-891. 
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convention signed between both governments on October 22 of the same year. 
Commodore Graham More was appointed in command of the escorting British 
warships, receiving clear instructions "to protect the embarkation of the royal 
family and to escort them to America (... ) to such port or place in the Brazils as his 
Royal Highness may decide to go to, affording them every aid and assistance in 
,, 6 your power . 
Beyond Madeira island, More would be acting under direct control of the 
Admiralty, being instructed by Smith to deploy his squadron in the best form to 
protect the Brazilian coast against any attempt at attack or invasion by the 
Spaniards or French, coming from Europe or America. He was also commanded to 
support the Prince Regent's government, and "to protect the trade of his Majesty's 
subjects and annoy that of the enemy. " 7 
The Portuguese royal family reached Bahia in January 1808, and on the 
28th Brazilian ports were declared open to the trade of all friendly nations. Shortly 
after this, the Portuguese court was re-established in Rio de Janeiro, and the 
British squadron reinforced with some ships-of-the-line, which arrived at Rio de 
Janeiro on 17 May 1808 under Rear Admiral Smith's flag. His appointment as 
Commander-in-Chief of this squadron was the recognition that a new adminis- 
trative naval unit should be created in Brazil, the Brazils or South America Station, 
especially in a moment in which the British government was about to assemble an 
expeditionary force to attack Spanish Americas 
Smith had made himself a British national hero by his defence of Acre 
against Napoleon, in 1799, having many brilliant qualities as naval officer. In the 
following months Spanish situation became very complicated, with the capture of 
6. - Gerald S. Graham and R. A. Humphreys (editors), The . Vcnw and South America. 
1807-1823. London, Navy Records Society. 1962: 3-4. 
7. - Graham and Humphreys: 3--t. John Barrow, The Life and Correspondence of. ldmiral 
Sir Wiliam Sidney Smith, London. Richard Bentley, 1848.11: 270-278. 
8. - Lynch (1969): 22-23. 
;> 
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the royal family and its change from enemy to ally. Admiral Smith was convinced 
that this change would open South American ports to British trade, and with this 
idea on mind became an enthusiastic supporter of Princess Carlota Joaquina's 
aspirations to the Spanish crown, sending a number of letter to colonial authorities 
at Rio de la Plata, Chile and Peru. By this way he became involved in Spanish 
colonial affairs, interfering with the British Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro's policy. 9 
Smith's attitude was very much in the line of his character, but it deserves a more 
extensive analysis, at least in his approaches to the Peruvian Viceroyalty, since it 
provides a good starting point of the way in which these relations will conducted 
during the next decade, serving as a reference for future Commander-in-chief. 
Just by the time Smith arrived at Rio de Janeiro, the Spanish monarchy was 
overthrown by Napoleon, at Bayonne, and Fernando VII was replaced by Jose 
Bonaparte as king of Spain and the Indies. These outrageous events found an 
immediate response by the Spaniards, and "Juntas" of resistance were formed 
almost all over the country, sending agent to London to request British assistance 
against the common enemy: Napoleon. On 4 July 1808, peace between both 
countries was proclaimed, and British plans to invade Spanish America were 
definitively cancel. In September, a Junta Central was appointed to rule Spain and 
its colonies in the name of Fernando VII. 
Since February 1806 some British merchants were already engaged in a 
licence trade with Spanish America, which according to some authors included 
Peruvian ports. 1° But as soon as Spain became an ally, a significant number of 
British merchants considered that this trade will no longer be in hand of a few 
individuals, and several vessels departed British ports bound for Spanish America. 
In the winter of 1807-1808, eleven of them sailed for Chile and Peru with cargoes 
9. - Barrow, 1: Introduction: II: 281. Graham and Humphreys: 2. Robert A. Humphreys. La 
1farina Real Britänica y la Liberation tie Sudamerica. Caracas, Fundaciön John Button 
y Fundation Eugenio Mendoza, 1962: 10. 
10. - Lynch (1969): 27. 
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valued almost a million pounds. Amongst them was the Vulture, of London, master 
Joseph Christie, with goods worth more than 800,000 dollars, in charge of 
Alexander McClure, as supercargo. ll 
By the time this vessel arrived at Rio de Janeiro, Admiral Smith was 
already in possession of a letter from the Spanish Secretary of State addresses to 
the viceroys of Buenos Aires and Lima and to the Capitän General of Chile, 
instructing them to release any British soldier taken prisoner at Buenos Aires in 
1806. Most of them were already liberated following the agreement signed 
between Buenos Aires Viceroy Liniers and British General Whitelock, on 7 July 
1807, but it was though that a number of them remained in inner towns, and even 
in Chile or Peru. To carry the letters to the other side of the continent, Smith 
appointed Lieutenant William Fitzmaurice, who was to sail on the Vulture, and to 
take back the prisoners on board of the same vessels. 
As far as we know, no British prisoner was sent to Peru in 1806-1807, but 
how aware was Smith of that situation? It is difficult if not impossible to know 
that, but he surely though that it would be an excellent opportunity to initiate 
correspondence with the Peruvian Viceroy in a moment in which several British 
merchant vessels were already sailing around Cape Horn with that destination. As a 
matter of fact, when the Vulture departed Rio for Valparaiso, there was still quite a 
number of British and Spanish privateers fighting each other along the West Coast, 
whose masters were unaware of the alliance treaty between Spain and Britain, 
against the French. For this reason several incidents happened during the second 
half of 1808, involving the capture of both Spanish and British vessels, amongst 
whom was the Vulture, taken by the Cantabria, off Valparaiso, on September 27. 
A few days before, the Spanish vessel Napoleon was captured at Coquimbo by the 
British frigate Scorpion, master Tomas Wane. On October 12, two British vessels, 
I1. Lynch (1969): 29. Graham and Humphreys: 6-7. Jose A. de la Puente Candamo. "La 
Independencia - 1'790 a 1826". Flistoria Uaritima del I'erfr. Lima. Instituto de Estudios 
Histörico-Maritimos dei Peru. 1975.1: 159. 
3 
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frigate Pandur, master Tomas Anderson, and brig Antelope, captured the frigate 
Nueva Castor, master Ramon Goycochea, even when the latter produced a printed 
copy of the peace treaty. On the next day, following a fighting in which the skipper 
was killed, another British vessel named Scorpion was captured, at Pichidanqui, by 
the frigate San Andres, master Jose Medina. 12 Another capture reported in British 
sources was the Warren, but following the Spanish naval report of this capture she 
was a North-American vessel taken in Concepcion, Chile, in February 1808.13 
As could be easily understood, the situation was uneven in the Pacific, and 
to make it even more complicated, in some cases Chilean and Peruvian authorities 
permitted British vessels to trade. That was the case of the Scorpion, who was 
captured and condemned for contraband after being allowed to enter in Valparaiso 
and to receive some cargo on board. '4 
Back to Lieutenant Fitzmaurice's mission, following his arrival at 
Valparaiso on 17 September 1808, he informed the Governor of the recent peace 
and obtained permission to travel to Santiago in company with Mr. McClure. 
Provided with an official permission from the Governor of Valparaiso, the 
vulture's skipper was instructed to cruise off the port, and to send a boat for them 
on the sixth day. A few days later, the Buenos Aires privateer Cantabria entered 
the port, and her master was warned not to attack the British vessel. However, he 
replied arrogantly that the Governor can "command in land what ever he wish, but 
in sea I will act under my own judgement". Saying this, the privateer left the port 
on September 27 and captured the vulture, sailing afterwards to Callao. 15 On the 
12. - Vivero to the Secretario de Marina. Callao 24/11/1808. AAB. Expediciones a Indias, 
legajo 44, carpeta 26/5/1809. 
13. - Vivero to Gil de Taboada. Callao 24/2/1808, AAB. Expediciones de Indias, legajo 43, 
carpetas 1858 & 1860,1° 187. 
14. - John Stoddard Jones, "Historical Study of Anglo-South American Trade, with special 
reference to the Period 1807-25" (Ph. D. Thesis. U. of London. 1934): 131. Smith to 
Pole. Foudrovant Rio de Janeiro. 24/2/1809. and enclosed letters. ADM 1/19. 
15. - Vivero to the Secretario de Marina, 25/10/1808. AAB. Expediciones de Indias, legajo 
44, carpeta 26/5/1809. Some other sources pointed out that the privateer's name was 
Ramoncita, a brig belonging to the Limenian company of Almazza and Arismendi 
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same day, Fitzmaurice and McClure returned from Santiago, presenting an 
energetic protest against the privateer's aggression. After some delay, they 
managed to find a vessel to take them to Callao, where McClure was to try to 
rescue his ship and cargo, while Fitzmaurice continue the second part of his 
mission. 16 The latter's presence in Lima was not recorded in any Peruvian source; 
however, he returned to Rio in 1809, having fulfilled his mission in a way 
satisfactory to Smith. '7 
Shortly after the Vulture departure, Smith gave a more decisive step in his 
aim to open Spanish ports to the British trade, writing letters to Viceroy Liniers, 
from Buenos Aires, and Abascal, from Peru, and to the Captain General of Chile. 
He was convinced that most of the population of these territories were in favour of 
free trade, but were opposed by a small group, "who are averse to all trade or 
intercourse with Great Britain", which could be reduced with the help of Princess 
Carlota Joaquina an by "sending the Portuguese line-of-battle ships, which are 
useless here, round Cape Horn to those coasts under the command of the Spanish 
Prince Don Pedro Carlos, nephew to King Charles IV '. 18 
His point of view respect British involvement in Spanish internal affairs was 
not shared by Viscount Strangford, arrived at Rio as Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary in July, motivating a number of complains against the 
Admiral which finally led to his replacement in 1809. But in September 1808, 
Smith was firmly convinced that British intervention will be absolutely legal, as 
Princess Carlota Joaquina, the only member of the Spanish royal family free at that 
[Puente (1975) 1: 159. Smith to Pole. Foudrovant Rio de Janeiro, 24/2/1809, and en- 
closed letters addressed to Smith, ADM 1/191. 
16. - Puente (1975) 1: 159. 
17. - William Fitzmaurice joined the Navy in 1793. Discharged from the Foudrovant on 4 
July 1808, to carry out his mission on the Vulture. His return to Rio is not registered. 
however, he was positively there in November 1809. on board the Vereida. He would 
remained Lieutenant until his retirement (ADM 9/7: ADM 9/3 1 
18. - Graham and Humphreys: 13. 
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time, would provide the proper authorisation. Since Portuguese approval for this 
project was unlikely to be obtained, the Princess, whose ambitious increased 
proportionally to the problems of her family in Spain, "offers herself to go and 
conciliate parties towards permanent political and commercial arrangements 
between the three countries" (Peru and Chile, with Brazil and Britain). Smith, who 
even acted as intermediary between Carlota Joaquina and her husband, offered his 
own flag ship, the London, "for the conveyance of the princess". 19 
While such a proposal was studied by the Admiralty, Smith found no 
problem at all to write proclamations and letters on behalf of the Princess, sending 
them "from one end of this continent to the other". They reached Peru early in 
1809, a month after the local proclamation of Fernando VII as Spanish King, 
accompanying a letter from Carlota Joaquina. Abascal recorded in his memoirs that 
the Princess was "encouraging this government, high court, archbishop, bishops, 
town council, and many private individuals to maintain their loyalty to her father, 
ignoring his abdication to the first-born", and announced "that Prince Carlos de 
Borbon y Braganza would be appearing in a short time, to rule in the name of 
Carlos IV, during his absence and the absence of the other members of his August 
20 Royal Family". 
The letters were entrusted to Frederick Dowling, master of the Higginson 
Sennior, who was appointed as messenger of Her Royal Highness Cabinet. Loaded 
with goods for more than one million dollars, and furnished with an expressive 
letter from the Princess to the Spanish authorities introducing Dowling to the 
trade, the Higginson Senior sailed for the Pacific in September 1808. Smith was 
hoping that her admission to the trade would "operate as a precedent at this 
19. - Idem: 18-19. 
20. - Jose Fernando de Abascal Y Sousa. _tlemoria 
de Gobierno. Sevilla. Escueia de Estudios 
Hispano-Americanos. 1944.1: 481--182. Vivero to the Secretario de Marina. Callao 
10/2/1809. AAB. Expediciones a Indias, lebajo 44. carpeta 2066. 
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moment of enthusiasm" , 
21 and in this sense he asked Viceroy Abascal to "allow to 
extend here direct trade with his Nation, according to those intimate relations 
recently acquired by the alliance with our Nation". A third letter was addressed to 
Abascal by Fernando Jose de Portugal, secretary of the Princess, and known to the 
Viceroy, also recommending Dowling's trade enterprise. 22 
Smith's enthusiasm found little support either from the Captain General of 
Chile or the Peruvian Viceroy, since none of them allowed the Higginson Senior to 
trade. In Callao, were she arrived in December 1808, Dowling's representations to 
Abascal were rewarded only with a passport to protect his vessel from the Spanish 
privateers on her return to Rio de Janeiro. Despite this offer, Dowling showed 
himself reluctant to leave the port and insisted to be allowed to sell his cargo. He 
was clearly acting against the "Leyes de Indias" and the treaty of 1790, which 
banned any foreign trade with Spanish colonies, and therefore Abascal was fully 
entitle to detain and put to trial the Higginson Sennior charged as smuggler. 
Finally, Dowling was forced to depart Callao by two gunboats. 23 
Even when this attempt to open Peruvian ports to British trade failed, 
Abascal was impressed by Smith's audacity. It was clear that, as happened in 
Buenos Aires, the offer was tempting, since Princess Carlota Joaquina's aspirations 
could not be regarded as totally illegal. Moreover, as certain amount of British 
trade was already allowed, under the regulation of 1806, its increase could be a 
matter of interpretation. Finally, it was out of doubt that such a trade would benefit 
some important members of the local administration. Therefore, why Abascal 
rejected such a proposition? It is out of the scope of the present thesis provide a 
full analysis of the Spanish internal affairs during the last colonial years in Peru, 
21. - Barrow II: 301-302. Graham and Humphreys: 18. 
22. - Abascai 1: 481-482. Graham and Humphreys: 18 
23. - Abascal I: 480-484. Guillermo Lohmann Villena (editor), "Documentaciön Oficial 
Espanola" en Colecciön Documental de la Indepenclencia del Perii (quoted onwards as 
C. D.!. P. ). Lima. Comision National del Sesauicenienaro de la Independencia_ 
1972-1974, t. XXII. vol. L 180-182. 
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however, it seems that Abascal was quite convinced that any concession in this 
sense would debilitate its own condition as Viceroy, representing a king who no 
longer was legally recognized. For this reason, we could agree with Abascal when 
he refers to Smith, at least in this issue, as a men with "a great sagacity and intel- 
ligence in political matters". 24 
However, as already mentioned along previous pages, the Admiral was 
very impulsive and for that reason and due to the capture of several British vessels 
on the West Coast, by early 1809 he wrote to the Admiralty expressing his "wish 
to be authorised and enabled to send two frigates and a sloop-of-war round Cape 
Horn with the precise instructions how far to interfere for the protection of the 
British flag". 25 Moreover, as he feared that French influence in Buenos Aires could 
threaten British interest, he even proposed a new attempt to capture that city. 26 
For all these reasons, Smith was replaced in June 1809 by Vice Admiral the 
Hon. Michael de Courcy, who commanded the Naval Station for the next three 
years. In that time a few incidents arose along the west coast, including the capture 
of some British vessels for smuggling, as was the case of the Cyrus, in November 
1810, but none of them motivates a direct intervention of the Naval Station. Trade 
remain very much the same, with certain amount of British goods entering 
Peruvian ports on neutral vessels "under the protection of passports from the 
constituted sovereignties of Spain", and some bullion sent in return on Spanish 
vessels, under the protection of the Royal Navy. That were the case of the Gerona, 
Crosbie master, with 600,000 pesos, and the Archiduque Carlos, H. S. Moore 
24-- Abascal I: 480-484. 
25. - Smith to Liniers. Foudrovani, Rio de Janeiro. 16/1/1809; enclosed with Smith to Pole. 
24/2/1809. ADM 1/19. 
26 
.- 
Carlos Roberts. Las invasiones inglesas del Rio de la Plata (1806-1807) v la induencia 
inglesa en la indevendencia y organization de las Provincial del Rio de la Plata, 
Buenos Aires. Talleres Grdficos Jacobo Peuser, 1938: 345-353,358-3,59. 
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master, with 4'000,000 pesos on board, with cargo owned by Larrazabal, Menoyo 
& Trotiga Company. 27 
These years were also extremely important for the Spanish colonial system. 
In January 1810, the Junta Central dissolved itself to avoid being captured as the 
French were advancing through Andalucia, appointing a Regency of five in its 
place. They should summon the Cortes, or Spanish parliament, in Cadiz, one of the 
few places still not occupied by the enemy. The Cortes represented all the 
territories under the Spanish crown, including America and the Philippines, and 
therefore deputies from all these places were to be elected and make their way to 
Cadiz. As the Regency was also needing some economic support, they asked for a 
loan from the British government, which will be reimbursed with the public 
treasure sent by the viceroyalties of Mexico and Peru. As a result of this appeal, 
the Regency received half a million dollars, and the British government 
commissioned two warships for the transport of the deputies and treasure from 
America. H. M. S. Baluart was to sail for Nueva Espana, and H. M. S. Standard, 
Captain Charles Elphinstone Fleeming, `8 to Peru and Chile. The latter departed 
Cadiz in April 1811, with some Spanish officers and passengers on board, amongst 
whom was Jose Miguel Carrera, a Chilean who would play a relevant role in the 
independence of his country. If the naval and political part of the expedition will 
remain in hands of Captain Fleeming, the collection of treasure was commissioned 
to Mr. D. Drummond, British Army's quartermaster general for Spain and the 
Mediterranean. He had to ask the Peruvian Viceroy for two or three millions 
dollars in silver which the Regency had promised. Part of this money would be 
27. - William Bennet Stevenson, .4 historical and descriptive narrative of tiventv years' 
residence in South. Imerica, London, Husrt, Robinson, Edinburg, Constable and Oliver 
and Bovd, 1825, III: I20-121. Jones: 143. Admiralty to De Courcv, 22/3/1810, ADM 
2/934: 7-8. 
28. - Fleeming was promoted to Captain in 1794, and appointed to the Standard in April 
1811 [John Marshall. Ronal , Vavv Biograph v. London. Longman, 1823-1830, L 578. 
Pitcairn Jones, "The commissioned officers of the Royal Navy, 1660-1815", P. R. O. J 
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used to repay the British loan and the balance to continue the war in Spain. 
29 The 
Standard receive some cargo from the Spanish government, but also was 
authorised to took on board private owned goods, either from Spaniards or 
foreigners. 3o 
Beyond the fact that the Standard was the first British man-of-war sailing 
as an ally along the Pacific Coast of South America, this voyage is important as it 
was taken as a reference for setting up a guideline for British captains in its relation 
with the newly formed independent governments. Unaware of local complexities, 
Captain Fleeming did not adopted a neutral position in the struggle between 
patriots and loyalist already happening in Chile on his arrival at Valparaiso. 
Following his personal feelings, and probably after Peruvian Viceroy Abascal's 
advise, he wrote a letter addressed to the newly formed independent Chilean 
government compromising himself and Britain as firm supporters of the loyalist 
cause. As could be expected, the Chilean government complained against that 
letter before the British government, Fleeming being disapproved and his case 
refereed as an example of how not to conduct themselves in the conflict between 
Spain and its colonies. 31 For this reason, this voyage deserves a more detailed 
explanation. 
Even before the Standard's reached Valparaiso, Chile and many other 
places in Spanish America adopted self-government as a direct result of the 
problems in Spain. Initially, these juntas were acting in the name of the prisoner 
King Fernando VII, claiming that sovereignty had reverted to the people, and 
29. - Fray Melchor Martinez, 11elnoria histörica obre la revolution de Chile, Santiago, 
Biblioteca Nacional. 1964.1: 263]. Abram Langlas mentions H. M. S. Undaunted as the 
British man-of-war due to sail for Peru. As no mention of this ship had been found in 
any other source, it seems that either Langlas mistook the Standard with the Undaunted 
or the latter was replaced by Fleeming's frigate at some stage before her departure 
[Abram Isaac Langlas "The relations between Great Britain and the Spanish Colonies. 
1810-1812", Ph. D. Thesis. U. of London 1939, chapter III: 241. 
30. - The cargo list was published by the Gaceta del Gobierno de Lima, 7/9/1811. 
31. - De Courcy to Croker. Foudrovant, Rio de Janeiro. 3/3/1812, ADM 1/22. Graham and 
Humphrevs: 72-73. 
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therefore the authority had to came from them rather than from a Junta or Regency 
in Spain. In practical terms, this point of view implied independent government, 
and in the Chilean case a Junta was appointed with that end in view on 18 
September 1810. A few days later, on 2 October, the Junta sent a letter to Admiral 
de Courcy asking him to use force to detain any French vessel coming to the West 
Coast, and "offering him, at the same time, anything in our hands to improve our 
relations". 32 Some weeks later, on 21 February 1811, a further step to 
independence was given when the Chilean Junta decided to open four ports to 
foreign trade, a measure which was regarded as subversive by Peruvian Viceroy 
Abascal. When news of Abascal's reaction reached Chile, the Junta became afraid 
that a military expedition would be prepared against them from Lima. 
Framed by these conditions the Standard arrived at Valparaiso, and on July 
27, Fleeming reported his mission to the newly formed Chilean Congress, and in 
the name of the alliance existing between Britain and Spain, offered the Standard 
to transport deputies and treasure to Spain. After a long debate on the issue, the 
Congress replied in very ambiguous terms, inviting the British Captain to visit 
Santiago to explain his mission in person. As Fleeming refused to left his ship, and 
emphasised the purpose of his visit, the Congress replied that no deputies had been 
elected, and no treasure would be sent to Spain since it was needed to prepare the 
defence of the country against Abascal's expedition. Obviously, both replies were 
highly displeasing to the British Captain, and, firmly convinced that the majority of 
the population were against the new government, he invited Carrera to sail with 
him to avoid such an unsettled country. Fleeming was far to know that Carrera 
would dissolve the Congress few weeks later, in September, to establish himself in 
the government. " 
32. - Martinez 1: 131-132. 
33. - Martinez 1: 264-268. Diego Barros Arana, Historic . lenerai de Chile. Santiago. Rafael 
Jover y otros, 1884-1902, VIII: 362-367. Jose Miguel Cürrera. Diarto de Jose Aliguel 
Carrera. Santiago. Quimaatü, 1973: 20-22. 
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The frigate's arrival at Callao was registered in the official local newspaper, 
in a note which include a long list of goods coming aboard. A few days later, both 
Fleeming and Drummond send introducing letters to the Viceroy. The latter, whose 
main mission was to receive treasure for the repayment of the British loan, offered 
himself to transport private or state owned treasure, and to make any financial 
arrangements with banks in London. His offer was accepted, both by the Viceroy 
and by local merchants, and when the Standard finally departed, she took on board 
some tin and nitrate state owned, 2'516,652 private owned pesos and 410,797 
state owned pesos. Almost 13% of this treasure belonged to the British 
Government as a repayment for the loan given to the Junta Central. 34 The local 
agency of the Real Compania de Filipinas, one of the most powerful Spanish 
shipping companies at the time, collected the treasure at its office in Lima. 35 
During his stay at Lima, Fleeming met Abascal more than once, providing 
him with useful information on Chilean affairs and with a copy of his 
correspondence with that government. When news of the overthrow of the Junta in 
Chile reached Callao, on September 4, Fleeming though that the new rulers were 
loyalist, who would allow him to fulfil his mission. For this reason, and probably on 
Abascal's advice, he wrote a letter to the new government in Chile inviting them to 
maintain their loyalty to the King, and denied any rumours regarding British 
support and interest in the independence of the Spanish colonies in America. In his 
letter, dated October 3, Fleeming pointed out that the British Nation, honouring its 
alliance with the Spanish Nation, would be acting absurdly by "supporting with one 
hand Spanish interests in Europe and ruining with the other the same interests in 
America". To make things even more complicate, Fleeming stated that "England 
considers that the Spanish Americans have not yet reached those indispensable 
34. - Gaceta clef Gobierno de Lima, 2/11/1811. El Peruano, 19/12/1811. Vivero to the 
Secretario de Marina, Lima 31/10 & 30/11/1811. AAB, Expediciones a Indias, legajo 
48, carpetas 29/3 & 29/4/1812. 
35. - Gaceta del Gohierno cie Liina, 7 and 11/9/1811 and 15/10/1811. ". "he Standard was the 
first British Warship who convey treasure from the West Coast of Esc; cenum-, n. 
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conditions which could allow their independence; " considering that such an 
attitude was not the general opinion of its inhabitants. 36 
Despite his gross mistake in get involved in that internal struggle, Fleeming 
was able to describe colonial society in very crude but realistic terms, very much in 
the line of arguments used by Timothy E. Anna on his study of Lima society at the 
time of independence. '' In this sense, Fleeming include the following paragraph: 
"Those called indigenous, have no opinion strictly speaking; and those 
European Spaniards, living in America, show horror to such an idea; the 
American Spaniards, who live and work have the same feelings; and those 
'g half-caste, by inclination, followed the same party". 
On its arrival at Santiago, this letter caused great indignation amongst the 
new Chilean rulers, leaded by Carrera, who were more radical than the junta met 
by Fleeming in July. This letter and the intervention of Captain Hillyar, H. I. S. 
Phoebe, in setting a peace treaty between both parties in 1814, were used in the 
following years to complain against the British policy in respect of the new 
republics in America. It is important to mention that despite Admiralty disapproval, 
Fleeming's career was not affected, and eventually reached the high rank of 
Admiral. 39 It could be difficult to explanation such an attitude, but as far as it was 
impossible to provide him with proper instructions in a issue which was not 
foresaw at his departure from Britain, he could not be blamed on that. 
The war with the United States and the British squadron in the Pacific (1812-1816) 
36. - Barros Arana VIII: 362-367. Gaceta (lei Gobierno de Lima, 15/10/1811. 
37. - Timothy E. Anna. The Peruvian Declaration of Independence: Freedom by Coercion", 
Journal of Latin . Imerican 
Studies. 7 (November 1975), University of Cambridge: 221- 
248. 
38. - Barros Anna VIII: 362-367. Gaceta del Gohierno de Lima, 15/10/1811. 
39. - Marshall 1: 578. Pitcairn Jones, Op. Cit. 
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The lesson learned by the Admiralty after Fleeming's mistake was applied 
with the British squadron sent round Cape Horn to protect British whalers during 
the war with the United States. Nonetheless, his senior officer, Captain Hillyar, of 
H. M. S. Phoebe, became involved in the struggle between loyalist and patriots, 
providing a further lesson to the Admiralty when the latter blamed him for 
misleading their leaders to accept an improper treaty. Obviously, captains sailing to 
the west coast needed a far more precise set of instructions to avoid future 
complains against British neutrality in what was officially regarded as an Spanish 
internal affair. 
The war also provide another set of experience, referred to the operation of 
a squadron in those distant waters, with a limited support offered by Spanish 
colonial authorities. The latter, at once, enforced trade regulations, capturing a 
number of British vessels and motivating an increasing commitment of British 
captains in the protection of their nationals. This situation will worsen from 1816 
onwards, when patriots privateers included new threats to British shipping, but the 
experience gained between 1813 and 1815 helped to provide a line of conduct on 
this sort of issues. 
As part of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain retaliated the continental blockade 
by declaring that any cargo destined for Europe should be landed at British ports. 
This measure mainly affected the fast growing North American shipping, and 
eventually led to an open war between Britain and the United States. This war 
lasted for almost three years, in which basically the Royal Navy blockade the 
enemy ports, while the United States Navy concentrated its effort against British 
shipping. Most of the action was seen on Atlantic waters, but the North American 
presence on Fort Astoria, Columbia River, and basically the U. S. frigate Essex's 
presence on the whaling grounds off the Peruvian coast, moves the British 
Admiralty to send a squadron to the Pacific. 
0 
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By June 1812, the British North West Company bought the Isaac Todd 
arming and fitting her as a privateer destined to support their interests in the 
Columbia territories, requesting support from their government. As a response, 
H. M. S. Phoebe, Captain James Hillyar, 40 was commissioned to accompany that 
privateer and to clear the area of hostile vessels. Secret orders were also issued, 
commanding Hillyar to capture Fort Astoria, and then to form a British settlement 
at the mouth of the Columbia river. 41 
By late-January 1813, before this expedition departed British ports, U. S. 
frigate Essex, 42 Captain David Porter, managed to escape from the continental 
blockade and to sail round Cape Horn into the Pacific, with orders to destroy 
english whalers in the Pacific. Porter quickly established a warm relationship with 
the patriots, specially with the Chilean leader Jose Miguel Carrera, being supported 
by Joel Roberts Poinsett, who had arrived in Chile early in 1812 as the first official 
American consul general to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru. 43 
From mid-April to early-October, Porter raided the whaling grounds, which 
lay between 170 South and the Equator, at a distance of 10 to 100 leagues from 
coast, taking advantage of his unexpected presence and capturing twelve British 
whalers. One of them, the Atlantic, was fitted out as a naval vessel, being manned 
by 60 men, armed with 20 guns, and renamed Essex Junior. `'`` Some of the British 
prisoners were liberated at Tumbes, and within few weeks they were dispersed at 
Guayaquil, Callao and Valparaiso. The notice of the Essex raid and the fate of 
40. - Hillvar (1769-1843) was promoted to Captain in 1804. In command of the Phoebe since 
1810, he participate in several actions (Madagascar. July 1811, and capture of Java). 
Rear Admiral in 1837 [Marshall. Op. citi. 
41. - Admiralty to Hillyar. London, 12/3/1813. ADM 2/1380. 
42. - On her arrival at Valparaiso. on 15 March 1813. the Essex was reported with 40 guns. 
28 twenty four-pounder, and 12 long nines, and 340 men [William S. Dudley, (editor), 
The Aýaval War of 1812. _1 Documentary History. Washington. Naval Historical Center. 
1992: 690]. 
43. - Lawrence A. Clayton. The Eagle and the Condor. The United States and Peru. 1800- 
1995", manuscript version, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1995: 58-59. 
44. - Dudley: 697-699. 
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these British seamen reached Rio de Janeiro within few weeks, specially as some of 
the later were in "the greatest distress" and "in danger of being starved to death". 45 
The Isaac Todd and the Phoebe finally sailed from Portsmouth in March 
1813, and three months later entered Rio de Janeiro. During the voyage, the 
Company vessel showed poor sailing conditions, probably "in part of her being 
badly stowed, heavy masts and rigging and too many guns on her deck". 46 In Brazil 
they were received by Rear Admiral Manley Dixon, who had been appointed as 
Commander-in-Chief in 1812. A man of impulsive temperament, Dixon was to 
encounter problems during his command in South America, one of which was 
linked to this voyage and the subsequent capture of the Essex. As this frigate was 
known to be stronger than the Phoebe, and since the latter's final destination had 
became known by word of mouth from two Company officers, Dixon felt it 
necessary to reinforce Hillyar with two sloops. They were the Racoon, Captain 
William Black, 47 and the Cherub, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, 48 both already 
under orders to sail for the West Coast to protect the whalers. To prevent a total 
loss, the Isaac Todd's cargo was redistributed amongst the other ships, departing 
Rio in July. Dixon's decision to reinforce Hillyar was approved by the Admiralty; 
however, his delay in sending men-of-war to the Pacific was criticised. 49 
Hillyar's instructions, in addition to his main task with the Isaac Todd and 
enemy vessels on the North West Coast, reminded him that the sloops were to 
patrol the whaling ground, but according to the circumstances, he was permitted to 
45. - Dixon to Staines, La Ceres, Rio de Janeiro. 25/3/1814: enclosed with Dixon to Croker 
30/3/1814, ADM 1/22. 
46. - Graham and Hwnphrevs: 9,3-94. 
47. - Black joined the Navy in 1793. He was present during action in Toulon (1793) and lie 
de Groix (1795). Promoted to Captain in 1814, he left the Navy in 1846 [Marshall II: 
426-428]. 
48. - Tucker (1775-1852) joined the Navy in 1793. Commander of the Cherub since 1809, 
was promoted to Captain in 1811. Rear Admiral in 1846 [William R. O'Byrne,. 1 Naval 
biographical Dictionary, London. John Murray, 1849: 1209]. 
49. - Graham and Humphreys: 92-95,98-102. Croker to Dixon, London. 10/8/ 1813, ADM 
2/934. 
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modify the mission of any or both of them. 50 The Company's vessel became 
separated from the squadron just before the Cape, failing to reunite with them at 
Juan Fernandez. Suspecting that she had been captured by the Essex, Hillyar 
decided to continue his original mission with the Racoon and to cruise in search of 
the enemy with his frigate and the Cherub. The three vessels sailed northwards and 
Captain Black parted company off Tumbes, early in October. He was to reach 
Columbia river two months later, just to found that Fort Astoria was already in 
British hands. After a formal ceremony, taking possession of the fort and renaming 
it Fort George, the Racoon sailed to San Francisco, where the Isaac Todd was 
finally met. 51 
The Phoebe and Cherub patrolled the whaling grounds for a while before 
anchoring in the mouth of Tumbes river, where they remained ten days watering 
and completing supplies before returning to their task. 52 There remained patrolling 
the area one further month before heading for Callao, where they entered on 3 
December 1813. Hillyar was to found three vessels at the anchorage, arrested 
under the charge of smuggling. Two of them were British, the Hunter, master V. 
Rapel, captured off Valparaiso, and the whaler Hector; the third was the North 
American Boriska, chartered by the British ambassador in Brazil to buy grain and 
flour "for the use of the combined armies in Portugal". 53 
It was clear that trade could not be legally entertained with colonial ports, 
but as far Valparaiso was declared an open port by Chilean authorities and Britain 
50. - Graham and Humphreys: 98-101. 
51. - Graham and Humphreys: 149. Barry Gough, The Royal Vavv and the : Northwest Coast 
of North America, 1810-1914: A Study of British : Maritime Ascendancy. Vancouver, 
University of British Columbia Press. 1971: 16-24. 
52. - During this time a lieutenant and two men drowned, when the launch in which they 
were sailing up river Tumbes capsized. 
53. - The Hunter was captured by the Vulture or Primer Cantahria, Captain Domingo 
Arellano. The Hector was seized by the brig Santa Teresa, captain Juan Villa. The 
Boriska was captured by a privateer under the command of Domingo de Amezaga 
[Hillvar to Croker, 23/12/1813 and Hilivar to Abascal_ 10/12/1813: enclosed with Dixon 
to Croker, Aquilon, Rio de Janeiro, 16/4/1814, ADM 1/22. Puente (1975) 1: 159 
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and Spain were allies, Hillyar found proper to intervene in the protection of these 
vessels. Following his instructions, which specified that if he found 
"any reprisals to have been made of British Vessels or their Cargoes by 
Spanish Privateers or Guarda Costas, or by the authorities of their Ports 
(... ) You are to inquire the cause thereof and to do your utmost by con- 
ciliation, to have them restored, according to the Laws subsisting between 
the two Nations", 54 
Hillyar wrote a letter to Abascal, on December 10, and talked to him at least twice, 
one on the Phoebe, three days later; and the other one at Lima Palace. The British 
captain was very confident about his intervention, even to write to the Admiralty 
saying that "I have many personal influence with his Excellency", but despite that 
assumption, Abascal restrained himself from interfering by arguing that the ships' 
trial was out of his jurisdiction, under the local Naval Court. To reinforce his 
assertion, Abascal asked Spanish Navy Captain Jose Pascual de Vivero, President 
of that court, to give guarantees of a fair trial, which were provided on the 17th of 
that month. " 
This kind of official response to British captains interventions became the 
general rule in he following years, making difficult to them to go further on their 
claims. However, as the local Naval Court was under the presidency of the 
Commander of Callao Naval Department, its almost invariable failed in favour of 
Spanish naval vessels and privateers. Moreover, even when Callao Naval 
Department had its own jurisdiction, the Viceroy had a great influence on it, and it 
was unlikely that any Spanish naval captain will. act against his will. In general 
terms, this was a fine setting to avoid any political compromise from the Viceroy 
himself. British captains realized that soon, and in the following years several 
54. - Graham and Humphreys: 98-101. 
55. - Hillvar to Croker_ 23/12/1813. Vivero to Hillvar. 17/12/1813. and Abascal to Hillyar. 
16/12/1813, enclosed with Dixon to Croker, : 1qui/on, Rio de Janeiro 16/4/1814, ADM 
1/22. 
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suggestions were made to the Admiralty to put some political pressure to change 
that system. 
But beyond legal frames, it was clear that foreigners were not welcome to 
Peru, especially if they tried to compete with local merchants, represented by the 
powerful Consulado del Comercio. After independence, both groups pressed on 
the Peruvian government to obtain either a protectionism or a liberal policy on 
foreign trade. This struggle will last for several decades, with some up and downs 
in the period covered by this research, until the 1850s, when the latter were able to 
gain enough local support to emerge as the winner of this economic contest. 
56 
Back to the Phoebe and the Cherub, in January 1814 they left Callao for 
Valparaiso, were the Essex and the Essex Junior where finally found. After some 
minor incidents in the anchorage, the British ships sailed and remained off the port, 
to prevent the escape of their enemies. 57 Six weeks later, on 28 March, the Essex 
tried to make her way out of the port, being forced by the British ships to present 
combat still at neutral waters. After a gallant defence, in which casualties were 
severe in both sides, the Essex was defeated. The Essex Junior, neutralised by an 
agreement between Porter and Hillyar, sailed in the following weeks to the United 
States with the prisoners. 58 
The attack of the British men-of-war clearly attempted against Chilean 
neutrality, and according to Captain Porter's journal, the Governor of Valparaiso 
refuse to attend a requested to fire the port batteries in defense of the Essex, but 
promised to interced if she was able to make their way to the anchorage. 59 
Obviously, Captain Hillyar considered far more risky to allow the Essex gaining 
56. - Paul Gootenberg, "The Social Origins of Protectionism and Free Trade in Nineteenth- 
Century Lima", Journal of Latin American Studies, 14 (November 1982), Cambridge 
University: 329-358. 
57. - Graham and Humphreys: 132-133. 
58. - Gough (1971): 17-18. C. S. Forester, The _Vaval 
War of 1812. London, 1957.184-187. 
Graham and Humphreys: 141-142. 
59. - Clav=on, 60-61. 
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open sea than the Chilean reaction. On the other hand, Chilean authorities were not 
willing to get involved in that war, specially against the British, which already were 
their most importan commercial partners. 
By this time, Chile was still under control of the Patriots. Carrera had been 
deposed and the government entrusted to General Francisco de la Lastra, backed 
by the influential patriot leader Bernardo O'Higgins. Abascal's initial hopes were 
for a peaceful settlement of the Chilean affair, however, in January 1813 he 
realized that only military action could succeed in re-establishing the loyalist order 
there. Consequently, a military expedition was sent under Brigadier Pareja. After 
his defeat in Chillan, a second expedition was preparing to sail from Callao, under 
General Gainza, when the Phoebe and Cherub visited that port, in December 18 
During the visit done by Hillyar to the Viceroy, he was asked by Abascal to 
intercede with the Chilean government to avoid further bloodshed. As a similar 
invitation was made by the newly established Chilean government, the British 
Captain went to Santiago to meet General Lastra; and after that, to Talca, where 
General Gainza and the loyalist troops were already present. His negotiation ended 
when both generals subscribed to the treaty of Lircay, in May 1814. By this treaty, 
most of the conditions before February 1810 were re-established in return for 
accepting some autonomy for Chile and open trade. However, as the Patriots in 
Chile were already involved in a civil war, between Carrera and O'Higgins, and the 
loyalist troops were to be withdrawn from that territory, Abascal repudiated the 
treaty and sent more troops under Brigadier Mariano Osorio. Finally, the Patriots 
were defeated in Rancagua, 1-2 October 1814, and the colonial order was 
restored. Without foreseen how little effect Lircay' s treaty would have, Hillyar left 
Valparaiso for Rio de Janeiro late in May, sailing in company with his prize. 60 
60. - Abascal II: 174-175. Graham and Humphreys: 141-143. Ricardo Montaner Bello, 
Ilistoria Diplomätica de la Independencia de Chile. Santiago. Editorial Andres Bello. 
1961: 20-21. German Leguia y Martinez. Ilistoria de la Einancipaciön clef Peril: el 
Protectorado, Lima, Comisiön Nacional del Sesquicentenano, 1972,1: 237-240. 
Martinez II: 223-225. 
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Hillyar's intervention in the Chilean conflict and the settlement obtained in 
Lircay, was then recognized both by the Viceroy and by the Chilean government, 
as well as the British one. However, when in 1818 Chile reached a definitive 
independence, its new government accused Hillyar of inducing their previous 
leaders to accept a treaty with conditions which were contrary to their principles. 61 
Having fulfilled his mission and captured his main opponent in the Pacific, 
Hillyar returned to Rio de Janeiro, while Captain Tucker, of the Cherub, sailed to 
Callao in April and afterward to the Sandwich Islands, where he remained for two 
months searching for enemy vessels, before returning to Valparaiso. 62 
Meanwhile in Britain, the news of the Essex cruise on the Pacific had 
produced a strong reaction from those involved in the Southern whale-fishery. 
Pressure was put on the Admiralty for more protection, and therefore, in 
November 1813, Admiral Dixon was commanded to send round the Cape two 
additional frigates and one sloop, with this sole object. The Tagus, Captain Philip 
Pipon, 63 was the first to be sent to the Pacific, reaching Valparaiso in April 1814. 
She was followed, one month later, by the Briton, Captain Sir Thomas Staines. 64 
These two ships were to relieve Hillyar's squadron "for the protection of 
the southern whale-fishery", patrolling the same area all around the year except in 
March and April, when the grounds move south and eastwards (laying between 38° 
S to 48° S and from 10 to 50 leagues off shore). Both captains were instructed to 
take fresh supplies and water from western ports, and a special mention was made 
to take every care not to get involved in political affairs. They also were to give 
61. - Croker to Dixon. London, 26/9/1814. ADM 2/934.. 4rchivo de don Bernardo O'Higgins. 
(quoted onwards as O'Higgins), Santiago. Archivo Nacional, 1946-1953, III: 48. 
62. - Graham and Humphreys: 147-148. ADM 51/2206. 
63. - Pipon joined the Navy in 1792. Captain since 1808, commanding the Tagus, and in 
company with the Niger, he captured the French frigate C. res, off Cape Verde Islands 
[Marshall Sup. 11. 
64. - Staines (1', 76-1830) joined the Navy in 1790. Captain in 1806 (Marshall Sup. 11. 
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assistance to those British seamen landed by Captain Porter in several American 
ports. 65 
In Valparaiso, first the Tagus and later the Briton, found the Phoebe and 
her prize, sailing for Callao in June. At a request of the Chilean government, and 
considering that such an attitude will not compromise British neutrality, they took 
"on board a number of the Loyalist party, who had been prisoners in Chile". This 
was the first British intervention in exchange of prisoners during the wars of 
independence. In most of these sort of cases they were regarded by both parties as 
an humanitarian task, but eventually this exchange was used by one of them to take 
advantage from the other, placing British captains in an embarrassing situation. We 
will came back to this issue latter on, when dealing with Peruvian independence 
itself. 
The Tagus and the Briton had a pleasant ten days stay at Callao, receiving 
"frequent visits from the Limenians" and making "frequent parties to the great 
city". Having completed supplies for a long cruise at the whaling grounds, both 
men-of-war departed Callao by late-June. After calling in northern ports, they 
sailed westwards, to Otaheti and Marquises Islands. On their way back to 
Valparaiso, they struck in Pitcairn Island, discovering there the last survivor of the 
Bounty's mutineers. At the Chilean port, they found the Cherub and the Racoon, 
as well as fresh instructions from Admiral Dixon, commanding Captain Staines to 
remain in the Pacific pending new orders, rather than return to the Atlantic after 
the six month period initially stated. 66 
The Racoon, after meeting the Isaac Todd in San Francisco, visited New 
Albion, the Sandwich and Society Islands, and finally arrived at Callao in August 
1814. She was to remain forty days at this port, receiving supplies, naval stores and 
65. - Dixon to Staines: enclosed with Dixon to Croker. La Ceres Rio de Janeiro, 30/3/1814, 
ADM 1/22. Graham and Humphreys: 128-129. 
66. - Graham and Humphreys: 147-148. ADM 51/2184. john Shillibeer, .1 : Narrative of the 
Briton's voyage to Pitcairn 's Island. Lon: on, Law & Wittaker, 1817: 222-23. 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
repairing her hull with the help of carpenters and caulkers from the Naval Station, 
"to proceed round the Cape during the summer months". On her way to Rio de 
Janeiro, the Racoon entered Valparaiso to receive some bullion to be convoyed to 
Britain. 67 
By late-November, the Briton and the Tagus departed Valparaiso for 
Callao, to be closer to the whaling grounds and to make some repairs with the help 
of the Naval Station. They remained at this port for almost two months, time 
enough for their officers to establish good relationships with Limenians, specially 
with the ladies, as the relevant accounts pointed out. Regarding this point, should 
be mentioned a funny incident involving two young officers of the Briton, who 
were detained when attempting to pay a nocturnal visit to Miss Ramona Abascal, 
the Viceroy's daughter. On the other hand, in a more serious aspect, another 
officer of the Briton, Lieutenant Shillibeer, bought a bundle of documents 
belonging to the Inquisition. It seems that the seller was William Bennet 
Stevenson, an Englishman who lived in Lima since 1804, and when a mob sacked 
the Inquisition in 1812, he bough some documents taken from its archives. These 
papers contained "chiefly allegations against the Friars for libertinism, and 
immorality, and even of offering violence to women to when they had been called 
as spiritual confessors". 68 
The last vessel to be commissioned to the Pacific in this time was the 
Indefatigable, Captain John Fyffe, 69 who reached Valparaiso by Late-January 
1815. As very little enemy activity was expected, she remained as the sole British 
man-of-war on that coast until January 1816. The Indefatigable visited Callao 
twice, in June and September. On her first arrival at that port, the local Spanish 
67. - Black to Croker. Racoon. Lima. 30/8/1814: enclosed with Dixon to Croker. Cherub, Rio 
de Janeiro, 24/12/1814, ADM 1/22. Staines to Dixon, Briton, Valparaiso. 9/11/1814. 
ADM 1/22. ADM 51/2765. 
68. - Stevenson 1: 229-230,268-270. Shülibeer: 126-127. 
69. - Promoted to Captain in 1807 [Marshall. Op. Cit. I 
`ý 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
authorities learned that the government of Buenos Aires had commissioned up to 
four privateers (Hercules, Ospot, Constitution and Trinidad), to cruise on the 
West Coast. On her second visit, after being patrolling the whaling grounds, Fyffe 
obtained some supplies and local support to have her hull caulked. 70 
The war with United States had already ended more than a year before by 
the treaty of Ghent, signed on 24 December 1814. Since Britain no longer had a 
reason to keep a man-of-war on the West Coast of America, and since the trade in 
that region was not fully allowed, no relief was sent for the Indefatigable. The 
small number of British merchants still trading in Valparaiso, after the defeat of the 
Patriots, complained about that decision, feeling that the privateering campaign 
inaugurated by the Buenos Aires government could affect their interest. However, 
their appeal found no response. 71 
The period that closed with Fyffe's withdrawal had comprising several 
important situations in the West Coast of South America. An international war was 
fought in these waters; the first Chilean attempt to became independent failed to 
resist the reaction of Abascal; and the Patriots from Buenos Aires were sending 
forces through Alto Peru, and preparing a privateer campaign against the Peruvian 
Viceroyalty. The latter, under the strong hand of Abascal, remained as the 
cornerstone of the Spanish colonial system in South America, sending forces to 
fight the Patriots to almost everywhere. However, the next few years would 
involve substantial changes in that situation. They began in December 1815, with 
the Buenos Aires' privateering campaign, followed by General Jose de San Martin 
campaign in Chile, initiated in January 1816. The final defeat of the Loyalist, in 
Chacabuco, in February 1817, would allow the return of British trade to Chilean 
ports, and therefore an increasing importance of Valparaiso, which soon became 
70. - ADM 51/2463. 
71. - Marshall Supplement: Staines. 
as 
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the busiest port on the West Coast. With this expansion of British interest, under 
the stress of privateers from both parties, it was only a matter of time before 
British warships were again commissioned in the Pacific. 
In a broad sense, the period covered since the creation of the South 
America Station until January 1816, shown a growing but still incipient British 
commercial interest on the West Coast. The Admiralty's response to it was to 
commission a squadron to operate on the Pacific to protect their whaling-fishery 
during the war with the United States. Rear-Admiral Smith and Captain Fleeming's 
intervention in internal South American affairs provided a valuable lesson to the 
Admiralty, who from thence onwards provide more precise instructions to those 
captain send round Cape Horn to serve on the Pacific. The case of Captain Hillyar 
was rather different, since he acted by invitation of both parties. But the reaction of 
the Chilean government after 1818, prevented other British captains to adopt such 
a degree of personal commitment. 
British captains interventions on protecting British vessels captured by 
colonial authorities were totally unsuccessful during this time, but this result could 
not be blamed to them, as Viceroy Abascal was determined to enforce existing 
legislation, which clearly forbade any foreign trade. In the next few years, the 
attitude adopted by colonial authorities became more permissive, and consequently 
British captains succeeded on their claims. 
'r) 
CHAPTER TWO 
The War of Independence 
(1816-1826) 
The struggle for Peruvian independence came trough several moments in 
respect of its maritime aspects. Initially, patriots from Rio de la Plata and Chile 
armed a privateering campaign against Peruvian maritime trade. This menace was 
considerably increased when the newly constituted Chilean Squadron gained 
control of the western coast of South America. Finally, while the military campaign 
was conducted in Peruvian territory, a national squadron was formed to finish with 
any loyalist resistance on the sea. 
In this context, and taking into consideration the growing number of 
neutral vessels aiming to sustain trade with loyalist or patriots, both sides 
established a number of blockades upon the coast controlled by the opposite. In 
general terms, these measures were far from the normal usage on European 
maritime war, and consequently a number of incidents arose with neutral vessels, 
most of them British. 
The South American Naval Station sent a squadron to the Pacific shortly 
after the final liberation of Chile, with clear and precise instructions not to 
compromise British neutrality in the war between Spain and its colonies. Beyond 
those difficulties related to operating a naval force without a base facility, there 
were a number of reasons which make this task more complicated. We are going to 
analyse them later in the text, but in general terms we can identify the following 
ones: 
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a) For most of this time, British captains were the sole British authority 
along the West Coast of America, and therefore had to exert a great 
deal of autonomy, some times beyond the instructions given by the 
Commander-in-Chief; 
b) During the war, the patriot party gained esteem amongst British naval 
officers and, in spite of incidents with Lord Cochrane and some other 
former British naval officers in the patriot service, they began to 
support the patriots with some secrecy; 
c) The attitude of local authorities changed accordingly to the 
development of the war; 
d) The number of naval vessels destined to the Pacific was not enough to 
satisfy the increasing demands of protection first from British 
merchants and afterwards from consular agents; 
e) Transport of bullion represented a temptation not only for British 
captains but also for British and local merchants to act illegally; 
f1 Finally, during this period, two former enemies, the United States and 
France, sent naval squadrons to be stationed on the Pacific for the 
protection of their national interest. 
Privateers in the South Pacific (1816-1818) 
San Martin's triumph over the royalists at Chacabuco, on 12 February 
1817, albeit not decisive, brought many important changes to the West Coast of 
South America. With central Chile liberated, and the defeated Spanish army under 
siege in Talcaguano and Concepcion, a government was established in Santiago 
with Bernardo O'Higgins as Supreme Director ad interim. Amongst the first 
measures adopted by his government, were the re-opening of Chilean ports to 
foreign trade, bringing to Valparaiso an increasing number of British ships. Initially 
from Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, and later directly from England, they began 
to arrive, glutting the port's stores "with every description of goods and wares". ' 
The Chilean economy, as O'Higgins and San Martin clearly understood, 
relied basically on this trade, and every effort was to be made to kept it running. As 
long as the Spanish squadron based in Callao was in control of the sea, those 
72. - Samuel Haig, Sketches of Buenos . 
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vessels engaged in the trade were under threat; consequently, it became absolutely 
necessary to built up a navy capable to protect the trade. Moreover, both patriot 
leaders also realized that it was necessary to destroy the loyalist stronghold in 
South America to avoid any further reaction and to secure the already achieved 
independence. In this sense, the Chilean Navy-to-be should also defeat the Spanish 
squadron and support the subsequent landing of an army in Peru. The weakness of 
the Spanish Navy after Trafalgar would help this achievement. It was only a matter 
of time, as one of the commissioners who visited South America on behalf of the 
United States government between 1817 and 1819 stated, "Peru must soon follow 
the condition of Chile, the power of Spain once annihilated in this quarter, can 
never be restored; she can only send troops round Cape Horn (an enterprise 
beyond her strength)". -3 
As happened in 1811, as soon as the news of Chacabuco reached Lima, the 
Peruvian Viceroy decided to fight back Chilean independence once again, this time 
by focusing his effort to annoy the Chilean economy, based almost solely on 
foreign trade. As already mentioned, it only could be protected by the naval force 
which the Chilean government had to build up very quickly, but in the meantime 
something had to be done. As most of that trade was carried by British vessels, San 
Martin considered that he could obtain a certain degree of involvement from 
Commodore William Bowles, '' senior officer of the British South America Station, 
who knew San Martin from his previous two-year service in Rio de la Plata 
(1813-1814). For this reason, a few days after the battle of Chacabuco, he wrote a 
friendly letter to Bowles, inviting him to came round the Cape to discuss some 
important points, and stating that "an interview between us would contribute very 
much to the welfare of this country, and I hope if it is in your power we shall have 
73. - Henry Marie Brackenridge. South America. _4 
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one". Moreover, San Martin suggested "that some British ships-of-war should 
come to these seas, as much for the protection of your commerce as for the 
advantages which would result from their presence". 75 
Quite aware that such an attitude would affect British neutrality, Bowles 
replied very politely to San Martin, letting him know that it was impossible for him 
to depart Rio de la Plata at that moment. In the following months, a number of 
British merchant vessels were detained by Spanish naval vessels and privateers, 
convincing Bowles that the West Coast was likely to became a very unsafe place 
for British shipping. However, he was unable to sail round the Cape until the 
second half of the year, when additional men-of-war would arrive at the Station. 
Meanwhile, Bowles' action was restricted to explaining to the merchants involved 
the risk in this trade and his own limitations to provide assistance if required. 
Despite his advice, by late May "several valuable English ships have nevertheless 
been dispatched for Valparayso". 6 
As was expected by the newly established Chilean government, on 15 
March 1817, Peruvian Viceroy Joaquin de la Pezuela retaliated by proclaiming a 
blockade of all the ports in Chile and Peru, except Colan, Callao and the island of 
Santa Maria. Pezuela had three main maritime problems: the blockading itself 
against the Patriots in Chile; the defence against privateers from Buenos Aires and 
Chile; and finally, the control of the illegal trade, mainly carried out by British and 
North American vessels. 
The Spanish squadron at Callao, already engaged in the pursuit of enemy 
privateers and in the transport of troops to Arica and Talcaguano, consisted of five 
vessels, as follows: 34-; un frigate Venganza, 34-gun frigate Esmeralda, 26-gun 
sloop Sebastiana, 16-gun brig Potrillo, and 18-gun brig Pezuela. They were 
75. - Graham and Humphreys: 191. 
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clearly too small a number to cover all that extended coast properly. Economic 
reasons contributed to making their task more difficult, and only after a long delay, 
Captain Tomas Blanco Cabrera, with the Venganza, the Potrillo, and the 
Sehastiana, was able to leave Callao to blockade Valparaiso. On his arrival there, 
late in October 1817, six months after the blockade had been proclaimed, he found 
that a large number of foreign vessels, principally British, were already at the port. 
Amongst the ships lying in the anchorage was H. M. S. Amphion, with Commodore 
Bowles on board, who had finally been able to came to the West Coast. Despite 
Blanco's efforts to carry out his mission, in the following days four British mer- 
chant ships entered and another three left the port, without being able to intercept 
them. '' His only success during these days was the capture of the Mary Ann, with 
some compromising papers on board. " 
The third problem which Viceroy Pezuela had to cope with, was 
contraband. As the available Spanish naval force was insufficient to prevent it, new 
regulations, published on 6 November 1817, authorized the use of privateers for 
this purpose. Both the blockade and the use of privateering to enforce revenue 
laws deserves a more detailed analysis. 
In the first case, Pezuela was blockading not only enemy ports but also his 
own ports, giving no official notice of this measure to foreign countries since it was 
considered an internal affair and no foreign trade was allowed there. These were 
the reasons outlined by Pezuela to Bowles on his arrival at Callao, in November 
1817. Bowles' reply was cautious but energetic, pointing out that the issue would 
be forwarded to his government, and asking for a reasonable period of grace for 
those vessels coming from Europe. He argued that British ships, in spite of Spanish 
legislation, should be allowed to trade with Chile, since the ports of that country 
were already open to foreign trade. To illustrate his complaint, he argued that the 
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Mary Ann, was detained "upon no pretence that I can understand, except that she 
was attempting to enter a port in Chile the blockade of which had not at that time 
been either declared or notified". 8° This argument contains a tacit recognition of 
Chilean independence, and it reflects, to some extent, the Admiralty's point of view 
concerning British commerce in the Pacific. Nevertheless, as Bowles realized that 
the main issue was not the blockade itself, but the "Leyes de Indias" (Spanish laws 
concerning its colonies in America), he refrained from "venture on debating 
without positive instruction" from the Admiralty. " Some months later, at 
Valparaiso, Bowles reached a provisional agreement with Captain Blanco Cabrera, 
Senior Officer of the Spanish blockading squadron. According to it, British 
merchant vessels "shall not be molested, but are merely to be warned off, agreeably 
to established custom, and considered at full liberty to proceed for any other 
destination", " The circumstances in which this agreement was reached will be 
explained later on, but at this stage it should be mentioned that, despite being 
disapproved of by Viceroy Pezuela, it provided a couple of months of tranquillity 
for British shipping heading to the West Coast of South America. 
Despite the insistence of Britain, and the eventual permission given to some 
merchants, Spanish American ports remained officially closed to foreign trade. As 
the Patriots succeeded in other parts of the continent, opening more ports to 
foreign shipping and fitting out privateers to destroy the seaborne trade based in 
Callao, the Peruvian economy became isolated. Consequently, a more liberal 
interpretation of the "Leyes de Indias" became necessary to avoid a total collapse, 
and finally Callao was opened discreetly to foreign trade. However, when Bowles 
reached this port, Peruvian shipping was still unaffected and therefore the 
prohibition of foreign trade was enforced with great energy. Less than one year 
later, the situation would be rather different. 
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In respect to the use of privateers to enforce revenue laws, it should be 
taken into account that merchant vessels could be commissioned as naval vessels 
only in time of war and to fight with another power. Bowles also realized that and, 
without complaining to Pezuela, informed the Admiralty. 83 Despite these 
considerations, it became clear that Pezuela was adopting the only possible course 
of action, since its own restrictions to establish a proper blockade encouraged 
illegal trade. On the other hand, smuggling was not only a threat to the legal trade 
but was also helping the spread of liberal ideas through books and proclamations. 
As was already mentioned, Bowles finally entered Callao in November 
1817, finding at the anchorage four British ships under arrest. Two of them, the 
Justinian, Thomas Patrick owner and master, and the Will, F. Heartley master, 
sailed from Buenos Aires to Valparaiso, late in 1816, on the strength of a royal 
order issued by the Spanish King two years before, on 3 September 1814, 
"authorising Spanish loyalists in a rebellious colony to proceed with their property 
by any possible means to a loyal colony". " Furnished with a letter from Bowles to 
Field-Marshal Francisco Marco del Pont, Spanish President of Chile, the Justinian 
entered Valparaiso with a single Spanish passenger and more than 200,000 dollars 
worth of goods. As four North American vessels were allowed to land part of their 
cargo prior to the Justinian's arrival, Patrick was also authorized to discharge. 
Unfortunately, before this could be completed, news of the defeat at Chacabuco 
reached the port, which was soon involved in great confusion, with troops and 
loyalists fleeing from the patriot's advance. In these circumstances, the Justinian 
was confiscated, and sent to Callao with evacuee troops, reaching this port on 9 
March 1817. Her case was brought to the Prize Court, as having entered 
Valparaiso with the main purpose of trade, but on 1 May, before the sentence 
could be proclaimed, she was sold and armed as a privateer. To make Patrick's 
83. - Graham and Humphrevs: 218. 
84. - Graham and Humphreys: 2: 5. 
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situation more complicated, the cargo landed at Valparaiso, valued at 202,008 
dollars, was confiscated by the patriots on entering the port. " 
The Will, F. Heartley master, furnished with a similar letter from Bowles to 
Marco del Pont, reached Valparaiso on 1 January 1817 with eight Spaniards on 
board. Nevertheless, it seems that the master landed part of his cargo without 
proper permission, and consequently the ship was arrested a few days later. 
Heartley and his crew were landed and the ship used as powder depot from 25 
January until the evacuation of the port after Chacabuco. On 1 March, she entered 
Callao with 250 evacuee troops on board. Heartley managed to reach Callao in a 
French merchant vessel, and after forty-five days of complaint and representation, 
was allowed to come on board to attend to the maintenance of the ship. 36 
The other two British ships found by Bowles at Callao were the already 
mentioned Mary Ann of London, master Edward Hadaway; and the whaler Hydra 
of Plymouth, master Laban Russell. The former had been captured by the 
Venganza, on 24 October 1817, when she tried to enter Valparaiso. Officially, the 
Mary Ann was bound for New Holland, but papers on board identified Valparaiso 
as her real destination. Sent to Callao, she was condemned and her cargo sold for 
89,134 pesos, for attempting to "to enter Valparaiso without an urgent cause, and 
having goods on board". " The Hydra was captured at Tumbes river, where she 
entered to buy supplies after being at sea for more than five months. Following the 
usual practice of British and North American whalers fishing in the Galapagos 
grounds, the master paid for his provisions with some old clothes, old iron, oil, 
11 slop clothes (... ) earthen ware" and other trifling goods. Unfortunately for him, he 
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was denounced, and his vessel was captured by the privateers Cleopatra and 
Tagle. The crew was taken on board the privateers and the Hydra was sent to 
Callao, arriving on 25 October. At this port, the Tribunal de Presas ordered her 
release on 16 December, but all the money and goods on board which could not be 
proved to have come from Britain were confiscated. Russell, the master, declared 
that 20 doubloons in fold, and 533 dollars in silver, were the balance in his favour 
of the goods he sold at Tumbes, but 2,113 dollars, and 23 watches, were also 
found on board. 88 
Bowles interceded for the first two of these ships, succeeding with the Will, 
which was finally returned to her owner on 17 January 1818, after being partially 
repaired and allowed to take some cargo on board as compensation. 39 The 
circumstances in which the other two vessels had been captured deprived them of 
Bowles' protection, as he realized that they had been acting unlawfully. These 
kinds of problems would increase in the following months, with some British 
skippers trying hard to trade with local merchants, while Spanish authorities 
enforced colonial laws, which banned such a trade. Strictly speaking, the latter had 
the right to detain any unauthorized neutral vessel attempting to trade along the 
western coast of South America, however, some failures on the establishment of 
blockades and on the procedures following the detention of a British vessel, would 
allow British captains to intervene. In these cases, they would conduct themselves 
very much in the line of Bowles in 1817, considering first if they were not acting 
against current legislation. 
This legislation ascertained that any vessels detained under suspicion of 
contraband or by violating a blockade, should be judged by the Prize Court. As 
88. - Pezuela to Bowles, 25/11/1817 and Hvcra's case: enclosed with Bowles to Croker. 
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head of a maritime department, comprising the West Coast of South America, 
Callao housed that local version of the Admiralty Court. This tribunal differed from 
British courts in its composition, being under the presidency of the Commander of 
the Naval Station and was composed of naval officers rather than lawyers. Their 
decision had to be submitted for approval to the Viceroy, and therefore it was 
affected by many external elements. When a foreign vessel became involved in a 
trial, very few lawyers offered their services to defend it, and even when one was 
finally accepted by the Court, he was subject to much pressure to act according to 
due form. As foreign trade was forbidden in Spanish America, no consular agent 
was present at Peru, and only two Britons were living in Lima at that time. Bowles 
realized that, reporting to the Admiralty that "the masters of the vessels, alike 
ignorant of the language and laws, suffer themselves to fall into the hands of de- 
signing persons, who betray them into declarations of which advantage is then 
taken for their ruin". 90 He considered that the main reason for this unfair treatment 
by the Tribunal was the generalized animosity to foreigners in Peru, and suggested 
to the Admiralty, that some pressure should be put on the Spanish government for 
"the amelioration of the Spanish prize courts, and -for- the establishment of some 
commercial agent" in Lima. " 
On his arrival at Callao, Bowles was taken on board the Amphion Sergeant 
Major Domingo Torres, as an emissary of San Martin and O'Higgins to Pezuela. 
He also carried two letters addressed to the Viceroy by both the Patriot leaders. In 
this way, he was the first British captain to use his vessel to transport emissaries or 
messages from one side to the other, a policy which was also followed by North 
Americans and eventually French Captains. It is difficult to say whether he was 
compromising British neutrality with such an attitude, as far as it could be expected 
from a neutral power, however, as happened in this particular case, most of these 
90. - Graham and Humphreys: 216. 
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emissaries used neutral warships to conduct intelligence activity. Were British, 
North American or French captains already aware of such a situation? It is difficult 
to provide an answer to this question, but as far as British captains became more 
sympathetic to the patriots, it could be suspected there was a certain degree of 
complicity. 
The Amphion arrived in Callao at the time when General Osorio's 
expedition was preparing to sail to attempt the reconquest of Chile, Pezuela 
became suspicious of Torres' presence and Bowles' well-known friendly 
relationship with San Martin. For this reason, Bowles was asked to either remain in 
port for a fortnight after the departure of the expedition, or to leave within 24 
hours. Taking into account the purpose of his mission, Bowles decided to remain 
in port. Pezuela, whose suspicion of British support for the Patriots was 
increasingly strong, distrusted Bowles' promise and ordered the Governor of 
Callao to prevent his escape by use of the artillery of the forts if necessary. On the 
other hand, Torres was confined to the fort of Santa Catalina, in Lima, to prevent 
him making contact with local Patriots. However, he succeeded in this part of his 
mission, and returned with valuable information for San Martin concerning the 
expedition which was being prepared to liberate Peru. 9- 
Fulfilling Bowles' promise to Pezuela, the Amphion only set sail for 
Valparaiso on December 19, ten days after General Osorio's expedition left Callao. 
On board was Sergeant Major Torres, who would be transhipped to the Spanish 
man-of-war Venganza, since Pezuela insisted on the most strict respect for the 
blockade for part of the Amphion, to a point that both captains had to agree to land 
"one launch manned by British and Spanish seamen to pick up one officer and 18 
sailors, who were landed as sick at Valparaiso". 93 All these precautions failed when 
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no Spanish naval vessel was found sustaining the blockade at the arrival of the 
Amphion, having been called by the Governor of Talcaguano to help in the defence 
of that place. Feeling that this circumstance liberated him from the promise made 
to the Viceroy, Bowles entered the port. As the Spanish squadron reappeared off 
the port a few days later, the very day when San Martin was visiting his ship, 
Bowles was placed in a difficult dilemma, having to choice between leaving the 
port "appearing to abandon the British trade which looked up to me for 
protection" or remain "infringing the acknowledged rights of a belligerent power". 
He decided to remain. Two weeks later, the second U. S. man-of-war entering the 
Pacific, frigate Ontario, Captain James Biddle, arrived from Rio de Janeiro with 
judge John B. Prevost, a special agent of the U. S. government appointed to Chile 
and Peru. Prevented from entering the port by Captain Blanco Cabrera, Biddle 
replied that he was unaware of the blockade and, even when this measure already 
existed, neutral warships should not be included on it. Stating that he departed Rio 
de Janeiro with the full-knowledge of the Spanish Consul General at this port, and 
that his orders were to sail to Valparaiso and Callao to protect North American 
shipping along the West Coast, Biddle refused to accept the blockade for United 
States warships and made clear his intention to use force if necessary. Blanco, 
placed in the difficult position of either giving concessions or replying to Biddle's 
arrogance by force, and taking into account Pezuela's instructions dated 10 
December 1817, which clearly mentioned not to compromise both nations, allowed 
the frigate to enter the port. 94 
Bowles, learning of this incident, met Blanco on 30 January 1818, asking 
for similar a concession for British warships. The latter, after an amicable 
conference, and feeling himself forced by his first decision, agreed that British men- 
of-war "might enter and sail freely" from Valparaiso. " It is interesting to point out 
94. - Blanco to Vacaro. [tenganza, Valparaiso. 2/2/1818: enclosed with Vacaro to Secretario de 
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that Blanco was aware of Bowles' compromise with the Viceroy, since a packet 
boat dispatched by the latter arrived at Valparaiso a few days ahead the Amphion. 96 
Being already aware that the detention of British merchant vessels was "not 
for attempting to infringe the blockade of Valparaiso, but for undertaking a voyage 
prohibited by the Spanish colonial laws", Bowles asked Blanco Cabrera for an 
additional concession. Arguing that no official notice was given before October 
1817, "many English ships had been encouraged by the absence of any prohibition 
of this nature to sail with valuable cargoes for the ports of Chile", and 
consequently they should not be liable to detention. Taking into account Pezuela's 
instructions regarding foreign shipping, which clearly expressed not to detain any 
vessel unless war contraband was found on board, Blanco Cabrera accepted not to 
detain them but to warn them off. Notwithstanding, this concession did not include 
those foreign vessels already at Valparaiso. 97 A few days latter, Biddle met Blanco, 
and requested and obtained the same facilities for North American vessels. 98 
As was already mentioned, Bowles considered that this provisional 
agreement provided two months of tranquillity for British shipping heading to the 
West Coast, time enough, either for another British man-of-war to be sent to the 
Pacific or for the Spanish squadron to abandon the blockade for some other 
reason. Two months later, the Spanish squadron was in fact defeated by the 
Chilean one, ending the blockade. " 
The attitude of all three captains, Spanish, British, and North American, 
reflected, to some extent, the way in which their countries and navies were to 
conduct themselves in the following years. The Spaniards, at the nadir of their 
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strength, were forced to accept conditions both from the British and from the 
North Americans. The North Americans were more activated by feelings of 
national pride, even when their attitude led to illegalities. The British conducted 
themselves more politely but finally obtained what they wanted for their trade, 
making good use of every opportunity to legalize their position. 
When Bowles left Valparaiso, in February 1818, the economic activity of the 
port had increased considerably despite the blockade. A clear indication of this was 
the fact that a considerable number of British vessels entered or left the port since 
it was opened by the Chilean government, only one being captured by the 
blockading squadron. Another indication of this increase, more closely related to 
his own ship, was an unusually high number of deserters. 10° 
With first hand experience on what was happening on the Pacific coast of 
South America, Bowles asked the Admiralty for additional men-of-war to be 
commissioned to the South America Station. As a result of his petition, four ships 
were sent, two of them to be based on the West Coast, with precise instructions to 
observe the most strict neutrality in the conflict between Spain and her colonies, 
"abstaining from all political interference with the several parties", protecting 
British shipping and prosecuting those British ships involved in piratical or illegal 
activities. ' o' 
The two naval vessels commissioned to the Pacific were the frigate 
Andromache, Captain William Henry Shirreff, 102 and the sloop-of-war Blossom, 
Captain Frederick Hickey. 103 As senior officer of this squadron, Shirreff's 
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instructions gave particular attention to the provisional agreement signed by 
Bowles and Blanco Carrera, as it was the main legal argument likely to be used in 
protection of British trade. Foreseeing that Viceroy Pezuela had already 
disapproved of the agreement, Shirreff was to request a two months extension, to 
receive new instructions from Bowles. 104 
When the British men-of-war entered Valparaiso, in May 1818, the Spanish 
squadron had already abandoned the blockade, while the loyalist army, under 
General Osorio, after a victory over San Martin in Cancha Rayada, was finally 
defeated in Maypu, early in April. No further complication was expected for the 
moment, and the only incident that arose following Bowles' departure occurred 
when the Chilean squadron attacked the Spanish one, on 26 April. During the 
action, the Chilean frigate Lautaro, Captain Jorge O'Brien, hoisted British colours 
to confuse the Spanish frigate Esmeralda, and some British regimental uniforms 
were also seen on board. Consequently, General Osorio complained to Hickey, on 
his arrival at Talcaguano, early in May, and the latter protested to the Chilean 
government. 105 
Both the Andromache and the Blossom arrived at Callao in July. The latter 
remained only a few days, sailing afterwards to the Columbia river, but the former 
remained in port for almost a month. Shirreff brought with him more than twenty 
loyalists deported by the Chilean government, and certain letters addressed to the 
Viceroy by the Spanish ambassadors in London and in Rio de Janeiro. The British 
Captain visited Pezuela, and this courtesy was returned by the Viceroy's wife and 
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daughter, who could hardly know that the same frigate would take them back to 
Europe two years later in very different circumstances. 106 
The Peruvian seaborne trade and economy, eight months after Bowles' visit, 
was already being affected by privateers from Chile and Rio de la Plata, many of 
them manned by British and North American seamen and adventurers. The Spanish 
squadron, based in Callao, was seriously affected by this situation, being unable to 
attempt any decisive action to regain control of the Southern Pacific. In May 1818, 
the deficit in the Peruvian defence budget amounted to 117,000 pesos monthly, 
besides 200,000 pesos needed for the most urgent expenditures. To study and 
suggest possible solutions to this complex problem, Pezuela commissioned the 
"Junta de Arbitrios", the body responsible for taxation. Several ideas were 
discussed, and finally, in July, after prolonged debate, the opening of Callao to 
British trade was proposed to the Viceroy as the only possible way to reverse the 
economic decline. They suggested opening the port for a two-year period to 
vessels coming from Britain and Ireland, even if they called at Brazil or Chile. 
Goods imported by these ships were to be taxed according to a selective base, and 
masters were to present their cargo list 48 hours after arrival, or leave the port 
within six days. The master or supercargo would be allowed to stay and live in 
Lima as long as their business required, but not on a permanent basis and not by 
opening offices. They would have to designate an agent amongst the members of 
the Tribunal del Consulado, the body which represented merchants, traders, 
bankers and other active groups in the economic life of Lima. On the other hand, 
British merchants would be allowed to export gold and silver, on paying the 
normal rate. ' 0' 
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It is unlikely that Shirreff, whose arrival at Callao was quite opportune, was 
unaware of the proposal made by the Junta de Arbitrios, since during his 
conversations with Pezuela, he had suggested a similar plan. The Viceroy, already 
convinced that the opening of Callao was the only realistic way of obtaining re- 
sources to continue the war against the Patriots, needed to obtain the support of 
the Tribunal del Consulado before executing the idea. Pezuela found support for 
this proposal amongst the majority of this body, except the Gremio de Comercio 
(Chamber of Commerce) which congregated the most important merchants in 
Lima. They were firmly opposed to accept foreign trade in Peru, and having 
offered to contribute 117,000 pesos monthly for defence expenditure in a 
five-month period, any decision concerning the opening of the port was deferred 
for that period. However, amongst those members of the Tribunal who were in 
favour of the proposal were Pedro Abadia and Felix de Ochavarriague y Blanco, 
agents of the Compania de Filipinas. They firmly believed that the merchants would 
be unable to fulfil their promise, and asked Shirreff to return to Callao when the 
time had elapsed. On the other hand, Pezuela promised to Shirreff that if the 
merchants failed to pay, he would open Callao for two years, exactly as proposed 
by the Junta de Arbitrios. As a demonstration of his sincerity, the Viceroy gave the 
British Captain a copy of this proposal. " 
The acceptance of this idea by Pezuela was the final step in a series of 
concessions made to foreign vessels which began even before Bowles' arrival, late 
in 1817. Officially, no permission could be granted for this trade, but in several 
cases foreign ships were authorized to land their goods. When Shirreff entered 
Callao, the presence of foreign vessels at the port was already a normal 
occurrence. Consequently, a small but growing British capital began to be invested 
in Lima. 1 ' Despite the fact that this trade was still illegal, the three following 
108. - Graham and Humphrevs 248-250. Timothy E. Anna. The fall of the Royal Government in 
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events gave clear indication of how extensive it was. Firstly, in 1817, when the 
Amphion left Callao, she took treasure worth 20,000 pounds sterling on board, 
from British properties at Lima and Callao. Secondly, when the U. S. frigate 
Ontario entered Callao on her way from the Columbia river to Valparaiso, Captain 
Biddle was asked by Pezuela to take on board his emissaries to San Martin; one of 
them was the British merchant Thomas Crompton, whose main aim was not to 
negotiate the prisoner's exchange but to obtain intelligence both in that port and at 
Santiago. Finally, during this first stay of the Andromache at Callao, eight parcels 
of silver where received on board, being transhipped at Valparaiso to the Tyne, 
Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, "' sent by Bowles from Rio with this sole 
purpose. "' 
Captain Shirreff returned to Callao in November 1818, when the time given 
by the Viceroy to the Tribunal del Consulado had elapsed, and to support the 
opening of the port. As Abadia and Ochavarriague foresaw, the merchants had 
been unable to fulfil their promise, and on 29 January 1819 the Junta de Arbitrios, 
summoned again by the Viceroy, proposed the execution of the plan presented in 
July 1818, and requested that foreign vessels already in Callao were authorized to 
land their cargo. Pezuela, avoiding so decisive a step, accepted only the second 
suggestion, but assured Shirreff that British merchant ships would continue to be 
allowed to enter and trade at the port, according to the Junta de Arbitrios' 
proposal. The only explanation of this ambiguity can be found in Pezuela's 
intention not to place himself in total rupture of existing Spanish law. At least in 
this aspect of his administration, he tried to act pragmatically but still within the 
law, a difficult and sometimes impossible situation. In November 1819, when the 
proposal to open Callao to foreign trade was finally sent to Spain, it was too late to 
110. - Falcon entered the navy in 1800. Appointed to the Tvne on June 1817. Rear-Admiral in 
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exert some practical effect to revert the situation. "' Nonetheless, the Spanish 
government did not disapprove immediately Pezuela's decision to open the port to 
foreign trade. Only by late December 1819, Pezuela was instructed to close the 
port because an expedition was about to sail to Rio de la Plata. `3 
As might readily be supposed, Pezuela's decision was strongly criticized, 
especially by those local merchants who would be affected by loosing control of 
the market. Even today Lima is a city in which gossip is very easy to spread, and in 
1819 the possibility of a Viceroy opening the port of Callao to British vessels 
provided enough elements to many tales referring to a commercial liaison between 
Pezuela and Shirreff Concerning the latter, it was said that great care had to be 
taken with him "since he is a resolute enemy of America, and as his only wish is 
money, he will not stop to use his influence to allow for more vessels and goods 
coming in, and to carry the contraband authorized by Pezuela, who receives a 
percentage of this trade". 14 We have found no proof to confirm those stories. 
A rather different kind of opposition was found in Chile when the news of 
the tacit opening of Callao reached Valparaiso. It was argued that this trade would 
complicate the operations against the Peruvian Viceroyalty, providing it with 
economic resources to sustain the war and facilitating the contraband of war. 
Acting from this point of view, some patriots tried to persuade Shirreff to delay 
this agreement until the departure of the expedition to liberate Peru, which was 
planned to sail shortly. "` However, the opening of Callao to foreign shipping was 
not in Shirreff hands. His intervention on this issue was according with his 
instructions, which directed him to do everything possible to improve the security 
of British shipping along the west coast. 
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Despite all this, Pezuela remained highly suspicious of British neutrality, and 
when in July 1818, he wrote in his diary that Shirreff sailed from Callao "against all 
my will, because I have so much experience of these English, who are less attached 
to us than to the insurgents, and always prejudicial to both, making more damage 
to us than to them". I" 
Captain Shirreff was the first British captain to be involved in an exchange of 
prisoners as a humanitarian task. On his first arrival at Callao, in July 1818, 
Viceroy Pezuela agreed to that exchange and an equal number of patriots sailed on 
the British frigate to Chile. However, there were returned from Valparaiso because 
their ranks did not correspond with those initially sent 117 In his second visit to 
Callao, in November 1818, Shirreff conducted not only prisoners to be exchanged 
but also a proposal from San Martin to establish a system to administer the funds 
required by those prisoners who still remained both in Chile and Peru. In the 
following months, other neutral naval vessels became involved in this issue, helping 
to make less painful a war in which there were so many links amongst those who 
were actually fighting. 
As happened to Bowles, Shirreff also had to deal with incidents referring to 
British merchant vessels detained by both parties. One of the more complicated of 
them was the case of the whaler Inspector, master John Duncan. She was 
confiscated on the Tumbes river, by orders of the Governor of Guayaquil and the 
local authorities, to chase the Chileno, a patriot privateer who had just captured 
the Peruvian vessel Dolores. Duncan refused an initial offer of 22,000 pesos for the 
use of his ship in this search, and also refused to accept the return of the ship when 
it was offered by the pilot in charge of the chase, named Eduardo Cano. He consid- 
ered that he could only accept that return if the Governor of Guayaquil agreed to 
pay a suitable compensation, and he persisted in this opinion even when the 
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Chileno was sighted. Following a short fight, the whaler was captured and sent to 
Valparaiso. In the trial that followed, Duncan remained obstinate, refusing to 
defend himself, and despite Shirreff and Hackey's interventions, the Inspector was 
condemned as a good prize. Under the circumstances in which the British vessel 
was captured, no further complaint could be made to the Chilean government. 
Instead of that, and taking into consideration the intervention of loyalist authorities 
from Tumbes and Guayaquil, Shirreff wrote to Pezuela in protest. In his reply, the 
Viceroy could only indicate that he had given strict orders to avoid the repetition 
of incidents of this kind. "' 
When the Andromache entered Callao in November, it became known that 
the Chilean squadron, under Blanco Encalada, had left Valparaiso to intercept a 
Spanish convoy with troops coming from Cadiz. "' There is no evidence that 
Shirreff himself provided this sort of information. Instead of that, it is more likely 
that such kind of news could be spread by word of mouth either by the prisoners 
taken from Chile for exchange, or by some crew-member of his frigate. Up to this 
stage, Shirreff could not be blamed for acting against his neutral condition, but 
after a few months his attitude changed in favour of the patriots, providing first 
hand information to Admiral Lord Cochrane to respect Callao's defences. 
The Andromache remained at Callao until February 1819, sailing for 
Valparaiso in company with the Blossom and the merchant vessel Alexander. On 
board the second were more than 3'000,000 pesos in treasure which "was sent out 
of Lima by wealthy Europeans". It seems that part of this treasure was shipped 
without paying duties, causing an energetic protest from Pezuela and the adoption 
of certain measures to watch over the British warships in the anchorage. However, 
in the enquiry ordered by the Viceroy, no proof was found against Shirreff or 
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Hickey, but certain British and Peruvian merchants from Lima were blamed. "' This 
was the first incident involving British warships convoying treasure from Callao. In 
the following years another two events would contribute to Callao gaining a bad 
reputation in this particular respect. They involved the captains of the Hyperion 
and Superb, who were victims of fraud, and lost a large amount of money thereby. 
During the three months when Shirreff was at Callao, an important event 
occurred in Chile: the arrival of Lord Thomas Cochrane to take the command of 
the Chilean squadron. Cochrane, the future Earl of Dundonald, was without doubt, 
one of the best frigate captains in the Royal Navy, but having been involved in a 
famous Stock Exchange scandal, in 1814, he was dismissed both from the Navy 
and from Parliament. Irascible, intrepid, and with an intense interest in money, he 
was to introduce an important and decisive factor to the war in the Pacific. With 
him in command of the Chilean Squadron, the recent permission given by Pezuela 
for British trade at Callao, might be threatened. In the following months, he would 
give clear proof that this fear was quite real. 
Lord Cochrane as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Naw. (1818-1822) 
Until the second half of the Seventeen Century Callao was the sole port of 
entrance for those goods coming from Spain to Peru, Alto Peru, Chile, and Rio de 
la Plata. With the opening of Buenos Aires and other ports, Callao's 
preponderance became threatened, forcing Peruvian shipowners and merchants to 
diversify their investments, exerting a greater control up on Chilean grain and 
Guayaquilean cacao. At the beginning of the Nineteen Century, Callao became the 
head of a newly established naval department, with jurisdiction from Panama to 
Chiloe. All these elements explained the importance of Callao as a maritime centre, 
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with a considerable mercantile fleet and a number of related activities. This 
situation changed during the struggle for independence, bringing about the almost 
complete destruction of Peruvian shipping, and driving away those human and 
economic resources invested in maritime enterprises. 
The immediate beneficiary was Valparaiso, which was opened to foreign 
trade several years before Callao, attracting a large number of merchants. Soon, 
the Chilean port was full of European goods, but that market was limited, and 
many of the foreign merchants trading there were really interested in what was 
supposedly the more profitable Peruvian market. In the years 1817 and 1818, as 
already mentioned, British ships began to trade with the latter market, replacing 
Peruvian and Chilean ships in the regular grain traffic, and re-exporting British 
goods from Chile at a higher price. Despite the benefits this trade could bring to 
those merchants involved, it had clear disadvantages to the Chilean war effort and 
was of direct benefit to Peru in preventing wartime shortages, providing a cover 
for war contraband, and diverting grain from home. 12' 
Consequently, it became absolutely necessary both to destroy Spanish naval 
power and to exert effective control of the trade from Chile to Peru, which in 
practical terms meant imposing a blockade. However, in 1817, when the Chilean 
government committed itself to building up a navy with this purpose in mind, the 
first difficulty to overcome was the scarcity of seamen. One of the greatest 
achievements of Bernardo O'Higgins, the Supreme Director, was to understand 
that reality, and to seek in other regions the human contribution needed to support 
their effort. A warm response was found both in Europe and the United States, and 
a considerable number of British and North American seamen and adventures made 
their way to Valparaiso; some of them looking for an easy way to earn money and 
reputation, but others truly convinced of the justice of the Patriot's cause. Many of 
121. - A full description of this trade was provided by Lieutenant R. N. William Bowers. Naval 
Adventures during thirty-five years' service. London, Richard Bentley, 1833,11: 59 on- 
wards. 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
these men would give their lives for the freedom of South America, fighting either 
on the battlefields or on the decks of warships and privateers. Others, at the end of 
the war, established themselves as citizens of the new republics. Amongst the 
Britons who came to fight for the independence of the Spanish colonies in 
America, and who distinguished themselves were Martin George Guise, William 
Miller, F. B. O'Connor, Frederic Augustus Elmore, George Young, James 
Paroissien, William Wilkinson, Robert Forster, Thomas William Cartier, George 
O'Brien. But, undoubtedly, one of the most controversial was Lord Thomas 
Cochrane. 
Sacked from the Royal Navy and the House of Lords in 1814, Cochrane 
enjoyed a well established prestige for his remarkable ability as a frigate captain, 
but his precariously controlled temper, and his undeniable ambition, made him a 
difficult personage, especially as the subordinate of a new republic. Cochrane 
himself, by his writings, provides a good deal of information about his personality 
and career, before, during and after his service in America. 122 It is sufficient to say 
here that he accepted the command of the newly-born Chilean Navy, after refusing 
an invitation to serve as Admiral in the Spanish Navy. Contacted by the Chilean 
envoy to the European courts, Alvarez Condarco, Cochrane arrived at Valparaiso 
late in 1818 to take command of the Chilean squadron, composed of seven sails, as 
follows: 50-gun frigate O'Higgins, Captain Robert Forster; 56-gun frigate San 
Martin, Captain William Wilkinson; 48-gun frigate Lautaro, initially Captain 
Charles Wooster and later Martin Guise, 20-gun schooner Chacabuco, Captain 
Thomas Carter; 18-gun brig Galvarino, Captain John Tooker Spry; 16-gun brig 
Araucano, Captain Ramsay; and 16-gun Puyrredon, Captain Prunier. 
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Knowing Cochrane's virtues and frailties, as early as December 1818, 
Commodore Bowles and his officers anticipated all sorts of troubles. Furthermore, 
while his fame as captain was fully recognized by his former comrades, the cause of 
his dismissal had gained for him a very bad reputation and even antipathy amongst 
them. A measure of this feeling was Bowles' instructions to Shirreff, in February 
1819, regarding the conduct he would have to observe in dealing with Cochrane. 
Bowles pointed out that, Cochrane being a British subject fighting against a King 
who is at peace with his own King, was acting illegally. Furthermore, concerning 
the specific question raised by Shirreff about saluting Cochrane's ensign, Bowles 
denied that right, adding that "it is highly improbable that British warships should 
show any mark of respect" for him, and if he insisted in being saluted, Shirreff was 
to refuse even to the point of using force. `=3 
These fears would be fulfilled shortly after Cochrane's arrival at Chile, 
through several incidents involving foreign merchant ships and warships, the very 
first of which arose when Captain Biddle, of the U. S. frigate Ontario, refused to 
salute his pennant. The Ontario's arrival at Valparaiso from Callao, having 
received at that port merchants' bullion remittances for the ports on the East Cast, 
would bring another misunderstanding with Cochrane. The Chilean government, 
suspecting that this treasure, as well as that brought from Callao by the British 
frigate Andromache, arrived some time later, belonged to Peruvian rather than 
British merchants, showed great concern about the neutrality of both men-of-war. 
Several suggestions were made to stop this illegality, the strongest of which seems 
to be an official requirement to surrender the treasure, by using force if necessary. 
Chilean and British sources differ on what happened after Cochrane was prevented 
by the Chilean government from taking this extreme course. British sources 
indicate that the Chilean Admiral, assuming that action was the only suitable way 
to obtain the treasure, prepared his squadron to attack both warships as soon as 
123. - Bowles to Croker. Creole. Buenos Ayres. 1/3/1 %419, ADM 1/24. 
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the government gave the order, commanding Captain Wooster, a North American, 
"you must take the Andromache, and I the Ontario, lets we should get hanged in 
our countries when we return". 12' At the end, no extreme decision was taken by the 
government, but rumours of this possibility and of Cochrane's preparations 
reached Shirreff and Biddle. Bowles, who learned of this a few weeks later, in 
March 1819, expressed his disgust to the Chilean envoy in Buenos Aires, indicating 
that by no means would he allow a British warship to be searched, since that right 
could only be claimed regarding merchant vessels. Moreover, Bowles pointed out 
that, if any attempt was to be made, he "without waiting for orders from his 
government, would know how to take compensatory action by using one ship and 
two frigates which would arrive in a short time". 12' 
It is difficult to say how successful Bowles would have been had he really 
used force against Cochrane's squadron. As stated, this force consisted of three 
frigates, one schooner and three brigs, totalling 234 guns, which hardly could 
match a British squadron formed by a ship and two frigates. However, at the time 
when Bowles wrote his menacing letter, March 1819, the Pacific Squadron was 
reduced to the 38-gun frigate Andromache and the 18-gun sloop Blossom, being 
immediately reinforced by the 10-gun brig-sloop Icarus and the 20 gun 6th rate 
Slaney. If we are going to relay only on numerical terms, the Chilean squadron was 
stronger than the British, even if the latter acted in junction with the North 
Americans frigate Macedonian and frigate Ontario; but fighting is not only a 
matter of numbers, it depends on many other things. Under Cochrane, the Chilean 
squadron became an effective naval force, but it took to him some time to reach 
such a level, a time which was far more valuable fighting the weaker Spanish 
Squadron rather than British and North American naval vessels. Even if succeeding 
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in an action against naval vessels of these two nations, the Chilean squadron surely 
would be destroyed by a superior naval force sent some months later. Taking this 
into account, it seems that Cochrane was really trying to know how far he could go 
without actually compromising himself in a real incident with two stronger naval 
powers such as Britain and the United States. 
Bowles' attitude was promptly known in Chile, but no further comment was 
made on the issue until August 1819, when Antonio Jose de Irrisarri, Chilean 
envoy to the European courts, took cognisance of the appointment of Commodore 
Thomas Hardy as Commander-in-Chief, and that in fact a ship and two frigates 
were ready to sail from Britain to the Pacific. Fearing that Hardy's appointment 
and the reinforcements were an indication of hostility to Cochrane, Irrisarri applied 
to the Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, complaining of the British captains' 
attitude in the West Coast. Flemming was the first to be mentioned, for his 
unhappy communication to the Chilean government in 1811; but the main 
complaint was directed against the consular condition assumed by all the others, 
who "without diplomatic investiture, had tried some times to compromise that 
Government, making declarations against the policy of this Cabinet, and asking 
extravagant things to that Supreme Authority. 11126 
Using these arguments cleverly, Irrisarri was really asking for the 
appointment of a British consul in Chile, which would mean the recognition of its 
independence. He also argued that Chilean ports being the only ones opened to 
foreign commerce on the West Coast, British merchants used them to trade with 
Peruvian ports, providing the royalists with a protected way to move their property 
out of the country, and supplying Lima with provisions. Finally, he stated that if no 
acceptable solution was adopted by the British government, Chilean ports would 
be closed to their ships. '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Shortly after his flag had been hoisted on the O'Higgins, Cochrane was 
ready to sail for his first cruise along the Peruvian coast. The Chilean government's 
instructions were to use the squadron to blockade Callao, seeking out and 
destroying the Spanish naval forces, which were supposed to be out of the port, 
and to destroy the Peruvian mercantile marine. With four vessels, the Admiral left 
Valparaiso on 14 January 1819, giving orders to Rear Admiral Blanco Encalada, 
his second in command, to follow his force as soon the other three were ready. "' 
One month later, when the squadron was already off Callao, the Lautaro, 
the look-out vessel, sighted three ships sailing south. They were the Andromache, 
the Blossom, and the merchant ship Alexander, being informed of the proximity of 
the Chilean Squadron. About 5 p. m., the Andromache closed distances with the 
O'Higgins, and Shirreff came aboard the Chilean frigate to have a meeting with 
Cochrane. At this encounter, amongst other things, the latter gave extensive 
assurances "that although he had left England he had not forgotten he was an 
Englishman", " and that he would not act against British interests. Shirreff, in 
flagrant violation of his neutral condition, and by way of return for Cochrane's 
declarations, gave the Admiral valuable information about the port defences and 
movements of the Spanish squadron and merchant ships. Obviously, Shirreff did 
not mention this in official reports, but his help was recorded in several accounts. 1 ' 
However, an unhappy incident overshadowed the meeting, when boats of 
the Lautaro were sent to examine the Alexander and certain British whalers which 
were sailing near to her. The officer sent to the Alexander told her master, in a 
very indiscreet way, "that if the Andromache had not been in company they would 
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have searched the Blossom also". "' The boarding officer's attitude, probably only a 
swagger, should be interpreted as an indication of the general aggressiveness of the 
officers in the Chilean service under the vigorous leadership of their Admiral. 
Despite this incident, the meeting of Cochrane and Shirreff reassured Bowles of the 
urgency of sailing for the West Coast once again, with the purpose of convincing 
the Chilean government 
"of the danger they will incur if they suffer Lord Cochrane to 
compromise them with England, and if possible to induce them to 
reinstate the former commander of their squadron -Rear-Admiral 
Blanco Encalada-, who is an officer of one of the best families in 
Chile and has always conducted himself with good sense and pro- 
priety" 132 
Even when he finally was unable to return to the West Coast, Bowles' 
attitude reflected a greater intention to became involved in Chilean internal affairs, 
an attitude which was followed to some extent by his successor, Commodore 
Thomas Masterman Hardy. Cochrane's behaviour was the reason for such a 
change, since, in many cases, he acted far beyond the Chilean government's 
instructions, as we shall see in the following pages. 
Back on the West Coast, having failed in his first attack to Callao (29 
February and 1 March 1819), Cochrane left Callao to sail along the northern coast 
to distribute proclamations and to procure provisions for his ships. On 1 March, he 
issued a proclamation declaring under blockade "the port of Callao, and all other 
ports, bays and harbours, as well as the line of coast from the port of Guayaquil to 
Atacama in Peru". Neutral ships already in any of the port under this blockade, 
were to leave them before 8 March. If any neutral ship was found with "military 
officers, masters, supercargoes, or merchants, of the countries subject to the king 
131. - Graham and Humphreys: 270. 
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of Spain, it shall be sent to Valparaiso" to be judged. 133 Callao was initially block- 
aded by the Chacabuco, until early April, when Rear-Admiral Blanco Encalada 
took over this responsibility with the San Martin and Puyrredon. This first 
blockade of Callao would last only for two months, since Blanco Encalada was 
forced to suspend it in May to avoid the starvation of his squadron, the ship with 
supplies sent from Valparaiso having been captured by Spanish privateers. 1 ' 
Shortly after that, Cochrane returned to Valparaiso as well. 
Like the previous loyalist blockades, this one was impossible to carry out 
properly with the number of ships in the blockading squadron; and therefore it was 
denounced as illegal by Captain John Downes, of the U. S. frigate Macedonian, 
senior officer of the North American Pacific Squadron. Furthermore, when the 
news of Cochrane's proclamation reached Europe, Irrisarri advised his government 
to reduce the area under blockade, "to Callao, or other, or other ports, which in 
reality were to be blockaded", thus legalising it. l35 Peruvian ports, although not 
formally opened to foreign trade, were already allowing individual British and 
United States merchant ships to land their cargoes, since this was the only way of 
satisfying local needs. The privateering campaigns of 1817 and 1818 had made 
sailing under Spanish colours extremely insecure, to such an extent that Shirreff 
was asked by Viceroy Pezuela to transport to Europe the treasure belonging to the 
Spanish Crown. This request was refused, in accordance with Shirre: s instruc- 
tions which only allowed him to accept on board treasure and property belonging 
to his own countrymen. 1 ' 
133. - "Proclamation by Lord Cochrane. Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral and 
Commander- 
-in-Chief of the Ships and Vessels of the States", The Annual Register, 1819, London 
1820: 154-155. Graham and Humphreys: 270-272. 
134. - Fuenzalida (1978) 1: 128. Billignsley: 93. Cochrane: 18-21. 
135. - O'Higd ns III: 64-65. Pons 1: 428. 
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Bowles' reaction to Cochrane's proclamation was cautious, taking into 
account that any serious misunderstanding with the new republics would threaten 
the "immense mass of British property" in their ports. Consequently, he decided 
not "to resist the blockade now established by the government of Chile" until new 
instructions were received from the Admiralty. He only asked for two things: free 
access to all the blockaded ports for British warships, and for British whalers, "the 
designation of a port in Peru, between Callao and Guayaquil, where they could 
take water, fresh supplies (... ) in reply of which was designated the port of 
Paita". 137 
In September 1819, after several months in Valparaiso, the Chilean squadron 
sailed to attack and destroy the shipping at Callao, and to re-establish the blockade, 
achieving in that way the dominion of the Pacific. If he succeeded, "the 
expeditionary army could, without impediment, set sail from our [Chilean] ports, 
which is going to give freedom to Peru, and secure, as a necessary consequence, 
the unalterable independence of South America". 138 A few days after the departure 
of Cochrane, the Slaney, Captain Donat Hendry O'Brien, "' sailed from Valparaiso 
to Callao. Even when the departure of the British vessel was already delayed by 
Shirreff attending a request made by the Chilean government, O'Brien reached 
Callao before the Chilean squadron. At the anchorage there were four British 
ships: Inspector, master James Bruce; Pacific, master William Robinett; Merope, 
master John Libon; and Catalina. When Cochrane arrived, on 26 September, all 
the ships in the anchorage were commanded to move behind the defensive line 
formed by the Spanish squadron, within gun-range from the forts. However, 
O'Brien considered that British vessels would be more secure sailing to Huacho 
under his protection, requesting and obtaining a proper permission from Viceroy 
137. - O'Higgins IV: 151. 
138. - Fuenzalida (1978) 1: 327. 
139. - O'Brien entered the navy in 1796 as ordinary seaman. Captain of the 
Slanev since August 
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Pezuela. In this sense, orders were issued from the Slaney to the merchant ships to 
prepare to leave the port under her protection. ''' 
It should be mentioned that Pezuela initially refused to provide such 
permission, fearing that Cochrane would attempt to capture the British vessels or, 
at least, try to attract their crew to the patriot service. However, taking into 
account that the 20-gun Slaney was no real protection for the British 
merchantmen, it is possible to think that Pezuela was actually looking for an 
incident between the Chilean Admiral and the British Captain, as a result of which 
the loyalist would take advantage. In fact, that incident almost happened when the 
already mentioned British merchant vessels departed Callao. 
The Pacific was the first of them to leave the port, bound for Valparaiso, on 
the afternoon of 28 September. The following morning, she was intercepted and 
captured by the Galvarino, being forced to head towards San Lorenzo Island, in 
spite of the master's claims that his ship was under the Slaney's protection. The 
Inspector and the Catalina were the next two to leave the anchorage, late on the 
28th. They were instructed by O'Brien to wait until the morning, five miles to the 
north, and then to proceed to Ancon, in order to finish the landing of their cargo. 
On the next day, while the Catalina made her way to Ancon, the Inspector was 
intercepted, captured and forced to change her course for San Lorenzo Island, by 
another Chilean man-of-war. 
Meanwhile, the main body of Cochrane's squadron having reached Callao 
harbour, an officer was sent to the Slaney to give official notice of the 
re-establishment of the blockade. O'Brien, in his reply, stated that Great Britain did 
not recognize the validity of the blockade, and that he would not allow any action 
against British ships. Cochrane's insistence, sending an officer to the Slaney once 
again, was followed by a rough exchange of verbal communications, which led 
O'Brien to declare his intention to use force, if necessary. When the discussion 
140. - Hardy to Croker, Owen Glendower. Buenos Aires. 9/5/1819, ADM 1/25. 
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reached this point, the detention of the Pacific and the Inspector became known on 
the British naval vessel. Acting immediately, O'Brien closed distances with the 
Inspector, sending an armed boat to liberate her. As the merchant ship did not haul 
down her sails, the Slaney "was under the necessity of firing a shot ahead of the 
Inspector merchant ship to prevent her being taken to the Island of San Lorenzo, 
which had effect". Immediately after this, the Slaney headed towards the Pacific, 
which was already anchored at San Lorenzo, and, closing distances, ordered her to 
weigh anchor and set sail for Ancon. Robinett, the Pacific master, made good use 
of this opportunity and shortly after the signal was hoisted both the merchant and 
the man-of-war were sailing in company towards the aforesaid port. The fourth 
British ship in Callao, the Merope, was due to sail for Calcuta with goods and 
treasure on board, but to prevent any incident, it was transhipped to the Slaney. 
Shortly after this, an armed boat was sent from the Galvarino to take possession of 
the Merope and to sail her to San Lorenzo; however, the master refuse to obey this 
order and, following O'Brien's signal, sailed to join the Slaney. The same day, the 
three merchant vessels reached Ancon without further problems with the Chilean 
squadron. ' 4' 
In the correspondence Cochrane and O'Brien ex-changed on this issue, the 
former argue that he had no previous knowledge of the Slaney's protection of the 
merchant vessels and that none of them was taken with violence. 142 Nonetheless, in 
spite of his success in protecting those vessels, O'Brien's energetic and aggressive 
attitude was disapproved of first by Bowles and afterwards by the Admiralty, who 
stated that "Captain O'Brien was not justified in the steps which he took and in 
141. - Hardy to Croker, Owen Glendower, Buenos Aires. 20/5/1820. ADM 1/25; enclosed. 
O'Brien to Shirreff, Callao. 1/12/1819; enclosed with the latter. letters from the masters of 
the Inspector, the Uerope, the Pacific. and the Indian Oak. Most of the cargo in those 
ships belonged to the British merchant Thomas Guthrie, master of the Indian Oak, who 
thanked O'Brien for his intervention. 
142. - O'Brien to Shirreff. Callao, 1/12/1819; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, Owen Glendower, 
Buenos Aires, 20/5/1820, ADM 1/25. 
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giving `convoy' to merchant-ships in time of peace acting illegally against a 
belligerent". '43 
The Slaney was to remain in Ancon until 12 October 1819, receiving the 
remittances from the merchants there, sailing afterwards to Callao. Her second visit 
to Callao was to be extended, at the request of both the Viceroy and the British 
merchants John Heim and Geo. Waddington, not leaving the port until early in 
November in company with the Merope. At a request of the Tribunal del 
Consulado, Viceroy Pezuela authorized that 348,000 pesos belonging to Mr. 
Licarazo and Mr. Francisco Murrieta, two local merchants, were shipped on the 
Slaney to buy some goods at Rio de Janeyro. To obtain such a permission, they 
contributed with certain ammount of money for the War effort and payed an 
advance for the import duties. "4 
Cochrane failed in his second attack on Callao, and in his pursuit of the 
Spanish frigate Prueba, achieving a brilliant success by capturing the Spanish 
stronghold of Valdivia, early in 1820. Back at Valparaiso, the preparations for the 
great expedition to Peru prevented him from sailing again before September of that 
year. 
The need for the destruction of the Spanish forces in Peru, as the only way 
to secure their own independence, was understood by patriot leaders both in 
Buenos Aires and Chile from the very beginning of their struggle for independence. 
After their initial attempts to destroy these forces, by a land campaign in Alto Peru 
which ended in complete failure, the patriots realized that the only possibility of 
achieving their aim would be by sending an expedition by sea. As a result of this 
new strategy, the privateering campaigns and Cochrane's two expeditions were 
planned and carried out as preliminaries, making excellent propaganda for the 
planned expedition. 
143. - Graham and Humphreys: 298. 
144. - Pezuela: 552. Marshall. Sup. IV: 283-7-86. 
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The expedition itself was one of the most complex operations in the wars for 
the independence of Spanish America, involving every kind of resource. The first 
step having been taken by Cochrane in gaining the control of the sea from the 
Spaniards, the second, and most difficult, was committed by O'Higgins and San 
Martin in preparing and organising the overall operation. Supreme command was 
conferred on the latter, with power enough even to dismiss Cochrane, if necessary, 
and to appoint Captain Guise in command of the squadron. The increasing 
disagreement between San Martin and Cochrane, which was ultimately to end in an 
unhappy enmity, was one of the points to be taken account of in this operation. 
The expedition, at its departure, consisted of eight naval vessels and fourteen 
transports, with an expeditionary army of 4500 men. 
The difficulty in keeping secret such an operation led the Chilean 
government to adopt extraordinary measures, one of which was an embargo placed 
on those vessels at Valparaiso bound for Peruvian ports. This measure, given as 
early as 12 February 1820, was the occasion for a serious incident between 
Cochrane and Captain Thomas Searle, "' of the Hyperion, the new senior officer of 
the British Pacific Squadron. On his arrival at Valparaiso, in February, Searle 
found the Slaney in port with five British vessels, the whalers Caledonia and Tiber, 
and the merchants Inspector, Hydra, and Livonia. The last three, loaded with 
grain, had been held back by this measure. Considering this action unfair, Searle 
complained to O'Higgins, obtaining his permission for the departure of the three 
ships. However, apparently because of some administrative error, Cochrane was 
not informed of the permission, and therefore refused to allow the merchant ships 
to leave the port (though the Hydra had already departed). As this delay lasted 
more than one month, and in order to avoid difficulties with the Chilean squadron, 
Searle travelled to Santiago to meet O'Higgins and ask him for a confirmation of 
his previous order. The meeting was held on 25 April, and the Director, reiterating 
145. - Searle entered the navy in 1789. Commissioned to the ffi-pe-ion in September 1818. Rear- 
Admiral in 1846 [Graham and Humphreys: 2811. 
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his authorization, assured Searle that the ships could sail immediately without any 
kind of impediment. On 5 May, even when no official notice had been received by 
him, Cochrane allowed the two whalers to leave the port, but maintained the 
prohibition on the other two merchant ships remaining at the anchorage. Two days 
later, Searle decided to use force, and ordered the Inspector to leave the port 
under his protection. In spite of orders to the contrary sent by Cochrane to the 
master, the merchant ship weighed anchor and headed outwards under convoy of 
the Hyperion, with her ports opened and guns ready to open fire. Cochrane, placed 
in the dilemma whether to enforce his orders and create an international conflict, or 
to allow the Inspector to leave the port, chose the latter course. Obviously, an 
energetic protest from the Chilean government followed this incident, and Searle's 
attitude was disapproved of by Commodore Hardy and the Admiralty, qualifying it 
as "intemperate and injudicious". "' 
Searle's disposition towards Cochrane did not improve in the subsequent 
months, and further incidents arose following the detention of the Rebecca, at 
Pisco, as offender against the blockade. When they met again, at Callao harbour, in 
late-October 1820, the British Captain took not only an unkind attitude but a 
hostile one, "by casting loose his guns, with their trompions out, when my flag-ship 
entered the roads; thereby either intimating that he considered me a pirate, or that 
he would so treat me, if he had an opportunity". "' A final incident between 
Cochrane and Searle occurred on 21 November, when the Pacific, a British 
merchantman arrived at Callao. An officer from the O'Higgins was sent to the 
Hyperion with a letter from the Chilean Admiral to Captain Searle. The later not 
only refused to receive the letter during the day, as doing this could compromise 
his neutral condition, but even throwing it overboard. "' 
146. - Graham and Humphreys: 300-302.306. Searle to O'Higgins. enclosed with Hardy to 
Croker. Owen Glendower. Buenos Aires. 1/9/1820, ADM 1/26. 
147. - Cochrane 1: 93. 
148. - Felix Denegri Luna (editor), "Misiones y Documentaciön de Cancillerias Extranjeras", en 
C. D. J. P. Lima, 1976, t. XII: 93-95,172. 
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While Commodore Hardy disapproved of Searle's attitude and ordered him 
to proceed to Valparaiso to wait for his arrival, the Admiralty was far more severe. 
They referred to Searle's actions as "intemperate and injudicious; and as repetition 
of it might, and probably would, be attended with consequences highly injurious to 
the public interest, their Lordships direct that the Hyperion be removed from the 
South American station". 149 
Before that order reached him, Searle was to witness Cochrane's attack on 
Callao and the capture of the Spanish frigate Esmeralda. In that naval action, the 
U. S. frigate Macedonian and the British Hyperion were to be involved to some 
extent, since both were at the anchorage at that moment, close to the Spanish 
frigate. On the night of 5 to 6 November, the Chilean squadron made an intrepid 
boat attack on the aforesaid frigate. The boats were sighted and hailed by the 
Hyperion and the Macedonian's sentries, but in a very discreet way to avoid 
revealing their presence to the Spanish ship. After a bloody fight on the deck and 
forecastle, the Esmeralda was surrendered and steered out of the forts' range. 
Having noticed the attack, the batteries on land opened fire on the Esmeralda, who 
immediately hoisted similar lights as the Hyperion and Macedonian, whose 
captains had "previously agreed on with the Spanish authorities in case of a night 
attack (... ) to prevent being fired upon". Under these circumstances, the forts fired 
at random trying to hit the Esmeralda, but in the confusion the two neutral men- 
of-war were several times struck, being forced to cut their cables and left the 
anchorage. l so 
The capture of the E. smeralda was a heavy loss for the Royalist cause, and it 
was natural that the Callao garrison and part of the population became very 
agitated over it. The common idea, amongst them, was that the attack was led by 
British and North Americans officers; or, at least, with the help of the Hyperion 
149. - Graham and Humphreys: 305-306. 
150. - Graham and Humphreys: 321-322. 
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and the Macedonian. To some extent, they were right in supposing this, since the 
attackers were led by English-speaking officers, and both British and North 
American warships were lying so close to the Spanish frigate that their sentries 
could have been heard. Acting under these feelings, early next day, certain British 
and North Americans were attacked by a mob. Amongst them were some crew 
members of the Macedonian, who had landed to buy the daily supplies for their 
ship. Two of them were killed and six more were badly injured, and only saved 
their lives when the local authorities came to their help. Their boat was plundered 
by another group, and only the intervention of another boat from the Hyperion 
saved her from total destruction. While these regrettable events were happening, 
the British and North Americans at Lima and Callao, numbered as many as 91 
people, feared for their lives and requested official protection. Most of them were 
merchants, but they were also some masters, supercargoes, crew members from 
the warships, amongst whom was Captain Downes, of the Macedonian. Pezuela, 
fearing that the violence against foreigners would became worse, sent parties of 
soldiers for their protection, asking them to refrain from showing themselves in the 
streets and to embark at Chorrillos, where the boats of the Hyperion and the 
Macedonian were to be allowed to land to pick them up. 's' 
Incidents between Royalist and foreigners did not conclude with the 
embarkation of the latter, and on 8 November, the North American sloop Rampart 
was received with shots from the forts, even when her colours were clearly hoisted. 
The Viceroy, anxious to put an end to this difficult situation, promised a full 
investigation of the incident to Searle and Downes, and the punishment of those 
involved in the attack on the boat and the sloop. The collaboration between both 
captains would continue to be very close in the following days, as was previously 
agreed between Downes and Shirreff In this sense, on 21 October, the 
Macedonian convoyed out of the port nine merchant ships, six North Americans 
151. - ldem. Pezuela: 761,797. Billingsley: 112-114. 
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and three British. When the convoy was crossing before Cochrane's flag ship, a 
thirty-one gun salute was exchanged with the Hyperion, showing both to the forts 
and to the Chilean squadron their intention of protecting vessels of both 
nationalities. " 
Before the Chilean expedition departed Valparaiso, San Martin had asked 
both the British and the North American senior officers at Valparaiso to be 
guarantors of any agreement to be reached with the loyalists. Shirreff, who was the 
senior British officer in Valparaiso at that moment, showed great interest in 
accepting the proposition, forwarding it to Commodore Hardy for his approval. 
The latter did not authorize such an intervention in South American internal affairs, 
considering "that the smallest interference of a British officer between the 
contending parties would be contrary to the spirit" of his instructions, and that it 
could endanger the neutrality which they were to observe. "' It seems, however, 
that only Pezuela's refusal to accept any foreign participation in the conflict, still 
considered by him as an internal dispute, avoided a further compromise from 
Shirreff, since Hardy's order to not accept the invitation reached Valparaiso too 
late. 154 
The expedition to Peru finally set sail on 20 August 1820, and on the same 
day the Chilean government declared the coast from Guayaquil to Iquique (2° to 
20° South) under blockade. This measure, which would be in force from August 
25, provided a reasonable time for those ships coming from distant ports, and 
indicated the intention of opening Peruvian ports to the foreign trade as soon as 
they were liberated. Despite these essential aspects, which distinguished this 
blockade from that of 1818, it was still impossible to carry it out properly with the 
number of ships available to the patriots; and, therefore, it was rejected as illegal by 
152. - Billingsley: 112-114. 
153. - ADM 50/151,17/8/1820. Graham and Humphreys: 303. 
154. - Pezuela: 625. Hardy to Croker. Creole, 9; 12/1820, ADM 1/26. 
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the British and North American commanders in the Pacific. First Searle and later 
Hardy protested against the measure, pointing out that no British ship would 
respect it. Nevertheless, to avoid difficulties, they recommended British merchants 
to restrain their trade to those ports under blockade. '; ` 
The first place reached by the expedition was Pisco, on 7 September, landing 
early the following day. In this bay there were two merchant ships, the North 
American Canton and the British Rebecca, both of which were captured and sent 
to Valparaiso as the first offenders against the blockade. The latter, master John 
Thomson, was freighted at Callao, after having sold all her cargo there, to receive 
1,400 bottles of liquor belonging to Jose Arismendi, agent of the Compania de 
Filipinas. Searle, who reached Callao few days later, complained about this capture 
by sending an extremely brusque letter to Cochrane, and describing this action as 
piratical in his report to Hardy. ` ' 
We have already mentioned the outcome of this incident, but it provides us 
with other kind of evidence: foreign trade was by then getting out of any real 
control from loyalist authorities. The detention of the two mentioned vessels, 
followed by capture of the Nightingale and the Mary, at Pucusana and Arica, 
shown that neutral vessels were already trading in other ports aside Callao, with 
the collusion of local merchants. 15' 
A different kind of incident occurred when John Brown, Captain of the 
Chilean privateer Maypu, captured in 1818, escaped from the Hospital at Bellavista 
and managed to reach the Tyne. He was able to obtain asylum from Captain 
Falcon, who refused to deliver him to the loyalist arguing that Brown was a British 
155. - Graham and Humphreys: 309-313. Gazeta Ifinisterial tie Chile II, n° 59,26/8/1820: n° 
81.24/2/182 1. n° 99.6/6/182 1. 
156. - Hardy to Searle. 10/12/1820: enclosed with Hardv to Croker, Creole, Buenos Aires, 
12/12/1820, ADM 1/26. 
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subject. ''' This kind of attitude was to be repeated several times in the future, not 
only during the wars of independence, but also during successive civil wars. 
When the Andromache reached Callao on her fifth visit, in late December 
1820, the political, military, and economic situation in Lima had clearly 
deteriorated. With the Patriot army in Chancay, the Chilean squadron blockading 
Callao, bands of "montoneros" (guerrilla) fighting almost everywhere, and groups 
of Patriots conspiring in the city, Pezuela was in a very difficult position. An 
indication of these difficulties was the proposal made by the town council, in its 
session of 16 January 1821, to put the city under British protection. The proposal 
was finally rejected, but its mere existence was clear indication of the desperate 
situation in Lima. '59 
On the other hand, pressed by his generals to adopt a more aggressive strate- 
gy, since the loyalist army remained passively quartered at Aznapuquio, near Lima, 
the Viceroy ordered General La Sema to advance with the Army towards San 
Martin's position at Huacho. For some reason, a few days later, Pezuela ordered 
La Serna to counter-march the Army to Aznapuquio. According to certain 
rumours, Shirreff was involved in Pezuela's decision as he mentioned that the 
loyalist army's advance was exactly what San Martin expected to occupy Lima, 
moving its army southwards by sea while the loyalist troops were still marching. 160 
Such a lack of decision was too much for loyalist generals, and on 29 
January, they forced the Viceroy to relinquish the government to General La 
Serna. Pezuela was unable to impose his authority any longer and finally resigned. 
In the following weeks he tried to obtain passage for Europe, for himself and his 
family, both with Shirreff and with Rear Admiral Pierre R. Jurien de la Graviere, 
who had just entered the Pacific in command of a French Squadron. San Martin 
158. - Vargas VI: 75. Pezuela: 720. 
159. - Leguia III: 659-661. 
160. - Mariano Felipe Paz Soldära, Historia del Peri Inclenendiente, primera Parte, 1819-1822, 
Lima, 1868: 140. 
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refused to provide a passport for the former Viceroy, but he granted such a 
document for Pezuela's family, attending a request made by Countess Cochrane. 
With this permission, Shirreff agreed to receive Dona Angela de Pezuela and her 
family aboard the Andromache, where they were met by Admiral Cochrane, during 
a farewell visit the Lord made to his wife. ' 61 
This sort of humanitarian intervention, providing passage for loyalist or 
patriots, increased in the following months, and it deserves a small paragraph. As 
could be easily understood in a war of this kind, a number of people from one side 
or another tried to leave the country by any possible way. Foreign men-of-war 
were amongst the safest way of doing so and, consequently, several applications 
were made, especially for high ranked loyalist officials. Amongst them we can 
mention Generals Ricaford (September 1821) and Rodil (January 1826), and naval 
Commander Manuel Abreu (December 1821) who were received on board British 
men-of-war only after obtaining a proper permission from the patriots. 112 However, 
it seems that, in some cases, passage was provided without that permission. At 
least, that was what the Peruvian government claimed in the case of Spanish 
General Loriga, who sailed on board the Aurora, in July 1824.153 
By November 1820, having elapsed only five years since the final defeat of 
Napoleon, the presence of a French squadron on South American waters was 
considered with suspicion by Commodore Hardy on his reports to the Admiralty. 
Under the flag of Rear Admiral Jurien, the French naval force was formed by three 
men-of-war, as follows: ship-of-the-line Colosse, frigate Galatee and corvette 
L 'Echo, the first two of them entering the Pacific by late 1820.164 Considering that 
only two British frigates were stationed on the West Coast, Admiral Hardy dis- 
161. - Anna (1979): 169. ADM 51/3012. Cochrane 1: 109. Pezuela finally succeeded in leaving 
Peru. early in July 1821, in a clandestine way on board the North American merchant 
vessel General Brown [Pezuela: 847-863. Billingsley: 130-135 . 
162. - ADM 50/151.6/9/1821. A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 842,29/11/1821. 
163. - A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 839.11 & 16/7/1824. 
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patched another two men-of-war round the Cape: 6th rate Conway, Captain Basil 
Hall; ` and 5th rate Owen Glendower, Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer, ' being 
followed in February by Hardy himself on the Creole. By early 1821 the Pacific 
Squadron consisted of four men-of-war, almost half the actual force of the South 
America Station. 
The main reason for Hardy's presence on the Pacific was Cochrane. As 
already mentioned, the Chilean Admiral's attitude towards neutral vessels was 
fairly aggressive, and Hardy feared that it would grow in the following months. His 
apprehension increased shortly after his arrival at Valparaiso, when four British 
ships (Edward Ellice, Lord Suffield, Rebecca and Indian), captured by the Chilean 
squadron, entered the port. He also learned that other two British ships, loaded 
with rice, flour and corn, were detained and diverted to Huacho to supply the 
Expeditionary Army with their cargo. 16' 
Sailing to the Peruvian coast in late-April 1821, Hardy failed in his 
attempts to meet Cochrane and San Martin, returning to Valparaiso to complain to 
the Chilean Government for the detention of five British seamen on the O'Higgins 
and for the blockade of the Peruvian coast . 
168 He succeeded in the first case very 
easily, and orders were issued by the Supreme Director to release the five seamen. 
With respect to the blockade, he wrote additional letters making clear his decision 
to provide a more direct protection to those British ships trading along the 
Peruvian coast. Finally, on 22 June, the Chilean government issued a new decree 
165. - Captain Basil Hall entered the navy in 1802. He wrote several books on his naval service. 
one of which refers to his interview with Napoleon. at Santa Helena. His Extracts from a 
Journal written on the Coast of Chili, Peru and _\Jexico, in the 
Years 1820,1821,1822 
(Edinburgh, 1826), 2 vols.. provides valuable information from his personal experience in 
those years. and has been quoted by several authors. 
166. - Spencer entered the navy in 1804. He commanded the Owen Glendower from 1819 until 
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reducing the blockade to the coast between Ancon and Pisco (11°48' to 13°51' 
South). 16' 
A week later, having learned of new incidents with the Chilean Admiral, 
Hardy decided to force the Chilean government to put an end to what he 
considered to be Cochrane's abuses. He therefore landed and came to Santiago, 
from 29 June to 24 July, to make the claim stronger by his presence. In the meeting 
held with Bernardo O'Higgins, the British Commodore protested against 
Cochrane's attitude towards neutral ships, rating it as almost a piratical one. 
Hardy, who finally demanded to know whether the Chilean government sanctioned 
the attitude adopted by his admiral or not, received a satisfactory answer from 
O'Higgins, stating that Cochrane was acting beyond his instructions and "contrary 
to his wishes". "' Regarding this point, O'Higgins wrote, "I had to humiliate myself 
before the British chiefs to reconcile the insanity of this man -Cochrane- with the 
orderly running of our revolution". '71 
Almost a year later, when the Peruvian government had already been 
established, the Minister of War and Marine, Bernardo Monteagudo, was to refer 
to the same issue, pointing out that Cochrane had gone "not only beyond his 
Excellency's Instruction [San Martin], but in opposition to it". "' 
O'Higgins, first, and Monteagudo, later, must be taken as witnesses in any 
final judgement on Cochrane's activities in the Pacific. Despite the irrefutable 
success he achieved in clearing the sea of enemy vessels, he also created a great 
number of problems for both newly-established governments. It is easy now to 
criticize both Cochrane's attitude and O'Higgins' and Monteagudo's opinion, but 
169. - Gazeta 1linisterial cle Chile IL n° 81.24/2/1821. ADM 50/151: 20 & 27/5,13' 15.24 & 
26/6/1821. 
170. - Graham and Humphreys: 341-344. ADM 15 1: 19 & 21/7/1821. 
171. - Puente (1975) I: 394. 
172. - Monteagudo to Hardy. Lima 21/11/182!: enclosed with Hardy to Croker, Creole, Callao, 
30/11/1821, ADM i/28. 
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in the last resort without the "insanity of this man" the successful conclusion of the 
naval aspect of the war, and with it the expedition to Peru, would probably have 
been delayed. 
While Hardy remained at Valparaiso, the Peruvian situation deteriorated 
very fast. In May 1821, negotiations were held between loyalist and patriots, at 
Punchauca, trying to put an end to the war. During these discussions, both parties 
agreed to ask for a British guarantee to any agreement reached. This proposal was 
politely rejected by Captain Spencer, the senior officer at Callao, arguing that any 
British intrusion could threaten the neutrality which they were instructed to 
maintain. 1' 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of the blockade of Callao had a 
growing impact on the loyalist economy. Without trade, Callao and even Lima 
became a heavy charge to the already exhausted Public Treasure. This situation 
forced Viceroy La Serna to write a letter to Commodore Hardy, offering to 
provide a close attention to British interests, and even to open Callao to foreign 
vessels with flour (25 June). "' However, before any action could be taken, the 
loyalist abandoned Lima (July 1821). 
Within this context, some other incidents arose with the Chilean naval 
forces. During a cruise along the southern Peruvian coast, Cochrane forced four 
British ships to pay a duty to allow their trade with the ports already liberated, 
using as precedent the British rule of 1756 concerning neutral trade. "' One of them 
was hit by shots from Arica forts, on 5 April, when the San Martin, Cochrane's 
flag ship, opened fire upon them without giving notice to the neutral shipping. 17/6 A 
small garrison left by Cochrane at this port had to abandon it by late July. William 
173. - Vargas Vl: 153. 
174. - ADM 50/151.16/5/1821: 13/7/1821. 
175. - They were: Admiral Cockburn, Rebecca. Robert Fuge and Joseph [Hall to Hardv. 
Conway, 14/6/1821. ADM 1/261. 
176. - Billignslev: 137. Cochrane 1: 195-196. 
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Miller, the officer in command, forced a British vessel to take him and his troop to 
Pisco, giving in return permission to trade with Callao without being detained by 
the blockading squadron. " 
As already mentioned, by late June 1821, Viceroy La Serna understood the 
impossibility of keeping the capital under his control any longer. Finally, on 4 July, 
the loyalist army abandoned the town and withdrew to the Andes. Lima was placed 
under the control of the Cabildo, with only a small force of two hundred men to 
keep order. As serious disorders might arise at any moment, threatening the lives 
and property of the citizens and any foreigners in the town, the Cabildo asked 
Captain Basil Hall, of the Conway, for help. He agreed to provide this support, and 
British marines landed and marched to Lima, remaining there until the patriot army 
entered the city, on 6 July. Some days later, the Conway left Callao for Ancon, 
where she would remain for a few days. Lying at the anchorage were several 
neutral ships, heavily loaded with goods, awaiting the fall of Callao to the patriots 
and its opening to foreign trade. 178 
As Captain Hall's instructions 179 pointed out the convenience of having a 
complete account of the political situation in the places he visited, he wrote a very 
complete journal, part of which was published in 1826 as Extracts of a Journal 
written on the Coasts of Chili, Peru and Mexico, in the Years 1820,1821,1822. 
As this book was the sole printed account of a British Captain visiting Peru in 
those years, it was frequently quoted by Peruvian historians to refer to British 
opinion on San Martin's plans. Hall and San Martin met several times, and at their 
last encounter, the latter asked Hall to take aboard a male mummy, found in an 
archaeological place north of Lima, to be put on exhibition in London as a token of 
177. - Hardy to Croker. Creole, Callao. 19/8/1821, ADM 1/27. 
178. - Vargas. VI: 171. ADM 53/249,7/8/1821. 
179. - Instructions enclosed with Hardy to Croker, Creole Bahia, 14/10/1822. ADM 1/27. 
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friendship. The mummy was taken by the Conway to London, and delivered to the 
British Museum; however, we have found no trace of his exhibition. 18' 
Late in July 1821, Hardy sailed for Callao with the Creole and the Superb, 
Captain Adam Mackenzie. '8' On his arrival, Hardy found that a new incident had 
arisen with the Chilean squadron when the loyalist army left Lima. Captain Forster, 
who was in charge of the blockade, agreed with San Martin, La Serna and General 
La Mar, Governor of Callao's castles, to allow the departure of two British ships, 
the Lord Lyndock and the Saint Patrick, taking only Spanish passengers who were 
leaving the country. However, on 8 July, when Cochrane arrived, this permission 
was cancelled, and the ships declared to be offenders against the blockade. To 
reinforce his prohibition on leaving the port, Cochrane "personally informed the 
masters he would sink them if they attempted to come out. "` Even when the 
Conway was then present at Callao, the masters had no choice but to remain. For 
this reason, both ships received several shots when the blockading squadron at- 
tacked the forts, the night of 24 July. Before the cables were cut and the ships 
sailed out of the port, Thomas Fairborn, master of the Saint Patrick, was mortally 
injured. Having succeeded in leaving the port, both vessels were captured by the 
Chilean squadron, being released only after Hardy's intervention. Another two 
British vessels, the Wellington and Colonel Allen, were detained by Cochrane. The 
first of them was the former Spanish corvette Cleopatra, purchased by an English- 
man residing in Lima, and towed out of the Spanish line by the boats of the 
Conway, on 13 July. The Colonel Allen was loaded with wheat owned by 
Spaniards. Considering that both vessels were acting beyond normal usage of 
180. - Hall I: 186-187; 11: 54-55 
181. - Mackenzie entered the navy in 1777. In January 1821 commisioned with the Superb, re- 
turning to Britain in June 1822. He died in November 1823, being Captain of the Ocean 
[ADM 9/2,115. Marshall (11) l: 234-237. The Times 18 & 28/11/1823 1. 
182. - Graham and Humphreys: 345. 
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maritime war and clearly aside the permission given by Captain Forster, Hardy 
decided not to interfere. 183 
The loyalist withdrawal from Lima did not include Callao, which was still 
defended by a considerable garrison. Therefore, one of the first measures adopted 
by the newly established Peruvian government was to open the port of Ancon to 
foreign trade. Hardy was asked by Minister Monteagudo to give notice of this 
measure to those British merchant ships waiting to trade with Lima. '' 
Monteagudo's letter also asked Hardy to recognize Peruvian independence, but the 
latter, in a very polite way, replied that it was not in his power to give such 
recognition but that he would forward the request to the British government. 'ss 
The British Commodore reached Ancon late in August, where some forty 
British ships were lying at the anchorage, waiting for authorization to land 
approximately five thousand tons of goods. Finally, Lima market was about to be 
opened to foreign goods. A new kind of struggle would now be faced until the 
1850's by British and other foreign merchants: liberalism versus protectionism. 
Hardy had a first taste of it, when British merchants at Ancon complained to him 
on the excessive duties the newly established Peruvian government charged their 
goods. 
This long term struggle (liberalism versus protectionism) would provide a 
general background for the relations between the British squadron and the 
Peruvian government. The latter was organised by early August, and shortly after a 
national squadron began to be built up under the command of Captain Guise. 
Several of the officers and sailors of the Chilean Navy were attracted to the service 
183. - Graham and Humphreys: 344-346. ADM 50/151.22 & 24/8,3-6.8.11-13/9/1821. ADM 
51/3445. Gazeta del Gohierno de Chile, ill. n° 48 extraordinary 29/8/1821. 
184. - Some of these vessels were waiting for quite a while, since most merchants expected from 
San Martin a quickest capture of Lima and Callao. For instance, the Viper. William 
Bowers master. was loaded with wheat for eight months, expecting for the opening of 
Callao [Bowers: 911. 
185. - ADM 50/151.30/9 & 1,7.9-10/10/1821. Monteagudo to Hardy. Lima 21/11/1821: 
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of the newly formed squadron, and a serious misunderstanding between the 
Peruvian government and Admiral Cochrane ended with the departure of the 
Chilean squadron from the Peruvian coast. As a result of this, San Martin issued a 
declaration, dated 21 November, stating that Cochrane was acting on his own, and 
that the Peruvian government could accept no responsibility for that. 1 ' 
During the second half of 1821, British captains had to deal with a number 
of different situations which required great ability and common sense. The war at 
sea was substantially reduced, since loyalists only retained a few places along the 
West Coast from which they could conduct a privateering campaign. 
The Peruvian Navy (1821-1826) 
Peruvian independence was proclaimed by General San Martin at several 
places in Lima, on 28 July 1821. An independent government was established 
under his protection, and three Ministries were created: Foreign Affairs, Finance, 
and War and Marine. Despite the fact that the new government considered itself as 
a national representation, it should be born in mind that half of Peru was still in 
loyalist hands. Even worst, as later events will prove, only a minority of people in 
Lima truly supported the new government, most of them being indifferent, 187 
In general terms, in the following three years Peru will suffered a number 
of changes. The government shifted from San Martin to the Congress, and 
successively to Riva Agüero, Torre Tagle and finally Bolivar. All of them were 
much devoted to defeating the loyalist resistance up in the Andes to pay a close 
186. - Monteagudo to Hardy. Lima 21/9/1821; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, Creole. Callao, 
30/11/1821, ADM 1/28. ADM 50/151,8/11/1821. 
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attention to establishing a long term set of rules on foreign trade. Moreover, as 
several studies have proved, "' local merchants, despite being debilitated by the 
long economic struggle prior to Peruvian independence, were reluctant to support 
any liberal measure adopted from the government. With several ups and downs in 
the following decades, especially in the 1820's, only the beginning of the guano era 
(1850's) provided a favourable moment for the liberals to succeed in this conflict. 
During the early stages of it, in the very first years, many foreign merchants were 
attracted to Peru, which was considered the most valuable market in South 
America. Unfortunately for them, they soon realized that only a small part of 
Peruvian society could afford European goods. 
Heavily taxed since independence, a considerable number of commodities 
were introduced to Lima market as soon as it was opened (August 1821). 
However, in the following three years Lima changed hands several times between 
patriots and loyalist, threatening foreign capital invested in those goods. British 
captains provided as much support as they could to their countrymen, being the 
sole official representative of their government until a consular agent was 
appointed in 1824. 
The war at sea lasted until 1826, when General Rodil finally surrender at 
Callao. In those years, several blockades were established by the Peruvian 
government, against which British, North Americans and French captains used the 
same arguments as on previous occasions. As a result of that situation similar 
188 
.- 
Paul Gootenberg, "Los liberales asediados: La fracasada primera generaciön de 
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incidents happened. A number of British officers and seamen serving in the 
Peruvian squadron provided an additional source of conflict. 
This naval force began to be built up in September 1821, as soon as Callao 
surrendered to the patriots. Argentinean Bernardo Monteagudo was nominated 
Minister of War and Marine, Chilean General Luis de la Cruz appointed General 
Director of the Navy, and British Captain Martin Guise commissioned as 
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron. During the second half of 1821, the 
squadron comprising some purchased, captured or condemned vessels, achieved a 
considerable number in a very short time. The 1822 Peruvian Navy List includes 
the following men-of-war-"' 40-gun frigate Protector, Lieutenant Commander 
James Esmond, 34-gun frigate Guayas, Commander Tomas Guillermo Carter; and 
frigate Consecuencia, Captain Hipolito Bouchard; 12-gun sloop O'Higgins, 
Commander Jose Maria Garcia; 20-gun sloop Limena, Commander Carlos Garcia 
del Pöstigo; 18-gun brig Balcarce, Lieutenant Commander Juan Robinson; 14-gun 
brig Belgrano, Commander Guillermo Prunier; brig Regencia, Commander 
Bernardo Ureta; and brig Nancy, Commander Manuel Loro; 17-gun schooner 
Cruz, First Lieutenant James Gull; 7-gun schooner Macedonia, First Lieutenant 
Matias Godomar; and 1-gun schooner Castelli, Second Lieutenant Jose Wikham 
Former Spanish naval vessels and facilities, as well as regulations and a 
number of its officers, petty officers and men, who found themselves identified 
with Peru rather than with Spain, became part of the Peruvian Navy. 
The newly formed squadron's initial task was the establishment of a close 
control of the southern ports to deny their use by the loyalists. In September 1821, 
the frigate Consecuencia, Captain Bouchard, commissioned to fulfil this purpose at 
the port of Pisco, detained two British merchant vessels: the brig Nancy, William 
Dowling, master; and the Livonia, John Goodfellow, master. The former, having 
189. - Jose Gregorio Paredes, . 
llrnanaque Peruano Y Guia de Forasteros para el ano de 1822, 
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arrived from San Blas, a Mexican port still held by the loyalists, was obviously 
lying when he declared to Pisco's authorities Rio de Janeiro as his last port. 
Furthermore, Dowling was unable to present any one of the relevant papers of his 
ship. The cargo, part of which had already been landed prior to the detention, was 
confiscated and the crew was gaoled. Finally, a few days later, manned by a prize 
crew, the Nancy sailed to Callao. "' In November, having departed Valparaiso 
without license, the Livonia was also detained by Pisco authorities, her cargo, 
mainly grain, was landed and the vessel sent to Callao. "' 
Captain Mackenzie, of the Superb, by then at Callao, protested to the 
Peruvian Minister Monteagudo, not for the detention itself but for the ill treatment 
of the British crews and for having to dispose of the cargo before it was 
condemned. Several letters were exchanged on this issue and even when 
Monteagudo assured Mackenzie that orders were already given to return the 
cargo, nothing happened at Pisco. In the meantime, H. M. sloop-of-war Dauntless, 
Captain Gambier, called at Pisco in her way from Valparaiso to India, with 
instructions to obtain a full account of this incident. It seems that Gambier went 
beyond his orders during his three-day presence at this port, since he was accused 
by the Peruvian government of arresting the persons who guarded the Nancy and 
also for threatening to arrest the frigate Consecuencia. 19'- Even when this incident 
was not recorded in the Dauntless log, something happened at Pisco to lead 
Governor Pardo de Zela to complain against Gambier. The Peruvian government's 
190. - Dowling to Mackenzie, Pisco 9/10/1821: enclosed with Mackenzie to Monteagudo. 
Superb, Callao, 13/10/1821. A. H. de M. bergantin Vancv. Leguia, V: 624. Wilson to 
Palmerstone. Valparaiso. 24/2/1833, F. O. 61/23 & F. O. 61/18: 323-325. PRO. ADM 
50/151: 8/11/1821. 
191. - Goodfellow to Mackenzie. Livonia, Pisco. 9/10/1821: enclosed with Mackenzie to 
Monteagudo. Superb, Callao 13/10/1821, A. H. de M. bergantin : Vancv. ADM 50/151. 
31/7/1821. Leguia V: 621-623. PRO. F. O. 61/18: 293: 61/20: 173-174,190: F. O. 61/23. 
London. 7/6/1833, F. O. to Wilson: and Wilson to Palmerston, Valparaiso. 22/2/1833. 
192. - Gambier to Mackenzie. Dauntless, Callao 24/10/1821: enclosed with Mackenzie to 
Monteagudo, Superb, Callao 25/10/1821, A. H. de M. bergantin Nancy. Paz Soldän: 351- 
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protest was too much for Mackenzie's patience, and on 27 October he wrote a 
very energetic letter, pointing out that he was already weary 
"of so many Representations on this subject and lament to observe that the 
Orders of Government should be so evaded or tardily executed at even so 
short a distance as Pisco (... ) I should be wanting, Sir, in my duty did I 
tamely look on & see not only Property but the Persons of His British 
Majesty's Subjects, calling upon me for protection, exposed to such gross 
violations without strongly but respectfully appealing to the Supreme 
Government of the Country". 193 
More strongly written was his last letter, dated five days later, mentioning 
that this sort of incident was far from being the best way to promote "mutual good 
by exchanging the productions and commodities of each" country, and stating that 
a formal protest was to be forwarded to the British government. 19' 
Less than a month later, because of the war, both British merchant ships 
were already commissioned by the Peruvian government, the Nancy as brig-of-war 
and the Livonia as transport. Their trials were to last until February 1822, when 
the Peruvian Supreme Court condemned both British ships as good prizes. 19` 
During the following decade, the British government claimed against the sentence 
and finally succeeded in obtaining a full compensation for the shipowners. 
These two cases, and others in the following years, were used by some 
Peruvian historians to blame the British government for abusing the strength of 
British warships in the area. However, the facts pointed out that serious 
miscarriages of justice were committed by Peruvian authorities, either at the 
moment of the capture itself or during the trials. The most common of them were 
the improper landing and disposal of the cargo, and the use of the prize before 
193. - Mackenzie to Monteagudo. Superb, Callao 27/1011821. A. H. de M.. bergantin . 
Vance. 
194. - Mackenzie to Monteagudo. Superb, Callao 1/11/1821. A. H. de M.. bergantin Nancy. Paz 
Solddn: 353. 
195. - Guise to Monteagudo, Callao 5/11/1821, A. H. de M. bergantin : Vance: corbeta Livonia 
1821. does. 9-10, Capitania de Puerto del Callao, entradas y salidas dc buques 1821, doe. 
52. Paz Solddn: 351-352. 
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being condemned. On the other hand, even when Captain Mackenzie's attitude was 
energetic, his correspondence did not include any threat of using force. Only 
Captain Gambier's uncertain attitude at Pisco could be blamed as violent, but even 
so, it is doubtful that a 18-gun sloop could be a real menace to a frigate such as the 
Consecuencia. 
On 21 September, Callao fortress surrendered to the Patriots and 
consequently the port was opened to foreign vessels. A week later, provisional 
regulations for trade were issued by the Peruvian government, opening Callao and 
Huanchaco to foreign trade. In general terms, these regulations kept strong 
reminiscences of the over-protective Spanish system. Import tax was fixed at 251,10, 
and to save 5%, foreign traders had to appoint Peruvian agents; import of goods 
already produced in the country were charged double; and a lower rate was fixed 
for Peruvian and other Latin American merchant ships. Silver coins were to pay 
5% as export duties, gold was rated as 2.5%, while the export of non minted silver 
was prohibited. '96 Despite these restrictions, the regulations were welcomed by 
most of the British merchants, who asked Captain Mackenzie to represent their 
favourable opinion to the Peruvian government. There are some Peruvian 
historians who suggest that a number of British merchants protested against these 
regulations; however, we have found no proof of their complaints. 19' 
A great number of foreign vessels arrived at Callao in the succeeding days, 
most of them having been waiting at anchor in Ancon and, shortly after that, local 
stores were overwhelmed by their goods. This unusual concentration of foreign 
ships and property, in a port which offered good prospects to newly arrived 
merchants, and with an avid navy of able seamen, produced a considerable number 
of desertions amongst foreign vessels, especially British and North American ones. 
The first reason was to persist for almost the whole century, but the last one 
196 .- Paz 
Solddn: 235. 
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disappeared as soon as the irregularity of payment and the poor quality of the food 
in the newly formed Peruvian squadron became well-known amongst foreign 
seamen arriving at Callao. As early as November 1821 the number of North 
American and British deserters was so great that some of them were reported as 
wandering in Lima and Callao "in great disgrace". "' 
The situation of those foreign seaman serving in the Peruvian squadron 
deteriorated very quickly, and by late 1822 discipline in Peruvian men-of-war was 
seriously affected. At midnight on the 9 December 1822, British sailors of the 
Belgrano took control of the ship, received on board some other British sailors, 
from land and from the schooner-of-war Cruz, landed their officers and sailed for 
the Philippines. As the Peruvian Squadron was out at Puertos Intermedios, the 
local naval authority asked the help of the British brims sloop Alacrity and the U. S. 
schooner Dolphin to recapture the Belgrano, qualifying her as a pirate vessel. 
Nevertheless, both Lieutenant Bance, of the Alacrity, and the Dolphin's Captain 
refused to interfere as the mutineers had shown no piratical intentions at all, 
considering that only Peruvian warships were concerned with the brig's capture. 
When Hardy learned of this incident, and of a similar one involving the Chilean 18- 
gun brig Galvarino, he gave "the necessary orders to Captain Prescott, of the 
Aurora, to capture her if she committed any piratical act on British ships". " 
As soon as Callao was opened to foreign trade, a number of problems 
arose between foreign masters and the newly constituted Peruvian authorities, with 
the consequent intervention of foreign naval captains. =01 Even when in many cases 
some local authorities abused their position, the Peruvian government considered 
the latter's intervention were interfering in Peruvian internal policy. For this 
reason, when a new set of trade rules was issued on 17 October 1821, granting 
198. - Hardy to Croker, Creole. Callao. 30/11/1821, ADM 1/28. 
199. - A. H. de M. corbeta Livonia 1822; bergantin Be/grano 1822. Puente (1975) 1: 429-430. 
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rights of citizenship to those foreigners trading in Peru, it also established that they 
"should no longer enjoy the privilege of complaining to, and claiming the 
protection of, the commanders of vessels belonging to their several nations", unless 
for those cases recognized by the Law of Nations, such as a complete infraction to 
their rights. Accordingly, they would be liable to national laws and subject "to all 
contributions which might be levied by government, as well as to the bearing of 
arms for the maintenance of public tranquillity" but not to a point to "be called to 
march against the public enemy". "' 
Captain Mackenzie, of the Superb, who was at Callao when the decree was 
issued, wrote to the government pointing out that he reserved his right to observe 
the decree until Hardy's arrival at the port. Nonetheless, British captains continued 
offering their protection to those British masters who feared that port authorities 
were about to detain their vessels. '°` 
As a result of the war itself, the Peruvian mercantile marine decreased 
considerably, seriously affecting coastal traffic and the government's incomes, 
which heavily depended on external and internal trade. As the former was already 
in foreign hands, for the aforementioned reason, it became clear that coastal trade 
should also be opened for them. In May 1822 foreign ships were allowed to 
undertake this service. It was a good chance to make profitable business and a 
number of British shipowners applied for the necessary permission. It was granted 
with a single condition, that foreign merchant vessels agreed to be governed by 
national regulations in the same way as national merchant ships. '°3 Many of these 
vessels were to trade with the loyalists in Southern Peru, a coast which was 
officially under blockade, but the government found it proper to allow that trade 
201. - Thomas Sutcliffe, Sixteen years in Chile and Peru, from 1822 to 1839. By the retired 
governor of Juan Fernandez. London. Fisher, 1841: 55. Gaceta del Gohierno, 
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on payment of an extra duty. As can be easily understood, these sort of measures 
were regarded as illegal by foreign naval captains. 
Despite this problem, by late 1824 British trade in South Peru was already 
considerable, to the extend that a number of British agents established themselves 
at Quilca, Arequipa, Tacna, Arica, etc. One year later, in December 1825, a visitor 
to Tacna wrote: 
"Tacna appeared more like a British colony than a Spanish one. It is 
amazing how soon every new market opened to our trade is overwhelmed; 
what a matter of regret it is, to find the national competition, the merchants 
and manufacturers eating each other, the latter especially going to ruin by 
engrossing the three branches of ship-owner, merchant, and manufacturer, 
instead of confining themselves to their own particular business". " 
In fact, as skilful merchants, the British sustained trade with loyalist and 
patriots, trying to take advantage of both of them. A good example of this was the 
settlement they reached in early 1824, following the occupation of Lima and Callao 
by the loyalist, or in 1825, while the patriots blockaded and besieged Callao, 
enabling the small fishing village of Chorrillos, south of Callao, to be open to 
foreign trade. In both cases British merchants were allowed to continue with their 
trade in Lima and Callao. Even when loyalist Marshall Monet refused to give a 
formal authorization to a trade which was prohibited by colonial legislation, he 
stated that any goods introduced into Callao were due to pay duties to help 
support the loyalist army. British Captains at Callao in those days, represented to 
Monet British merchants' gratitude for this determination, and asked him to allow 
them to stay or to freely leave the country. `05 
204. - Joseph Andrews, Journey from Buenos _- ores, through the provinces of 
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Tucuman, and Salta, to Potosi, thence by the deserts of Caranja to . -irica, and 
subsequently, to Santiago de Chili and Coquimbo, undertaken on behalf of the Chilian 
and Peruvian : Mining . -Issociation in the years 
1825-26. London. John Murray, 1827: 
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The general situation of the war was to remain with no major changes until 
1823. In the meantime, the loyalists not only retained Southern Peru but were also 
able to advance and occupy Lima. Two expeditions were sent against them by the 
Peruvian government, following a general strategy elaborated by San Martin. The 
Junta appointed by the Congress to rule the country, following San Martin's 
retirement, in September 1822, sent the first of this expeditions. Defeated by the 
loyalist in January 1823, the Army removed the Junta to appoint Colonel Jose de la 
Riva Agüero as President of Peru. He was to sent the second expedition, which 
was as much a failure as the previous one. Almost immediately, Lima was occupied 
by the loyalist and Riva Agüero's government abandoned the city first to Callao 
and afterwards to Trujillo, were he established a new government which was not 
recognized by the Congress. Late in that year, with General Simon Bolivar and 
Colombian troops already in Peru, the Congress appointed Marquis of Tone Tagle 
as President, declaring war on Riva Agüero and his followers as rebels. By early 
1824, Lima was occupied once again by the loyalist, forcing the Congress to 
entrust all political and military power to Bolivar, while Tone Tagle surrender to 
the loyalists. Bolivar was to initiate the final campaign against the loyalists, which 
ended at the Battle of Ayacucho (9 December 1824), with the defeat of Viceroy La 
Serna. 
British trade in Lima and Callao was affected by the circumstances of the 
war, especially as loyalists and patriots took turns in the control of one or both 
places. In each one of these cases, the British squadron acted in the protection of 
their nationals. 
In early April 1822, the patriots were defeated at Ica, and it was feared that 
the loyalists would advance towards Lima. The Callao anchorage was crowded 
with more than sixty ships, "principally English merchantmen", the port had plenty 
of stores and goods, and Lima had a considerable "number of smart shops, 
abounding in French silks and jewellery and British goods of every sort and 
J 1r 
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description". When news of this defeat reached Lima, some measures were taken 
to prepare the defence of the city and its port, and it was rumoured "that an 
attempt would be made to embody foreigners into a company of militia" . 
206 To 
avoid being involved in the conflict, a number of them took refuge in the shipping 
"and many of the merchants put all their specie, for safety, on board H. M. 
brig-of-war Alacrity, then lying in the harbour. " The panic was so extensive that 
even the Peruvian government entrusted some public funds to British naval 
custody. Disregarding the generalized attitude of their nationals, a small number of 
British merchants "volunteered a much more welcome and efficient measure, that 
of raising a subscription of some thousand dollars for the assistance of the 
Government in its present exigencies". =07 The loyalists did not advanced on Lima 
this time, and with some hesitation foreign merchants landed and returned to their 
activity. 
In 18 June 1823, a strong loyalist column, under generals Canterac and 
Valdez, advanced towards Lima, forcing the government to abandon the city. The 
British merchant Robert Proctor wrote a first-hand account of those uncertain 
days. On June 15, Proctor abandoned Lima for Callao, "intending to find shelter on 
ship-board" for himself and his family, and two days later came aboard the Aurora 
with an official letter for Captain Prescott, '°8 "from the merchants, requesting him 
to come to Lima to negotiate with the Spaniards". Attending this request, Prescott 
landed and meet Canterac, who had just demanded "from the city the sum of 
350,000 dollars, to be paid before four o'clock in the afternoon. " As the British 
Captain stated that "it was utterly impossible to raise the sum in the given time", 
the Spanish General was polite but determined, and only after a long conversation 
206 
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on this issue, "he altered his resolutions: about 150,000 dollars were paid at the 
time specified". 209 
That was not the only problem. It should be remembered that colonial laws 
were still in force, and Canterac also mentioned this topic in his conversation with 
Prescott. "He said if the English would send their property to his camp, it should 
be protected, but that while it was in the city, it must take its chance. " Even when 
British properties were respected by the loyalist, a number of robberies were 
committed "between the evacuation of the patriot troops and the entrance of the 
Spaniards. " For this reason, when the loyalist abandoned the city, by mid-July, 
Prescott requested and obtained permission both from loyalist and patriot's 
generals "to march a body of marines into Lima, to protect British property and 
houses". "' This was the second opportunity in which British marines were landed 
for this purpose, the first was in July 1821, when the Conway's marines did the 
same at the request of Lima Council. British merchants showed their gratitude to 
Captain Prescott by awarding him with a present worth 1,500 dollars. 
Lima and Callao were occupied by the loyalists once again in February 
1824, following a revolt of Callao's castles garrison. Immediately, Captain William 
F. Martin, of the brig-sloop Fly, by then the sole British naval vessel at Callao, 
dispatched boats and marines to protect British ships and property. There were 
more than forty vessels lying in the harbour at gun-range, fifteen of them were 
British. Despite gun-fire from the fortress, twelve sailed out during the following 
days, but three remained because their sails had been taken ashore. Learning that, 
on 12 February, Martin sent an armed boat which towed them out of the 
anchorage, and a landing party forced the harbour master's office, which was 
209. - Robert Proctor.: Varrative of a Journey across the cordillera of the . -indes. and of a 
residence in Lima and other parts of Peru, in the years 1823 and 1824. London 1825: 
136.140-144. 
210. - Idem.: 144,153-154. 
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abandoned as a result of the revolt, to recover the papers of these vessels. '" As far 
as we know, no complaint was made by loyalist authorities about Martin's attitude. 
The new ruler of Callao, Colonel Casariego, had good relations with 
British Captains. Before the revolt, he was a prisoner of the patriots, but even so, 
his son was received aboard the Aurora, and Captain Prescott obtained leave for 
him to visit the British frigate on his parole. With this background, British 
merchants asked and obtained Casariego's permission to re-ship their properties in 
Callao on a payment of 15% of its value, but the arrival of the Peruvian frigate 
Prueba, on 17 February, interrupted the proceedings. `' 
As Callao was already in enemy hands, and loyalist Marshall Monet was 
approaching with fresh troops, the patriots were forced to abandon the city. 
Fearing that the absence of any respectable force would lead to lawlessness and 
robbery, the town council asked Captain Martin to intercede before Marshall 
Monet for a quick entry to the city. Consequently, a British Lieutenant formed part 
of the deputation sent to the loyalist camp, and two days later, on 29 February 
1824, Monet's troops entered the city. ='3 
Until December, Lima's situation remained uncertain, to the extent that the 
city council asked twice for the landing of Royal Marines to protect neutral lives 
and properties. The first time, early in October, one hundred men were landed and 
stayed in Lima until the 14, when loyalist troops reoccupied the city. The second 
time was on 5 December, when the city was abandoned definitively by loyalist 
troops. This time, the Cambridge's marines landed and helped Colonel Soler, the 
newly appointed Prefect of Lima, to control the city. As a greater number of 
211. - ADM 51/317.1. Hardy to Croker, Creole, Rio de Janeiro. 30/8/1823, ADM 1/28. Bowers: 
283. Proctor: 342-343. Sutcliffe: 81-86. 
212. - Ideen. 
213. - Proctor: 353. 
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patriot troops entered the city on the following day, the marines returned on 
board. '-' 1 
Probably the most urgent issue which had to be faced by the Peruvian 
government in those initial years, was to raise enough funds to continue the war. 
All possible ways to obtain money were employed: local and external loans, as well 
as voluntary and forcible contributions. British subjects were to participate in all of 
these ways, one of the most important being the loan given in 1822 for a total 
value of 1'200,000 pounds sterling which was to generate the first Anglo-Peruvian 
Debt, only settled twenty seven years latter. 215 The British Pacific squadron was 
not related to this debt at any stage, but it became deeply involved in supporting 
British merchants when the Peruvian government tried to force them to contribute. 
On 27 September 1822, the Peruvian Congress issued a decree stating that 
merchants trading in Lima were due to contribute 400,000 pesos to the war effort. 
The Tribunal del Consulado, being responsible for the collection, assigned one 
quarter of the total amount as the share to be covered by British merchants, who 
were under as much obligation as Peruvians in everything concerning taxes and 
contributions, according to the trading regulations dated 17 October 1821. 
Nevertheless, British merchants, under the chairmanship of John Moens, refused to 
contribute and decided to leave the country instead. Consequently, Moens wrote to 
Captain Prescott, informing him of their decision and asking him to be received on 
board the Aurora and to request their passports from the Peruvian Government. 
Prescott conferred what they wanted but, in his reply, he remarked that British 
merchants were already trading under Peruvian law and therefore were subject to 
local taxes. The British Captain wrote to the Minister of War and Marine and to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking both for guarantees for their fellow 
214. - Maling to Eyre, Callao. 8/12/1824, enclosed with Eure to Croker, Spartiate, Rio de Janeiro 
4/3/1825. ADM 1/29. 
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countrymen and for their passports. Guarantees were quickly offered, but no 
passports were issued despite the Minister's promise. After a prudent period of 
waiting, Prescott had an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform 
him that the Aurora was to prevent any British vessel entering the port until pass- 
ports were granted. On the next morning, 10 October, the Aurora left anchorage to 
intercept a British brig which was arriving, sending her to San Lorenzo. Both the 
Peruvian government and the British Captain were aware that preventing British 
shipping entering the port would affect import duties, the sole regular income of 
the government, and consequently, on 11 October a decree was issued allowing 
British merchants and their properties to leave the country. This misunderstanding 
between British merchants and the Peruvian government was to be solved in the 
following days, and a loan of 73,400 pesos was offered by the former and accepted 
by the latter, under certain conditions. However, a new statement was made by the 
Government, confirming that no exception was to be made for foreigners in future 
contributions. 216 
As this sort of incident would occur with certain regularity in the following 
years, with almost similar results, it deserves some comments on the attitude 
adopted by the parties involved. The Peruvian government acted with great naivete 
in believing that foreigners would accept without protest any sort of contribution, 
especially when they knew that their trade was essential to the newly-formed 
republic. British merchants took advantage of this fact and of the presence of 
Captain Prescott, who realized that they were acting against local regulations but 
felt unable to refuse his protection. Despite Prescott's reflections concerning their 
legal condition, the merchants also knew that being a British man-of-war at Callao 
they would be safe. 
216. - Gaceta del Gobierno, 28/9 & 12/10/1822. Prescott to Hardy & to Valdivieso. Callao. 7& 
10/10/1822; enclosed with Hardy to Croker, Creole, Bahia, 7/3/1823. ADM 1/27. ADM 
50/151,5/3/1821. Gustavo Pons Muzzo v Alberto Tauro (editors). 'Primer Congreso 
Constituvente". en C. D. I. P. t. XV, Lima 1973-1975, f: 145,15+, 156: III: 30,45. Paz 
Soldän: 17-20. 
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Framed by this general situation, the war at sea was conducted mainly by 
the Peruvian squadron, helped by some Chilean men-of-war, against a few loyalist 
privateers. In 1821, the loyalist controlled not only Southern Peru, but also Chiloe, 
in Chile, and San Bias, in Mexico. In late 1824 they lost control of South Peru and 
San Blas, but in return they gained Callao. From 1821 until 1824, almost all of the 
logistic support received by the loyalist in Peru was carried out by neutral shipping 
calling at Puertos Intermedios, named so after their position between Callao and 
Valparaiso. It was important to the Peruvian government to deny the use of these 
ports to the enemy. 
With this purpose in mind, and linked to the expeditions sent to Alto Peru, 
two blockades were declared, on 15 October 1821 and on early March 1822. 
Both of them considered the coast too long to be effectively covered by the 
Peruvian squadron, from Nazca and Pisco to Cobija (about 14° to 24° South). 
Mainly for this reason, but also because the second one did not provide enough 
time of grace for those merchant ships already heading to those ports, they were 
rejected by British, North American and French naval captains. At least in the first 
case, the Peruvian government realized that it would be more realistic to allow 
ships of these three powers to carry on with their trade, with the sole restriction on 
war contraband. That, at least, was the answer received by Hardy. " 
Obviously, a number of incidents arose in respect these two blockades. For 
instance, in April 1822, as the British brig Brazen was captured, Captain Prescott 
protested emphatically and ordered Captain Maclean, of the Blossom, to return to 
Valparaiso via Quilca, to assist other British vessels in the area. On his arrival at 
this port, later that month, he found the U. S. ship-of-the-line Franklin and the 
French frigate L Amazon, providing close support for their national shipping 
217. - Gaceta del Gobierno 15/10/1821. Hardy to Croker. Creole, Callao. 14/11/1821. ADM 
1/28. A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 839.4/4/1823. 
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entering and leaving the port, in defiance of Peruvian Captains' protest. "' The 
Franklin hoisted the flag of Commodore Charles Stewart, who also had under his 
command the sloop-of-war Dolphin. 220 
On 16 March 1824, following the fall of Callao into loyalist hands, the 
Peruvian government issue a decree increasing the coast under blockade up to 
Chancay, providing legal support to the blockade of Callao already established by 
Guise since February 19.221 However, this decree had some particulars which made 
it as inapplicable as the previous ones. For instance, it forbade any sea trade from 
Chancay to Cobija, but insisted on payment of duty at 25% of the cargo value. 
Captain Thomas Brown '222 recently arrived 
from Valparaiso with the Tartar, 
protested immediately, considering that the decree inflicted basic rules such as a 
period of grace for those vessels coming from distant places, or the absurd situa- 
tion of collecting import taxes for those goods destined to a territory not under its 
control. To make this complaint more emphatic, Brown stated that any British 
sailor in the Peruvian service who became involved in hostile act towards British 
vessels on the high seas, were liable to be prosecuted under British law. He 
probably made this statement having Admiral Guise in mind, as relations between 
both of them were not on a good standing at that moment as a consequence of a 
previous incident. 33 At Pisco, Admiral Guise had forced the Thomas Nowland, 
William Clarke master, to choose between paying the duties or leaving the port 
with no cargo on board. "' The master agreed to pay with 85 jars of pisco, a locally 
made liqueur, but as soon as his ship arrived at Callao he asked for Captain 
Prescott's support to recover his pisco. Consequently, the Aurora sailed to Pisco, 
219. - Puente (1975)1: 4')4-435. Billingsley: 160-163. ADM 50/151,6/6/1823. ADM 53/141. 
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where the Protector, Guise's flag-ship, was anchored. Prescott's complaint was to 
be answered by the Admiral, but no solution was reached. Therefore, the issue was 
presented directly to the Peruvian government. 225 In the meantime, the news of the 
increasing of the blockade's limits, reached Rear-Admiral Eyre, the British 
Commander-in-Chief, at Rio de Janeiro. He immediately gave clear instructions to 
the senior officer in the Pacific, to capture and detain any warship acting against 
the Law of Nations, and to retain the Captain until the government gave 
guarantees or he himself ordered his release. 126 
Without reaching such an extreme position, British men-of-war acted with 
greater decision on the protection of their shipping. That was the case of the 
British schooner Mermaid, detained by the 20-gun brig Congreso, on 24 June 
1824, and liberated by an armed boat sent by Captain Bowles. '21 In the following 
weeks, the Cambridge was to protect several other vessels on entering Callao (the 
sloop Royal Sovereign, and the brigs Antelope, Duncan Forbes, Elizabeth, Atlas 
and Esther). 2 So close a protection helped the loyalist to increase the number of 
their privateers. This was the case of the schooner Grecia, a former Royal Navy 
vessel, which was allowed to sail into Callao anchorage to enter into communica- 
tion with the Cambridge. But the master did not honour his word, he not only 
landed but even sold the schooner to Rodil. A few days later, the Grecia was 
captured by Guise and sent to Trujillo to be condemned. 229 
In real terms, this blockade was basically concentrated on Callao, where 
some incidents occurred. One of them was the result of the difference of opinion 
between Admiral Guise and the British and North American Senior Officers, in 
225. - [dem., 3,4 & 12/6/1824. 
226. - Brown to Bolivar. Tartar. Callao_ 24/5/1824: Prescott to Brown. . Iurora. Callao. 7/6/1824 _ 
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respect to the concept of being in port. The former claimed that Callao port 
included all the Bay, while the latter replied that foreign ships were not to be 
considered in port as long as they remained out of the fortress' rang e. '30 
During those years (1821-1824), the Pacific squadron was under the 
command of succeeding senior officers. As no consular agent was appointed until 
1824, British captains had to fulfil consular matters, such as settling controversies 
amongst British skippers, supercargoes and crews. This particular aspect was far 
more complicated due to the great mobility of the squadron. It should be born in 
mind that the area under its responsibility was enormous, covering not only the 
west coast of America, but also the South Seas Islands. In fact, the Pacific 
Squadron had to protect British interest from the Cape Horn Meridian to 170° 
West Longitude. As can be easily understood, despite its importance, it was not 
always possible to have a vessel at Callao, and even so, the time each one of them 
remained at port, was also limited. Consequently, it became absolutely necessary to 
have a consular agent settled in Callao as well as in other important ports all along 
the area under the Squadron's control. 
Towards the end of 1823, the British government decided to appoint 
consular agents in the newly established Latin American republics. Late in 
December, the Cambridge, Captain Thomas Maling, left England with three consul 
generals on board (for Montevideo, Santiago and Lima). Mr Thomas Charles 
Rowcroft, the first British Consul General in Peru, landed at Callao on 21 June 
1824; in the company of his Secretary, Mt. Willimott, and V. Passmore, appointed 
Vice-Consul at Quilca, Arequipa. 231 
Unfortunately, Consul General Rowcroft was shot dead on 6 December 
1824, in a lamentable incident when he was returning to Lima from the Cambridge. 
230. - Idem.. 23/6/1824. 
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He came on board with his daughter, duly authorized both by Bolivar and Rodil to 
cross the front safely, to deliver some correspondence for the Foreign Office. It 
was about 5 p. m. when he finally began his way back, despite General Rodil's 
advice to wait for the following day to make a safer crossing of the lines. Half a 
mile after the loyalist line, darkness came, and some minutes later a warning shot 
was made by patriots' sentinels. The Consul General, showing great imprudence, 
left his carriage and, riding the horse of one of his servants, took the front, calling 
the other to follow him. A few minutes later a number of shots were fired and 
Rowcroft fell down mortally wounded, dying on the following day. Captain Mating 
buried him with full honours in the island of San Lorenzo, and his daughter was 
received on board the Cambridge to be convoyed back to Britain. Rowcroft's 
attitude was unnecessarily risky, even foolish, and the only explanation we found 
was his lack of experience in South America. Mailing accepted this situation as an 
accident, and no complaint was made to the Peruvian government. A few days 
later, the Mersey entered Quilca to transport the Vice Consul Passmore to 
Chorrillos to take charge of the Consulate. -32 
Between 1821 and 1824, the Pacific Squadron was formed by an average 
of four men-of-war. A force strong enough if acting together, but not so much in 
the way it was deployed. As soon as loyalist naval power disappeared from the 
Eastern Pacific, foreign merchants began to operate along the western coast of 
America. As already mentioned, first Valparaiso, then Callao, afterwards 
Guayaquil, Panama, San Bias, and some other ports, were visited by foreign men- 
of-war, providing protection to their nationals. During these years the most 
unsettled place was Peru, and therefore British, North American and French 
squadrons concentrated their efforts in that part of the station. The normal strength 
of North American and French squadrons was two men-of-war, the largest of them 
being a frigate. Despite the fact that foreign captains faced similar problems, they 
232. - Maling to Eyre. At Sea, 14/12/1824: enclosed with Evre to Croker. Soartiate, Rio de 
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retained a certain suspicion of each other, especially the British in respect of the 
French. In 1823, for instance, international relations between both countries 
deteriorated, to a point that it was reasonable to think of a new war. To prevent 
such an event, both British and French Pacific Squadrons would be involved in a 
solitary campaign, both senior naval officers, Captain Prescott and Baron Roussin, 
agreed to respect Callao's neutrality. "' 
The major naval threat to the British squadron were patriot and loyalist 
forces. The former consisted of a considerable number of vessels under the flag of 
a former British Navy Commander, Vice-Admiral Guise. Despite his efforts to 
conduct a proper maritime war against the loyalist, Guise was unable to prevent 
gross failures on his government's conception of maritime war, such as the 
blockades. Forced to fulfil his duties as the Peruvian Squadron Commander-in- 
Chief, he came through several embarrassing situations, especially with British 
captains. Neither Guise nor the Peruvian government were willing to be involved in 
a major incident with foreign powers, and sooner or latter they relinquished their 
position in favour of what foreign captains required. In practical terms, loyalist 
naval power had not existed since 1821, as those privateers operating from San 
Blas, Chiloe and eventually Callao were not a real threat to the British squadron. 
Aside official positions, and always in general terms, personal relations 
between British captains and both patriot and loyalist leaders remained good. 
Commodore Hardy, for instance, was amongst those invited by San Martin to the 
ceremony of presentation of the Orden del Sol (Order of the Sun), a sort of nobility 
(chivalry) order created in December 1821. 'ßa On July 1823, General O'Higgins 
was received on board the Fly and taken to Callao, having being deposed as 
Supreme Director of Chile. In October that year, Captain Maclean, of the Blossom, 
met Viceroy La Serna at Quilca, being informed by him about the general situation 
233. - O'Bvrne, Op. Cit. ADM 50/151.2/8/1823. 
234. - Graham and Humphreys: 353. ! cguia V: 151. ADM 50/151,16/12/1821. 
/lei 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
of the war and the chaos involving the independent government. 5 By late 1823, 
Captain Thomas Brown, of the Tartar, held some interviews with members of 
Tone Tagle's government, receiving a good general impression of them and 
obtaining a special treatment for British merchant ships calling at Puertos Interme- 
dios. 236 On 10 August 1824, Captain Maling, of the Cambridge, met General Rodil 
at Callao Castles. That November, Maling and Captain Martin, of the Fly, landed 
at Chancay to present their respects to General Bolivar. The latter entertained them 
and returned the visit twice in the following two days. In his report on these visits, 
Maling states that Bolivar showed a friendly attitude towards Britain and clearly 
distrusted the French. =37 
One of the few Peruvian authorities unable to have a good personal 
relationship with British Captains was Admiral Guise, mainly because of his own 
position as Commander-in-Chief of the Peruvian Squadron. His differences with 
Captain Maling, of the Cambridge, were not softened when both met on board that 
British man-of-war, on 26 July 1824. Guise accused Maling of favouring the 
Spaniards, while the latter sent one of his lieutenants before Bolivar to represent 
his point of view in respect of the incidents arising from the enforcement of the 
blockade by the Peruvian Admiral. 238 However, when in 1826, having been 
dismissed for certain political differences with Bolivar, Vice Admiral Guise was 
imprisoned in Lima, he was visited by Captain Maling and Captain Maxwell, of the 
Briton, as a gesture of friendship to a countryman. On 17 September 1826, when 
Guise was finally acquitted, he was received on board the Cambridge with full 
honours according to his rank. 239 
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236. - Eyre to Croker. Spartiate, Rio de Janeiro, 12/6/1824 & 2/5/1825, ADM 1/29. A. H. de M. 
Libro Copiador 903,18/12/1823. 
237. - Maling to E\re. Callao. 14/12/1824: enclosed with Evre to Croker. Sparriate, Rio de 
Janeiro, 4/3/1825. ADM 1/29. 
238. - A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 839,30/7/1824. 
239 
.- 
Hugh Salvin, Journal written on board of His _faiestv's Ship Cambridge from Januarv, 
1824, to May, 1827, by the Rev. if. 5., Ch plain, Newcastle, Edward Walker, 1829: 87. 
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Rodil's resistance 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
1824 was a crucial year for the independence of South America. Royalist 
troops were defeated in two major battles (Junin, on 6 August; and Ayacucho, on 
9 December), at Ayacucho, General La Serna, the last Viceroy in America, finally 
surrendered his forces. They included the garrisons of Callao, under Brigadier 
Rodil, and Chiloe, commanded by Brigadier Quintanilla; and the army of Brigadier 
Olaneta, in Alto Peru; none of whom accepted the capitulation. The latter army 
was finally defeated in March 1825. Chiloe, was to resist until early 1826, when it 
finally surrendered to Chilean forces. During this period, Quintanilla commissioned 
a number of privateers, some of which acted clearly above the law. British men-of- 
war visited Chiloe on several occasions, first to announce Ayacucho's capitulation 
to Quintanilla, and later to protect British shipping, threatened by royalist 
privateers. `40 The third case, Callao two years' resistance and its implications for 
British-Peruvian relations, need more detailed treatment. 
By late 1824 British naval captains and crews stationed in the Pacific were 
far from the attitude adopted thirteen years previously by Captain Fleeming. In 
general terms, they felt liking for the patriots, and when the news of their final 
success at Ayacucho was received on board the Cambridge, it was cheered by 
every one and some officers even asked for Captain Maling's permission to give 
three hurrays for the patriot's triumph. Putting aside his own personal feelings, 
Mating did not grant the permission as he considered improper such an attitude 
from a neutral power. 241 
240. - The _I 
ferse v, Captain Ferguson. visited Cliloe in March 1824. to complain before General 
Quintanilla for the capture of the brig Katherine. The Eclair, Captain Bourchier, sailed in 
July 1825 to Chiloe in order to inform General Quintanilla of the general situation of 
South America and Europe [Eyre to Croker, Spartiate, Rio de Janeiro. 18/6/1824 and 
ti'elleslev, Rio de Janeiro. 25/11/1825, ADM 1/29. Bowers II: 145-163.190-1911. 
241 
.- 
Salvin, Op. Cit. 
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As Callao was still held by General Rodil, at the request of the Peruvian 
government, Captain Maling agreed to convoy Peruvian Colonel Monteagudo and 
two Spanish officers, to inform Rodil of the capitulation. On 26 December 1824, 
the Cambridge anchored out of the range of Callao's fortress with these three 
officers on board. Immediately, Maling sent a letter to the Spanish General, 
offering his ship for a meeting between Rodil's commissioners and those already on 
board, or asking for his permission to land the Spanish emissaries. Already aware 
of La Serna's capitulation, and with a special mention of the surrender of the 
Callao fortress, Rodil had no intention of following suit, hoping that 
reinforcements coming from Spain would arrive at any moment. In this sense, his 
reply was sharp, refusing any further contact except "every single issue which 
could be of direct interest to the British government, or one of his subjects". It was 
clear that any British mediation was banned by Rodil, and therefore Maling 
returned to his anchorage at Chorrillos. A few days later, up to eight men-of-war 
from Colombia, Chile and Peru, under Vice-Admiral Blanco Encalada, re-establis- 
hed the blockade of Callao. 242 
Until early 1826, when Rodil finally surrendered, the fishing village of 
Chorrillos was the port of Lima. Foreign ships had no major problems using that 
port, only the lack of proper ballast. The nearest place where it could be found was 
the north reef of the Island of San Lorenzo, and for this reason, by early 1825, 
Captain Murray Maxwell, of the Briton, ordered that all British merchant ships 
should call at that place after landing their cargoes and before going to sea. =43 
However, vessels calling at San Lorenzo were to face a new sort of problem, as on 
17 May 1825, General Rodil proclaimed as enemies "every single ship or boat, 
without regard to her nation", which entered the area between the Island and the 
242. - Jose Ramon Rodil, 1lernoria del Sitio del Callao, Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispano- 
Americanos, 1955: 28-29,213-217. 
243. - Murray to Willimot, Briton. Chorrilos. 16/7/1825; enclosed with Eyre to Croker, 
lWelleslev, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/30. 
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mainland. When Murray Maxwell learned of that announcement, he sent a launch 
armed with a carronade and small arms to protect three British merchant vessels 
already ballasting at San Lorenzo. Wishing to present a formal protest, and to 
avoid any problem with the blockading squadron, the British Captain landed on 9 
June and went to Lima aiming to obtain permission from Colonel Tomas Heres, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to sustain correspondence with Callao fortress. A 
serious misunderstanding was to arise on this issue, as the Minister refused to grant 
the permission, considering that Rodil's naval forces were unable to represent any 
real threat to shipping calling at San Lorenzo. Captain Murray Maxwell and 
Proconsul Willimott, were to insist on this issue for a complete month, without 
success. 244 On this issue, the Peruvian government's attitude seems to be excessive- 
ly severe, as there was no real point in refusing to allow British warships to enter 
into contact with Callao, as long as they could exert some control over it. 
When the news of Rodil's decree reached Valparaiso, Captain Maling, by 
then Senior Officer of the Squadron, ordered Captain Maxwell to enter in contact 
with Rodil to present his formal protest. To carry out his mission, Maxwell met the 
President of the Peruvian Government's Council and, after some delay and 
insistence, permission for the Briton and the Tartar coming into the port was 
granted. `' On 27 July, both warships already in the port, an officer from the Briton 
was sent with correspondence to the fortress. As was expected, Rodil reiterated his 
point of view and refused to cancel the decree. Nevertheless, he invited both 
British captains to have breakfast with him on the following morning. When 
Maxwell and Brown landed, they realized that, in spite of the blockading forces' 
efforts, very little real damage had been inflicted on the fortresses and the garrison 
was in good health and in high morale. During breakfast, which consisted of 
various different dishes, Captain Brown offered General Rodil a passage to Europe 
244. - Murray to Willimot and to Maling, Chorrillos. 4& 9/6/1825, and 6i8/1825, enclosed with 
Eyre to Croker, [ielleslev, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/182, ADM 1/330. 
245. - Evre to Croker, iVelleslev, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825, ADM 1/30. 
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on board the Tartar, but the latter replied with irony that he would enjoy very 
much receiving him in Lima, the next time the Tartar entered Callao. Probably to 
show that the fortress had enough powder, Rodil ordered gun salutes when the 
British captains left for their ships, a courtesy which was returned by the Briton 
and the Tartar. " 
Aside these details, the fact was that British captains were forced to 
continue giving armed protection to British merchant ships calling at San Lorenzo, 
since the blockade was not effective enough to prevent enemy boats to reaching it. 
Rodil's invitation was to bring a disagreeable consequence for Maxwell 
and Brown, as two deserters from the fortress accused the former of having 
received two or three boxes with Callao's treasure. Such an accusation was a very 
serious one, since it mean that British naval officers were acting against blockade 
rules. Consequently, the Peruvian government asked for explanations and they 
were given by Maxwell. Finally, the two deserters admitted to have been lying and 
the Peruvian President himself received Murray Maxwell to present the 
government's apologies. `" 
By late December 1825, Rodil was seriously thinking giving up his 
resistance, but to take a final decision about it he needed fresh information about 
the European and Spanish situation. In this sense, on 19 and 21 December, British 
colours were hoisted in the fortress, inviting a British man-of-war to enter the port. 
Captain Maxwell obtained the Peruvian government's permission and ordered the 
Eclair, Captain Samuel Hemmans, to shorten distances and to the enter in contact 
with the fortress. However, this attempt failed as a general attack was made before 
contact was established. "' A few days later, on 11 January 1826, General Rodil 
asked permission from General Salom, who was in charge of the siege, to send an 
246. - Rodil: 287-290. Rodil to Maling, Callao. 28/7/1825: enclosed with Eyre to Croker, 
Wellesley, Rio de Janeiro, 25/11/1825. ADM 1/30. 
247. - Puente (1975) II: 148. 
248. - Murray to Eyre. Callao, 31/12/1825. ADM 1/30. 
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officer aboard the Briton to receive information from Europe to help him reach a 
decision regarding his resistance. This request was accepted and the intelligence 
brought from the British warship was so discouraging that Rodil finally made up 
his mind to surrender. "' 
Negotiations began on 17 January, and a highly honourable capitulation 
was signed five days later. Even though Rodil repeatedly requested the use of the 
Briton as a meeting place for the negotiations, this time it was the Peruvian 
government which refused to accept any foreign participation on the agreement. 
Having requested to be received on board the Briton as soon as the capitulation 
was signed, Rodil came aboard on the afternoon of the 22nd, in company of one 
officer and three servants. Captain Maxwell showed great consideration towards 
him, recognizing the great respect Rodil had gained amongst Britons for his gallant 
defence. The Briton finally left Callao in February, Rodil was convoyed to Rio de 
Janeiro and sailed afterwards to Europe in another ship, reaching Spain in 
August. ° 
Just prior to the Briton's departure, the Cambridge arrived at Callao, 
where she was to remain for almost ten months, sailing not further than Huacho. 
During their long stay at Callao, Captain Maling and pilot William Carr found time 
to write some directions for entering Callao through the Boqueron. Moreover, 
finding that the use of this passage could save some time to those vessels coming 
from the south, Messrs. Gibbs, Crawley and Co., agents of Lloyd's at Lima, with 
the Cambridge's Captain "have gone to the expense and trouble of laying down 
buoys in the Channel". These instructions were published in a Peruvian newspaper 
on April 1827, and in Britain two months later. " These were not the first 
249. - Rodil: 123-129 
250. - Rodil: 300-312. Anna: 236-237. Murray to Evre. Briton. Callao. 31/12/1825. ADM 1/30. 
251. - El Telegrafo de Lima n° 17.2314/1827, n° 188,17/11/1827. The Naval and Military 
Magazine, London, 1 (1827): 625. 
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hydrographic remarks regarding the Peruvian coast made by British men-of-war. 
For instance, Casma was surveyed initially by the Tartar, in April 1825, and after- 
wards by the Mersey. 252 By the same time, Mr. Bayley, Master Mate on the 
Cambridge, had already made several accurate plans of the places touched by his 
vessel, Captain Maling forwarding them to the Hydrographie Office. '53 
The Peruvian struggle for Independence finally ended in 1826, after almost 
ten years. The country was placed in a difficult economic and political situation, 
relying almost completely on foreign shipping for its trade as the Peruvian 
mercantile marine was totally destroyed. The British presence had become 
absolutely necessary during the war, both for patriots and loyalists, and therefore 
British warships were involved in quite a delicate task, protecting their nationals 
from the abuses of both sides. During most of this period, British Captains were 
the sole British authority in the area, holding responsibility to represent their 
government and to provide it with proper information to establish a policy 
regarding the newly-formed republics. The arrival of consular agents was to 
liberate naval officers of these kind of duties, but in subsequent years the usual lot 
of inter-service frictions were also present in Peruvian ports. 254 
252. - ADM 50/151: 5/7/1825,10 & 14/1,23/6/1826. 
253. - Maling to Lord Melville. 13/4/1825, Scottish Record Office, GD 51/2669-689. 
254. - D. C. M. Platt The Cinderella Service, British Consuls since 1825. London. Longman, 
1971. Eyre to Croker. Wellesley, Rio de Janeiro, 26/4/1826, ADM 1/29. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Peruvian Republic, 
internal and external conflicts 
(1826-1835) 
With the end of the struggle for Peruvian independence, the government 
became a sort of prize for a number of military leaders or "caudillos". Having 
fought the wars of independence, they were truly convinced that they were the only 
people able to rule the country; or even worse, that they had the right to do it. 
Peruvian History calls this period the "first militarism", and it was full of internal 
and external conflicts. It finally ended when Peru and Bolivia became a confeder- 
ation ruled by the strong hand and able mind of Bolivian Marshall Santa Cruz. 
During this nine-year period (1826-1835), Peruvian relations with the other 
two Bolivarian republics, Colombia and Bolivia, went through some ups and 
downs, to a point that war eventually broke out against them. In the case of 
Colombia, the reason of the conflict was closely related to Bolivar's desperate 
attempts to avoid Colombia breaking up into three separates States: Nueva 
Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador. The war itself helped very little in that purpose, 
and Colombia disintegrated in 1830. The reasons for the conflict with Bolivia are 
more complex, and could be related to the liberal policy instituted by its President, 
Marshall Santa Cruz, who established a sea-port at such an isolated place as Cobija 
with the clear intention to compete with Arica as the gate for Bolivia foreign trade. 
ý. o ..: ý 
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Blockades were established in both cases, being regarded as illegal by North- 
Americans, French and British, for the same reasons argued against most of those 
blockades declared during the war of independence. 
Peruvian relations with Britain, the United States and France, the most 
important commercial powers at that time, also suffered some changes. According 
to Paul Gootenberg, 255 the most active and persevering of them was the United 
States, whose consular agents at Lima, notably William Tudor (1824-1828), tried 
every possible way to open for his nationals the over-protected Peruvian market. 
The French acted with a great sense of opportunity, appointing a Charge de 
Affairs, in 1826, whose main duty was to obtain as many advantages as possible for 
those luxury goods which were the core of their trade. In a general sense, those 
willing to improve their lot through trade and commerce, generally viewed the ties 
between their countries and Peru as positive. Those challenged by foreign imports, 
such as textile manufacturers in northern Peru, wanted to maintain the status quo, 
keep the markets closed and protected. In this sense, Peruvians were described as 
either "nationalists" or "internationalist", "protectionist" or "free trade 
imperialist" 
. 
256 
That was a very fluid situation, in which French and North American 
consular agents committed themselves very seriously and deeply in Peruvian 
internal affairs to convince politicians, caudillos and merchants, of the advantages 
of liberalism against protectionism. That was a long term struggle, in which the 
powerful Chamber of Trade, as part of the Tribunal del Consulado, was able to 
resist liberalism advances until the 1850's. In this long term struggle, North 
255. Between Silver and Guano, Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1989,18-33. 
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American and French consular agents were enthusiastically supported, and 
sometimes overpassed, by naval commodores. 257 
The British, following Consul General Ricketts failure in convincing Bolivar 
and Peruvian elite to establish a free-trade regime, limited their efforts to maintain 
their trade without disturbance. That attitude was to last throughout the period 
covered by this chapter, in spite of which the value of British imports increased 
slowly until reach 600,000 dollars in 1836, finally exceeding the 1825's figure, as 
shown in graphic one named "British imports to Peru (dollars/years)". 258 
Accordingly, it could be said that commercial links between British and 
Peruvian merchants improved during these years. However, a serious 
misunderstanding was to threaten this particular relationship in 1830, following the 
detention of the brig Hidalgo by Peruvian authorities, and the subsequent 
intervention of two British men-of-war. As a consequence, British consular agents 
at Lima were forced to abandon the country, and their duties were taken over by 
naval captains for a couple of years. Even when this incident was soon overcome 
by both governments, it helped to increase the general antipathy towards 
foreigners, a feeling which was properly supported by the local elite as a way to 
defend their control of the Peruvian market against liberal ideas brought by North 
Americans, British and French. 
'56. Clayton, 107-108. 
^` Margarita Guerra. "La Confederaciön Pacifico-Boliviana en el testimonio de los informes 
de marinos franceses". (PH. D. Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Catöiica del Peru. 1967;, 1- 
9,28-40. Robert E. Johnson. Thence .4 round 
Cape Horn: The Storv of United States Vaval 
Forces on the Pacific Station, 1818-1923, Annapolis. U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1963. 
_SP 
- Heraclio Bonilla, Gran Bretana v el Perti: los inecanismos dc un control econön: ico, 
Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977 , p. 
159. 
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Graphic 1 
British Imports to Peru (dollars/years) 
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In 1832, the new British Consul General in Peru, Belfort Hinton Wilson, who 
was to remain in office for a decade, arrived to Callao. A former aide-de-camp of 
General Bolivar, Wilson was very well acquitted with Bolivarian republics and its 
leaders. His previous experience and the particular situation he had to face, forced 
him to request that the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron should serve for a 
fixed period of time, establishing in this way a more regular service. 
Another topic in which the Pacific Squadron became involved during these 
years was in the exploration of Peru itself, both by means of hydrographic surveys 
and by expeditions to the Amazon basin and the Andes. In this task, they were 
supported by local authorities. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the way in which the British Squadron 
conducted in each one of the situations previously mentioned, trying to identify the 
following general issues: 
a) Degree of neutrality British captains adopted during internal struggles; 
b) Attitude towards Peruvian authorities; 
c) Cooperation between British naval captains and local consular agents; 
d) Attitude adopted during international wars against Colombia and Bolivia; 
e) Relations with other naval forces in the area 
f) Commitment of the Pacific Squadron to support the increment of British 
trade 
Internal struggles 
In September 1826, mainly because internal problems in Colombia, General 
Simon Bolivar abandoned Peru, entrusting the government to a Council headed by 
General Andres de Santa Cruz. A few months later, following the rebellion on the 
Colombian Division quartered in Lima, echoing Colombian internal problems, the 
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newly approved Constitution, according to which Bolivar would rule Peru until his 
death, was revoked. The Colombian Division was repatriated and Santa Cruz, 
despite his close links with Bolivar, managed to continue ruling the country until 
June 1827, when the Congress elected Marshall Jose de la Mar as President of 
Peru. As was already expected, the new government faced some difficulties with 
Bolivar and his followers, and soon the relations between Peru and Colombia 
deteriorated. To avoid a possible Bolivian intervention in favour of Colombia, the 
Peruvian government supported local nationalist and even sent an expeditionary 
army to help to depose Bolivian President, Colombian Marshall Antonio Jose de 
Sucre. 
This intervention, followed by other diplomatic incidents, plunged Peru and 
Colombia into war. The political outcome of it was the deposition of President La 
Mar by Great Marshall Agustin Gamarra, who became the new ruler of Peru by 
late August 1829. Gamarra was to remain in office four years, a time in which 
seventeen rebellions tried to depose him. In 1830, when he marched to Cuzco, the 
Presidency was temporary exerted by vice-president General Antonio Gutierrez de 
la Fuente, who was replaced in April 1831 by Andres Reyes, President of the 
Senate. For a few weeks in 1832, Peruvian Presidency was entrusted to Manuel 
Telleria, President of the Senate; and in 1833 to Jose Braulio del Camporredondo, 
vice-president of that Parliament branch. 
In December 1833, Marshal Jose de Orbegoso was elected President of Peru. 
A military coup attempted to disown that result, but Lima's population reacted 
against this coup and defeated the rebels, thus beginning another civil war, which 
finally ended in April 1834 with Orbegoso's triumph. During the fighting, Marshall 
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Santa Cruz, President of Bolivia since 1828, was called to support Orbegoso. Even 
when he officially declined to intervene in Peruvian affairs, Santa Cruz was deeply 
involved in them, by supporting and even encouraging some local South Peruvian 
leaders to create a separate State. Less than a year later, in January 1835, Callao 
garrison mutinied against President Orbegoso, while he was in South Peru. 
Following a short struggle, General Salaverry controlled the situation, only to lead 
another uprising on the following month. The civil war which followed this 
revolution lasted almost a year, providing Bolivian President Santa Cruz what he 
actually was looking for, an official invitation from President Orbegoso to sent an 
army to support him in the struggle. The outcome of Santa Cruz intervention was 
the establishment of the Confederation of Peru and Bolivia, under his protection. 
In general terms, British captains were able to remain aside the revolutionary 
turmoil of the new Spanish American republics. However, in a few cases they 
became involved, as happened with Captain Bingham, of the Thetis, on December 
1829, when he answered a request of the Chilean government to capture the rebel 
20-gun brig Aquiles. His attitude was highly disapproved of by the Admiralty, and 
it became an important precedent for those captains who afterwards were to face 
similar "invitations" from Peruvian or other Latin American governments. 259 
Regarding Peru, the most sensitive of this situations occurred on 1 January 
1835, when the garrison of Callao castles mutinied against President General 
Orbegoso, and offered allegiance to General La Fuente, who having arrived at 
Callao two days before was on board U. S. schooner Fairfield, Commander 
259 Baker to Croker, iVarspite, Rio de Janeiro, 8/2/1830, and Admiralty minute, 23/9/1830, 
ADM 1/32. Fuenzaiida (1978) II: 379. 
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Sallet. `60 Even when La Fuente declined to accept the leadership of the rebellion, 
the mutineers considered that he was under the restraint of foreign naval forces 
and, consequently, decided to attack any foreign boat landing at Callao. 
At the anchorage was H. M. sloop Satellite, Captain W. C. Smart. He landed 
by 8 a. m. in order to learn what was going on, and two hours later other boats left 
the sloop for the shore, in charge of Lieutenant William Russell Drummond. They 
were received by the mutineers with musket bullets, one of which wounded 
Lieutenant Drummond "in the leg so badly, that he was obliged to submit to an 
amputation of which he died" a month later. This young naval officer had the 
strange honour to be the first buried at the British Cemetery, located at Callao, on 
1 February 1835.261 
The rebellion ended only at 12.30 of the following day, when the "Peruvian 
flag was hoisted at the fort and a salute fired of 24 guns", the fort being occupied 
by troops under Generals Nieto and Salaverry. During the first day of fighting, 
shots were received on board the shipping lying in the harbour; one of them was 
the Peruvian schooner Isabel Estrella, where a seaman was wounded. Unable to 
land to get medical care, the master took him to the Satellite, but sadly he died that 
evening. Late that night, as gun and musket fire increased, the British man-of-war 
shifted further out from shore, sending boats to assist the shipping in the harbour 
to move out of gun-range from the castle. 262 
X60. 
- El Geino del Rimac. 2& 3/1/1835. El Redactor Peruano, 7/1/183 . 
261 ADM 51/3474. Burial Grave Lt. Drummond. Peter Campbell Scarlett, South America and 
the Pacific, London, Henry Colburn. 1838. II: 121-122. Brenda Harriman. The British in 
Peru: 36. 
^6 ADM 5 1/3474. Ei Genio del Rineac. 1& 2/1/183 5. 
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A formal complaint was presented to the Peruvian government for these 
actions, but General Salaverry's rebellion against President Orbegoso, while he 
was visiting South Peru, brought another unsettled period for Peru, making it 
impossible to conduct a proper enquiry to identify those responsible for the 
incidents of January. Salaverry was able to cope with local resistance at Callao and 
Lima, being proclaimed Supreme Chief of the Republic and declaring war on 
Orbegoso and his allies. The British Pacific Squadron was to be involved in this 
civil war in September 1835, when Captain Charles Pearson, of the brig-sloop 
Sparrowhawk, offered protection for two supporters of Marshall Gamarra. 
As already mentioned, following Salaverry uprising, President Orbegoso 
asked for Bolivian President General Santa Cruz's assistance by sending troops. As 
a consequence of this situation, Salaverry, with Gamarra as new ally, declared war 
on Bolivia in July 1835.263 
The first battle was fought at Yanacocha, Cuzco, on 13 August 1835, and 
was a triumph for Santa Cruz and Orbegoso's army over Gamarra. The survivors 
of the defeated army made their way to the coast, trying to reach the security 
offered by the navy, which largely supported Salaverry. While a number of them 
were captured and executed by the victors, Colonels Bernardo Escudero and Juan 
Torres managed to reach Arica, being received on the French merchant ship 
Cassimer Perrier, sailing afterwards to Islay, already occupied by Orbegoso's 
troops. The night of 3 September, fearing that they would be shot if the port 
authorities forced the Cassimer Perrier's skipper to deliver them, both officers 
came to the just arrived Sparrowhawk, asking for asylum. Following his 
X63. 
- Jorge Basadre. Historia de la Rep6blica del Pear. Li° aa, Editorial Universitana, 1968. II: 
112-113. 
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instructions, to avoid compromising British neutrality, Captain Pearson refused to 
receive them on board. Escudero and Torres, already aware that the Cassimer 
Perrier was under search by an armed party, managed to board the British 
merchant vessel Dyson without being discovered. Early in the following morning, 
having learned of the presence of both Peruvian officers in that vessel, the acting 
British Consul at Islay, Mr. Crompton, came aboard the Sparrowhawk to consult 
with Pearson what to do in this case. They initially agreed to return Escudero and 
Torres to the French vessel, but having learned that a boat with an armed party 
was already at the Dyson's side asking for them, aiming to avoid any violence on 
board a British vessel and considering that any other decision would mean 
condemning them to death, decided to offer the Sparrowhawk's protection to both 
Peruvian officers. To confirm their suspicions, Crompton was informed by the offi- 
cers in charge of the search party that they had orders to shoot Escudero and 
Torres two hours after they landed. Pearson's attitude was fully approved by the 
Admiralty, 264 even when, at least technically, British neutrality was affected as 
those received on board were directly involved in the fighting. 
Salaverry was finally defeated in Socabaya (7 February 1836), being shot to 
death shortly after that battle. His death removed the last obstacle to the 
establishment of the Confederation of Peru and Bolivia. Even before Socabaya, 
Salaverry's relatives and followers, most of them naval officers, garrisoned at 
Callao, which was placed under siege almost immediately by Orbegoso's troops. 
General Salaverry's mother, wife and brothers, where received as refugees on 
764. 
- Crompton to Pearson and Pearson to Mason. Sparrowhawk, Islay, 4/9/1835; Ad niralty 
Minute. 10/1/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/183°,. ADM 
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board the French man-of-war La Flore, Commodore Maulac, with the full support 
of British Commodore Mason, taking into account their civil condition. 
226' 
Peruvian civil wars during this period included some blockades, which in turn 
moved foreign naval captains to repudiate them. That was the case of the blockade 
of the coast from Atico to I1o, declared on 7 April 1834 by General Domingo 
Nieto, Commander-in-Chief of South Peru for President Orbegoso. A few days 
before, Captain Seymour, in the Challenger, arrived at Islay to receive merchants' 
remittances, being asked by Udmy Passmore, the local British consul, and by a 
number of British and French merchants, to delay his departure, since it was 
expected that rebel troops would appear at any moment. Seymour remained at port 
until 23 April, sailing afterwards for Valparaiso were he informed Captain James 
Townshend, Senior Officer of the Squadron, of that situation. The blockading 
decree was initially denounced as illegal by Passmore, since no naval force was 
present at Islay to enforce it. However, on 14 April, it became know that the 
Peruvian sloop-of-war Libertad was cruising off the port, legalizing in that way the 
blockade. 266 
Captain Townshend considered General Nieto's decree as absolutely illegal, 
since those kind of measures only could be adopted by the highest level of the 
government, which in the case of Peru was President Orbegoso himself. Therefore, 
he instructed Captain Eden, of the Conway, to cruise off Puertos Intermedios from 
May to September, recapturing any British vessel seized by Peruvian men-of-war, 
and landing marines to recover any British property put on shore as a result of this 
'65 
- Alfredo Guinassi Moran, General Trinidad _I 
Loran 1796 a 18.54. Estudios Hisröricos v 
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blockade. 267 Fortunately, no incident arose as the civil war ended shortly after the 
blockade was declared. 
Despite having quite a small naval force, on 6 March 1835, the government 
headed by General Salaverry declared Islay and Arica under blockade, closed the 
coast between Pisco and Islay to foreign trade, and placed an embargo on all native 
vessels at Callao bound to other Peruvian ports. 268 
As could be expected, British Commodore Mason, of the Blonde, and French 
Captain Nonay, of the brig Acteon, protested against this set of measures, refusing 
to accept them. Their attitude moved Salaverry's government to soften its position, 
banning only war contraband. Quite unusually, the U. S. Senior Naval Officer 
accepted the blockade. 269 
To avoid compromising British neutrality in this civil war, Rear-Admiral 
Hammond, Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station, instructed Mason 
to prevent British vessels from transporting war material for both parties, and 
asked the Admiralty for reinforcements, taking into account the unstable situation 
on the West Coast. 270 In order to offer better protection to their nationals, Mason 
and the French senior naval officer reached an agreement, according to which they 
would help and even replace each other when necessary. This agreement was 
267 Townshend to Eden. Dublin. Valparaiso 15/5/1834: enclosed with To«nshend to 
Seymour, 11/6/1834. ADM 1/42. ADM 3108. 
'68 Gaceta del Gohierno, 7/3/1835. Scarlett II: 110. 
, 69 Scarlett 11: 120. 
270 Hammond to Dawson, Snartiate. Rio de Janeiro 11& 12/2/1835, ADM 1/43. Hammond to 
Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 225/8/18T5, _ADM 
1/44. 
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approved by Hammond, but remained unofficial, to avoid a further obligations to 
his forces. 27' In the following years, this co-operation will continue very closely. 
While civil war between Salaverry and Orbegoso lasted, the Peruvian 
squadron, having joined Salaverry, was ordered to blockade and commit hostilities 
along the coast from Nazca to Cobija, still in the hands of Orbegoso and his few 
followers, as well as to clear the seas from enemy vessels. 272 Accordingly, Captain 
Iladoy, with the Libertad and the Arequipeno, captured Islay on 5 June. Two days 
later, H. M. sloop Satellite, Captain Smart, arrived and was visited by Iladoy and 
the senior officer of the landed troops. A few days later, the three men-of-war 
sailed to Arica, and on 12 June, following the attack of both Peruvian vessels to 
the port, 273 Captain Smart sent her cutter to help the British barge Fairfield to 
move out of the anchorage. 274 These naval operations were legally conducted, not 
producing any complain from the British captain. 
Besides blockades, Peruvian civil wars brought a number of associated 
problems, both at the countryside and in towns. Claiming to support one of the 
parties in dispute, several bands of guerrilla groups made it unsafe to travel inland, 
both for Peruvian and foreigners. British Consul General Wilson, French Viscount 
Eugene de Sartinguies and an English gentleman, were to realise that on 25 March 
1835, when they were assaulted by one of these groups just a few miles away from 
Lima gates. 275 
". 
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These kind of problems eventually moved British captains to land marines for 
the protection of British lives and properties. That happened on 27 March 183, 
two days after Consul General Wilson was assaulted, when Lima was threatened 
by a number of guerrilla groups who claimed to be fighting for Orbegoso. In this 
circumstance, and attending a call made by the British Consul at Callao, Captain 
Mason sent a party of marines "to protect the property of an Englishman near 
Callao from the montoneros". 276 This action was not reported by Mason, nor was 
it recorded in the Blonde's log, for he was acting beyond his instructions, 
suggesting that these sort of attitudes could be expected in similar situations. 
In October 1835, when Captain Harcourt, of the North Star, arrived at 
Callao, the situation was even more complicated. Salaverry had moved south with 
his troops in late-September, leaving a small garrison to protect the city, at the very 
moment when Orbegoso's troops came close. For this reason, British merchants 
and Consul General Wilson asked for Harcourt's protection and requested 
permission from the acting government to allow a party of marines to land. 
Permission was denied, but within a few weeks the situation deteriorated to a point 
that this decision was changed. 277 On 14 December, attending a new request made 
by foreign merchants and consuls, Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel B. 
Ferreyros, authorised the landing of British, French and United States marines to 
protect their fellow countrymen. On his reply to Wilson, Ferreyros recognised that 
even when the government was still able to guarantee foreigners' security, that 
situation could change at any moment. In the following couple of days, North 
Americans and French marines landed and marched to Lima. On 16 December, 
`76. - Scarlett fl: 117-118. 
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Ferreyros wrote another letter to Wilson, informing him that his government was 
no longer able to control the city, and therefore marines should land to protect 
British subjects in Lima. He even offered San Pedro or Las Mercedes monasteries, 
and the Police barracks, to quarter those troops to be landed. In the following 
days, the city was abandoned by its garrison, which moved to Callao, and the 
government dissolved itself 278 
British property at Lima amounted to several million dollars, as only Gibbs, 
Crawley & C° had 1'200,000 dollars, and there were "fourteen other houses". 279 
Under normal circumstances it was a difficult task to move such a quantity of 
goods, but in those days it became impossible as mules were confiscated by the 
army, and many robberies were committed in the road from Lima. 
Foreseeing that chaos, on December 24 Mason landed a party of marines 
with specific orders to protect British lives and property and not to get involved in 
the civil war itself. British marines remained in Lima almost a month, until 22 
January 1836, when, having occupied the city General Orbegoso, they returned to 
the Blonde. Second Lieutenant Frazier, the officer in command, was recommended 
to the Admiralty for his troops' intervention to stop a looting attempt. 280 
Shortly after that, with French and North American marines still at Lima, 
Mason departed for Valparaiso, ordering the Rover to follow him on 31 January. 
He considered that no further protection was required at Lima, without 
compromising British neutrality, since the civil war was still going on in South 
enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dub- 1s Mason to Hammond. Blonde Callao. 24/12/1835. 
lin, Rio de Janeiro. 6/5/1836. ADM 1/45. 
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15/7/1836, ADM 1/46. 
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Peru. That point of view was not shared by French and North American 
commodores, neither by British merchants and Consul General Wilson. For this 
reason, the latter produced a strong complaint assuring that Mason had failed in 
provide a proper protection. Moreover, they request that the Admiralty appoint an 
Admiral as a separate command to the Pacific, since the amount of British trade 
and properties deserved more protection that was actually offered by a 
Commodore. 281 
This complain reveals the great difficulty naval captains had in fulfilling 
merchants' and consuls' wishes, and, on the other hand, it also shows the rivalry 
between naval and consular services, matters which will be discussed latter on. In 
spite of these considerations, it was the first time a request was made to the 
Admiralty to create a separate naval station for the Pacific, even when in 1830 
Rear Admiral Baker suggested to move the Commander-in-Chief's usual 
anchorage from Rio de Janeiro to the Pacific. 282 That proposal was grounded by 
the Admiralty, who stated that the Brazilian port was the main place of residence 
for the Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station. 283 
Some months later, in September 1837, Rear Admiral Charles Bayne 
Hodgson Ross was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station, an 
appointment which could be directly related to the claim made by British merchants 
at Lima during those unsettled days in January 1836. Nonetheless, despite this kind 
of complaint, the British squadron was able to maintain neutrality in those 
Merchants complain, Lima 28/1/1836; enclosed with Mason to Hammond. 16/4/1836; 
enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin. at Sea, 15/7/1836, ADM 1/46. 
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uncertain years, in which a number of caudillos tried by every possible way to 
reach power. 
Several of them were met by British captains and officers, some in their 
greatest moments and some other in disgrace, and two Peruvian Chiefs of State 
even visited British men-of-war. Santa Cruz, Head of the Government following 
Bolivar's departure, came on board the Cambridge, Captain Maling, in 26 
November 1826; `3' and President Orbegoso visited the Samarang, Captain Paget, 
on 25 August 1834, being received by Commodore Mason, of the Blanche, Senior 
Officer of the Squadron. In company with the Peruvian Squadron, the Samarang 
took the President on a short visit to San Lorenzo Island landing him late that 
evening. 285 It is highly suggestive the presence of Santa Cruz and Orbegoso on 
board British vessels, as they were the most identified with liberals ideas amongst 
those who ruled Peru in this period. 
Amongst those British naval officers who provide a valuable source of this 
period, was Lieutenant Charles Brand, who visited Callao and Lima from 16 
September to 10 November 1827. The reason for his long stay at these places is 
not clear, especially considering that he arrived and departed in merchant vessels 
and no records were kept. His journal, published as Journal of a voyage to Peru 
(London 1828), gives no clue of his mission, providing instead a good description 
of both towns and population. `86 
284 ADM 51/3085 
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But, if high level relations were more or least easy going, it was rather 
different with naval authorities, mainly because incidents arose in respect to British 
seamen serving in Peruvian men-of-war. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a number of foreign seaman joined the 
Peruvian Navy at its earliest stages. However, as at the end of the independence 
wars the Peruvian squadron was almost completely dismantled and its budget was 
deeply cut, wages were delayed and consequently desertion increased, specially 
amongst British and North American sailors. Some of the former were received on 
British men-of-war, producing the immediate complain from Peruvian naval 
authorities. 
That happened in late 1827, when Joseph Gilbert and William Brand, two 
British seamen serving on Vice-Admiral Guise's flag-frigate Presidente, `87 deserted 
and were enlisted on the ILlenai, Captain Michael Seymour. He was informed that a 
number of British seamen were forced to enter Peruvian service, receiving no 
bounty for it, and being subject to the same treatment and punishment as nationals. 
Amongst those were mentioned William Elbroo and another two on board the 
Congreso, while Thomas Hillars, Thomas Elmes, James Head and James Osborn 
were reported on other Peruvian men-of-war. 288 
On 1 December, Peruvian Vice-Admiral Guise wrote a letter to Captain 
Sinclair, of the Doris, asking for both deserters (Gilbert and Brand), assuring him 
that they had received a proper bounty. In his reply, Sinclair stated that the 
Peruvian government would have to release all those British sailors enlisted by 
287. - Former Protector.. 
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force, and even if they volunteered they were not to be subject to the same punish- 
ments as nationals. Nevertheless, in a private letter, he promised to give both 
sailors back if a receipt for their bounty was provided. A number of letters 
followed, and they gradually developed into a growing misunderstanding between 
Guise and Sinclair. Finally, as the deserters were not likely to return from the 
Menai, the Peruvian Admiral proposed to refer the whole subject to the British 
Admiralty. 289 
Scarcely two days after the Doris' departure, William Elbroo was reported 
by his brother George as having been enlisted by force on the Peruvian brig 
Congeso. Pro-Consul Willimott immediately complained about this new incident, 
as well as Captain Pait, of the Volage, who sent Lieutenant Parker to the Congreso 
twice to obtain a first-hand account on the subject. Parker's report stated that 
Elbroo was taken on board against his will and afterwards forced to receive the 
usual bounty. Peruvian authorities responded that as the sailor had received a 
proper bounty, there was no reason to release him from the service. Elbroo's 
situation was to remain uncertain for some months, but his case suggests that some 
of the British sailors serving in the Peruvian Navy felt that they were properly 
backed by British Captains if deserted and claimed protection, arguing that they 
had been enlisted by force. ` 90 
In any case, British captains' attitude with respect to British seamen in the 
Peruvian service was fully approved both by their superiors at Rio and London. 
Learning of these incidents, Rear-Admiral George Eyre, Commander-in-Chief of 
, s9 Otwav to Sinclair. Ganges, Rio de Janeiro. 27/4/1828. ADM 1/30. 
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the South America Station, was very critical towards Peruvian authorities, 
mentioning on his report to the Admiralty that they only respect force, "being the 
British on its service the main cause of our problems". 291 Consequently, British 
Captains serving in the Pacific were instructed to direct their claims in these sort of 
situations through British consular agents, and if this claims were unsuccessful, 
they were to use force, requiring first a direct order from the 
Commander-in-Chief. 292 
A final judgement of this kind of problems required a serious analysis of 
Peruvian and British naval records; however, the former are incomplete and, 
obviously, the latter provide only a half the story. Taking into consideration that 
during its first years the Peruvian Navy was ruled by former Royal Navy officers, it 
was quite unlikely that any of them could order or support such a silly action as 
abducting foreign sailors, or enlisting them without payment. A firm defence of this 
point of view was made by the Peruvian Commander-in-Chief in 1834, when 
another incident arose regarding a British sailor deserting from the Peruvian 
squadron. 293 
In conclusion, it seems to be very probable that some abuses were committed 
on both sides; on the one hand Peruvian captains were trying to have properly 
manned vessels despite the budget cut, and, on the other, British sailors were 
taking advantage of the support given by the British squadron, even when not 
always telling the truth. 
Eyre to Croker, Ganges. Rio dc Janeiro. 29/7/1828. ADM 1/31. 
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From our point of view, when British captains claimed that foreign sailors 
were not to receive the same treatment as nationals, they were reflecting a sense of 
superiority with respect to Peruvian seamen. It should be reminded that those who 
signed to join that service, submitted themselves to similar treatment as nationals. 
This topic raises another issue, already mentioned in the previous chapter, the old 
dislike Peruvian had for foreigners. It lasted for several years, as an additional 
aspect of the more complex economic contest between protectionism and 
liberalism, between local and foreign merchants. 
Eventually, British men-of-war were also affected by these kind of feelings, 
as happened with the i'v1enai, Captain Thomas Bouchier, at Arica on 29 December 
1828. For unmentioned reasons, a mob attacked a British group which had landed 
for watering, forcing Bouchier to dispatch a number of armed boats to protect their 
men. While the boats were heading to shore, port defences were prepared for 
action and a similar attitude was assumed in the British frigate. Fortunately, shortly 
after midday, port authorities presented their excuses for the mob attitude, and the 
incident was overcome. 294 
A new incident between Peruvian authorities and British Captains arose by 
late-March 1834, following the U. S. schooner Dolphin, Lieutenant Commander J. 
C. Long, unauthorised visit to Chorrillos, a port which was not officially open to 
receive vessels. For some inexplicable mistake, Jose Maria Corbacho y Abril, 
Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was informed that the vessel at that 
anchorage was H. M. S. Dublin instead of the Dolphin, and therefore he wrote a 
letter to British Consul General Wilson asking for explanations. To make things 
'94. 
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more complicated, Corbacho's letter included a paragraph stating his belief that the 
Dublin was at Chorrillos not with "the object to protect any illegal trade, but for 
some accident, and if he promises to re-embark those officers who are said to be 
landed, she could take her usual anchorage in Callao harbour". 295 
Without consulting with Captain Townshend, of the Dublin, Wilson replied 
making clear the Minister's mistake, refusing to accept the suggestion that British 
naval officers could be engaged in any sort of unlawful activity, and asking for full 
explanations. 296 A few days latter, Corbacho accepted his mistake, but make no 
further comments on the possibility that British officers were involved in illegal 
trade, ending his note by stating that it was not necessary to enlarge further on this 
issue 
. 
297 
Townshend was not entirely satisfied with this answer, and considered it 
absolutely necessary to receive written apologies on those suggestions which 
referred to the honour of his officers. Moreover, according to his point of view, the 
lack of a trade treaty between Britain and Peru allowed the use of "British power 
in these seas when so ever and wherever it suits to protect and support His 
Majesty's subjects and properties". 298 Taking advantage of the Minister's mistake, 
and trying to establish a guideline for relations between Peruvian government and 
the British squadron, especially in revolutionary times, he made a highly unusual 
statement, disregarding Peruvian sovereignty: 
'95 Corbacho to Wilson, Lima 24D/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, Dublin. 
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"I consider myself, as well as every one of his Majesty Ships and Vessels, 
to be at full liberty to proceed to any part of the coasts of this country, and 
hold communications therewith, either by the boats, or otherwise, as may 
considered beneficial for the protection of British subjects, and their 
property"29 
As could easily be expected, Townshend's letter was unacceptable to the 
Peruvian government, and therefore Corbacho wrote to Wilson on 5 April, asking 
for the withdrawal of all those expressions concerning Peruvian sovereignty. The 
British Captain refused to do so and left Callao in late-April 1834, promising to 
Wilson to submit all the correspondence on the Dolphin incident to the 
Admiralty. 300 
It seems that because of internal struggles, the Peruvian government failed to 
make a further complain to the British government. Townshend's letter deserved 
that, as it was the strongest and tactless proclamation done by a British Captain 
with respect to Peruvian sovereignty. But, as happened in many other cases, the 
unsettled condition of the country facilitate such kind of disrespect. 
But definitely, the most important incident arose in 1830, when the Tribune 
and the Sapphire captured the Peruvian sloop-of-war Libertad, following the 
detention of the brig Hidalgo. 
-ýý. - Townshend to Wilson, Dublin, Callao 31/3/1834; enclosed with Townshend to Seymour, 
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The brigantine Hidal, go's incident (1830)'01 
The brig Hidalgo (former Pam Be Civil), a British-owned vessel sailing 
under Mexican colours, changed owner and name at the Mexican port of Guaymas, 
departing for Callao early in March 1830. Thomas Spencer, the new owner, taking 
into account that on a previous visit to this port local authorities had not been very 
exhaustive in the inspection of the vessel's licence, did not bother to obtain a 
proper registration of the Hidalgo as a Mexican vessel. The Master Juan Pablo 
Fletes was provided with a licence to sail from Oaxaca to Monterrey, granted by 
the naval authority at San Blas, on 2 February; and with bills of lading which 
proved that the cargo was British owned. By the end of that month, the Hidalgo 
entered Guaymas sailing afterwards directly to Callao. 302 
On his arrival at this port, on I May, Fletes produced the vessel's papers for 
the port authorities, who immediately detected that the Hidalgo registration was 
quite different from those granted by Mexican authorities. Moreover, as Foreign 
Affairs Minister Jose Maria de Pando pointed out in the following days, the brig 
was sailing with an irregular licence, since the one presented by Fletes only 
authorised the Hidalgo to trade along the Mexican coast. Charged as offender 
against article 2° of the 1822 Prize Regulations, article 6° of Privateering 
Regulations and article Ist of the 10th title of the Matricula Regulations, the 
Hidalgo and her cargo were detained on 2 May. 303 
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According to these regulations, a preliminary view of the case was to be 
made by the Peruvian Navy's Commander-in-Chief, who might choose either to 
release or to prosecute the vessel. The same authority could decide to land the 
cargo even before the sentence was pronounced if it was likely to suffer damage on 
board. In this case, the cargo was deposited in the Customs Office under a number 
of keys, one of which was delivered to the master of the detained vessel . 
304 
The cargo was valued in 29,574 dollars, consigned at Guaymas by William 
Duff & Company, the former shipowner, to a number of British merchants at Lima. 
The main part of it was treasure for John Maclean and William Duff himself. 
Maclean's part consisted of '05 
4,200 dollars in coins 4,200 
7 silver bars (144 marks 9 dollars a piece) 8,496 
774 marks of silver pina (9 dollars a piece) 6,966 
87 ounces of gold and dust (15 dollars a piece) 1,305 
20 doubloons (17 dollars a piece) 340 
60 cooper bars (21.11 dollars a piece) 1,267 
TOTAL 22,574 
On the very day of the Hidalgo's detention the whole of the cargo was 
transferred to the storerooms of Callao fortress and, following the normal 
procedure, the master was provided with one of the three keys which locked it. Up 
to this stage, it seems that neither the agent Richard Yeoward nor the consignees 
considered necessary the intervention of British consular agents at Lima, Thomas 
Sutton Willimott and William Patrick Kelly. However, a few days later the treasure 
was removed and taken to be melted down for coins at Lima's Mint by direct order 
of Jose de Rivadeneyra, the Treasury Minister. As no explanation was given to the 
304 Lima, 29/4/1822, Reglamento Provisional de Presas. Gaceta de! Gohierno n° 37 & 38.8 
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owners, in a very short time news of this action spread amongst British merchants 
at Lima and Callao, who obviously became indignant for what they considered an 
abuse. 306 
As could be easily understood, Yeoward and the consignees complained 
about such an action, being supported by both British consular agents at Lima, 
who addressed several strongly written letters to the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. 
Pando. As the Minister took the issue with calm, excusing the language of the vice- 
consuls, they considered that a more forcible action should be taken to secure 
satisfaction. Consequently, when the Sapphire, Captain Dundas, and the Tribune, 
Captain Duntze, arrived at Callao, Willimott and Kelly came on board (10 May), 
and suggested they should impose by force the British claim by taking an equiva- 
lent amount from the Peruvian sloop-of-war Libertad, Commodore Garcia del 
Pöstigo, which was due to arrive at Callao on the following days with treasure on 
board. Dundas agreed and from 13 May both British men-of-war established an 
undeclared blockade of the port, waiting for the Libertad's arrival, announcing 
Willimott and Kelly the British intention "to detain and hold in deposit an equal 
amount of Peruvian Government property, wherever it may be with" . 
307 
The Libertad, having been cruising the southern coast since 7 April, 
enforcing the government policy to prevent smuggling, left Islay bound for Callao 
with almost 32,000 dollars and vice-president General Antonio Gutierrez de la 
305 Duff & C° to Maclean. Guaymas 2/3/1830. enclosed with Baker to Croker. GT'anspire. Rio 
de Janeiro 13/8/1830. ADM 1/32. 
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307 Willimott to Dundas, Lima, : 1/5/1830; enclosed with Baker to Croker. Gi'arsprte, Rio de 
Janeiro 13/8/1830, ADM 1/_32. ADM 51/3410. Willimott to Pando (copy n' a), Lima, 
10/5/1830, P. R. O., F. O. 61/18. 
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Fuente on board. 301 Since the British decision to recover the Hidalgo's cargo by 
force was already know by the Peruvian Government, some measures to prevent 
any forcible action against the shipping lying at Callao were taken. A more strict 
control on the anchorage was established, armed boats patrolled the port; and the 
landing of any member of the British squadron at Peruvian ports was prohibited. 
However, these measures were to be regarded as gestures far from any real 
effectiveness, unfit to repeal any serious attempt made by the two British 
men-of-war. At port there were only three Peruvian naval vessels: the brig 
Congreso, the schooner Arequipeno and an 18 feet-long gunboat, a force too small 
to prevent any British action, even when it was reinforced on 15 May with a 
second gunboat. 309 
Incidents begun on 13 May, when two long boats of the Sapphire captured 
one belonging to the Congreso. During that night, the Arequipeno's boat discov- 
ered two British launches and one boat approaching its position. After a short 
exchange of fire, the Peruvian gunboat intervened and drove back the British by 
firing a few rounds of shots. These incidents were recorded in Peruvian and French 
sources, as the frigate Vestale, Captain Neuquer Ducamper, was then at the 
anchorage. '10 On the following day, the Peruvian merchant brig Primer Ayacucho, 
308 
- A. H. de M. Libro 402,15/2 & 7/4/1830. 
'01) A. H. de M. Libro 402,13/5/1830. Hida/oo, Callao. 14/5: _lrequipeno, 
Callao. 14/5 : 
Libertad, Callao. 16/5. all the three Vivero to Rivadenevra. Willimott to Pando. Copies 2 
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310 ADM 51/3410 May 13. A. H. de M. Hidalgo, Callao. 14/5/1830; _3requipeno. Callao, 
14/5/1830; and Libertad, Callao. 16/5/1830. all of them addressed by Vivero to 
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arriving from the Chincha Islands, was detained by the British to obtain some 
information on the Lihertad's position, being released in that very evening. 311 
Meanwhile, Peruvian authorities adopted some measures to prevent 
Commodore Garcia del Pöstigo from entering the port. The schooner Olmedo 
sailed from Callao on 11 May and spent eight days cruising off Sangallän with this 
purpose in mind; '` and shortly after midnight on 13 May, a boat was dispatched 
with the same task. Despite the officer in charge's efforts to leave the harbour by 
the southern mouth before dawn, the boat was sighted from the Sapphire and 
pursued by two of her long-boats. The chase lasted for some hours and finally the 
Peruvian boat was forced to run ashore at Chorrillos to avoid been captured. '`' 
As a consequence of these incidents the Peruvian government adopted a 
more aggressive attitude towards the British squadron. As very little could be done 
at sea, since Peruvian naval forces at port were no match for the British, on 14 
May it was decided to forbid the British squadron's communications with land at 
any part of the entire Peruvian coast. It was also decided not to entertain 
correspondence with consular agents Willimott and Kelly any longer, and to close 
all Peruvian ports to British trade if the Tribune and the Sapphire continued in 
their hostile attitude. Accordingly, the British consular agents asked for their pass- 
ports the same day, but their letter was returned unopened. Only at this point, did 
Willimott and Kelly realise that they had exceeded their authority, leading Peru and 
Britain close to a breaking point. They immediately wrote to Captain Dundas 
31 Denegri (1976) 1: 368. 
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313 A H. de M. Hidalgo, Callao. 14/5/1830; : ýrequipeno, Callao, 14/5/1830. Vivero to 
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asking him to end hostilities, but unfortunately, this letter did not reach Dundas on 
time. '' 4 
Unaware of all these occurrences, that very night the Libertad arrived and 
anchored at the outer harbour at 3.30 a. m., because of lack of wind. At 5.00 a. m., 
while she was lifting anchor to enter the inner port, the Tribune came alongside at 
a pistol-shot distance, prepared for battle. Commodore Garcia del Pöstigo, who 
was quite a brave man, found himself placed in a ridiculous situation, with "the 
deck full of horses and absolutely unready for battle as my sole concern was to 
weight anchor". As vice-president, General La Fuente, was on board, Garcia del 
Pöstigo asked him for instructions, being commanded to obey the intimation in 
order to avoid further outrage. Almost an hour later, the Sapphire took up position 
in front of the Libertad, sending a boat with an armed party to take possession of 
her. 315 
According to Peruvian sources, this British party gave no explanation to the 
Peruvian Commodore for their attitude, moreover, as Garcia del Postigo recorded, 
"they only received insults instead of answers to their questions". However, as 
soon as the British learnt of vice-president La Fuente presence on board the 
Libertad, they moderated their attitude. At 7: 15 a. m., having already manned the 
captured sloop-of-war, Peruvian colours and the Vice-President's flag were 
314 A. H. de M. Libro 402. May 15. Willimott to Dundas. Lima 15/5/1830; enclosed with 
Baker to Croker, Warspite, Rio de Janeiro 13/8/1830. ADM 1/32. 
315 Garcia del P6stigo's report. enclosed with Vivero to Rivadenevra. Callao, 17/5/1830, n° 
253 & 16/5/1830. A. H. de M. Libertad. Dundas to Bingham, . Sapphire, Callao 31/5/1830, 
P. R. O., F. O. 61/18. 
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hoisted by the British crew. Fifteen minutes later, the Libertad sailed to anchor 
three miles away, in the company of the two British men-of-war. 316 
By this time, La Fuente was already aware of the situation by a letter from 
Captain Dundas. In the same letter Dundas stated that General La Fuente, his 
family and personal staff, were totally free to land at any moment, taking with them 
only their baggage but nothing belonging to the Peruvian government. Protesting 
against the British attitude, La Fuente refused to land without being properly 
authorised by the Peruvian government. Therefore he wrote a letter to the Foreign 
Affairs Minister asking for instructions. On his reply, Pando stated that the 
Peruvian government had no other alternative than to accept the situation, and that 
it was wisest to land as soon as possible but not to entertain any further 
correspondence with British captains. Accordingly, General La Fuente landed with 
his family and personal staff that very evening, while, in an ambiguous attitude, 
gun-salutes were made from the Sapphire. '17 
On 17 May, thirty silver bars and a parcel with "macuquinos", 318 valued 
altogether at twenty thousand dollars, were landed as personal baggage of General 
La Fuente. Even although part of this treasure really belonged to him, it also 
included the entire government property. Up to what point La Fuente was aware of 
this trap is uncertain, but as long as his honour was committed, as soon as he learnt 
that government property was landed in his name, he notified Dundas that the 
money would remain on shore to be re-shipped on the Libertad. A number of 
316. 
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317 Vivero to Rivadenevra, Callao. 17/5/1830, n° 252 & 253, A. H. de M. Lihertad. Willimott 
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letters were exchanged on this issue in the following days; Dundas asking for the 
treasure and La Fuente promising to deliver it as soon as possible. But besides 
these promises and some information stating that the money was finally shipped, 
the state owned treasure not only remained on land but it was secretly moved to 
Lima on 25 May, in two oxcarts covered "with herb or any other thing to avoid 
any suspicion or malice regarding their contents". 319 
Following La Fuente's landing, and knowing that the Libertad was running 
short of fresh supplies, the Peruvian government forbade providing her with any 
while she was under British detention. Moreover, on 20 May, Garcia del Pöstigo 
was commanded by his government to lower his colours and to consider himself 
and his men as prisoners of war. The order was carried out as soon as it was 
received on board, and at 1.30 p. m. on that day Peruvian colours were hailed down 
on board the Libertad. A few hours later, a British prize crew took possession 
of the vessel, and on the following day the remaining treasure on board the 
Libertad, consisting of 9,972 pesos, 5 reales, and 328 marks 4 ounces of silver 
pina, was taken on board the Sapphire and boxed under Garcia del Pöstigo and 
Dundas' seals. The British Captain issued a receipt for this treasure, ordered the 
British prize crew to withdraw before sunset and informed Garcia del Pöstigo that 
the Libertad, was "at perfect liberty" from that moment onwards. Early next morn- 
31S. 
- Macuquina, gas a colonial silver coin, impc.: %ctly minted. Its real value was below its face 
value. 
79 A. H. de M. Libro 402, reserved notes on '? 4 & 25/5/1830: Lihertad letter n° 46,18/5/1830. 
Dundas to La Fuente. 21.26 & 29/5/1830; and La Fuente to Dundas. 22/5/1830: enclosed 
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ing, the Peruvian sloop entered the inner port to her usual anchorage, ending in this 
way a week-long detention. 320 
With that treasure in its power, but unable to communicate with land, and to 
refresh supplies and water, the British squadron was placed in a difficult position. 
Moreover, since Willimott and Kelly were no longer recognised by the Peruvian 
government as British consular agents, Captain Dundas was considered responsible 
for the incident and the only accepted British authority in Peru. Acting accordingly, 
he wrote a letter to Minister Pando asking for the former British consular agents' 
passports, which were issued on 18 May. In the following days, Willimott and 
Kelly, as well as their families, were received on the Sapphire and the Tribune, 
respectively, with some help from the Colombian frigate Colombia. 32' 
When the incident occurred there were two French and two Colombian 
men-of-war at Callao, under Captain Ducampier and Commodore Wright, 
respectively, who provided some assistance both to Captain Dundas and to the 
Peruvian government. The French help consisted of the use of their boats for 
watering the British vessels. An action which was conducted since 26 May, having 
been duly authorised by the Peruvian government. 322 
According to General Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Colombian Minister at 
Lima, before the Libertad was captured, he was asked to use frigate Colombia to 
prevent the Peruvian man-of-war from entering Callao. Having refused to intervene 
320 
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in such a way, Mosquera participated in some of the meetings between Peruvian 
authorities and British consular agents. Following the capture of the Libertad, the 
Colombian Minister continued offering his help to solve the problem, visiting 
Captain Dundas on 19 May. 323 Afterwards, Mosquera was officially asked by 
President Gamarra to be a mediator between both parties. Obviously, such a 
mediation requires Dundas's agreement, at for this reason Mosquera wrote to the 
British Captain, who refused to accept it. 324 
Why did Captain Dundas refuse on 23 of May something which surely was 
consulted by Mosquera four days ago? It seems that he changed his mind after the 
official gazette, El Conciliador, 32.5 on 19 May, published the Peruvian government 
version of the incident, which includes some judicial references to justify the 
appropriation of the treasure taken from the Hidalgo, blaming the British for what 
had happened. Moreover, on 22 May, President Gamarra issue a new law, which 
provided a legal frame to delay the process more, and consequently the return of 
the funds, if that was the final sentence. 326 Being aware of that, Dundas considered 
that any proper agreement could be reached at that stage, and therefore he declined 
to accept Mosquera's mediation. 
President Gamarra was quite aware that his initial position was absolutely 
illegal, since the Hidalgo's trial was still going on when her bullion was minted. On 
the other hand, the capture of the Libertad and the removal of the treasure on 
323 Tomäs Cipriano de Mosques, Examen critico del lihelo publicado en la Imprenta del 
Comercio en Lima por el reo prö/ugo Jose _\Jaria Obando. Valparaiso, Itnprenta del 
Mercurio, 1843,1,285-286. 
324 ADM 51/3410,19/5/1830. A. H. de M. Libro 402,20/5/1830. 
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board, enabled the Peruvian government to improve its position in the whole 
incident. Nevertheless, no firm decision was taken, and in the end the Peruvian 
government reduced its claims to those against British naval and consular officers 
involved in the incident rather than the British government itself Realistically, no 
other solution was feasible. There was no doubt that resistance was unlikely to 
succeed, even with the help of another Peruvian man-of-war. There was also no 
doubt that Peru could not afford a more aggressive attitude towards the British and 
therefore the government had to adopt a conciliatory attitude. 
Despite the help provided by the French and Colombian commodores, the 
British remained unable to receive fresh supplies or to entertain any 
correspondence with land, and therefore were also powerless to provide any 
support for their nationals on shore. After a few days in this embarrassing situation, 
on 30 May, the Sapphire and the Tribune sailed for Valparaiso. Following 
Rear-Admiral Baker's relief program, the Sapphire departed for Rio de Janeiro by 
mid-June. On her arrival at this port, Baker was fully informed of the incident and 
approved Dundas' attitude, taking into account the consular agents' request and 
the lack of stability of the Peruvian government. 327 
The trial of the Hidalgo would last until 1837, when the Peruvian Supreme 
Court declared that the brig papers were irregular, but also ordered to return the 
bullion to its owners, with a compensation at the rate of 12 percent a year. 328 It 
seems highly probably that this sentence was issued following certain pressure from 
32' Dundas to Baker, Sapphire, At Sea, 7/8/1830; enclosed with Dundas to British merchants 
at Lima and their reply, 27 & 29/5/1830, ADM 1/33. 
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Marshall Santa Cruz, by then ruler of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, and very 
close to the British Consul General at Lima, Belford Hinton Wilson. 
In the meantime, the treasure removed from the Libertad was transhipped 
from one British man-of-war to another several times; and finally, by 1833, it was 
handed over to John Maclean, on the understanding that he would accept Peruvian 
Justice's final decision on the issue. 329 British captains continued to support the 
Hidalgo's case, as happened with Captain Burgess, of the Alert, who called at 
Guaymas by mid-1831 to obtain certain papers related to the brig's transference. 330 
Shortly after Dundas and Duntze's departure from Callao, Luis Macala, 
acting as British commissioner, informed the Peruvian government that the 
Seringapatan, Captain William Waldegrave, was due to arrive at any moment. As 
was already mentioned, President Gamarra had little choice but to compromise 
with the British, to avoid a more embarrassing situation. Therefore, his prohibition 
of British men-of-war entering Peruvian ports was modified on 31 May, to affect 
only the two vessels directly involved in the incident. 331 
As already mentioned, one of the outcomes of the Hidalgo incident was the 
removal of British consular agents at Lima. Almost immediately, and without any 
instruction on this sense, Captain Bingham, of the Thetis, succeed in restoring 
relations with Peru. According to his instructions, Bingham was due to leave the 
West Coast by July, taking on board British merchants' remittances from Chile to 
Mexico and the treasure convoyed by the Seringapalan from the South Seas to 
329 Wilson to Bidwell, Lima. 19/4/1833; enclosed a receipt signed by Captain Townshend for 
the treasure handed over by Captain Waldegrave, dated 20/3/1832. P. R. O., F. O. 61/23. 
330. Waldegrave to Baker, 11/5/183 1. enclosed with Baker to Elliot, ti'arspite, Rio de Janeiro, 
25/6/1831, ADM 1/36. 
331. A. H. de M. Libro X02,31/x/1°30. 
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Callao. With this purpose in mind, the Thetis entered Callao on 23 June 1830, in 
the Alert's company. 332 
Being fully aware of the strains on Peruvian and British relations after the 
Hidalgo incident, both British naval vessels entered the port under truce flag, 
Commander Fitzgerald, of the Alert, being commissioned to present Bingham's 
salute to the Governor of Callao and to ask permission to use port facilities. Since 
restrictions for British men-of-war entering Peruvian ports were already limited to 
the Sapphire and the Tribune, "whereas full satisfactions are received for the 
outrage both committed against Peruvian colours", permission was granted with no 
delay and both the Thetis and her companion entered to the usual British 
anchorage, out of the gun range of the castles. 333 
On the same day Bingham wrote a letter to Minister Pando, regretting 
"exceedingly the unpleasant differences which have arisen" between the Peruvian 
government and British naval and consular officers, and expressing his hopes that 
amity and commerce between both nations would continue with no interruption. 
Pando's reply, dated two days later, clearly stated that the Hidalgo incident did not 
affect Peruvian relations with Great Britain, taking into account that the 
responsibility for the incident was upon individuals (Kelly, Willimott and Dundas) 
rather than on the British government. Realizing how anxious the Peruvian govern- 
ment was to restore normal relations, on 5 July, Bingham simultaneously asked to 
be recognised as provisional Consul General and for the removal of the Tribune's 
prohibition from entering Peruvian ports, taking into account that the affair was 
332 Baker to Croker. JVarspite. Rio de Janeiro. 7/7/1830. ADM 1/33. Vivero to the Minister of 
War. Callao 23/6/1830, A. H. de M. frigate Colombia. 
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already represented by the Peruvian government to the British one, "of whom that 
of Peru hopes for the most complete satisfaction". Two weeks later, the Peruvian 
government agreed to these requests for the sake of friendship and trade between 
both nations. 334 
Lord Palmerstone, British Foreign Secretary, was to disapprove of the 
attitude adopted both by Willimott, Kelly and Dundas, "declaring that the blockade 
and seizure of the Libertad and its cargo were quite unjustified". 335 He was firmly 
convinced that the two Pro-consuls had exceeded their authority and acted without 
official consent: "they ought to have protested, exhausted all peaceful mean 
possible, and then have communicated with the government so as to await 
instructions from Whitehall". 336 As a result of this incident, Willimott and Kelly 
were dismissed; and despite the defence done by the Admiralty to Captain Dundas, 
he was blamed by Palmerstone for his lack of judgement and forced into retirement 
on half pay. 337 
On his reply to the Peruvian government, although Palmerstone admitted that 
he disapproved the way in which consular and naval officials conducted in the 
Hidalgo incident, he make clear that it was a result of a number of previous abuses 
against British merchants and properties. 
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"He demanded that the Peruvian Government comply its obligations on the 
score of compensation and declared that Great Britain was not disposed to 
tolerate any further abuse of its citizens by Peru. As for the bullion taken off 
the Libertad, he stated that he had ordered that it should be restored to the 
Peruvian Government since he had no desire to condone any breaking of 
Peruvian law, granted that the incident had occurred in Peruvian territorial 
waters". "8 
Disregarding Bingham's success in restoring friendly relations with the 
Peruvian government, British merchants were disappointed since they expected a 
far stronger attitude, following the one adopted by Captain Dundas. Their 
frustration turned to irritation as Bingham asked the Consul Generalship for 
himself instead of appointing one of the merchants. Finally, when John Maclean 
was requested by Bingham to hand over consular records, the latter was accused 
for interfering on consular affairs without authority to do so. The British merchan- 
ts' irritation could be understood as part of the general feeling towards General 
Gamarra's government, after the Hidalgo incident; however, as Bingham pointed 
out in his report, it "tends to nothing but to hostilities and to the compromise of 
their own interest", valued at four million Pounds Sterling at that time. 339 
Opposition to Captain Bingham came also from the former consular agents. 
As soon as they learned that Bingham had taken possession of the consular 
records, both protested for what they considered an intolerable interference in their 
service by a naval officer. Even when the records were returned to Maclean in the 
following weeks, on 24 July, Kelly and Willimott presented a formal protest 
addressed to the British merchants at Lima and to the British consular agent at 
339. Palmerston to Peruvian Foreign Minister. 19/9/1332, , 
P. R. O., F. O. 61/21 IWu (1991). 
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Valparaiso. Unfortunately for them, Lord Palmerston disapproved of their attitude 
in the entire issue, being compelled to withdraw their protest. 340 
When Rear-Admiral Baker learned of Bingham's proceedings at Callao, and 
the reaction amongst British merchants and bygone consular agents, he considered 
that the former could manage for themselves as they had done prior to 1824, with- 
out any sort of consular intervention. Consequently, captains serving on the Pacific 
squadron were commanded to restrain themselves to the naval service and not to 
become involved in consular affairs. Baker's order would have been grounded on 
the old rivalry between naval and consular service, and on the fact that Bingham, 
and afterwards Captain Waldegrave, of the Seringapatan, reported the Peruvian 
situation directly to the Foreign Office, informing that the "Consul General Ship 
will be in charge of the Senior Naval Officer in the Pacific until further instructions 
were received. "341 
When the Seringapatan arrived at Callao, on 25 July, Captain Bingham 
asked permission from the Peruvian Foreign Affairs Minister to be replaced as 
provisional Consul General by Captain Waldegrave, as he had to leave for 
Guayaquil, San Blas and Rio de Janeiro in the following days. The answer was 
interesting, as it is evidence of how much the Peruvian government was willing to 
improve relations with Britain. It stated that the government was highly satisfied 
with "the delicacy and moderation showed -by Bingham- as Senior British Naval 
340 Bingham and Waldegrave to the Earl of Aberdeen. Callao, 26/6/ & 24/8/1830. P. R. O., 
F. O. 61/18. Baker to Croker, [Garspite, Rio de Janeiro. 12/11/1830. ADM 1/34. 
341Bingham to the Earl of Aberdeen, Callao, 26/6/1830. P. R. O., F. O. 61/18. Baker to Croke:, 
Warspite, Rio de Janeiro, 30/11/1830, ADM 1/34. 
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Officer at the port (... ) recognizing -Waldegrave- as British provisional consular 
agent" 
342 
Having been appointed Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron with the aim 
of providing a more regular service for that part of the station, Waldegrave 
assumed the Pacific squadron's command on his arrival at Callao, late in July 
1830. ''43 During the following year, Waldegrave's main concern was related to the 
regularity of the conveyance of treasure, accomplished by the Thetis, in September 
1830; the Eden, in February 1831; the Tribune, in June; and the Alert, in 
September. Even when the Hidalgo incident was still open, relations between the 
Peruvian government and British captains were as friendly as before. Examples of 
this were President Gamarra's conversations with Captain Townshend, of the 
Dublin, in December 1832, in which "the President had to admit there was blame 
on both sides", 344 and Commodore Garcia del Pöstigo visiting Captain Burgess, of 
the Alert, on 22 October 1830, at 11o. 'as 
The attitude adopted by Captain Bingham deserves a further comment. 
Acting politely, he was able to restore relations between Peru and Britain at a 
consular level. Even when afterwards Admiral Baker instructed his captains to 
restrain their actions to naval duties, Bingham solved a real problem. Waldegrave 
continued that policy and therefore, at least at an official level, the incident was 
softened by direct and immediate naval intervention. The incident itself shows how 
British naval and consular service could cooperate in defence of British interest, 
342 Bingharn to Pando and the latter's replyI. Thetis, Callao, 27/7/1830. PRO.. F. O. 61/18. 
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but it also reveals some aspects of the old rivalry between both services. 
Cooperation and rivalry would came together along the period covered in this 
chapter. 
Following Consul General Rowcroft's death, in December 1824, the 
Consulate was exerted by V. Passmore, Vice-Consul at Quilca, until March 1826, 
when the newly appointed Consul General Charles Milner Ricketts arrived in the 
Ranger. 3 He remained at Lima for almost a year, being unable to react against the 
consequences of the oversupply crisis of 1826, which moved early Peruvian trade 
policy far from liberal standards. In the period covered by this chapter, Santa Cruz 
and Orbegoso tried to soften that position, being supported, with a variable degree 
of commitment, by foreign merchants and consular agents. 347 From 1828 to 1830, 
Thomas Willimott and Patrick Kelly took over the responsibility for British 
representation in Peru, as Pro-Consuls, being succeeded by naval captains, 
following the Hidalgo' incident. This situation lasted until March 1833, when the 
already mentioned Consul General Belford H. Wilson arrived in the Tyne. 348 
Wilson had acquired an intimate knowledge of South American affairs having 
served General Bolivar as his personal assistant for several years until his death. 
When he was appointed Consul General in Peru, in 1832, he was only 28 years 
old. 349 On his way to Peru, he met Rear-Admiral Baker, Commander-in-Chief of 
the South America Station, at Rio de Janeiro, who provided him with useful 
346. 
- ADM 51/3402. 
34'. Gootenberg (1988), 408-409. Gootenberg (1989). 26. Matthew (1968), 566. 
348 Wilson to Palmerstone. Tvne, Valparaiso. 23/2/1833; Iquique, 10/3/1833; Islay, 
27/3/1833; and Arequipa 26/3/1833, P. R. O. I. 
F. O. 61/23. 
349. 
- See Celia Wu. Ph. D. thesis -Introducciön al estudio de Sir Belford Hinton Wilson", Lima 
1965, for a comprehensive study of Wilson's activities as Consui Gcneral in Peru. 
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information regarding the general situation of Peru and particularly about the 
Hidalgo case . 
3'0 Being already aware of the Foreign Office opinion towards the 
length of service of the British senior naval officer in the Pacific, Wilson asked 
"that the command of H. M. Naval Forces on the coast of the Pacific 
should be entrusted to one individual well acquainted with those 
countries, as commodores for a fixed term. Such Command not to 
be liable, as at present, to pass into various hands, according to the 
Seniority of the Naval Officers whose ships may accidentally visit 
that Coast"351 
That measure was already taken by Admiral Baker in July 1830, when he 
appointed Captain William Earl Waldegrave, of the Seringapatan, as Commodore 
of the Pacific Squadron. When Wilson arrived at Valparaiso, he met the new 
Commodore, Captain Lord James Townshend, of the Dublin, 352 and afterwards 
visited Cobija, Iquique, Arica and Islay, to acquire a first hand knowledge of 
British trade at those places. 353 
For obvious reasons, consular agents were more acquitted with local 
situations than naval captains, while the latter could develop a better understanding 
of general situations, involving more than one single place. A good example of this 
assertion was the continue requirement that consular agents and merchants did for 
more naval support. This issue was clearly pointed out by Rear-Admiral Baker, in 
1830, when disapproving Captain Coghlan, of the Forte, for delaying his departure 
from Valparaiso attending to the request done by the British consular agent at this 
port. Baker affirmed that British consular agents, far from being sources of 
350 
- P. R. O., F/O 61/21: 153-159. 
351 P R. O.. F/O 61/21: 14-16. 
352 Admiralty to Bart. of the Foreign Office. 13/7/1832. P. R. O., F. O. 61/18. 
353 Wilson to Palmerstone. Tvne, Valparaiso, 23/2/1833; Iquique, 10/3/1833; Islay, 
27/3/1833; and Arequipa 26/3/1833. P. R. Q., F. O. 61/23. 
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confidence for their nationals, coloured their requests and even interfered with the 
regular service. 354 
The most serious interservice incident in this period occurred between 
Commodore Mason and Consul General Wilson, during 1835, basically regarding 
the protection offered by the latter during the civil war currently going on between 
Salaverry and Orbegoso. It seems that these differences began when Mason 
proposed a British merchant resident at Callao, to be appointed as Vice-Consul at 
this port, replacing the one who was settled in Lima. Consul General Wilson was 
not of the same opinion, and surely took that proposal as an intrusion on his 
service. 
355 
On 25 August, Mason was about to depart Callao for Valparaiso, when he 
received a letter from Wilson requesting for a man-of-war to be permanently 
stationed on the Peruvian coast until the civil war ended, and enclosing a 
representation of the British merchants to delay his departure. 356 Mason considered 
this request as a sort of reproach, replying that since October 1834, Callao and 
other Peruvian ports were under protection of the Satellite and the Blonde. In fact, 
as the fighting was basically going on in South Peru, he found little reason to have 
a permanent vessel at Callao. To make clear his point of view, Mason went to 
Lima to met Wilson, on 26 August, but unfortunately he was forced to remain in 
the city, when the city gates were closed by order of General Salaverry to prevent 
any attack from those guerrilla groups supporting Orbegoso. Finally, three days 
later, the government issued orders to allow British officers to enter and leave the 
354_ Baker to Croker, JVarspite, Rio de Janeiro. 14/4/1830, ADM 1/32. 
355 
.- 
Hammond to Wood, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro. 12/5/1836, ADM 1/46. 
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city freely, and consequently Mason was able to come on board the Blonde. He 
was angry and asked Wilson to represent his protest to the government for being 
detained against his will, even when the latter, and afterwards Rear Admiral 
Hammond, considered this detention as an accident instead of a premeditated 
offence. To avoid similar problems in the future, Hammond instructed Mason to 
issue orders that any member of the British squadron should land properly dressed 
with uniform. 357 
At this stage, it seems that both Wilson and Mason already resented each 
other. A further incident arose when the former retained a letter addressed by 
Mason to the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Under normal circumstances 
British captains were not to entertain correspondence directly with any foreign 
government, since it was the normal duty of consular agents; however, Wilson 
having declined to intervene in an issue represented by the Peruvian Minister 
directly with Mason, the latter felt himself duly authorised to reply on the same 
level. The fact is that Wilson retained Mason's letter, which was a note of 
appreciation for some arrangements related to duties payable on supplies destined 
to foreign men-of-war. Obviously, Mason complained about the Consul General's 
attitude. 358 
Wilson reacted by early 1836, when he, as well as a number of British 
merchants of Lima, complained about the protection offered by the British 
Commodore. As was already mentioned, for almost a month a party of Royal 
"ý. enclosed Mason to Hammond, Blonde, Callao 2/10/1835; with Hammond to Wood, 
Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1835, ADM 1/45. 
35' Mason to Hammond, Blonde, Callao, 3/10/1835; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, 
Dublin, Rio de Janeiro. 10/12/1835. ADM 1/45. 
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Marines were stationed at Lima for the protection of British property and lives. 
However, it seems that French and North American naval assistance to their 
nationals was far more intense, including the use of naval boats to transport cargo 
to merchant vessels. '59 
From our point of view, both Wilson and Mason acted properly. The former 
very much concerned on the protection of British local merchants, and the latter 
taking into account that Callao was not the only place in need of protection on the 
Pacific. Compromising both approaches produced some friction, as it happened in 
several other places. But, at the end of the day, British merchants and properties 
were respected all along that civil war, and in this sense both Mason and Wilson 
deserve credit. 
International Conflicts 
As already mentioned, during the period covered by this chapter Peru faced 
two international conflicts, with Colombia and with Bolivia, both of them affecting 
British trade to a degree, and therefore involving the Pacific Squadron. 
The end of the War of Independence brought to Peru and Colombia a 
number of collateral problems, such as Colombian claims on Maynas territory and 
on the payment of a debt for the independence effort, as well as Peruvian 
counterclaim on the Guayaquil situation and the repatriation of those Peruvians 
enlisted by force in the Colombian Division stationed at Lima until 1827. These 
358 Mason to Hammond, Blonde, Callao, 2/10/1835, enclosed with Hammond to Wood, 
Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1835, ADM 1/45. 
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problems were poorly handled by both governments in office in 1828, Bolivar in 
Colombia and La Mar in Peru, involved as they were in the struggle for power 
between Bolivar's followers and their enemies, producing a tense situation between 
the two nations. This tension reached its highest point in July 1828, when 
Colombia declared war on Peru. A few days later, on 31 August, hostilities began 
when the Peruvian 24-dun sloop Libertad, Commander Carlos Garcia del Pöstigo, 
was attacked at Malpelo, off Tumbes, by Commodore Thomas Wright with the 20- 
gun sloop Pichincha and the 12-gun schooner Guayaquilena. Garcia managed to 
defeat both vessels, one of which eventually surrendered to Peruvian authorities. 
On 9 September, following this action, President La Mar declared a blockade of 
the Colombian coast from 3° 6' S to 9° N (from Tumbes to Panama), and shortly 
afterwards the Peruvian squadron sailed from Callao to enforce this measure. 360 
When war broke out, Peruvian squadron was formed by frigate Presidente, 
flagship of Vice-Admiral Guise, the already mentioned sloop Libertad, brig 
Congreso and 14-gun schooner Arequipef o. Colombia had almost no naval forces 
on the Pacific, except the Guayaquilena and Pichincha, trying to revert this 
situation by issuing a number of letters of marquee since the very beginning of the 
war. On the other hand, the British Pacific Squadron, under Captain Coghlan, of 
the Forte, was formed by the Volage, Alert, Doris and Menai. 361 
As happened with those blockades decreed during the wars of independence, 
this one became illegal by virtue of the complete lack of correlation between the 
extent of the coast to be blockaded and the number of vessels available to enforce 
360 Denegri (1976), 1.173-193. 
361 Vivero to Coghlan. Callao. 1219/1828; enclosed with Otwav to Croker. Ganges. Rio de 
Janeiro, 28/11/1828, ADM 1/31. 
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it. Consequently, Rear-Admiral Otway, Commander-in-Chief of the South America 
Station, instructed Captain Coghlan to denounce it as illegal and to recapture any 
British vessel detained by the blockading squadron. 362 
Based on this attitude, quite a number of British merchants and skippers 
were deeply involved supporting the war effort on both sides. That were the case 
of the sloop Royal Sovereign and the frigate Conde Morlay, arrived at Callao on 
by late 1828 with arms for the Peruvian army; as well as the schooner John Catto, 
who transported 130 Colombian troops from Panama to Monte Cristo. 363 
The naval campaign was to last until mid-1829, with Guayaquil being 
occupied by Peruvian forces after several attacks by Vice-Admiral Guise and his 
successors as Commander-in-Chief. On 7 April, schooner Arequipeno and brig 
Congreso attacked Panama and took out the English brig John Catto, William 
Clark master, previously detained by the Colombian privateer Tipuani. 364 The prize 
sailed for Guayaquil, where her cargo, consisting of 106 packs of tobacco, was 
landed, losing her papers when frigate President was burned and exploded on 18 
May. 365 
Shortly after that, the John Catto was put on trial at Callao Prize Court, and 
in January 1830 she was condemned to be sold in public auction. Learning of this 
sentence, British Pro-Consul Willimott tried by every possible mean to revoke it, 
causing obvious reactions amongst the members of the Prize Court. One of the was 
362 Otwav to Coghlan, 27/11/1828, and Admiralty Minute. 29/1/1829; enclosed with Otway to 
Croker, Ganges, Rio de Janeiro. 28/11/1828. ADM 1/3 1. 
363 A. H. M. 1829 carp. 14. leg. 13, docs. 51.67,80. 
364 Peruvian pailebot Tipuani, Juan Jose Lara master, sailed from Callao on 23/4/1827. It 
seems that she was captured afterwards [EI Telegraf de Lima, 25/4/18271. 
365 A. H. de M. Goleta John Catto. Denegri (1976) 1: 271-272,294-295. El Telegrgfo de Lima, 
11/7 & 23/10/1827. 
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Lieutenant Jose Espana, prosecutor on the trial, who with great indignation wrote 
"If we do not care about enforcing the law amongst foreigners living and trading in 
our republic, we surely will be shamed for it, and every single day they hold us up 
to public ridicule even more than now, scorning our laws, regulations, courts and 
insulting our judges". 366 
Finally, on 6 April 1830, the trial reached its final stage by a presidential 
decree, stating the neutrality of the brig, as having sailed under British colours 
when she was captured by the Tipuani. The John Catto was returned to the 
Colombian government, and six months later sold at Callao, being the sole incident 
to arise between the British and Peruvians during this war. 367 
The other international conflict faced by Peru in this period was with Bolivia. 
Ruled by liberal Andres de Santa Cruz, the Bolivian government implemented a 
number of measures to redirect his foreign trade from the Peruvian port of Arica to 
the newly established port of Cobija. Amongst these measures, lower duties were 
attractive enough to raise imports from 80,117 to 852,032 dollars in only four 
years (1828-1832), in spite of the additional cost of transport from such an isolated 
place as Cobija to La Paz. 368 Considering old economic, social and politic links 
between South Peru and Alto Peru, Santa Cruz also plotted to annex Peruvian 
southern provinces to Bolivia, driving Lima government to react against him in 
1831 and 1835.369 During the first one of these reactions, Captain Waldegrave, of 
the Seringapatan, was involved in an incident occurred at Cobija. 
366 
.-A. 
H. de M. Goleta John Catto 1830, doc. 4, f 6. 
367 
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368 Matthew (1989): 412-414. 
369 Basadre (1968), 11,14-17. 
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By May 1831, having failed negotiations at Arequipa, a Peruvian army led 
by General Gamarra was ready to invade Bolivia as a retaliation for Santa Cruz's 
intrusion in Peruvian internal affairs. In these circumstances, on the night of 26 
June, at Islay, the crew of the Peruvian sloop-of-war Libertad, mutinied, 
overpowered and landed their officers, sailing afterwards for Cobija. The reason 
for the mutiny seems to be the lack of payment in the last five months, but as far as 
the Libertad was received under the protection of Gaspar Aramayo, Governor of 
Cobija, it is likely that Santa Cruz's agents encouraged the movement. The 
Peruvian government reacted declaring the mutinied sloop as a piratical vessel, 
requesting to foreign naval stations as well as consular and diplomatic agents for 
her capture; and sending brigs Congreso and Arequipeno on her search. 370 
As could be expected, the request for foreign naval intervention was declined 
by French, North American and British commodores. Captain Waldegrave was one 
the first to be noticed of this request, as on "the 25 at night 30 miles south of 
Cobija, the Seringapatan was hailed by a Schooner who sent a boat on board" with 
Captain Garcia del Pöstigo's request of assistance to recover the Libertad. This 
petition was declined by the British Captain, as contrary to his instructions, stating 
that he only would intervene if piratical acts were committed by the mutineers. To 
prevent them from acting in such a way, when the Seringapatan entered Cobija, on 
July 26, she anchored close to the Lihertad, controlling by this means the 
mutineers' movements. At port there were certain quantities of British and French 
property and, consequently, Waldegrave decided to remain at port until 8 August, 
attending a request make both from the French consular agent and Governor 
37° Denegn (1976) 1: 341-342,44. Juan de Arona, Paginas Diplom iticas del Peru, Lima, 
Academia Diplomätica del Peru. 1968: 142-144,157-_58. 
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Aramayo. The latter's main concern was that President Santa Cruz could refuse to 
admit the Libertad under Bolivian protection, and in such a case he was unable to 
force the vessel to leave Cobija. 371 
On 29 July, the Congreso arrived off the port, sending a boat with Lieutenant 
Parker to notify Captain Waldegrave of President Gamarra's orders to capture the 
Liberlad wherever she was found. To avoid being involved in any eventual action, 
the Seringapatan lifted anchor and sailed to cruise off the port, while the Peruvian 
boat reached the shore to demand the return of the Libertad. As was already 
expected, Governor Aramayo refused to submit to this requirement, and according 
to the Peruvian Government's instructions, the Congreso established a blockade of 
the port. Waldegrave refused to recognize this measure, putting forward the 
following reasons: a) war had not been declared between Peru and Bolivia, b) 
notification of the blockade had not been given to neutral consular agents, and c) 
the presence of the Peruvian brig was not enough to enforce the blockade, 
specially when an "enemy" sloop was at port. Moreover, Waldegrave suggested 
that the Congreso should leave the port, as long as British and other foreign 
vessels were not going to respect the blockade. To enforce his position, the 
Seringapatan convoyed the arriving Swedish brig Berger Jack, of Stockholm, into 
the harbour, sailing between her and the Peruvian brig. 372 Some weeks latter, on 
37- Arona: 155-162. Waldegrave to Baker. Seringapatan, At Sea, 519/1831: enclosed with 
Townshend to Elliot, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro. 16/11/1831. ADM 1/37. 
372 Arona: 160-161. Waldegrave to Baker. Seringapatan, At Sea, 5/9/1831; enclosed with 
Townshend to Elliot, Dublin, Rio dc Janeiro. 16/11/1831. ADM 1/37. 
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his arrival at Callao, Captain Waldegrave addressed a strong protest to the 
Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning the blockade to 73 
On 1 August, Captain Waldegrave refused to allow the Lihertad sailing off 
the port in command of Diego Powell, who was just appointed by Aramayo. It was 
clear that Powell would be acting illegally unless he was a commissioned officer, a 
nomination which only could be done by the Bolivian President and, therefore, 
Waldegrave's attitude was quite proper. Despite the Governor's claims, the British 
Captain maintained his position, stating that he only would allow the Libertad 
sailing off if "a Peruvian men-of-war appeared off the harbour", the Congreso 
having already abandoned the blockade. Two days latter, all the Libertad's crew 
but twenty men landed, sails were removed and the vessel moved closer to the 
shore. "All dangers to the neutral property" having disappeared, the Seringapatan 
departed in the following days, 374 while the Libertad affair was to end that very 
month, following an agreement reached by both governments at Tiquina, near Lake 
Titicaca. 375 
Aside from these two international conflicts involving Peru, the area under 
the responsibility of the Pacific Squadron was also quite unsettled. Civil wars were 
fought at Chile, Mexico, United Provinces of Central America, Colombia and 
Ecuador, while the French presence in the South Seas extended considerably, 
373 
- ADM 51/3420. Waldegrave to Pedemonte. Serrnvapatan. Callao. 20/8/1831; enclosed 
with Waldegrave to Baker. At Sea, x/9/1831, ADM 1/37. 
374 Waldegrave to Baker, Seringapatan, At Sea, 5/9/1831; enclosed with Townshend to Elliot. 
Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 16/11/1831, ADM 1/37. Arona: 157-158. 
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producing some initial frictions between Catholic and Protestant missionaries. 
Accordingly, British merchants and consular agents in all the area increased their 
plea for a more active presence of British naval vessels. A request which was 
almost impossible to attend with the available number of vessels destined to the 
Squadron. 
During this period, and generally speaking, Commanders-in-Chief of the 
South American Station destined more than half of their vessels to the Pacific, 
averaging five men-of-war. Until 1829, the length of time they remained in the 
Pacific was variable, depending very much in the amount of bullion each Captain 
was able to collect. Even when the Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron finally 
decided which vessel sailed back to Rio de Janeiro, Rear-Admiral Baker 
considered necessary to establish a regularity in this service, by mid- 1829, he 
issued a set of rules which remained almost unchanged until the creation of the 
Pacific Naval Station (1837). First, having in mind that British merchants relied on 
naval vessels for the conveyance of their bullion, one of them was due to sail round 
the Cape to Rio de Janeiro quarterly. Second, for the service of British merchants 
in Central America, a warship was to sail up to San Blas yearly in November. 
Third, as long as the limits of the Station included Friendly and Society Islands, a 
ship would visit those places from time to time. 376 Finally, regarding some of the 
previous problems faced in the West Coast, Baker concluded that they "had chiefly 
arisen from the frequent changing of the Senior Officers, who had but seldom been 
376 Baker to Croker. 1T7arspite. Rio de Janeiro. 11/7/1829. ADM 1/31, and 15/2/1830. with 
enclosed letter from Baker to Bingham. 25/10/1829, ADM 1/32. 
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allowed to continue in that situation a sufficient time to enable them to acquire a 
competent local knowledge of that part of the Station"'" 
According to Admiral Baker's policy and the decline in the level of British 
trade with Peruvian ports, Royal Navy vessels spent less than one hundred days at 
Peruvian ports. Obviously, this figure was closely related to the severe decrease on 
the British maritime trade directed to Peruvian ports. As already mentioned, the 
starting point of this decline could be fixed in 1826, when struggle for Peruvian 
independence ended, and a Protectionist set of rules was established for foreign 
trade. If in 1826, several British men-of-war totaled 851 days at Peruvian ports, in 
the following year this figure was reduced to 309 days. The lowest figure was that 
already quoted for 183 2, being increased slowly in the following three years until it 
reached 369 days in 1835, mainly due to the unsettled Peruvian situation, with civil 
wars between Gamarra, Orbegoso, Salaverry and other caudillos. 
All these figures are shown in graphic two, "British men-of-war at Peruvian 
Ports", not considering survey vessels, such as the Beagle, who visited Callao in 
1835, or her tender, the schooner Constitution, who sailed along the Peruvian 
coast from August 1835 to June 1836. 
In spite of the time British naval vessels spent in Peruvian ports, it also 
should be taken into account that, under certain circumstances, British, North 
American and French commodores, supported each other in the fulfilment of their 
duties. As long as they faced similar problems, related to the unsettled condition of 
the country, these naval officers found ways of cooperation, acting jointly in some 
cases, as was the defence of foreigners at Lima in December 1835. 
". Baker to Croker, 6Varsorte Rio de ianeiro, 18/12/1821), ADM 1/, 2. 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
In spite of their own suspicion from each other, all of them considered the 
Peruvian Navy as an eventual opponent. The strength of this local naval force was 
seriously affected in 1829, when its largest vessel, frigate Presidente, got on fire 
and blew up at Guayaquil. The Peruvian Navy of the period was formed by a few 
sloops, brigs and schooners, most of them with good officers but poorly manned, 
due lack of proper payment. They were able to cope with the faulty Colombian 
naval opposition during the 1828-1829 war, however, they were not a real threat 
to foreign squadrons. Both foreign commodores and the Peruvian Commander-in- 
Chief, were quite aware of this situation and even when the British Squadron rarely 
concentrated more than three vessels at a single place, no attempt was made to 
offer resistance when eventually they had to use force for the protection of British 
lives and properties. That is what happened with the seizure of the Libertad, in 
1830. 
Graphic 2: "British men-of-war at Peruvian Ports" 
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British captains stationed in the Pacific were to protect their nationals, as 
Rear-Admiral Baker clearly stated in his instructions to Captain Waldegrave, of the 
Seringapatan, by mid-1831. As Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron, 
Waldegrave was "to give countenance and protection to this extensive commerce, 
and support the influence of British interest in these countries, is the first and 
indispensable duty of the squadron placed under your command". He, as did many 
other senior officers, had to attend an always increasing number of petitions for 
support presented by British merchants along the West Coast. 378 In attending them, 
they came through several problems with consular agents and merchants 
themselves, who generally considered that they deserved more protection that they 
actually received. 
That happened, for instance, by late 1835, when, aside from landing a party 
of marines, the Blonde had to move to Chorrillos, a fishery village which was 
declared the sea-port of Lima by Orbegoso. As the situation deteriorated very 
quickly at Callao, foreign and Peruvian merchants tried to embark their cargo in 
the safest possible way: by using foreign men-of-war's boats. According to 
Mason's report, while North American and French boats were committed to this 
service disregarding the nationality of the cargo's owner and whether or not export 
duties had been paid or not, he refused to do it, to avoid becoming involved in any 
illegal operation and so as not to compromise British neutrality. He only sent his 
launch to save British property, as there was no other way to do it, refusing to take 
on board 500,000 non-British-owned dollars from another vessel. His attitude 
disappointed British merchants, who felt that they were due to receive far more 
''s. - Baker to Elliot, IVarspire Rio de Janeiro. 25/6/1831,2 & 3/7/1831, ADM 1/36; 
1/12/1831, ADM 1/37; 19/6/1832, ADM 1/38. 
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"active" protection. Moreover, as the Blonde left Callao for Valparaiso on 25 
January 1836, the very day when Chorrillos provisional customs were closed, being 
followed by the Rover by early February, the merchants complained against Mason, 
considering that at least one naval vessel should remain at port until the danger 
elapsed. British merchants argued that Mason did not have enough authority to 
leave them without protection, suggesting that a separate station should be created 
for the West Coast of South America, since British investments in this quarter were 
considerable. They also complained about the use of British men-of-war in the 
conveyance of bullion, since this service disturbed the protection that they should 
offer. 379 We have already mentioned the final outcome of this particular suggestion: 
the establishment of the Pacific Station in 1837. 
When Captain Mason learnt of these complaints, two months later, he felt 
offended and considered that Consul General Wilson was moving British 
merchants in Lima against him, even unnecessarily delaying their protest. In his 
report, Mason considered that their fellow countrymen in Lima believed that they 
were the only part of the Station in need of protection. 380 In a general sense, 
Mason's attitude during those uncertain days, even though against the will of his 
compatriots, was quite proper, compared with that of United States and French 
captains. What happened later, in his relations with Mr. Wilson, can be understood 
in a general sense to be the usual sort of frictions between naval captains and 
consular agents. In a more specific sense, it seems to be true that British merchants 
in Lima, as well as in any other place in which their properties and lives were 
379 Mason to Hammond. Blonde 14 & 16/4; enclosed with Hammond to Wood. Dublin at Sea. 
15/7/1836, ADM 1/46. 
'R0. - Mason to Hammond. 16/4/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin at Sea. 
15/7/1836, ADM 1/46. 
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threatened, asked for more protection than they really needed, and far more than 
they could effectively receive. 
On the other hand, a further incident between Wilson and Mason occurred in 
June 1836, when Mr. Mariano de Sierra, Peruvian Foreign Affairs Minister, ad- 
dressed a letter to Consul General Wilson reminding him the regulations for the 
shipment of cargo, especially silver and gold. Even although Sierra's letter stated 
that some foreign men-of-war's boats were used to receive this sort of cargo 
without paying export duties, even entering ports not open to trade, he did not 
identify any of them, but was surely referred to the U. S. Dolphin. As already 
mentioned, the unauthorized presence of this schooner at Chorrillos, in March that 
year, produced an incident when the Foreign Affairs Minister wrongly identified 
her as H. M. S. Dublin. Obviously, those captains who allowed these shipments, 
placed themselves and their countries in a clearly illegal position. However, Mason 
found Sierra's comments offensive to British captains, arguing that even when the 
Satellite had visited Santa and Pisco, early in 1835; no treasure was received on 
board. Moreover, when his own frigate was anchored at Chorrillos, during the 
siege of Callao, in January 1836, he quite adamantly did not receive any non-Brit- 
ish owned cargo or treasure. Consequently, he asked Wilson to complain about 
Minister Sierra's letter. As in a previous situation, first Wilson and afterwards 
Hammond disapproved of Mason's extreme sensibility, taking into account that the 
Minister's letter was written in a general sense rather than accusing British vessels. 
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Furthermore, both considered that everything that Sierra asked was quite accept- 
able for British Captains. 'xl 
Accordingly, and reinforcing his own previous instructions, Hammond 
commanded Mason to remind the captains under his command not to accept any 
cargo on board their vessels without local customs intervention, in order to avoid 
giving any reason for complaint to the Peruvian Government. Hammond requested 
Wilson to inform to the Peruvian government about that part of his instructions, 
and that "he can assure that they have been perfectly executed". He recognised that 
at certain moments, during revolutionary times, the intervention of British 
men-of-war was absolutely necessary to protect British lives and properties, those 
being the only situations when British captains were not due to wait for the 
intervention of Peruvian customs. But in peace time, under normal circumstances, 
Peruvian law was to be most strictly observed by those British men-of-war visiting 
their ports. 382 
Besides the usual activities of the Pacific Squadron, during this period of 
time the British Navy was to be related to Peru through the general survey 
undertaken by Captain Robert Fitz Roy, and the exploration of the Amazon basin 
performed by two lieutenants. As is already well-known, the Hydrographic Office 
committed a number of vessels to survey the seas, aiming to produce the most 
391. 
- Mason to Wilson. 9/7/1836; Serra to Wilson, 14/6/1836; and Mason to Hammond, 
1/7/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 6/9/1836. ADM 
1/46. 
382 
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Hammond to Wilson, Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 6/9/1836, ADM 1/46. 
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accurate charts of both coasts of America for a more safe navigation, replacing 
former Spanish and British charts. 383 
The survey of South American waters began in 1826, with the Adventure, 
Captain P. P. King, and the Beagle, Captain Pringle Stokes. The first part of it 
lasted four years, returning both vessels to England by the end of 1830. Almost a 
year later, the Beagle sailed from Plymouth to continue the survey, under 
Commander Robert Fitz Roy. 384 
Having spent almost three years chartering the southern channels, with the 
help of the Constitution, a small schooner of 35 tons burden, the Beagle arrived at 
Callao on 19 July 1835. Captain Fitz Roy, who arrived almost a month later, in the 
Blonde, was introduced by Consul General Wilson to Captain Eduardo Carrasco, 
Director of the Naval Academy and the Hydrographit Deposit. Having already 
decided to commission the Constitution, Mr. Alexander Burns Usborne master, '81 
to undertake the examination of the coast of Peru, Fitz Roy and Usborne were 
provided by Carrasco with a large amount of information "-both verbally and in 
writing- besides which he ransacked the archives for manuscripts, charts, and 
books, from which he allowed extracts to be taken or copies to be made, in the 
most truly liberal manner". 386 
'F' Maling to Melville. 13/4/1825. GD 51/2/669-689, Scottish Records Office. L. S. Baker to 
Croker, Warspite. Rio de Janeiro. 10/2/1830, ADM 1/32. Dawson 1: 14. 
384. 
- Dawson II: 14-15. 
3R5 Usborne joined the navy in 1825, and served in several surveying vessels along South 
America. Australia, Ireland and other waters. He retired as captain in 1867 [Dawson II: 
1221. 
S6- Robert Fitzroy, Narrative of the survey voyages of His _Jajestv's Ships . -ldventure and 
Beagle, London 1839.1: 48-'7-484. Fitzroy to Hammond. Beagle Callao. September 1835, 
enclosed with Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio de ! anc_ro, 18/12/1835, ADM 1/45. 
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Accordingly to an anonymous biographer of Admiral Carrasco, amongst 
the information he provided were some "Instructions to Captain Fitz Roy" in two 
parts, and a "Description of the western coast of America, from Guayaquil to the 
Strait of Bering" . 
387 Nonetheless, we have found no other mentions of these works. 
The Constituciön, with an eight men crew, left Callao on September 6, 
properly furnished with letters of commendation from Bolivian, Chilean and 
Peruvian authorities. Mr. Usborne was instructed to commence his survey near 
Paposo, Central Chile, and to work along the coast thence to Guayaquil, returning 
to Callao to sail back to Britain. 388 
Carrasco's support of the Constitution's party continued after the Beagle's 
departure, on September 7, and even after she was sold at Paita, early in 1836, 
"winding up by advancing a large sum of money of his own purse, to forward the 
service in which they were engaged, and increasing their comfort during a long 
passage to England round Cape Horn. "389 
Despite a number of difficulties, mainly due to the civil war between 
Salaverry and Orbegoso, Usborne's party managed to fulfil their task. They 
completed a high quality survey, which was to be used for a number of charts in 
use for almost a century. 390 Before Usborne departed for Britain, he traced copies 
387Anonymous. "Apuntes biogräficos del senor contraimirante Carrasco" El Comercio, 
18/11/1865. 
388 Fitzroy, 1: 484: II: 186-192. 
189 Fitzroy I: 484. 
390 George Basalla. The voyage of the Beagle without Darwin", Manner's _tfirror 1961, vol. 
IL. 46-47. 
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of the charts "of the greater parts of the shores of Peru", which were given to the 
Peruvian government in return of their kindness. 39' 
As a recognition of Carrasco's support, Fitz Roy named the hills which 
surrounded Independencia Bay, south of Callao, after him. He was also proposed 
and admitted as correspondent member to the Royal Geographical Society of 
London and to the Royal Northern Antiquary Society, of Stockholm. 392 
Even when in 1836 the Sulphur was commissioned to continue the survey of 
the West Coast, she was to spent just a short visit to Callao and Paita before 
heading for Central America. This survey vessel was to return to the Peruvian 
coast by mid-1838. 
British interest in the exploration of the Amazon basin began as soon as the 
Independence war ended, considering that use of their rivers could provide new 
routes for trade. It is not clear who conceived the idea, but by mid-1827 Peruvian 
authorities and British Pro-Consul Rickets had already agreed to send an 
expedition to the Maranon river with the aforementioned purpose, Captain William 
Carter, Peruvian Navy, being appointed to lead it in company with Rickets' assis- 
tant. However, for some reason, time passed with no further step until October 
1827, when Lieutenant Henry Lister Maw, Royal Navy, offered himself to 
undertake the exploration of that area and the Amazon river. 
Having been officially landed from the Menai to recover his health, it seems 
unlikely that Maw was truly sick, since in the following weeks he was involved in 
391 John Barrow. -Sketch of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventure and 
Beagle, 1825-1836", in Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London (quoted 
afterwards as JRGS). VI (1836): 312-313. 
392 JRGS, VII (1837): 192 & OX (1839): vi. Anonymous. "ýpuntes biog*a icos... ". 
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an extraordinary effort to cross the Andes and sail down the Maranon and Amazon 
rivers. Duly authorized by Captain John Sinclair, by then Senior Officer in the 
Pacific, Maw's preparations for the journey began almost immediately, with the 
hearty support of British Pro-Consuls Willimott and Kelly, Peruvian Minister of 
Government Francisco Mariategui, and the Archbishop of Lima. Provided with 
letters of introduction from these authorities, on 30 November 1827 Maw sailed 
for Huanchaco on the Peruvian merchant brig Alcance Republicano. '93 From this 
place, the seaport of Trujillo, he was to begun a four months' journey which ended 
at Santarem, in Brazil, where the Governor ordered his detention. After some days 
in this situation, Maw was released, arrived at Para and shortly afterwards sailed 
home on the brig Douglas. In September 1828, Maw presented a full account of 
his journey to the Admiralty, an extract of which was published on the following 
year as a Journal of a Passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic, London 1829. In 
this year, Maw sailed back to the South America Station on the Polage. 394 
Maw's journal provided very valuable information about the Maranon and 
Amazonas, an area which was claimed by Colombia. He listed every single 
authority found along his route, including priest, finding that all of them were 
commissioned by the Peruvian government instead of the Colombian one. As this 
claim passed on to Ecuador, when it became a separate State (1830), and to a 
degree is still argued by some Ecuadorians historians, the testimony provided by 
Maw became one of the most valuables Peruvian proofs of effective possession of 
the area. 
393. 
- El Telegrafo de Lima, n' 201,3/12/1827. 
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A second British naval exploration to the Amazon basin was undertaken in 
1834, by Lieutenant William Smyth, of the Samarang. Being stationed at Callao 
for several months, Smyth was convinced by Mr. Thomas, an English resident at 
Lima, to explore a route which could connect Peru with the Atlantic by using the 
Pachitea, Ucayali and Amazon rivers. Consul General Wilson, Captain Paget, of 
the Samarang, and Commodore Mason supported and encouraged the idea, which 
was warmly welcomed by the Peruvian government. On 25 August, when 
President Orbegoso visited that British man-of-war, Mason officially presented the 
idea and obtained the President's promise to provide every possible help to the 
expedition. Smyth and his companion, Mr. Frederick Lowe, landed in the following 
days, to prepare their journey, being commissioned two Peruvian officers, Major 
Beltran and naval Lieutenant Azcärate, to accompany them up by the Ucayali and 
return to Lima by the Maranon. The expedition left Lima in September, provided 
with some instruments lent by Captain Paget and an number of articles bought by 
using three hundred dollars "subscribed by some of the British residents". 395 
The last contact Mason had with both officers was by a letter convoyed by 
Major Beltran, who had left them entering the Ucayali river, early in March 1835. 
They were to sail down this river, enter the Amazon and arrived at Belem do Para 
some weeks later. ' Considering that this expedition was to contribute to the 
better understanding of the Amazon basin, opening it to trade and science, Mason 
asked Rear Admiral Hammond for a letter of commendation for Smyth and Lowe 
394. 
- Lieutenant Henry Lister Maw return of service, 24/4/1840, ? QDM 9/44: Otway to Croker, 
Ganges, Rio de Janeiro. 29/3/1828, ADM 1/31; Maw to Croker, London, 1/7,19/8 & 
12/9/1828, ADM 1/3038. 
395 W. Smyth and F. Lowe, Narrative of a Journey from Lima to Para. London 1836: 1-11. 
JRGS. IV (1835): 117,373,561. 
396 JRGS, IV (1835): 561. 
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before the Lords of the Admiralty. However, this petition was denied as Admiral 
Hammond showed very little enthusiasm for this enterprise, considering that it 
would be of little help for British trade. 397 
Even when the expedition proved "that an easy navigable passage exists from 
the town of Pozuzo on the Pachitea, within 300 miles of Lima, by the rivers 
Ucayali and the Amazon to the Atlantic Ocean", 398 the unsettled state of Peru did 
not allow to be properly exploited until the 1860's. 
391 Hammond to Dawson. Spartiate Rio de Janeiro. 12/3/1835. ADM 1/43. Mason to 
Hammond, Callao 27/11/1835 enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Rio de Janeiro 
14/3/1836, ADM 1/45. 
398 'A Sketch of the Progress of Geography and of the labours of the Royal Geographical 
Society during the years 1836-77 JIGS. VII (1837): 191. Smyth. Account of tte Rivers 
Amazon and Nero, from recent Observations", JRGL'. VI (1836): 11-23. 
FOURTH CHAPTER 
The Confederation of Peru and Bolivia 
(1836-1839) 
Following the defeat of General Salaverry, in February 1836, Peru and 
Bolivia became a confederation under the leadership of Marshal Andres de Santa 
Cruz. In a Congress held at Sicuani, representatives of Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cusco 
and Puno, decided to became a new State named South Peru (17 March 1836). A 
few months later, on August 16, deputies from Lima, Junin, Amazonas and La 
Libertad, summoned a Congress at Huaura and created the State of North Peru. 
Both States placed themselves under the rule of Santa Cruz, as Supreme Protector. 
On 28 October 1836, the Confederation was formally created by the union of the 
states of North-Peru, South-Peru and Bolivia, placed altogether under the 
protection of Santa Cruz, who was entrusted with a wide range of powers, 
amongst them defence and foreign affairs. 399 
The Peru-Bolivian Confederation was to last three years, a time in which 
Santa Cruz tried to establish a liberal policy, lowering import taxes, opening the 
overprotected Peruvian market and trying to recover for Callao its leading position 
along the western coast of South America. With this purpose in mind, he 
successfully improved his personal links with foreign consular agents, especially 
with the British, Belford Hinton Wilson, who played quite an important role during 
the Confederation. Wilson's links with Santa Cruz went back to the Independence 
Wars, when the former was a young aide de camp of Bolivar, but it also reflected 
399. - Basadre (1968) . I: 131-142. Andres de Santa-Cruz Schuuhlcrafft. Cuadros sin(jpticos de los 
gobernantes de la Republica dc Bolivia, 1825 a 1956, v de la del Peru, 1820 a '. )56, (La 
Paz. Fundaciön Universitaria Simon I. Patiflo. 1956), 78-88. 
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an important fact: the unstable Peruvian political situation provided very little hope 
for those British who had invested in the country, either by trade or as shareholders 
of the British loan of 1822. Santa Cruz's success as President of Bolivia, where he 
established regulations of unusual liberality, and as previous ruler of Peru (1826- 
1827), gained him the reputation of being one of the most capable leaders for 
Peru. 40° Wilson was not the only one to believe that, since British captains also 
became supporters of Santa Cruz, producing highly enthusiastic reports on his 
political activity. 
French and North Americans were also fascinated by the new ruler, 
supporting him accordingly. But this enthusiasm was not shared by the Chileans, 
who considered the Confederation as a direct threat to their country, declaring war 
and finally destroying it. During this war, British captains were involved, mainly 
supporting British trade and citizens, but also acting as mediators and eventually 
providing some help to Santa Cruz. Consul General Wilson became too much 
implicated in this situation, carry along with him Rear-Admiral Ross, Commander- 
in-Chief of the newly formed Pacific Station. Wilson's attitude was to create some 
friction with the British Consul General at Chile, Colonel Walpole, a situation 
which also was echoed in the relations between the latter and the Pacific Station. 
Finally, during these years, French influence in the South Sea Islands grew 
considerable, mainly through the action of the French Commodore, Captain Abel 
Bergasse du Petit Thouars. This issue was to create new commitments for the 
British Pacific Station. 
Framed by this general situation, the aim of this chapter is to discuss the 
following issues: 
a) How deeply involved the Pacific Squadron became in supporting 
Consul General Wilson attitude towards Santa Cruz and the 
Confederation?; 
b) The neutrality observed by British Captains during the war between 
Chile and the Confederation; 
'00. - W. M. Mathew (1989), 41122-41-33. 
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c) The particular relationship between naval and consular agents in Peru 
and Chile; 
d) If the creation of the Pacific Station brought any substantial and 
immediate change in the British naval activity in the Pacific; 
e) If there was any significant change in the transport of bullion on naval 
vessels?; and 
f) Finally, the relationship of the British Pacific Squadron with other 
naval forces in the area. 
The Confederation and the British 
Several works had been written on the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 
explaining its creation, development and fall. For the purpose of this research, we 
have already provided the general background of the way in which the 
Confederation was created. The situation of Peru at that time was chaotic, having 
lost its leading role as the economic centre of the western coast of South America. 
Higher taxes than Valparaiso, contraband and unreliable customs, provide an 
explanation for the decrease in commercial activity. Other State incomes were not 
well collected, and in many cases they not reach the proper office, producing a 
growing deficit in the Public Budget. Public Administration was also poorly 
managed in other fields, with a considerable number of civil servants and military, 
whose efficiency and discipline was far from being acceptable. 401 
Marshal Andres de Santa Cruz, the Protector and real ruler of the 
Confederation, adopted a number of measures trying to correct this chaotic 
situation. New Regulations were issued for Trade and Customs, and a more strict 
control was exerted over Public funds. The Judicial system was also changed, as 
well as many other services, like Public Education. However, most of these 
measures did not last enough to produce a real change. Both, the Chileans and the 
internal enemies of Santa Cruz, moved faster to destroy the Confederation. Born in 
Bolivia, ruler of Peru (1826-1827), and President of his native country (1828- 
1836), Santa Cruz had already shown great abilities as an administrator but a poor 
+0I. - Basadre (1968), II: 137. 
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performance as a politician. Having to deal with such unsettled countries as Peru 
and Bolivia, he lacked a strong and loyal group of generals, and also a proper naval 
force. Chilean intervention under these circumstances was to precipitate something 
which would arrive sooner or later: the fall of the Confederation. 402 
Under the presidency of General Joaquin Prieto, since April 1830, Chile 
was undergoing one of the most important moments in its history: the 
consolidation of the republican system and the establishment of stable democratic 
foundations. Some of the most outstanding figures in this process were Diego 
Portales and Andres Bello, whose ideas would constitute the basis for Chilean 
political thought for the following decades. 
As was already mentioned in previous chapters, since independence, 
Chilean governments established a number of regulations aimed at turning 
Valparaiso into a more attractive port of destination for foreign trade bound for the 
West Coast of South America. As foreign goods were allowed to be landed at 
Valparaiso without paying duties, unless they were destined for local use, this port 
became a huge warehouse, with many implications for the local economy. The 
Peruvian economy resented this situation, at a time when protectionism was still 
strong enough to deny any liberal response to the Chileans' attitude. In spite of 
this, some attempts were made, but for some reason or another they failed. Within 
this context, in May 1836, Peruvian President Orbegoso rejected a Trade Treaty 
which provided Chile with certain advantages. " This was to be the last act in the 
long economic struggle between Callao and Valparaiso before it became a war. In 
fact, for Chilean merchants, it was clear that war was the only way left. 
Accordingly, they pressed their government to retaliate with higher taxes on 
Peruvian sugar and alcohol. -4)4 Additionally, the influence of those Peruvians 
deported by Santa Cruz to Chile should be mentioned. 
4402. - Ideen II : 138.187-190. 
403. - Paz Soldän IV: 3-5.8-11. Basadre (1968) II: 143-144. Denegri (1976) 1: 465-477. Mario 
Barros. Historia Diolomätica de Chile, 1.541-1938, Barcelona 1970: 120. 
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The immediate cause for the war was the expedition of General Freyre, a 
former Chilean President, who sailed from Callao in July 1836 with the intention of 
recapturing power in Chile. For this purpose, he hired the frigate Monteagudo and 
the brig Orbegoso, two Peruvian men-of-war which had been unarmed and offered 
for trading purposes by the Peruvian Government. " President Orbegoso distrusted 
the Navy too much, for the support it gave to Salaverry during the last civil war, 
and consequently he reduced the Navy's strength to a minimum. 
According to their papers, the frigate left Callao for Guayaquil, while the 
brig was bound for Costa Rica. 06 However, General Freyre and a number of 
Chilean deportees came on board, with clear intentions of starting a revolution in 
Chile. By July 9, the Peruvian authorities had become aware of this situation, and 
the Chilean Minister at Lima was officially informed that the Peruvian government 
was not involved in this affair. " The expedition itself proved to be a total failure, 
and General Freyre was captured on August 28, at Chiloe. The Chilean 
government, skilfully manipulated by Diego Portales, the powerful Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, War and Interior, reacted by blaming the Peruvian government for 
having sponsored the expedition by providing men-of-war for this purpose. The 
excuse to declare war had been given, and consequently secret plans to attack first 
were prepared. 
Well-recognized Peruvian and Chilean historians consider that neither 
Orbegoso nor Santa Cruz were aware that Freyre was engaged in such a poorly 
prepared venture. 408 Nevertheless, the Chilean government was not willing to 
accept their innocence. Minister Portales' attitude towards Santa Cruz was clear: 
Chile could not afford the luxury of having him as ruler of Bolivia and South Peru, 
405. - Ramon Herrera to Minister of War, Callao 31/8 & 29/9 & 5/10//36. A. H. de M. bergantin 
General Orbegoso; and 16/9/1836, A. H. de M. fragata _tlonteagudo. Paz Soldän IV: 75- 
76. 
406. - A. H. de M. libro 847.17/5/1836. 
407. - Paz Soldän IV: 77- "i 
408. - Denegri (1976) 1: 485--=92. 
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with enormous influence on the rest of Peru. Consequently, Santa Cruz's plans to 
confederate the three previously mentioned republics should be halted before its 
consolidation. The abrogation of the trade treaty with Peru, before Freyre's 
expedition, persuaded President Prieto to began hostilities. "' A loan was made to 
increase the number and readiness of the Chilean squadron and, even before 
Freyre's capture, two Chilean men-of-war, the brig Aquiles and the 5-gun 
brig-schooner Colo Colo, left Valparaiso for Peruvian waters, carrying Colonel 
Victoriano Garrido as High Commissioner to the Peruvian government. 
The Aquiles arrived at Callao on 21 August 1836, finding at anchor the 
British frigate Talbot, under Captain Pennel, who recorded: "The Aquiles' Captain 
[Angulo], after his visit to the Port-Master, remained on shore for some hours with 
his companions, sending a person to Lima, with the Chilean Consul General 
coming to Callao". "' When Captain Angulo returned to his vessel, he had a clear 
knowledge of the condition of the Peruvian men-of-war lying at anchor. They were 
the 12-gun bark Santa Cruz, the 6-gun brig Arequipeno, the schooner Peruviana, 
and the brig Congreso. 1" As a result of the policy adopted by Orbegoso, these 
vessels were almost totaly neglected and not in sailing condition, manned only by 
77 men, 30 of them being Chileans. To worsen their situation, none of the Peruvian 
vessels had gun-power on board, and most of their small arms were still under re- 
pair on land. ": Above all this, there was no reason at all to fear hostility from 
vessels of a friendly nation visiting the port. "' 
409. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Coquimbo, 13/3/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, 
Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
410. - Mason to Walpole. 27/2/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 
23/4/1837_ ADM 1/48. 
411. - Young to the Minister of War, Callao 27/6/1836: Young to the Jefe Superior Militar del 
Departamento. 1/7.3 &12/8/1836; Young to the Minister of War, Callao 20/8/1836. A. H. 
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412. - Young to the Jefe Superior Militar del Departamento. Callao 12 & 20/8/1836, A. H. de M. 
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Shortly after midnight, "not demanding any satisfaction or explanation or 
warning", five boats with 80 armed men left the Aquiles to capture the first three 
of the above-mentioned Peruvian men-of-war. They succeeded in their purpose and 
at dawn the Aquiles anchored at San Lorenzo Island in company with her prizes. '' 
Immediately, Garrido wrote to the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to 
Captain Pennel, justifying the attack as a mean of obtaining guarantee of the 
peaceful intentions of the Confederate government towards Chile. "' The Chilean 
action was fully disapproved by the British, first by Pennel and Wilson, and 
afterwards by Mason and Rear Admiral Hammond, who considered it an act of 
utmost treachery"6 
The attack of the Aquiles not only gained British disapproval, but also from 
some Chilean historians, such as Vicuna Mackena, who described it as a disgrace 
for both Chile and her Navy. 4' Other Chilean authors justified the attack on the 
principle of self-defence, relating it to the expedition of Freyre and the intervention 
of Santa Cruz in Peruvian internal affairs. "' I believe that neither the attitude of 
President Prieto, when he sent two men-of-war to commit hostilities against the 
Peruvian coast without prior declaration of war, nor that of Angulo, when he 
behaved falsely before the authorities of the Port of Callao, merit any justification 
whatsoever. If we assume that Chile had little possibility of challenging Peruvian 
naval power without a blow of this sort, it could be said that the only possible 
justification was the result. 
411. - El . 4raucano. 23/9/1836. Garrido to Pennel. Aquiles, 22/8, enclosed with Hammond to 
Wood. Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 8/12/1836, ADM 1/47. 
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Santa Cruz's first reaction was to detain Ventura Lavalle, the Chilean 
Consul General at Lima, ordering an immediate attack on the Chilean vessels. "' 
However, he soon realized that he did not have enough naval forces to retaliate, 
and it was far more convenient to accept Consul General Wilson's advice to 
negotiate a truce, avoiding in such a way a conflict which could endanger the 
Confederation itself. Conversations were held on board the Talbot, this being the 
first British intervention in this conflict. 
On 27 August, Chilean and Peruvian delegates signed a provisional 
agreement, according to which the former would retain the vessels already 
captured until a definitive treaty was reached, being allowed to take the two men- 
of-war involved in General Freyre's expedition. The agreement was approved by 
Santa Cruz but rejected by Prieto, following Portales' advice. "' 
Even before Garrido's arrival at Valparaiso, a new expedition was prepared 
under the flag of Vice-Admiral Blanco Encalada. On 10 September 1836, Minister 
Portales revealed to the Admiral his feelings towards the Confederation: "With the 
triumph of your arms, you are really going to obtain the second independence of 
Chile [... ] The Confederation must disappear forever from the American scene 
[... ]because of the command that the new organization would try to exercise in the 
Pacific, taking it away from us [... ] for all these reasons, the Confederation would 
soon smother Chile". 421 
On October 19, five Chilean men-of-war departed Valparaiso for Callao, 
with the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Mariano Egana, as High Commissioner 
419. - The brig Congreso still needed 25 days more to be ready for fighting, there was a limited 
number of ordnance at the port defenses, the sloop Libertad, due to arrive shortly, was 
unaware of the situation. and to buy and arm merchant vessels would take some time 
[Ramon Herrera to the Minister of War, Callao 26/8/1836. A. H. de M. bergantin 
Congreso]. 
420. - El Eco del Protectorado, 31/8/1836. Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 
8/12/1836, and enclosed letter, Pennel to Mason, Talbot. Callao 10/9/1836, ADM 1/47. 
Ramon Sotomayor Valdes, Campaia del Ejercito Chileno contra la Confederation 
Perri-Boliviana en 1837, Santiago 1896: 10-14. 
421. - Barros: 114. Guillermo Feliu Cruz and Erne: -Lo de la Cniz (editors), Epistolarto de Don 
Diego Portales 1821-1837, Santiago 1936-1937, III: 452-454. 
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to negotiate peace. His instructions were quite simple: he must obtain the 
dissolution of the Confederation. Obviously, after the Aquiles incident, five Chilean 
ships at Callao was not the best expression of peaceful intentions. That feeling was 
expressed to Commodore Mason, by General Herrera, Governor of Callao, who 
assured him that the Peruvian government was "not disposed to treat with Chile, in 
the presence of their squadron". "' 
Consequently, on October 30, when Admiral Blanco Encalada arrived at 
Callao, the Peruvian government, being "anxious for Peace and ready to make 
every reasonable sacrifice to obtain it [... ] refused to admit the Chile Squadron to 
the Port, or to treat in the presence of a hostile force". Following an exchange of 
correspondence, the Chilean High Commissioner left port on the night of 
November 11, stating that "it could be considered almost thatwar had been 
declared between Chile and the governments of the North and South-Peruvian 
states". 423 
The Confederate government reacted by prohibiting all trade with Chile, 
establishing an embargo on Chilean vessels at Peruvian ports and adopting defence 
measures along the coast. A final direct attempt to settle peace, on November 20, 
with the mediation of the United States, France and Great Britain, only merited 
Portales' rejection. Finally, on 2 February 1837, all maritime and land communi- 
cations with Chile, were declared illegal. 424 
Naval operations began in November, when Admiral Blanco cruised off 
Guayaquil waiting for some Peruvian naval vessels who were at that port. 425 By 
late November, the Peruvian sloop Libertad mutinied and headed for Valparaiso, 
422. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Callao. 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47. 
423. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Callao, 12/11/1836, ADM 1/47. El Araucano n° 338 v 340, 
24/2 & 10/3/1837. 
424. - El iraucano n° 340.10/3/1837. El Eco del Protectorado, n° 26 v 49. 
425. - El _4raucano, n° 344.7/4/1837: 
2-3. Fuenzalida (1978) 11: 413-414. Denegri (1976) 1: 
526-528. The I alparaiso and . -lquiles 
left the blockade by November 23 [Loyola to the 
Minister of War. Callao 15/12/1836. A. H. de M. corbeta I alparaisoj. The only 
Confederate vessel which remained at Guayaquil was the Catalina. 
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where she joined the Chilean forces against Santa Cruz. As soon as this defection 
was known in Lima, the Confederate government requested the intervention of the 
British squadron for the Libertad's recapture. After initial thoughts in favour of 
this intervention, Commodore Mason finally declined, bearing in mind the 
Admiralty's disapproval of Captain Bingham's intervention with regard to the 
Chilean brig Aquiles, in 1828, and the advice of Consul General Wilson. 426 
Simultaneously, Chilean envoys tried to convince Argentinian and 
Ecuadorian rulers that they should to declare war on the Confederation. The 
Argentinians were convinced and a small army was sent to attack Bolivia, an 
operation which achieved very little. In spite of his sympathy for the Chilean cause, 
the Ecuadorian President, General Vicente Rocafuerte, decided not to involve his 
country in the conflict. 427 
In the middle of this tense situation, British Consul Generals in Peru and in 
Chile, Belford H. Wilson and Colonel John Walpole, a former Secretary of Lord 
Palmerston, respectively, were to play a singular role as both were deeply involved 
in local internal affairs. While Wilson became a firm supporter of Santa Cruz, 
considering him as "the only man willing or capable of promoting the commercial 
and industrial interest of the country"; "' Walpole did not recognize the Confedera- 
tion and from a very early stage undertook a defence of the Chilean position. Each 
consular agent tried to get the Pacific Squadron involved in support his own point 
of view, and friction arose especially with Walpole. 
Naval captains had their own perception of Santa Cruz and the conflict 
itself. Regarding Marshal Santa Cruz, Commodore Mason wrote: 
426. - Denegri (1976) 1: 528-530. Mason to Walpole, Blonde Valparaiso. 4/3/1847; enclosed 
with Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
427. - Mason to Hammond. Valparaiso, 11/4/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood. Dublin 
Rio de Janeiro. 23/6/1837, ADM 1/48. Barros: 117-118. Paz Soldän IV: 128-130. Soto- 
mayor (1896): 28-35.57-60. 
428. - Celia Wu. Generals and Diplomats, Great Britain and Peru, 19-70-40, Cambridge 1991: 
67y78. 
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"trade had entirely revived and the very wise and salutary Reforms, and 
Regulations introduced by the Protector were beginning to operate for the 
benefit of Commerce; and in fact they are all calculated to call for all the 
great Resources of Peru; and such are its Resources that the Country only 
requires tranquillity to be prosperous. General Santa Cruz appears to me the 
only Man calculated to govern this restless and corrupted people. From the 
way in which he governed Bolivia, and put an end to the Revolution of 
General Salaverry, I formed my opinion "°`9 
Mason considered that the conduct of the Chilean government was quite 
uncivilized and ill-intentioned "and wide convinces me that they will not stick at 
the means, by which they think they can distress Peru". Making a comparative 
judgement between both governments, Mason stated that the Chilean ruled its 
countrymen in an almost semi-barbaric way, whereas the Peruvian had a more 
liberal attitude, acting moderately and in good faith. With regard to the conflict 
itself, he added "The object for which Chile contends appears to me unattainable, 
and if it could be attained, would not, I think, benefit for her". "' 
The first attempt to get British naval vessels involved in the conflict was 
made by Consul General Walpole, who wrote at least three letters to Commodore 
Mason, of the Briton, stating that the vessels taking part in General Freyre's 
expedition ought to be regarded as pirates, and therefore it was Mason's duty to 
capture them wherever they could be found. "' Mason, who was notified by Freyre 
himself before his departure from Callao on the expedition's aim, considered that it 
was an internal affair and therefore had already decided not to interfere, unless 
piratical activities were committed. "' Moreover, he was firmly convinced that the 
Peruvian government had not been an accomplice in the expedition, as was claimed 
by the Chilean government without producing any proof 43' 
429. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47. 
430. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde 27/2 & 13/3/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood. Dublin 
Rio de Janeiro. 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
431. - Walpole to Mason. Valparaiso. 28 & 30/7.4/8/18336, ADM 1/46. 
432. - Mason to Walpole. Briton Valparaiso. 1/8/1836. ADM 1/46. Mason to Hammond, Blonde 
Valparaiso, 14/3/1837, ADM 1/48. 
433. - Mason to Walpole, 27/2/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 
23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
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In early 183, a similar request was made by Salaverry, but it was rejected 
equally, amongst other reasons because British men-of-war were unable to exert 
the right of search upon merchant vessels in peace time. Showing a keen under- 
standing of the variability in South American politics, Mason stressed the fact that 
in these nations a man could be considered the worst enemy of his own country, 
while in exile, but on the day after his triumphal return he could be acclaimed as a 
saviour of his nation. 434 
In his report to Rear Admiral Hammond, Mason affirmed that any 
information coming from consular agents had to be regarded with much caution, 
since in most cases they were strongly influenced by local governments, losing the 
objectivity that they ought to maintain. Mason provided two examples to illustrate 
this affirmation, one of them related to the expedition of Freyre and the other one 
to the revolution of Salaverry. In the first case, Mason being already aware that 
something was about to happen in Chile, Walpole assured him that nothing should 
be expected in the following weeks. In the second case, scarcely two days before 
the start of Salaverry's revolution, Wilson assured Mason that he could give notice 
of any political unrest one month before it actually happened. Despite his low 
opinion with regard to the objectiveness of both consular agents, Mason was 
convinced that they, as well as naval Captains, had to make their best efforts in 
trying to stop a war between Chile and the Confederation, which could place 
British trade in the area at great risk. "' Moreover, taking into consideration the 
type of government ruling Peru, Mason believed that the naval service should be 
more effective that the consular one in this country. "' 
434. - Mason to Walpole. Briton, Valparaiso, I& 6/8. Mason to Hammond, 18/8/1836. ADM 
1/46. Mason's attitude on this affair was fully approved by Rear Admiral Hammond. see 
Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 12/10/1836. ADM 1/46. 
435. - Mason to Hammond. 13/8/1836, ADM 1/46. 
436. - Mason to Hammond. Cailao. 26/12/1836, enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio 
de Janeiro. 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
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Both consular agents, Mason and afterwards Rear Admiral Ross would 
make every possible effort to stop the war. Naval co-operation was closer with 
Consul General Wilson, and began following the attack of the Aquiles, when 
negotiations were held on board the Talbot, under Captain Pennel, as already 
mentioned. 
Commodore Mason had been at Valparaiso since August, with the Blonde 
and some other British naval vessels, witnessing the arrival of the Aquiles with her 
prizes and the preparations of the Chilean squadron under Admiral Blanco 
Encalada. The latter had publicly shown his dislike for the attack of the Aquiles, an 
attitude which gained for him a high degree of respect from British and other 
foreign naval officers, in contrast with the poor opinion they had of the 
honourability of Chilean captains. "' This final aspect awoke additional fears among 
British captains, as they thought that any squadron with such captains might 
endanger neutral shipping. "' 
Blanco and Mason met on September 25, on the Blonde, learning then that 
the Chilean Admiral was not very pleased with his mission, which was to enforce a 
blockade of Callao if peace negotiations between Mariano Egana and the 
Confederate government failed. Suspecting that Santa Cruz was ready to accept 
any conditions, difficult as they may be, so as to preserve peace, Mason expressed 
his hopes that war would finally be avoided. Blanco agreed with him and replied 
that he had real intentions of finding a peaceful arrangement for the conflict, as in 
fact he did. 439 
Even when war was not officially declared, some measures were taken by 
Santa Cruz as soon as he learnt of the rejection of the provisional agreement signed 
437. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Coquimbo. 13/3/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood. 
Dublin Rio de Janeiro, ? 3/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
438. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde. 27/2 & 13/3/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood. 
Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
439. - Mason to Hammond, Blonde Valparaiso, 26/9/1836. ADM 1/47. Barros: 124. Wu (1991): 
79. 
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on the Talhot. Amongst these measures, an embargo was placed on all vessels at 
Callao, to prevent the departure of the Peruvian brig-of-war Congreso being 
known, few days before the arrival of Blanco. Nonetheless, merchant vessels could 
sail "provided they were escorted far enough from the coast to prevent them being 
detained by the Chilean Squadron". Commodore Mason, who arrived at Callao five 
days ahead of the Chilean squadron, offered his protection to British vessels, "as 
there has been no Declaration of War, and consequently the latter can possess no 
Belligerent Rights, I sent the Talbot out twice. The Rover also escorted one to 
Guayaquil". ' 
Following his arrival, Mason was informed by General Herrera, Governor 
of Callao, who "called on me yesterday, before I anchored", that the Peruvian 
government was "not disposed to treat with Chile, in the presence of their 
Squadron". "' When the Chilean squadron arrived, Mason requested guarantees 
from the Chilean Envoy for hostilities not to be committed while negotiations were 
under way. In reply, he was informed by Egana that Chile and Peru were already at 
war. As Mason stated in one of his reports to Hammond, the attitude adopted by 
the Chilean government was far from the normal international usage, as 
explanations from the Confederation government should have been asked for, 
before declaring war, especially when the latter was willing to make every possible 
effort to avoid such a situation. 442 
On 16 December 1836, Chilean Admiral Blanco Encalada returned to 
Callao to blockade the port, informing Commodore Mason of his intention. 
However, taking into account that war between Chile and the Confederation had 
not been formally declared, Mason requested Blanco to exhibit "a less hostile 
attitude" towards the Peruvian government and not to interrupt trade. 
440. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Callao, 12/11/1836, ADM 1/47. 
441. - Mason to Hammond, Blonde Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47. 
442. - Mason to Walpole. Blonde Valparaiso. 27/2/1837; enclosed with Hammond to Wood. 
Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
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Understanding that under these circumstances any forcible action would be reject- 
ed by foreign squadrons, and taking into account his own point of view towards 
this conflict, Blanco accepted Consul General Wilson's advice to negotiate peace 
with the Confederation. Bearing this in mind, General Herrera and Admiral Blanco 
met on board the Valparaiso, and on December 21, a 15-day truce was signed. 4'3 
After the signature of this agreement, Herrera and Blanco came aboard the 
Blonde to notify Mason of this truce and to request a British guarantee for any 
subsequent treaty that might be reached between the Confederation and Chile. At 
this stage, everything indicated that a final agreement on this matter could be 
reached, and that the arrival of authority for Blanco Encalada to negotiate peace 
was only awaited. Consul General Wilson's intervention was important, requesting 
permission from Santa Cruz to allow the Chilean Admiral to come on board the 
Blonde. On this occasion, on December 26, he insisted on a British guarantee for 
the peace treaty after it had been approved in Santiago. '44 Ironically, on the same 
day, the Chilean Congress declared war on the Confederation, more precisely on 
Marshal Santa Cruz. 
Some days later, this news reached Callao and hostilities continued. The 
Chilean squadron was to remain cruising off the port until late-February, returning 
then to Valparaiso to prepare a full scale expedition to invade South Peru. Already 
convinced that there is no room for further negotiations, Santa Cruz prepared his 
forces to fight, trying to increase his naval squadron with privateers, issuing 
regulations with this purpose.; 45 
Both Chile and the Confederation understood that the first action of the 
war should take place at sea. Besides direct engagements between their naval 
forces, maritime war should include economic aspects, such as blockading enemy 
443. - El Araucano, n 336,10/2/1837: 7. 
444. - Mason to Hammond, Blonde Callao_ 22/12/1836: enclosed with 
Hammond to Wood, 
Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
445. El Eco del Protectorado, Lima 8/2/1837. Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 
16/12/1837, ADM 1/50. Sotomavor (1896): 104. 
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ports or destroying its mercantile marine. Both opponents worked out some 
regulations in this sense, affecting in a variable degree neutral shipping and trade. 
Consequently, some incidents arose with consular agents, which eventually 
involved foreign naval forces. 
Since the end of 1836, the Confederate government opened to foreign 
shipping a number of ports usually used only for coastal traffic, in order to prevent 
the negative effects that a blockade could have on trade. It was also announced 
that, if a blockade was established on the Chilean coast, certain periods of 
immunity would be allowed for neutral shipping, except for "Vessels of those 
Nations submitting to Blockades of the Coast of Peru, either by Chile or any other 
Country". '46 
This attitude was unusual in maritime war, since it forced neutral 
governments to choose between trading with Chile or with the Confederation. 
Apparently, such a proposal followed a subtle scheme suggested by the French 
diplomatic agent at Lima, about whom it was said that he even signed an 
agreement with the Confederate government "on the Subject of certain time being 
allowed for vessels from Europe entering Blockading Ports". " Mason referred to 
this issue, condemning the attitude of those diplomatic and consular agents "who 
wish to vary their conduct according to circumstances or rather as shall to them 
appear best for the commercial interest of their countrymen 1. `48 
Chile also issued regulations for the treatment of neutral shipping in the 
case of a blockade being declared on the Peruvian coast. Mason considered that 
these regulations did not constitute a formal declaration of blockade, so he request- 
ed and obtained guarantees from Vice-Admiral Blanco Encalada that neutral 
446. - Wilson to Mason, Lima ? /12/1836, enclosed with Hammond to Mason. Dublin Rio de 
Janeiro, 21/4/1837. ADM 1/47. 
-147. - Wilson to Mason. Lima 2/12/1836; enclosed with Hammond to Mason, Dublin Rio de 
Janeiro, 21/4/1837, ADM 1/47. 
4t8. - Mason to Hammond, Blonde At Sea. 25/1/1837, ADM 1/47. 
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vessels would receive every consideration from the Chilean squadron. "' Even 
though Mason firmly believed that Blanco Encalada was an honourable man, he 
feared that anything could be expected from Chilean captains, whose reputation 
was quite poor amongst the British Squadron. Taking this into consideration, and 
British naval regulations regarding the right of search, which forbade firing at 
merchant vessels to command then to strike their sails, Mason stated that he did 
not recognize the right of search for the Chilean squadron, declaring that British 
men-of-war were to recapture any vessel taken by the Chileans for offering 
resistance to search. 450 
In this general context, since late 1836, British merchants at Lima increased 
their demands for protection. Mason tried to attend to them as much as possible, 
reaching an agreement with Admiral Blanco in this sense. For this reason, even 
when he delayed his departure from Callao in early 1837, Mason considered that 
British trade was not under a real threat at that moment. Captain Pennel, of the 
Talbot, who also had to delay his departure from Callao, wrote in this sense: "I do 
not think that the merchants at Lima are the best judges of the distribution of the 
Squadron". "' 
Mason's attitude at Callao was fully approved by Admiral Hammond, who 
instructed him to consult with Consul General Wilson concerning any action to be 
taken with regard to the hostilities between Chile and the Confederation. None of 
these two governments could claim belligerent rights without a formal declaration 
of war. Once it was issued, Mason was to observe the most absolute neutrality. 
Hammond's instructions were particularly precise regarding blockades, indicating 
that they should be accepted provided they were properly enforced and conducted 
within the usual custom of maritime warfare. In a general sense, Mason should "act 
449. - Hammond to Wood Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1837. ADM 1/47. 
450. - Mason to Walpole. Blonde Valparaiso. 4/3/18337: enclosed with Hammond to Wood, 
Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 23/4/1837. ADM 1/48. 
451. - Mason to Pennel, Callao 21/1/1837. ADM 1/47. Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio dc 
Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADMM 1/48. 
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with regard to such blockades, agreeable to the principles maintained by the 
Government of Great Britain during the late war with France", 452 until the Admi- 
ralty issued specific orders for this case. Foreseeing the difficulties that could arise, 
Hammond requested more ships to be stationed in the Pacific. 453 
Santa Cruz had won a very good reputation amongst foreign consular 
agents, who applauded the achievements of his five-year administration in Bolivia 
and expected that Peru might achieve the same order, so as to allow their citizens 
to carry on their activities with an acceptable degree of stability, and the country 
itself to honour its debts. With characteristic skill, Santa Cruz obtained the 
sympathy of the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States and the 
Vatican, 454 which provided him with some advantage, and eventually foreign naval 
support. That is what happened in October 1836, when Santa Cruz requested to 
the French, North-American and British commodores a passage to Arica, to open 
the South-Peruvian Congress. 155 
Taking into account that war had not been formally declared, the advice of 
Consul General Wilson, and considering that Santa Cruz was "very anxious to go 
in the Blonde, " Commodore Mason promised to take him if possible, instructing 
the other captains of the Squadron.; 56 The Protector finally sailed to Arica in the 
French man-of-war La Flore, as Captain Pennel, of the Talbot, was unable to delay 
his departure from Callao. "' Some months later, in early May 1837, Santa Cruz 
returned to Callao in the Harrier, under Commander Carew, attending a request 
452. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde At Sea, 25/1; Hammond to Mason. Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 
21/4/1837; and instructions dated early in 1837, ADM 1/47. 
453. - Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 10/3/1837. ADM 1/47. 
454. - Barros: 112.119. 
455. - Mason to Hammond. Blonde Callao, 21/10/1836, ADM 1/47. 
456. - Mason to Hanunond, Blonde Callao, 12/11/1836; 24/11/1836. enclosed with Hammond to 
Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 16/4/1837. ADM 1/47. 
457. - Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837. ADM 1/48. El Eco del 
Protectorado n° 52. Accordingly to the Chilean newspaper El . -iraucano (re 369, 
22/9/1837: 3), Santa Cruz sailed on the Bisson. departing from Callao on 22 March 1837. 
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presented through Vice-consul Hugh Wilson. 458 Commodore Mason, Consul 
General Wilson and the British merchants at Lima approved Carew's decision, 
considering "that you [Carew} have acted according to the best of your judgement 
for the promotion of the British interests"; recognizing, in quite a candid fashion, 
that the Protector would gain some political benefits from being convoyed in a 
British men-of-war. 459 
In fact, Santa Cruz had already strengthened his internal position by 
showing himself tobe properly backed first by the French and afterwards by the 
British Naval Squadron. Carew acted with great candour in this matter, making his 
situation worse when he accepted the decoration of the Legion de Honor, a 
distinction which was previously granted to Mason, on 18 January, as Knight 
Commander. 76° Both naval captains, especially Carew, as well as the already 
mentioned consular agents, were extremely ingenuous not taking into account the 
fact that their help to Santa Cruz would compromise British neutrality. Rear 
Admiral Hammond was quite aware of that, and completely disapproved of 
Mason's offer, while the Chilean Government complained strongly at Carew's 
attitude. The British Foreign Office was unable to do anything but to offer 
apologies, which were presented by Colonel Walpole in April 1838. 'x' 
First Restorer Expedition (1837 
458. - Santa Cruz companions were Tomas Dieguez, Bishop Trujillo, 
Colonels Juan Larrea and 
Lorenzo Puente, assistances, Joaquin de Mora, private secretary, and eight servants [A list 
of passengers embarked on board H. M. S. Sloop Harrier, W. H. Carew Esq. Commander, at 
Arica for passage to Callao. 3/5/1837, ADM 1/51]. Torrico to H. Wilson, Palacio 
Protectoral. Tacna, 24/4/1837: enclosed with Ross to Wood. President Callao, 16/8/1838: 
Carew to Ross. Harrier Callao 11/5/183 8, ADM 1151 
459. - Carew to Ross, Harrier, Callao 11/5/1838, ADM 1/5 1. 
460. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
461. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 16/4/1837; and enclosed Hammond to 
Mason, 
21/3/1837, ADM 1/47. El. lraucano n° 399,20/4/1838: 2. 
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Chilean preparations finished by early-September 1837. The Restorer 
Expedition was formed by 3200 men, 400 of them forming a Peruvian Column, to 
be taken on 17 transports, under the protection of five men-of-war. Admiral 
Blanco Encalada, Commander in Chief of the Expedition, was also invested as 
Plenipotentiary as well as Colonel Antonio J. Irrisarri. Just before the departure of 
the expedition, part of the troops rebelled against the government at Quillota, 
Minister Portales, the most active enemy of the Confederation, being captured and 
shot dead. As soon as this news reached him, Santa Cruz tried to stop the war, but 
President Prieto was firm in his intention to destroy the Confederation, and the 
expedition departed on September 15.462 A few weeks later, General Moran 
departed Callao with four men-of-war, to cruise along the Chilean coast. War was 
already in progress. 
A minor Chilean operation, conducted against the Bolivian port of Cobija, 
provided a good opportunity to exert co-operation between French and British 
squadrons. An Army unit, formed by "200 convicts, ironically called the innocents 
by foreign merchants, who a few days before were liberated from Chilean prisons 
provided that they became soldiers", was landed there to promote a revolt against 
Santa Cruz. The nature of these men made possible every sort of excess and, 
consequently, British merchants requested protection from the French man-of-war 
Alacrity, under Captain Clery. Fulfilling the agreement reached between 
Commodore Sullivan and the French Commodore, to complement each other, 
Clery provided the guarantees requested and protected the shipment of treasure. "63 
As happened during Salaverry's revolution, in 1835, when Mason agreed 
with the French Commodore to co-operate in the protection of their nationals, this 
sort of complementary action between both squadrons was exerted during the 
conflict between Chile and the Confederation. For this reason, when Captain Eden, 
462. - El _4raaucano n° 353,9/6/1837. Denegri (1976) 1: 543-544. Sotoinavor (1896): 
62,104- 
105. 
46-3). - Sullivan to Hammond, Stag Valparaiso, 4/1/1838, ADM 1151. El Jraucano n° 373, 
20/10/1837. 
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of the Rover, sailed with the Chilean expedition, he was instructed by Sullivan to 
protect both British and French citizens and properties. "' 
On September 24, the Chilean expedition reached and occupied Arica. A 
Company was landed to guard the Customs House, but instead of doing that, the 
soldiers began to loot the goods housed there. As most of them were British 
owned, Eden complained to the Chilean Admiral, who ordered a court-martial 
which found guilty the Company's leader, who was immediately executed. The 
goods stolen amounted to 3,000 pesos, which were "made good to the proper 
parties by Admiral Blanco, from the military chest. " 
The next port of call was Islay. The Chilean expedition and the Rover 
entered on September 29, finding it already abandoned by local authorities and the 
keys of the Customs House in hand of the British Vice-consul Thomas Crompton. 
Taking into account that most of the goods guarded there were British owned, and 
as Admiral Blanco announced that no Chilean troops would be landed to protect 
them, Crompton requested such a protection from Captain Eden. Considering the 
risk involved and the responsibility assumed by Crompton, a marine party was 
landed from the Rover to protect the Customs House overnight. On the following 
day, the expedition continued to Quilca, where the expeditionary force finally 
landed on October 22. ' 
In the following days Blanco Encalada occupied Arequipa and established a 
provisional government headed by General Antonio Gutierrez de la Fuente. Instead 
of going further inland to defeat Santa Cruz, the Expeditionary Army, known by 
current bibliography as the Army of Restoration, remained inactive at Arequipa. In 
a short time it was demoralised, facing local hostility and with its ranks suffering 
from illness. By mid-November, Blanco was forced to surrender near the village of 
464. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 16/12/1837, ADM 1/50. 
465. - Ibidem. Sotomavor (1896): 116. 
466. - Hammond to Wood. Dublin. Rio de Janeiro, 16/12/1837, ADM 1/50. ADM 51/3373. 
Sotomavor (1896): 117-121. 
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Paucarpata, being unable to offer battle to superior forces under Santa Cruz. A 
treaty was signed on 17 November 1837. Chile recognized the Peru-Bolivian 
Confederation, renounced to interference in its internal affairs, and promised to 
return those vessels captured at Callao within eight days. In return, the Confeder- 
ation recognized a debt to the Chilean government, for the loan taken out in 
London during the War of Independence. 467, A few days later, Santa Cruz entered 
Arequipa while Blanco Encalada reembarked his troops at Quilca. 
While these events happened in South Peru, a Confederate squadron, under 
General Moran's flag, cruised along the Chilean coast for almost a month, 
capturing the garrison of the Juan Fernandez Islands and committing other 
hostilities. By late November, it was sighted off Valparaiso, and some measures 
were taken to defend the port. Amongst them, a hulk with two guns was anchored 
in a central position in the Bay. At 10: 30 p. m. on November 30, the North 
American whaler Maria arrived and was received with gun-shot from the hulk. 
Fortunately, Commodore Sullivan, of the Stag, was at the anchorage, and 
intervened to stop such a dangerous mistake. '68 
Hostilities committed by the Confederate squadron included a single vessel 
attack on Huasco, on December 7. The British ketch Basilik, under Lieutenant 
Macdonald, was lying at anchor when in happened, demanding from the Peruvian 
Captain that he gave every consideration to the respect of British subjects and 
properties. This request was fulfilled and no incident arose during the attack. 9 
Shortly after that, Moran headed for Callao, learning then of the Peace Treaty 
signed at Paucarpata and of a decree issued by Santa Cruz on November 29, 
drastically reducing the Confederation's naval forces. The Protector was truly 
convinced that the Peace Treaty would be accepted by Chile, mainly because of the 
467. - Sotomavor (1896): 156-158. 
468. - Sullivan to Hammond. Stag Valparaiso, 18/12/1837. ADM 1/51. 
469. - Macdonald to Sullivan, 16/12/1837; enclosed with Sullivan a Harnmond. Stag Valparaiso, 
5/1/1838, ADM 1/51. 
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assurance given by Consul General Wilson that the British Government would act 
as a mediator in the dispute. "' Relying on that promise, Santa Cruz considered that 
it was no reason to destroy the Chilean Army nor to maintain a very expensive 
naval force. If Wilson actually offered too much, Santa Cruz acted with extreme 
naivete believing that a non-ratified Treaty will be enough to actually compromise 
Great Britain. "" 
While Blanco Encalada and his army were at Arequipa, the Rover cruised 
between Quilca, Islay and Arica, the first two ports having been declared under 
embargo by the government established at Arequipa; and the latter under the same 
condition by the Governor of Tacna. As none of these embargoes had been issued 
by a proper authority, Captain Eden considered them illegal and announced that he 
was not ready to accept the detention of any British merchantmen. With that 
announcement and having escorted two British vessels and one from Hamburg 
departing from Islay, he forced to suspend these measures. 472 
The First Expedition of Restoration was a total failure, mainly due to 
poorly managed inland operations. Similarly, the Confederate expedition on the 
Chilean coast did not achieve much success, as it could have inflicted more 
considerable damage on Chilean shipping. British and French interests were 
properly protected by the joint effort of both squadrons, providing a prompt 
solution to the incidents that arose in the early stages of the Expedition of 
Restoration. As had been shown before, blockades and embargoes by both parties 
were not recognized by foreign powers, reflecting once again that European rules 
of maritime warfare were not easy to apply in this part of the world. 
Second Expedition of Restoration (1838) 
470. - Sotomayor (1896): 170-171. quotes El Mercurio 9/2/1838. 
471. - Wu (1991): 81. 
472. - Sullivan to Hammond. Stag Valparaiso. 24/11/1837, ADM 1/51. 
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The first transports with the Expeditionary Army on board arrived at 
Valparaiso on 16 December 1837. The day before, the British sloop-of-war Rover 
had entered the port, taking on board a Chilean officer with a copy of the 
Paucarpata Treaty. 473 As soon as the terms of the treaty were known, President 
Prieto refused to ratify the treaty, considering that it "neither satisfies the demands 
of the Chilean Nation, nor repairs those offences committed by the Confederation 
against her". He judged that the Chilean plenipotentiaries had acted far beyond 
their instructions and thence, since the treaty had no legal foundations, hostilities 
should be renewed "after this decision was notified to the government of General 
Andres de Santa Cruz". 474 
Despite his personal feelings towards the Chilean cause, Consul General 
Walpole attempted to restrain hostilities. As soon as he learned of the Chilean 
rejection of the treaty, and following Lord Palmerston's instructions, he asked to 
be received by President Prieto to represent the British position towards this war. 
For three hours, Walpole explained the inconvenience of such a conflict, making 
clear that his government was highly interested that peace should be finally 
achieved between Chile and the Confederation. "' According to a Chilean source, 
the British Consul General was highly disrespectful and even expressed himself 
with insolence and threat. "' 
On 31 December 1837, five Chilean men-of-war departed Valparaiso for 
Arica, under Captain Simpson's flag, to notify the rejection of the treaty and to 
capture as many Confederate men-of-war as possible. "' Shortly after one of these 
vessels delivered correspondence at Arica with that news for President Santa Cruz, 
473. - Sotomayor (1896): 160-165 & 262-263. Sullivan to Hammond. Stag, Valparaiso, 
18/12/1837 & 3/1/1838, ADM 1/51. 
474. - EI. lraucano n° 382,22/12/1837. 
475. - Herndn Ramirez Necochea. "El gobierno britänico y la guerra contra la confederaciön 
Peril-boliviana" en Revista Chilena de Historia y Geograra. Santiago 1961: 124. 
476. - Sotomavor (1896): 181-182. 
477. - Fuenzalida (1978) II: 431. 
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the Chilean squadron failed to capture a Confederate naval force at Islay. "' In the 
subsequent days, the Confederate sloop Confederation, with Bolivian General 
Balliviän on board, was taken by the Chileans off Callao. "' Simpson was to remain 
off Callao until 26 January, returning then to Valparaiso fearing another cruise of 
the Confederate Squadron along the Chilean coast. "' 
Santa Cruz's reaction to the Chilean attitude has been fully described by 
Celia Wu. 
"It was with a clear sense of betrayal that he bombarded Wilson with pleas 
for action, proposing that the British minister should convoke a meeting of 
plenipotentiaries from Chile and the Confederation to meet on board a 
British warship at Islay, trusting that `Chile would listen to the counsels of 
reason and humanity and would respect the name of Queen Victoria". "' 
The Protector even sent his private secretary to London, to represent his demands 
for British naval intervention. However, as the Treaty was not ratified and, 
consequently, the request for a British guarantee was not officially presented by 
both governments, British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, refused to 
intervene. In fact, Santa Cruz was too candid when he considered that British 
Consul General Wilson's promise of a British guarantee was enough to force the 
Chilean government to ratify the Treaty of Paucarpata. He acted worse when, 
based on that promise, he not only allowed the departure of Blanco Encalada with 
his men, equipment and vessels, but reduced his own army and naval forces. 
It was already too late to regret that decision. Measures needed to be taken 
to fight the Chileans. By March 1838, Santa Cruz declared Valparaiso under 
blockade, and Prieto retaliated on April 2, declaring Callao, Ancön and Chorrillos, 
478. - Sullivan to Hammond. Stag Valparaiso. 14/2/1838. ADM 1151. 
479. - Miller to Simpson and reply, 22/1/1838. A. H. de M. Presos. Moran at Jefe 
del Estado 
Mayor General, Callao 10/4/1/1838, A. H. de M. Juicios Y Sumarios. El Araucano n° 390, 
16/2/1838: 1-2. 
480. - Fuenzalida (1978) II: 436-437,442. El. lraucano n° 373,20/10/1837. 
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in the same condition. ` Two weeks later, five Chilean men-of-war, under the flag 
of Captain Carlos Garcia del Pöstigo, left Valparaiso to enforce the blockade. This 
force sailed in company with the British ketch Basilik, under Lieutenant 
Macdonald, who was instructed to kept an eye on the Chilean activity. "' Shortly 
before that, the British fourth rate President entered Valparaiso, hoisting the flag 
of Rear Admiral Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross, Commander-in-Chief of the newly 
created Pacific Station. 484 
His appointment, by late 1837, marked the creation of a that naval Station, 
with an enormous area under his responsibility, from the western American coast 
to longitude 170 degrees West, comprising not only the several American republics 
but a large number of islands in Oceania. In the following years, these islands 
became a very sensitive part of the Station, as British, North-American and French, 
tried to gain influence over island chieftains, by commercial, religious and even 
naval means. ` 
British merchants along the west coast of America considered the creation 
of the Pacific Station as their achievement. In fact, many of them, privately or as a 
group, had asked and pressed on the British government for it. In the Peruvian 
case, as already mentioned, a formal request had been sent by British merchants 
resident in Lima in 1834. It seems that that mercantile interest, as well as the war 
between Chile and the Confederation, and on the other hand the South Sea's situa- 
tion, finally moved the British government to create the Pacific Station. 486 In March 
482. - El Eco del Norte n° 75,17/3/1838. Ross to Wood. President Valparaiso, 6/5/1838, ADM 
1151. El 
-Araucano n° 
397 & n° 398,6 & 13/4/1838. 
483. - Fuenzalida (1978) II: 441. Ross to Wood. President Rio de Janeiro, 18/4/1838, ADM 1/50. 
Moran to Pardo, Callao 2/5/1838, A. H. de M. Escuadra Nacional. 
484. - Hammond to Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 1/3/1838, ADM 1/50. 
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1838, when Admiral Ross entered the limits of the Station, he had five men-of-war 
under his command; besides two surveying vessels of the Hydrographic Office. "' 
With that scant number of vessels, Ross had to find ways of co-operation with the 
United States and the French Commodores, 438 as previously British Commodores 
had done. 
One of the first areas of agreement was in respect the Chilean blockade of 
Anon, Callao and Chorrillos, which was rejected by Ross as well as by the French 
and the North American Commodores, arguing that it was illegal, unless it was 
established effectively and simultaneously. Garcia del Pöstigo considered that his 
force had done enough to establish an effective blockade in the neighbourhood of 
those ports, arguing that there was no rule establishing the distance at which a 
blockading force must be stationed from the coast under blockade. He considered 
this point particularly relevant in the case of Peruvian ports, since the prevailing 
South winds made it almost impossible for a naval force to remain off a single port. 
In a letter to Captain Bruce, of the Imogene, he said: 
"In every single moment I am close to the three blockade ports and 
if at the present time the main effort is over Callao, it is because the 
other two ports do not have much traffic; but be sure that as soon 
as it increases I will change the deployment of my Squadron". "' 
In spite of all these arguments, at the end of the day, the blockade became 
fruitless. 49" In these circumstances, it was reasonable to expect incidents to arise, 
especially as the Chilean force was unable to blockade all the ports at once. 
On May 4, a British merchantmen was intercepted by a Chilean sloop at 
Chorrillos. As soon as this detention was known, Commander Carew, of the 
Harrier, went to the Chilean flagship and received Commodore Garcia del 
487. - Ross to Wood. President Rio de Janeiro, 1/3/1838; at Sea, 19/3/1838, ADM 1150. 
488. - Ross to Wood. President Callao. 1/7/1838, ADM 1/51. 
489. - Garcia del Pöstigo to Bruce, Libertad Callao, 20/5/1838, ADM 1/51. 
490. - Ross to Wood, President Callao. 1217/1838, ADM 1/51. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 442. 
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Pöstigo's promise to release the British prize. '' However, shortly after that he 
changed his mind, following the detention of another two British vessels (Rose and 
Amelia). Carew met the Chilean Commodore once again, being unable to modify 
the latter's point of view on the legality of the blockade. Even when none of the 
three captured vessels would be released, Garcia del Pöstigo promised not to 
detain more British vessels until reinforcements arrived from Valparaiso. " In spite 
of this, on June 12, a Chilean man-of-war fired upon the Mary Marshal (or 
Warrell), of Liverpool, after she was allowed to enter the port. "' 
When Admiral Ross entered Callao, four days latter, he not only protested 
and demanded explanations for these incidents, but also explained to Garcia del 
Postigo his perspective on the blockade and his wish to remain neutral in the 
conflict. 
The Chilean Squadron left Callao on June 17, supposedly to cruise between 
this port and Ancön, but truly to obtain wood, water and food at Huacho. '94 This 
temporary suspension of the blockade gave the Peruvian government and foreign 
agents the most solid argument to repudiate it. Consul General Wilson addressed a 
letter to Admiral Ross supporting the Peruvian decision not to recognize the 
blockade any longer. Wilson quoted Andres Bello's Derecho de Gentes, who 
stated that a blockade becomes void when the blockading force abandons its duties 
even for a short period of time; being necessary to repeat the entire process to re- 
establish its legality. "' 
Four days latter, on June 21, when the Chilean Squadron returned to 
Callao, Admiral Ross notified Garcia del Pöstigo that Britain would not recognize 
491. - Bruce to Ross. Imogene Callao. 7/5/1838; Bruce to Carew, 4/5/1838; and Carew to Bruce. 
Harrier 5/5/1838, ADM 1/51. 
492. - Bruce to Ross, Imogene Callao. 31/5/1838. ADM 1/51. 
493. - Wilson to Ross. Lima. 15/6/1838: Ross to Bruce, President Callao, 16/6/1838; and Ross to 
Wilson. 30/6/1838, ADM 1/5 1. 
494. - Ross to Bruce, President Callao, 16/6/1838, ADM 1/51. 
495. - Wilson to Ross. Lima 23/6/1838, ADM 1/51. Andres Bello, Principios de Derecho de 
Gentes, Santiago de Chile. 1832.198. 
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the legality of the blockade any longer. ' Acting with unthinking rashness, Ross 
included in his letter some comments on the Chilean Squadron's raid on Huacho, 
condemning the distribution of inflammatory proclamations against the 
Confederation and his doubts respecting the way in which supplies were obtained 
at that port. The Chilean Commodore gave little importance to the suspension of 
the blockade, arguing that it was already suspended by May 25, when he was 
informed that British naval forces were not to recognize it unless the Chilean 
squadron was at all the three blockade ports at once. Regarding Ross' comments 
about Huacho, Garcia del Pöstigo not only made clear that he had paid for the 
supplies, but also stated that it was far from a neutral position to describe his 
proclamations as provocative.; 97 
It seems that the Chilean Commodore was quite aware of how ineffective 
the blockade was, mainly due to the firm position adopted by foreign squadrons, 
rather than his actual ability to enforce the blockade at the three ports properly. By 
mid-1838, Garcia del P6stigo had to dealt with seven British men-of-war; with the 
North-American Squadron, formed by one ship-of-the-line, two sloops and one 
schooner; and the French Squadron, formed by a frigate and a brig, totalling almost 
400 guns, while the Chilean Squadron mounted no more than 70 guns against 60 
of the Confederates' ships. '' Garcia del P6stigo even mentioned to Ross his 
personal disagreement with the blockade and his hopes that it would not be re- 
established, since Chile would not obtain any benefit from doing so but only incur 
the neutrals' ill will. " 
It would appear that Garcia del P6stigo was highly pragmatic on this 
matter, even though his opinion was not very consistent with his own mission. 
496. - Moran to Pardo. Callao 25/6/1838. A. H. de M. Escuadra Nacional. Fuenzal da (1978) II: 
444. 
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Considering his previous experience in dealing with British, French and North- 
American squadrons, especially when his frigate, the Libertad, was detained by the 
British men-of-war Sapphire and Tribune, in 1830, the Chilean Commodore was 
quite aware that it was out of the question to enforce a blockade declared illegal by 
foreign powers. Consequently, he decided to compromise in order to avoid further 
problems with neutral powers. 
Bulnes's Expedition 
Chilean naval activity was not enough to defeat the Confederation, a new 
expedition needed to be sent to seal the fate of Santa Cruz on the battlefield. With 
this purpose, and based on the regiments sent in 1837, a second expeditionary 
army was raised with up to 5400 men. This army was ready to depart Valparaiso 
by late June, ""' President Prieto travelling from Santiago to witness the 
expedition's embarkment and departure. According to a Swiss spectator, the 
Chilean President was not cheered by the troops and "many of them were 
embarked by force [... ] wearing ponchos and unarmed, being tied in couples with 
ropes, and thrown in the boats". '` Even though such a version was very similar to 
the one included in Admiral Ross' report, it differs from the "great enthusiasm" 
mentioned by some Chilean sources, and eventually accepted by Chilean 
historians. " 
On July 10, twenty-six vessels departed from Valparaiso with the Second 
Expedition of Restoration, under General Manuel Bulnes. Three men-of-war 
escorted such a large fleet, sailing without disturbance and joining Garcia del 
500. - E _Iraucano n° 409 & 413,29/6 & 27/7/1838. 
501. - J. Jacobo von Tschudi. Travels in Peru, during the years 1838-1842, London 1847: 28 
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Pöstigo at San Lorenzo. 503 On August 7 and 8, the expeditionary force landed at 
Ancön and began to advance towards Lima. 
A few days before, General Orbegoso, President of North Peru, had 
decided to break his ties with the Confederation and to recover his formal position 
as President of Peru. " As this decision will led to an attack by Santa Cruz, 
General Bulnes tried to convince him to join efforts against the Protector, and 
conversations were held on this issue. However, Orbegoso overestimated his 
forces, considering that he could defeat Bulnes and thereafter negotiate with Santa 
Cruz from a better position. On August 14, Orbegoso broke off negotiations and 
prepared his forces for battle. `0' 
Following an attack at Callao, the Restorer Army moved south and 
defeated Orbegoso's troops at Portada de Guia and occupied Lima on August 21. 
Four days later, a council of notable citizens of Lima decided to entrust the 
Government of Peru to General Agustin Gamarra, supported by the Chilean 
tArmy 506 Amongst Gamarra's first measures was the appointment of General 
Ramon Castilla as Minister of War and Navy, and the re-establishment of the Trade 
Treaty between Peru and Chile signed by Salaverry and abolished by Orbegoso. 507 
Meanwhile, Orbegoso with his remaining troops withdrew to Callao aiming 
to resist. Despite the efforts made by Gamarra to avoid further bloodshed, 
Orbegoso refused to surrender and, consequently, on August 31 Callao was 
declared by Gamarra under siege by sea and by land. i08 On the following day, using 
the authority given by President Prieto on July 30, which included power to declare 
enemy ports under blockade, General Bulnes adopted such a measure for Callao, 
503. - Fuenzalida (1978) II: 447-449. 
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Chorrillos and Ancön, from September ii onwards. Proper notice was given to 
foreign consular agents and commodores present at Callao. " However, Bulnes did 
not take into account the new situation created by the re-establishment of the 
Peruvian Government, placing Chile in quite an unusual position, since his forces 
were to blockade the ports of a government against which no formal declaration of 
war had been made. Furthermore, according to the Chilean Constitution, only the 
President could declare a blockade, and only after the Congress had approved it. A 
month latter, on October 17, the Chilean Government declared war on Peru, and 
the blockade of the three above-mentioned ports. 510 However, it was too late to 
change the development of the situation at Callao that September. 
Bulnes' blockading decree was immediately rejected by foreign consular 
agents and naval commodores. The latter (British Admiral Ross, French Captain 
Villenueve and North American Captain Ballard), requested Bulnes to postpone 
the start of the blockade until September 14, in order to arrive at a joint decision 
with regard to its legality. It was obvious that none of them was ready to accept 
the blockade before the proposed date. On September 13, following a meeting on 
board the President, as well as a meeting of their consular agents, the three 
Commanders-in-Chief decided not to recognize the blockade. They stated two 
main points for their decision: 1° the blockade was established by a note, and not 
following the formal procedure; 2° Bulnes' authority was not enough to declare 
such a measure in respect of ports not under Santa Cruz's control, since Chile had 
declared war against him and not against Peru. 5" 
Bulnes insisted on his point of view, arguing that the blockade was a 
response to the hostile attitude adopted by the Government of Orbegoso towards 
the Chilean Expedition. While this argument was valid in essence, it was not 
enough to make neutral commodores change their mind. However, taking previous 
509. - Fuenzalida (1978) 11: 455. Bulnes to Ross. Lima, 7/9/1838, ADM 1/51. 
510. - Ross to Wood. President Callao, 12/11/1838, ADM 1/52. 
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advice from Consul General Wilson, Admiral Ross decided to recognize the 
blockade only to "the port's defences", taking into account that the Chilean Naval 
Force was adequate to establish it properly. But even so, he made clear that no 
interference to British merchantmen would be accepted. 512 
This already difficult situation would became far more complicated on the 
following days, when the British Squadron used force against the Chilean 
Squadron as a consequence of an incident involving the Scottish doctor William 
Maclean. 
Amongst the first measures adopted by President Gamarra was the re- 
establishment of the Peruvian Army. It was subordinated to General Bulnes, 
nominated as Commander-in-Chief of the United Army of Restoration. 5 3 To 
provide animals for the Cavalry, it was ordered that, since October 2 at 6 p. m. all 
horses in the city of Lima would be confiscated. Early in that day, groups of 
Chilean soldiers were placed at several points in the capital to undertake the 
requisition. One of these places was the stone bridge across the Rimac river, where 
the Scottish physician William Maclean was involved in a serious incident, as a 
result of which he was wounded in the head and deprived of his horse. 
According to the available information, Maclean arrived at the bridge by 
8: 30 a. m. on horseback intending to leave Lima, being properly authorized to cross 
by a military party mounting guard there. Nevertheless, when he reached the other 
end, the Sergeant in charge of the guard asked him to deliver his horse. Maclean 
not only protested but he also tried to force his way through, being detained by a 
Chilean soldier who hit the Scotman's head with a spear. In this confused incident, 
the Chilean Sergeant was wounded when trying to protect Maclean. 14 
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Callao, 12/11 & 
1/12/1838, ADM 1/52. Luis Uribe Orrego, Las Operaciones Vavales durante la Guerra 
entre Chile i la Confederaciön Perin-Boliviana. 1836-37-38, Santiago 1891: 135. 
513. - EI. lraucano n° ea-traordinario & 432,28/9 & 7/12/1838. 
514. - Ross to Bulnes, President Callao 23/10 & 1/11/1838, Wilson to Bulnes 3/10/1838, ADM 
1/52. 
Z' J 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
A formal protest was presented by Consul General Wilson before the 
Peruvian Government and General Bulnes, demanding a full investigation of the 
incident and the punishment of those found guilty. The Peruvian government 
answered immediately, promising to investigate; but Bulnes did not respond at all, 
as he considered that the military party was under the temporary service of the 
Peruvian government and therefore out of Chilean jurisdiction. `'' 
A preliminary report was received by Wilson, alleging that Maclean - 
referred to as "the foreigner", "the English", - began the incident by hitting one of 
the Chilean soldiers. As might be supposed, Wilson reacted against this insinuation, 
and blamed Minister Castilla for orchestrating public opinion in order to use this 
incident against all foreigners in Lima. The issue increased in importance, 
becoming a matter of serious discussion, with strong arguments proffered in favour 
of both parties involved. Some of them were published by a number of short lived 
newspapers, amongst them El Periodiquito, Compatriotas and El Tribuno del 
Pueblo, which were quite active not only in denouncing British support of Santa 
Cruz but even encouraging people to take revenge on every single British and 
foreign citizen in Lima. 516 
On the very day of the incident, October 2, Admiral Ross addressed a 
strong protest to General Bulnes, demanding the immediate return of Maclean's 
horse and "to receive amends for such an outrage", stating that he would use every 
means under his control to obtain satisfaction. 517 Captain Scott, of the President, 
was instructed to deliver this letter personally, heading for Lima in company with 
the adjutants of the French and the United States Commodores. To make the 
situation even more complicated for the Chilean Commander-in-Chief, this small 
party was forced to protect itself during its journey from Callao, as Chileans 
515. - Wilson to Ross. Lima 2/10/1838; Bulnes to Ross. Lima 4/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
516. - Wilson to Ross. Lima 19/10/1838, ADM 1/52. Fuenzalida (1978) II: 456-457. Basadre 
(1968) II: 416-417. Paz Soldän IV: 239-241. 
517. - Ross to Bulnes. President Callao. 2/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
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soldiers shot at them at least twice . 
51' Finally, Scott held a meeting with Bulnes, 
receiving his promise that quick justice would be applied to solve the Maclean 
incident. Having remained at Lima for three days, waiting vainly for the results of 
this investigation, Scott and his companions returned to their ships. "' During his 
visit, the British Captain realized that some British-owned farms and property had 
been plundered by Chilean troops. Obviously, his report contributed greatly to the 
strengthening of Ross' attitude towards Bulnes. s_o 
By the end of that day, Ross had already decided to put pressure on Bulnes 
by detaining one of the Chilean men-of-war anchored at Callao. Accordingly, at 
11: 30 p. m. of October 2, sentinels on board the Libertad, anchored close to the 
mouth of the River Rimac, sighted the British sloop Imogene moving alongside. 
Surprised by such unusual movement, Garcia del Pöstigo sent an officer to the 
British vessel to ask the reasons for having changed her anchorage at that time of 
the night. The officer was informed that Admiral Ross had decided not to allow 
any movement of the Chilean vessel until satisfaction had been given respecting the 
Maclean incident. At daybreak, the President moved to the other side of the 
Libertad, while the Samarang sailed to Chorrillos Bay. 521 
518. - Wilson to Bulnes, 4/10/1838, ADM 1/52. Fuenzalida (1978)11: 457. 
519. - Ross to Bulnes, President Callao, 28/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
520. - Ross to Bulnes, President Callao, 1/11/1838, ADM 1/52. 
521. - Garcia to Ross, Bulnes to Ross & Ross to Garcia. 3/10/1838, ADM 1/52. Midshipman 
Dalrymple, of the Imogene, refers to the detention of the Libertad as follows [Admiral 
R. H. Sir John C. Dalrymple Hay, Lines from my log-books, Edinburgh 1898: 61-62]: 
"The Chilefan Commodore's ship had unmoored at sunset, and seemed to be going to sea 
without settling the claim. At ten at night Captain Bruce returned from dining with the 
admiral. The anchor was weighed. Topsails and top-gallant sails and jib set, the stream 
cable passed through the stern port, the ship beat to quarters, and in about ten minutes the 
sail was shortened and the ship moored head and stern so as to be right athwart hawse of 
the Chilian. Our ship was literally between his buoy and his jiboom, which was over our 
larboard gangway. An officer came from the Commodore to expostulate. and made 
Captain Bruce understand that we had fouled his cable, and that he wanted to weigh his 
anchor. Bruce, who scarcely knew any Spanish, took him down to the main deck, showed 
him the men at quarters. and the shotted guns ready to rake him, and said, 'Mira aqui. 
Senor. Look at this, sir. ' Then calling the captain's clerk M'Douall, who could speak a 
little Spanish, made him explain that if he attempted to weigh, we should sink him. I had 
the middle watch, and was desired to report if there was any movement on board the 
Chilian, but none took piace. Next day the captain called on Commodore Postego [sic. ], 
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Eight years ago, in 1830, Garcia del Pöstigo was in command of the then 
Peruvian sloop Libertad, when she was detained by two British men-of-war, 
following the Hidalgo incident. At that time, he was unable to offer resistance, but 
on this occasion he certainly could react. British and Chilean sources differ on this 
issue, as the former mentioned that no attempt was made to free the Libertad, 
while the latter reported that he was determined either to clear his way by using 
artillery or to blow up the sloop's magazine. In spite of what actually happened 
that night, no violent action was taken and on October 4, the Libertad was released 
from detention- Despite the final outcome of the Maclean incident, Admiral Ross 
was convinced that his energetic attitude had been enough to deter the Chileans 
from any other action against British subjects. 522 
The Chilean inquiry on the incident itself was to last some weeks, showing 
a growing animosity against Maclean, to such an extent that, at some stage, it was 
referred to as a trial against him. At this point, the Scottish physician decided that 
it was wiser to hide for a while, and thus the investigation itself became even more 
complicated. "' While the British Admiral and the Chilean General continued to 
exchange correspondence on this thorny issue, Santa Cruz's army approached 
Lima, forcing its evacuation by early November. In his last letter, Bulnes indicated 
that the investigation should continue, it being out of the question to undertake any 
immediate punishment in so far as there remained reasonable doubts respecting the 
responsibility of the soldiers involved in the incident. 524 
In essence, Bulnes considered that the Peruvian government was obligated 
to respond to the British claim, as the Chilean soldiers had been under its command 
who returned the visit. The admiral came down in the President and anchored close to 
him, and the further settlement of the matter devolved upon the diplomatist. " 
522. - Ross to Wood, President Callao, 27/11/1838, & Bulnes to Ross, Ancön, 11/11/1838, ADM 
1/52. Fuenzalida (1978) 11: 458-459. 
523. - Bulnes to Ross, Lima, 29/10/1838. ADM 1/52. Ross to Bulnes. President Callao. 
28/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
524. - Ross to Bulnes. & Buines to Ross, 9& 11/11/1838, ADM 1/52. 
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when the incident actually happened. `' Ross disagreed with that point of view, as 
he considered that, despite any agreement between Chile and Peru which allowed 
the service of Chilean troops under Peruvian command, the Chilean government 
was solely responsible for offences committed by its troops against British subjects. 
Furthermore, taking into account that the decree establishing the embargo on 
horses had been revoked on October 2, the Chilean troops guarding the bridge had 
acted under the exclusive responsibility of their immediate Commanding Officer 
and not following instructions from the government they supposedly should 
obey. 526 
Some months later, the British government presented a formal protest to 
the Chilean government regarding the Maclean incident, requesting a review of the 
investigation conducted at Lima. A new inquiry was opened, and its results 
confirmed the innocence of the Chilean soldiers when they reacted to Maclean's 
insults and punches. 527 
From our point of view, the incident was poorly managed by Rear-Admiral 
Ross, whose impulsive attitude can be explained by Consul General Wilson's 
advice and to his own conviction that a firm posture would deter any other abuse 
against British subjects. Ross overrated Wilson's objectivity, blinded by his well- 
known enthusiasm for the Confederation. Moreover, the detention of the Libertad 
was sustained for too short a time, not enough to obtain the required satisfaction, it 
being hard to explain why the British Squadron did not continue the detention of 
this vessel. Finally, everything suggested that Maclean himself provoked the inci- 
dent, furnishing Consul General Wilson with a different and more palatable version 
of what had occurred. Provided with this "evidence", Wilson requested the 
intervention of the British naval forces against the Expedition of Restoration. 
525. - Bulnes to Ross, Lima. 4/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
526. - Ross to Bulnes. President Callao. 1/11/1838. ADM 1/52. 
527. - Sotomayor (1900) 111: 437-438. 
_D9 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
In short, this incident triggered an inadequate use of force by the British 
Squadron, which was suspended before receiving satisfaction for an outrage 
supposedly committed. 
The end of the Confederation 
The defences of Callao proved strong enough to resist the attacks of the 
Expeditionary Army during October 1838, which had to face not only Orbegoso's 
resistance but also some restrictions in order to avoid damage on neutral property. 
Orbegoso himself placed the Callao Customs Office under the direct protection of 
foreign squadrons, as most of the goods housed there belonged to their 
nationals. 528 As already mentioned, to avoid being driven into battle from an 
unfavourable position, in early November 1838 the Army of Restoration left the 
capital and marched to Ancön and afterwards to Huacho, while sick and wounded 
soldiers were embarked at Chorrillos. 529 
Already undefended, Lima was occupied by Santa Cruz on November 10. 
On the following morning, he received Consul General Wilson and Admiral Ross, 
expressing to them his great interest in reaching peace with Chile. Clever and 
astute, but mainly basing his approach on the predisposition of both British agents 
towards his policy, Santa Cruz asked Wilson to negotiate with the Chilean Minister 
Egana on behalf of the Confederation as his plenipotentiary. 530 Considering how 
important it was for British interests to restore peace between Chile and the 
Confederation, Wilson and Ross showed great enthusiasm for this possibility and 
agreed to undertake and to support such an unusual mission for a neutral consular 
agent. '31 
528. - Ross to Wood, President Callao, 27/11/1838. ADM 1/52. 
529. - Ross to Wood, President Callao. 10/10/1838,12 & 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52. Diario de la 
campana que el Ejercito Unido Restaurador abriö en el Territorio Peruano el anlo 1838 
contra el jeneral Santa Cruz, titulado Supremo Protector de la Confederation Peru- 
Boliviana, Lima 1840: 44-45. 
530. - Santa Cruz to Wilson. 11/11/1838, PRO F. O. 61/51. 
531. - Ross to Wood. President Callao, 27/11/1838. ADM 1/52. 
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Even though we can explain Wilson's attitude, it is almost impossible to 
justify it. He acted mainly because of his personal commitment to Santa Cruz and 
the Confederation, feeling justified by Lord Palmerston's instructions to made 
every possible effort to secure peace between the two nations. In fact, Whitehall 
had offered British moral support to the Confederation since the very beginning of 
the conflict, but nothing further than that. At least two Confederate commissioners 
went to London and asked for British naval intervention to stop the war. None of 
them succeeded in their request, mainly because British mediation considered in the 
Paucarpata Treaty had not been formally requested by the Chilean government. 
The British reply was very clear: "H. M. 's government considers that Great Britain 
would not be justified in using its strength to reduce the two belligerent nations to 
a peaceful situation. "532 Nevertheless, Lord Palmerston instructed both Walpole 
and Wilson to work towards achieving a lasting peace between Chile and the 
Confederation, pointing out that Britain recognized the existence of the latter as a 
sovereign state and that he firmly believed that Santa Cruz was innocent of any 
involvement in the Freyre expedition. 533 
Provided with "a full delegation of powers from Santa Cruz, who autho- 
rized him to negotiate with Mr. Egafia in the most convenient terms, and 
undertook to accept every single decision taken on his behalf', Wilson came on 
board the President on the morning of November 12. On the following day, Ross' 
flagship joined the Chilean Squadron at Huacho. 534 
Conversations began that very day on board the Con, federaciön. During 
them, Egana proposed that both the Chilean and Santa Cruz's armies should leave 
Peruvian territory while a Congress, convoked under the 1834 Constitution, would 
decide if Peru was to accept or reject a federation with Bolivia. As this proposition 
532. - El: iraucano n° 454.10/5/1839: 3. 
X33. - Ramirez Necochea: 124-125. Wu (1991): 82-83. 
534. - EL1raucano n° 436.4/1/1839. Ross to Wood. President Callao, 27/11/1838, ADM 1/52. 
II1 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
implied the Confederation's dissolution, to which "the Protector was linked by the 
treaties of Huaura and Sicuani", Wilson replied that 
"the most he could accept was to withdraw the Bolivian Army, 
leaving in Peruvian territory those Peruvian troops under the 
Confederation; and then the Presidents of the North and South- 
Peruvian States would separately summon a Congress to decide if 
they were to remain in or leave the federation""' 
This offer was for Egana as unacceptable as his own proposal was for 
Wilson, and therefore negotiations ended. On November 21, the President 
returned to her usual anchorage at Callao, while the Restorer Army moved 
north. '; 6 
At this stage it is useful to make further comments on the attitude adopted 
by Consul General Wilson and Admiral Ross towards both belligerents. How 
acceptable was it for a Consular agent to became a plenipotentiary of a friendly 
government involved in a conflict in which his own nation was considered neutral? 
Did Wilson's arrival at Huacho on board a British man-of-war involve a certain 
degree of coercion? 
In a general sense, it was well-known how sympathetic the British and 
some other foreign governments were towards Santa Cruz, although using one of 
their consular agents in this way went, in our view, far beyond what could be 
accepted. Both Ross and Wilson, as well as the French and United States commo- 
dores and consular agents, considered that the Restorer army had very little 
possibility of success, believing that its defeat would produce a revolution in Chile. 
In this sense, it seems that the Consul General and the Admiral agreed to get 
involved in order to conclude the conflict more quickly, which could only lead to 
Santa Cruz's victory. Making his involvement even more evident, Wilson did not 
suspend his consular status during negotiations with Egana. On his part, Ross 
could have sent the Consul General in a less intimidating man-of-war than the 
535. - El _-lraucano n° 
436,4/1/1839. 
536. - Ross to Wood. President Callao. 12 & 27/11/1838. ADM 1/52. 
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President, whose 52 cannons were enough to cope with the entire Chilean 
Squadron. Even when Wilson negotiated with skill and dexterity, without 
expressing anything which could be taken as direct menace from the British 
government, Egana kept firmly to the Chilean point of view. Nevertheless, British 
intervention might have exerted a certain degree of influence upon Bulnes, moving 
him to accelerate his campaign in order to bring about a military decision in 
anticipation of new British mediation in support of Santa Cruz, as actually 
happened some months later. 
By late 1838, having realized how important it was to have a well-fitted 
naval force, Santa Cruz decided to "foster in every possible way the creation of a 
Squadron, either by encouraging the spirit of adventure in some foreign merchants, 
or by instructing Mr. Jose Joaquin de Mora, his Minister at Paris, to acquire two 
vessels in the shortest possible time. " To provide a legal frame over these 
actions, and taking into account some observations made by British Admiralty 
lawyers, in December 1838, the Protector modified the privateering decrees issued 
in June 1837 and August 1838.539 
Santa Cruz's invitation to fit out vessels as privateers found a response 
amongst a number of foreign sailors of fortune, some of whom were commissioned 
as officers in the Confederate Navy. Simultaneously, some vessels were acquired, 
and by late 1838, the Confederate Squadron was formed by the 25-gun sloop 
Edmond; the 18-gun barque Mejicana, the 6-gun schooner Perü, and the 10-gun 
schooner Shamrock or Smack. There must be added the Junin and the Yanacocha, 
sold in August to the British merchant Alejandro Ellis, who was ready to lend them 
to the Confederate government. However, Wilson clearly stated that these two 
vessels were not again to receive British registration if they once entered the 
service of the Confederation. "' 
537. - Bulnes: 268. 
538. - Ross to Wilson, President Callao, 12/12/1838. ADM 1/52. 
539. - Panizo to Ministro de Guerra. Callao 4/12/1838; and Ellis to Panizo. 
Callao 5/12/1838. 
A. H. de M. Escuadra Nacionai. 
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On 10 November 1838, the Chilean decree of October 17, declaring the 
blockade of Callao, was enforced by Captain Bynon with three men-of-war, the 
stronger of them being two schooners. However, Bynon "did not feel capable to 
repel an enemy attack with the vessels he had", and eventually abandoned the 
blockade. Shortly after that, foreign commodores declared the blockade was no 
longer valid. 54° 
Some naval activity was registered in the following weeks, with the 
Confederate squadron capturing two Chilean transports, the brig Arequipeno, and 
the Paita schooner San Antonio. 5" Finally, on 12 January 1839, the two Squadrons 
engaged at Casma Bay. The result of this action was inconclusive, both squadrons 
suffering severe damage and the Confederates the loss of their Commodore and the 
Arequipeno. `42 A new engagement was prevented by the intervention of the French 
frigate Vemus, whose Captain demanded the handing over of the new Confederate 
Commodore, as he was a French deserter. 541 
The Confederation was certainly unable to give battle to the Chilean 
Squadron after Casma, and its Army was defeated, on 20 January 1839, near the 
city of Yungay. Santa Cruz and his closest collaborators escaped first to Lima and 
afterwards to Arequipa, while General Moran took control of the fortress of Callao 
to resist the Expeditionary Army's advance. 
On the very date of the battle at Yungay, the President entered Santa with 
Admiral Ross and Consul General Wilson. The latter had fresh proposals from 
Santa Cruz, who was even ready to accept the Confederation's dissolution and his 
retirement to Bolivia. However, news of Santa Cruz's defeat at Yungay reached 
the anchorage even before Wilson presented any proposal. Having lost the purpose 
540. - Ross to Wood, President Callao. 1/12/1838, ADM 1/52. El Araucano n° 438.18/1/1839: 
3. Lopez Urrutia: 181. 
541. - Departamento de Marina del Callao 1838; Panizo to the Minister of War, Callao 
16/12/1838. A. H. de M. Escuadra Nacional. Blanchet to Panizo. Edmond Callao, 16/12/- 
1838, El Eco del Protectoraao. n° 138.19/12/1838. Fnenzaiida (1973) 11: 464-4.65. 
542. - Denegri (1976) I: 599-604. 
543. - Paz Soidän: 25' Baines: 283. 
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of re-establishing negotiations on behalf of Santa Cruz, the frigate returned to 
Callao on February 1. " 
Moran's defence of the port lasted until 6 March 1839, when he 
surrendered to the Army of Restoration after several days of negotiations held at 
Lima. During Moran's absence from the fortress, rumours spread accusing him of 
being disloyal to the garrison. The troops, whose poor discipline was already close 
to being broken, mutinied endangering private property at the port. As soon as the 
news reached Moran, he returned to Callao attempting to regain control of his 
men. Having failed, he requested asylum on board the President, this being 
received on March 8.545 Almost simultaneously, copies of the capitulation were 
distributed to the Callao garrison, whose officers learned that the surrender terms 
were highly acceptable and therefore General Moran was not liable to be accused a 
traitor. Nevertheless, having broken discipline, it was almost impossible to stop the 
troops, who dispersed through the town committing robberies and abuses. " 
In this situation the President's pinnace was sent ashore for watering, 
where it was almost overwhelmed by 40 persons asking for refuge on board a 
British men-of-war. Already out of control, the fort's garrison fired on the boat, 
wounding the master of the pinnace in the hand. Despite the injury, he was able to 
steer the boat with the refugees, back to the British frigate. 547 
Immediately after that, the officer who had been sent on shore to inves- 
tigate the situation, returned with a letter from Mr. Smith, from the British 
Consulate at Callao, informing Admiral Ross that looting had already begun, 
endangering British lives and property. Taking into account that there was no 
authority at all at the port, Ross decided to land 50 marines and 50 sailors, under 
Captain Scott's command. While the boats carrying this force were heading to the 
544. - Ross to Wood, President Callao. 31/1/1839. ADM 1/52,4/2/1839, ADM 1/53. 
545. - Ross to Wood. President Callao, 31/1/1839 ADM 1/53. 
546. - Moran's report. E1, Jercurio, Valparaiso 9/4/1839 [Sotornavor (1900) IV: 21-22. 
547. - Ross to Wood. President Callao. 31/3/1839 ADM 1/53. 
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beach, four or five gun-shots were fired from the forts against the President and 
the French brig Alacrity, without any consequence. " 
Captain Scott's instructions were quite clear, he was to protect British lives 
and property, but as soon as the first Chilean troops entered the town, he would 
request guarantees from their Commanding Officer and re-embark his party. The 
value of British property looted from the Customs House before Scott landed, was 
estimated at 60,000 dollars. "Shortly after this force landed, Colonel Coloma 
entered the port with a party of Chilean cavalry, being able to control the mob 
which was already sacking some State owned barracks. "549 Chilean guarantees 
were easily obtained and Scott returned on board with several more refugees. At 
the end of the day, there were 60 refugees on board, most of them officers of the 
defeated Confederation. 55° 
Moran requested permission from Admiral Ross to land with the British 
party, remaining on land when it re-embarked. Ross considered that Moran acted 
in such a way as to quiet the comments made by a number of officer-refugees on 
board, who blamed him for his lack of character. Most of these refugees were sent 
to Guayaquil in the following days, seventeen of them sailing on the Basilik, on 21 
March 1839.551 
548. - Ross to Wood, President Callao, 31/3/1839 ADM 1/53. 
549. - Moran's report, E11-fercurio, Valparaiso 9/4/1839 [Sotomavor (1900) IV: 21-221. 
550. - Ross to Wood, President. 31/3/1839, ADM 1/53. Amongst the refugees aboard the 
President were: Colonel Enrique Pareja, Jose Barrenechea, Enrique Pareja. Valisco 
Arrizueno, Jose Rodriguez v Juan Panizo; Commanders Jose Ravo, Francisco Remolino, 
Francisco Vasquez, Jose Noriega, Miguel Barron and A. Cardenas: Major Jose Armaza: 
Captain Jose Fernandez and Gomez, Lieutenants Jose B. Pito, Justo Mendizabal, Angel M. 
Boza. Ramon Valle Riestra. Felipe Larriva, Antonio Arriaga. Navy Lieutenants Guillermo 
Mason and Benito Caso: Pedro Arteaga: Felipe Cuenca: Midshipman Francisco Soro: civil 
Bartolome Bruno. Ancito Robles: intendente de policia J. Martinez [Ross to Wood. 
President At Sea. 26/4/1839. ADM 1/531. 
551. - General de brigada Gil Espino: comandante Miguel Barron, mayor Manuel Huertas: 
capitdn Jose Fernandez: coronel Jose Rodriguez: sirvientes Juan Vargas y Manuel 
Golones: tementes Gomez, Pedro Arteaga. Felipe Larriva, Justo Mendizabal. Felipe 
Cuenca. Alcantara: subteniente Luaue: sirvientes Martinez, Pirini: intendente dc Policia J. 
Martinez [Ross to Wooa. Ely Vaiparaiso. 5/6/1839, ADIvi 1/53. 
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The rescue of Santa Cruz by the Samarang 
As already mentioned, after his defeat at Yungay, Santa Cruz went to Lima 
to make a new attempt to defend the Confederation. However, he soon realized 
that it was almost impossible from the capital, so he decided to move to Arequipa 
where he still had some loyal troops and was closer to Bolivia. Before departing 
Lima, in an effort to maintain morale amongst his few followers, Santa Cruz made 
public declarations claiming that his troops in South-Peru would be enough to 
reverse the situation. However, at the same time, Santa Cruz wrote a private and 
confidential letter to Wilson, expressing his conviction that the end of the 
Confederation was certain. Feeling already defeated, the Protector added quite an 
unusual request in his letter, asking Wilson to 
"prepare for a warship to sail along the coast, sweeping the area between 
the port of Pisco (... ) and the hills of Arequipa, with the object of offering 
me security in case I encounter some obstacle or risk in my journey that 
cannot be by-passed. In addition, during these hazardous circumstances 
another ship should remain in one of the ports between Arica and Islay". `'' 
Wilson immediately handed the request to Admiral Ross, who instructed Captain 
William Broughton, of the Samarang, to sail for Islay and to offer asylum to Santa 
Cruz if requested. 
On February 14, Santa Cruz entered Arequipa, and three days later was 
met by Thomas Crompton, British Vice-consul at Islay, who informed him that the 
Samarang would soon arrive at that port, being ready to offer asylum if 
necessary. 553 On February 19, it became known in Arequipa that General Balliviän 
had succeeded in a coup in Bolivia, overthrowing Santa Cruz as President of that 
nation. Under these circumstances, Santa Cruz resigned as Protector of the 
Confederation and left Arequipa for Islay. His departure from Arequipa occurred 
as groups of citizens assembled throughout the city to protest against him and to 
designate new authorities. Amongst the latter was Pedro Jose Gamio, a well- 
552. - Santa Cruz to Wilson. 27/1/1839 PRO F. O. 61/58 [quoted from Wu (1991): 85]. 
553. - Crompton to Wilson. 17/2/1839. PRO F. O. 61/58 [Wu (1991): 851. 
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known enemy of Santa Cruz and firm supporter of Gamarra, who became the 
Prefect. 55' Following the rebellion of his last loyal battalion, Santa Cruz's protec- 
tion was reduced to Marshals Cerdena, Miller and Riva Aguero, and a small group 
of officers and officials of the deposed regime. On their arrival at Islay, at 9 a. m. 
February 22, they found the Samarang at anchor. 555 Asylum was immediately 
requested by Santa Cruz and granted by Broughton, the latter indicating that, 
according to Admiral Ross' instructions, the Samarang was to transport him to 
any port he requested. The British Captain pointed out that it would be highly 
advisable for Santa Cruz to come on board as soon as possible. However, 
overestimating his good fortune and unaware that a cavalry party had already been 
dispatched from Arequipa to "force Santa Cruz and his suite to evacuate Peruvian 
territory", 556 the former Protector decided to remain on land until the following 
morning, as Mr. Crompton's guest. 557 
At dawn on February 23, Major Julio Brousset with his 12 lancers entered 
the village, asking for Santa Cruz. Fearing that more troops would arrive from 
Arequipa following this party, many residents came to Crompton's house seeking 
the British Vice-consul's protection . 
55' As soon as Major Brousset learnt of Santa 
Cruz's whereabouts, he came to the British Consulate to capture the former 
Protector. Obviously, Crompton refused to accept such an action, informing 
Brousset that Santa Cruz was already under British protection. At the same time, 
he attracted the attention of the Samarang, hoisting first "a white flag and 
[afterwards} the national colours", 59 and firing off the rockets and Very lights 
554. - Sotomayor (1900) III: 503. Modesto Basadre. Die: anos de Historia Politica del Peru 
(1834-1844), Lima 1953. 
555. - "EI Republicano de Arequipa", El Trihuno del Pueblo n° 33, Lima 16/3/1839. 
556. - "Violaciön del territorio", El Tribuno del Pueblo n° 33, Lima 16/3/1839: 2-3. 
557. - Broughton to Ross, Saunarang Islay, 24/2/1839: enclosed with Ross to Wood. President 
Callao, 10/3 & 4/4/1839, ADM 1/53. 
558. - Crompton to Gamio. Islay 28/2/1839, E1.4raucano n° 454.10/5/1839: 2-3. Accordingly to 
Modesto Basadre, the chief of the cavalry party was Major Berenguel [Op. Cit. ] 
559. - "Violaciön del territorio". El Trihuno del Pueblo n° 33. Lima 16/3/1839: 2-3. 
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which Broughton had given him. Acting immediately, Lieutenant Wodehouse was 
sent ashore to investigate the situation, returning on board with the Vice-consul's 
request to land troops to protect his house and property, as well as Santa Cruz. 
Captain Broughton himself, landed and marched to the Consulate heading a 
column of seventy marines and sailors. On their arrival, Major Brousset was 
informed that Great Marshal Santa Cruz was under British protection and therefore 
he would be immediately escorted to the Samarang. Following a few minutes of 
tense deliberation, Brousset and his lancers abandoned Islay and Santa Cruz came 
on board without further delay, in company with Marshals Miller, Cerdena and 
Riva Aguero; former Prefect Jose Rivero, former Ministers Antonio Irisari and 
Garcia del Rio; and Commanders Nataniel Calvo and Juan Lenevo. As a last 
homage, Santa Cruz was received on board with a 21-gun salute. 560 Shortly after 
this incident the Samarang departed for Puna, arriving at Guayaquil on March 11, 
where Santa Cruz and his suite landed two days later. 
Before Broughton sailed from Islay, a press campaign was stirred up at 
Arequipa, blaming the British for having violated Peruvian territory. British 
merchants, both at Islay and Arequipa, feared that this campaign would excite 
Peruvian nationalism to a point that their lives and properties would be placed at 
risk. Having learned of this situation, Captain Broughton decided that a party of 
marines should remain at Islay, to protect their nationals if necessary. 56' 
Both the press and the newly appointed authorities accused Crompton of 
having abused his privileges by offering asylum to Santa Cruz and considering his 
own house as extraterritorial. However, the most serious accusation was against 
the landing of British forces and the subsequent violation of Peruvian territory. 562 
560. - Broughton to Ross. 24/2/1839; enclosed with Ross to Wood. President Callao. 10/3 & 
4/4/1839, ADM 1/53. Byam gives quite a fantastic version of these events (Op. Cit. 1941. 
561. - Ross to Wood, President Callao, 6/4/1839, ADM 1/53. 
562. - Marcos Riglos. comandante del Resguardo. to Arismendi. gobernador militar. Islav 
23/2/1839, ElAraucano n° 450.12/4/1839: 2. '`El Republicano de Arequipa': "Violaciön 
del territorio", El Tribuno del Pueblo n° 33 al 36, Lima, 16,23 & 26/3/1839. "Un Soldado 
Peruano", El Republicano tomo XIV n° 11. Arequipa. 20/3/1839: 1-4. 
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Prefect Gamio was the most severe critic, qualifying Crompton as "an enemy of my 
government, associated with the enemies of Peru, and violator and invader of 
Peruvian territory. " Exceeding his authority, Gamio refused to accept Crompton as 
British Vice-consul any longer, stating that he would remain at Islay only "as a 
private individual, with no right to hoist British colours at his house, having 
dishonoured it with his attitude, neither to use any other emblem usually accepted 
for Consuls and Vice-consuls". "' 
Crompton replied to these accusations stating that "Commanding Officers 
of British warships are not under the orders of British Consuls or Vice-consuls. " 
Therefore, they followed the "instructions from their Commander-in-Chief and, in 
case of an extraordinary event, acted according to their best judgement, and always 
following the Law of Nations. ""' He added: 
"The Commanding Officer of the Samarang landed a party as soon he 
realized that the British Consulate was surrounded by menacing forces, and 
he was forced to act in such a way because British warships around the 
World have no other object other than to ensure respect for British colours 
and not to allow any aggression against British citizens. "565 
Regarding his condition as British consular agent and the use of his national 
colours, Crompton replied that the Prefect of Arequipa had no authority to deal 
with that kind of matter. 566 
The incident was finally overcome thanks to Wilson's ability to justify the 
Samarang's intervention as a humanitarian act, similar to what other foreign men- 
of-war had previously performed o behalf of several of the new authorities, 
including Gamarra and his wife. With such a direct reference, and no doubt 
inasmuch that one day it might be necessary again to seek asylum on a foreign 
warship, President Gamarra himself told Wilson that every single British consular 
563. - Gamio to Crompton. Arequipa. 26/2/1839, El Tribuno del Pueblo n. 33. Lima 16/2/1839: 
3-4. 
564. - Crompton to Gamio. Islay 28/2/1839, El. 4raucano n° 454,10/5/1839: 2-3. 
565. - Crompton to Gamio, Islay 28/2/1839, E1,4raucano n° 454,10/5/1839: 2-3. 
566. - Crompton to Gamio, Islay 28/2/1839, El_-lraucano n° 454,10/5/1839: 2-3. 
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agent in Peru deserved his most profound respect, including Crompton. `6' In this 
way, and not pursuing the matter further, this incident was closed from the new 
government's point of view. 
By late 1839, no Chilean forces remained on Peruvian territory. The 
Confederation was already part of the past, and in the following months Peru 
would be involved in the most terrible anarchy. The Chilean government had 
succeeded in its goal, destroying a State which might endanger its growing 
economy. A British witness wrote referring to these events and the Chilean 
government: 
"They paid themselves their original debt; swelled out to a monstrous 
amount by all sorts of accumulation of interest; they employed a 
mutinous army and paid it out of Peruvian forced contributions; they 
created a navy, paid also by Peru; and, above all, they succeeded in 
their principal object, which was ruining Callao and throwing her 
growing prosperity back to Valparaiso". 5 
If we are to judge the attitude adopted by the British Naval Station during 
the War against the Confederation, we should be quite critical of its Commander- 
in-Chief, Rear-Admiral Ross, as he acted far beyond the dictates of neutrality. In 
fact, Santa Cruz's rescue was the most significant event in a policy which strayed 
from the usual one adopted by previous Commanders-in-Chief. However, it could 
be stated in his favour that Ross acted with the full support of Consul General 
Wilson and their superiors, both the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. This su- 
pport does not, however, relieve him of the responsibility then assumed. Santa 
Cruz, in British eyes, was the last chance for Peru and Bolivia to became a stable 
state. What came later was a very unstable period, with many revolutions and 
disorder, which forced more intervention from the British Naval Station. 
567. - Wu (1991): 88. 
568. - George Byam. Wanderings in some of the Western Republics of. 4merica. London 1850: 
185. 
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The war against the Confederation was, without any doubt, the most 
important event on the Western Coast of South America in the second half of the 
decade 1830-1840. Nevertheless, many other things complicated the work of the 
newly created Pacific Station. Incidents arose in Central America, which had to be 
attended to by Ross with the small number of vessels at his disposal. 569 To make 
things more complicated, between March and November 1838, Mexico and France 
were involved in what was called the "guerra de los pasteles", which led the latter 
to occupy the Mexican port of Veracruz. Even though this conflict was basically 
based on the eastern coast, the Pacific was also effected, mainly by the increment 
of the French Naval Station. 
Another source of problems for the Pacific Station was the South Sea 
Islands, where the French and North-American presence notoriously increased 
throughout the decade. In the following years this area was to be the setting for a 
new sort of contest, this time without guns or artillery, more related to the influ- 
ence which could be exerted on local rulers. In subsequent years this situation was 
to demand growing attention from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Station, 
modifying the usual deployment of his ships. 570 
Interservice friction 
The usual rivalry between the naval and consular services was to became 
quite clear in the relations of British naval captains and the Consul General in 
Chile, Colonel John Walpole. Problems began in February 1837, when Mason 
arrived at Valparaiso and found that the preparation of the First Expedition of 
Restoration was already underway. Aiming to deploy his vessels more effectively, 
Mason asked Walpole about the purpose of that expedition. The British Consul 
General not only answered that he knew nothing of the expedition, but also 
complained about Mason for having abandoned Valparaiso. Mason was righteously 
569. - Ross to Wood. President Valparaiso, 12/77/183 8. ADM 1/51. 
570. - Ross to Wood. President Cailao, 10 & 23/1/1839, ADM 1/52. 
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angry with such a reproach, since despite the shortage of vessels, the squadron 
under his command was doing its best to protect British subjects along the West 
Coast of America, where many places required far more attention than Valparaiso. 
Walpole notified Mason that he would present a formal complaint to the Foreign 
Office, accusing him of not fulfilling his duties as Senior Officer of the British 
Naval forces stationed in the Pacific. Mason not only refused to accept Walpole's 
complaints but also informed him that the Admiralty had already approved his 
decision not to interfere with General Freyre's expedition. "' 
The Chilean decree establishing the blockade of the Peruvian coast, issued 
in February 1837, provided another point of f iction. 57 According to it, Chilean 
men-of-war would exert the right of search on neutral vessels from that date, not 
giving a proper time for those vessels already sailing for Peru. This attitude was 
considered by Mason and Wilson as unacceptable under the usual rules of maritime 
warfare, leading them to complain against it. However, for Walpole the decree was 
absolutely legal and, in any case, he argued that the 1820's blockade of Callao, not 
having been formally revoked, could still be considered to be in force. "' 
More friction arose between Mason and Walpole concerning letters from 
the Peruvian government brought by the former for General Casimiro Olaneta, 
who was sent to Chile by Santa Cruz to negotiate peace, by early 1837. When the 
Blonde arrived at Valparaiso, the letters were delivered to the mail boat, but 
shortly after this Mason learned that Olaneta had already departed. Consequently, 
he tried by every possible means to jet back the letters, asking vainly for Colonel 
Walpole's support. The last mentioned replied that it should be regarded as a 
571. - Mason to Walpole, Blonde Valparaiso. 28/2 & 2.3/3/1837: enclosed with Hammond to 
Wood. Dublin Rio de Janeiro. 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
572. - Sotomavor (1896): 101. ElAraucano n° 343. 
573. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de Janeiro, 23/4/1837. ADM '/48. 
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private matter and, therefore, refused to intervene with the Chilean Foreign Affairs 
Minister. "a 
When Admiral Ross arrived at Valparaiso, in April 1837, a new incident 
arose with Walpole, this time with reference to precedence. According to the 
Regulations issued by the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, on 11 July 1827, 
consular agents were due to come aboard to pay a visit when an Admiral entered a 
port under their jurisdiction. The situation was just the opposite when a diplomatic 
agent was present, the Admiral having to land in this case. Colonel Walpole's 
condition was quite clear. He was British Consul General in Chile, and therefore he 
ought to came on board the President as soon as she arrived at Valparaiso, to 
present his respects to Admiral Ross. Walpole not only did not fulfil this duty, but 
he also complained against Admiral Ross for not having landed to salute hi M. 575 
The incident was forwarded to London, and in July 1838, putting aside his arro- 
gance and following precise instructions from the Foreign Office, Walpole came 
aboard the Fly, anchored at Valparaiso, to present his respects and apologies to 
Admiral Ross. 576 
This incident hampered relations between both British authorities. 
Walpole's attitude respecting the Chilean Government's position towards the 
Confederation, was another point of friction. Ross complained about this several 
times, pointing out that Walpole continually failed to provide proper information 
respecting the expedition against the Confederation, forcing him to find other ways 
to be informed about Chilean movements. '" Consul General Wilson also disliked 
Walpole, which contributed towards making more difficult the relations between 
the British Consulate in Santiago and the Commander-in-Chief of the Station. This 
574. - Mason to Hammond. 13/3/1837: enclosed with Hammond to Wood, Dublin Rio de 
Janeiro, 23/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
575. - Ross to Wood, President Valparaiso, 27/4/1838. ADM 1/51. 
576. - Ross to Wood, Fly Valparaiso. 31/7/1839, ADM 1/53. 
577. - Ross to Wood, President Cailao. 10/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
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sort of situation led Ross to comment: "how insignificant and unsatisfactory was 
the information received from Colonel Walpole, even at the last hour". i78 
X78. Ross to Wood. President Cailao. 10/10/1838. ADM 1/52. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conveyance of Treasure on British warships 
On 15 January 1834, British Consul General in Lima, Belford Hinton 
Wilson wrote a letter to Lord Palmerston, "complaining of the insufficient 
protection given to British interest in the Pacific, and particularly as contrasted 
with that afforded by the Vessels of War of France and the United States", and 
stating that British captains were "too much occupied with the business of `freight 
hunting' to be of much service to the various British communities. "579 A few years 
latter, in 1845, Britain and the United States were at the edge of war for the 
Oregon territories. It was in these circumstances when Rear Admiral George 
Francis Seymour commanded Captain John Gordon, of the third-rate America, , to 
remain on station in support of British interest in Oregon, California, the Hawaiian 
Islands and elsewhere. Instead, he left the station contrary to orders after having 
displaced the sloop Daphne (18), Captain John Onslow, which was to have 
conveyed the freight home at the end of her commission. "580 On his arrival to 
Britain, Gordon was severely reprimanded, resigning shortly after that, in October 
1846. There were some other cases in which Captains and even some 
579. - Wilson to Palmerston. 15/1/1834. PRO/F. O. 61/26. quoted from W. M. Mathew, "The first 
Anglo-Peruvian Debt and its Settlement. 1822-49". Journal of Latin American Studies, U. 
of Cambridge. 2.1 (1970), 85. Mason to Elliot. Blonde, Valparaiso. 27/1/1835, ADM 
1/2211. 
; 80. - Barry M. Gough, "Specie conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico in British Warships 
c. 1820-1870: An Aspect of the 'Pax Britannica", The Mariner's . 
Mirror, 69, n' 4 
(November 1983), 425-426. 
:6 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
Commanders-in-Chief disputed their shares of the freight, justifying some 
comments as the one wrote by Admiral John Moresby, a midshipman on the 
America, respect to specie conveyance: "certainly was not to the moral advantage 
of any who were concerned in this particular form of privateering". 
58' 
These evidences, as well as many other complains from British merchants 
based in Spanish American ports, led some scholars to accept that the Royal Navy 
was more concern with "freight hunting" rather than to protecting their nationals in 
these places. W. M. Mathew, a well-known British scholar, wrote regarding this 
issue: "Trips lasting up to nine months were being made round the Horn and up to 
Rio and the east coast of Mexico in search of cargoes. Callao was visited by only 
one of the vessels, and the timing of the calls and the duration of the stay were 
determined largely by trading opportunities. " 582 
According to this sort of asseverations British Captains put their own 
personal commercial interest above their duties. However, Barry M. Gough, 
having study this particular kind of naval service on the west coast of Mexico, have 
a very different point of view. He concludes that conveyance of specie in British 
warships, despite temptations and a well-known cases of abuse, was conducted 
over a period of fifty years with credit to the Royal Navy. "British warships 
afforded security to merchants during precarious times of revolution and national 
emergence in Latin America"583 
As we can see, in respect to specie conveyance, there are two different 
approaches to British naval vessels' performance on the Pacific. According to one 
581. - lbidem. 428. 
582. - Mathew (1970), 85. 
583. - Gough (1983), 430. 
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of them, naval officers were far more concern with obtaining as much freight as 
possible, leaving aside their main duty, which was the protection of British subjects 
and properties. According to the other approach, British naval officers did not 
neglected their duty, even when there were some cases in which failed for 
monetary interest. 
It is the aim of this chapter to discuss this issue, based on fresh evidence 
about conveyance of treasure and the frequency of British naval vessels visits to 
Peruvian ports. We will try to prove that "freight hunting", being important as it 
was, could not be generalised as the main concern of British captains in the Pacific. 
The 1eca1 frame 
Since Phoenicians times, merchants trading overseas followed a 
well-known sequence, which involved an initial investment in goods, their transport 
to and selling at the destination port, and the return with the profit, either in goods 
or in bullion. However, sea trade had always suffered some threats, such as pirates 
and enemy vessels during war time. By the beginning of the Eighteen Century, 
piracy was almost exterminated from the main sea-routes. However, since the 
Seventeen Century, maritime powers recognized that, in war time, naval vessels 
and privateers of any of the nations involved in the war could detain and search 
neutral vessels at the High Seas, removing the cargo belonging to its enemy. This 
belligerent right caused several problems, since bullion and valuable cargo was 
always a temptation to unscrupulous naval captains and privateers, who took 
advantage of their position to seize any or both of them. 
British merchants found that the safest way to send treasure home was to 
entrust it to Royal Navy vessels, paying a certain amount for freight. A similar 
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solution was adopted by British authorities for the carriage of public treasure, 
without any payment until 1807, when the Admiralty charged 0.5 % for this 
service . 
'8 4 
By the early Nineteenth Century, while this practice had already been 
abandoned elsewhere, it became a normal usage along the West Coast of South 
America. Trading with Spanish America had been a long term dream for many 
British merchants. However, these dreams faced several limitations until the 
Spanish rule in America began to fall, then it could became a nightmare. A 
considerable number of British merchants, with an important quantity of goods, 
crossed the Atlantic hoping to participate in the newly open Latin American 
market. However, they had to deal with the difficulties raised by the struggle for 
the independence in South America, which lasted almost eighteen years (1808- 
1826). During this period of time, the navies of Spain and the new republics, as 
well as privateers from both sides, endangered sea trade, and posed a special risk 
to bullion or treasure. Consequently, those British merchants trading in the area, 
considered that the use of Royal Navy vessels for the conveyance of their money 
was the safest way to effect trade with Europe, and consequently were ready to 
pay a freight for this service. The other possibility was shipping it in private 
vessels. However, as Captain Basil Hall, of the frigate Conway, pointed out in the 
1820's, the risk involved meant high insurance premiums and speculation on bill of 
lading sent to Europe by other routes. '85 
This peculiar naval service was almost a century, being framed by a number 
of Admiralty regulations, which established the amount of the freight to be charged 
584. - lbidem, 419, 
585. - Hall, II, 183.185.191-1,91.226-228.257-258. 
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for the conveyance of treasure. In July 1819, King George III fixed "a Rate, and 
direct the Disposal of Freight Money, for the Conveyance of Specie and Jewels on 
board His Majesty's Ships and Vessels'; commissions were set by proclamation for 
carriage as follows: from England beyond the Capes, 1% of the `public treasure' in 
time of war or peace, 2.5% of `private treasure' in time of peace, and 3% of 
`private treasure' in time of war. Of the commission, one-quarter went to the 
admiral on station, one-half to the ship's captain, and one-quarter to Greenwich 
Hospital for Seamen" 
. 
586 
In June 1831, following the end of independence's wars in Latin America, 
freight rates were reduced both for public and private funds, varying from 0.75% 
to 2% on time of war, according to the distance of the conveyance and the quality 
of the treasure; if the latter were gold or jewels, the freight was less expensive, 
whereas silver demanded a higher rate. Later in the 1830's the freight was changed 
once again, linking its value to the distance of the conveyance. Accordingly, trea- 
sure carried within the South Pacific or South Atlantic had to pay 1.5%; this figure 
raised to 2% if the shipment was from the North to the South Pacific, or from the 
Vest Coast to Rio de Janeiro, or from Rio to England. If the conveyance was from 
the Pacific to England it had to pay 2.5%. These figures were to remain in force 
until 1881, when it was reduced to a plain 1%, and finally eliminated in 1914.587 
Gold coins, and Spanish pesos or dollars, as were call by foreigners, were 
the only one form in which gold and silver could be legally exported from Peru 
until 1823. Under normal circumstances, silver was obtained by a process of 
amalgamation, in which mercury was used to separate silver from earth and basic 
586. - For the complete text of the Proclamations and other dispositions concerning this topic, 
see The _Vavv List from the 1850's onwards, section "Conveyance of Treasure". 
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metals. The product of this process was named "piata pina", and "unless containing 
intermixed pieces of gold, worth 8 Y4 dollars the mark. "588 Once the "plata pina" 
was casted into bars, increases its value to 9 dollars the mark. Afterwards, to 
export the silver, the bars were coined at Lima Mint. As could be understand, 
Peruvian production of silver was seriously affected by the War of Independence, 
drooping from 476,508 marks, in 1820; to 118,781 marks, in 1821; reaching its 
lowest figure in 1823, when it only was 3 5,022 marks. 589 
Assuming that these figures are referred to silver bars, and not taking into 
account the already mentioned taxation for minting them, we could estimate that in 
1820 and 1821 the total production of silver worth 5'357,601 dollars. In the same 
period of time, British naval vessels received on board at least twice this amount, 
whereas more treasure was exported in merchant vessels and North American 
naval vessels, not to mention another 3'000,000 dollars convoyed by the Blossom 
early in 1819. The logic consequence of this situation was a terrible shortage of 
currency in 1822, both for patriots and loyalist. 
As the loyalist retained control of the principal area of silver mining, they 
continue to produce and even to mint it at Cusco. It was a different situation for 
the newly established government of Peru, whose first Minister of Economy, 
Hipölito Unanue, presented a dramatic situation in his address to the Congress, in 
September 1822, stating that in the last twelve months, only 1'611,133 dollars 
were minted, while 4'011,270 dollars had been shipped at Callao. Pressed by the 
587. - Gough (1983), 420. 
588. - Barry M. Gough (editor), To the Pacific and Artic with Beechev. The Journal of 
Lieutenant George Peard of H. M. S. Blossom, 1825-1828, Cambridge, Hakluyt Society. 
1973: 251. 
589. - Gootenberg (1989), 162. 
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situation, he urged to modify the current regulations for trade, issued on 
September 1821. '90 According to them, silver coins were to pay 5% as export 
duties, while gold was rated as 2.5%. It was forbidden to export non-minted silver 
or gold; as well as that already crafted. 591 
Forced by the situation, which became more dramatic in the following 
months, these rules were modified by President Riva-Agüero, ruling the country 
from Trujillo, on 3 July 1823, allowing the export of silver bars, "plata pina" and 
non-minted gold, paying 10%, 5% and 6% duties, respectively. 592 The shortage of 
coinage was considerable increased by early 1824, due to the drop on silver 
production and the destruction of Lima Mint's machinery by the loyalist when they 
occupied the city in 1823 and in 1824. '9'' Because of these facts, on 11 March 1824 
a decree was issued establishing a temporary prohibition to export silver and gold 
coins, and modifying again the rules issued on July 1823. Therefore, export duties 
paid by silver bars were reduced to 5%, fixing its value as 8 dollars for mark, not 
making any difference for its purity. "Plata pina" will be valued at 7 dollars for 
mark, paying 5% for export duties, while gold taxation will remain at 6%. 59' 
On 30 March 1826, having ended the struggle for Peruvian independence, 
following the surrender of the loyalist at Callao, a new decree restored pre-1824 
conditions to export gold and silver, only coins could be used with that purpose 
590. - P. Emilio Dancuart, Anales de la Hacienda Püblica del Perin. Historia v legislaciön fiscal 
de la Republica, Lima. Libreria e Imprenta Gil. 1905,1: 242-246. 
591. - Paz Soldän. 235. Elias (1971-1974), II: 196. 
592. - Gaceta del Gobierno. VI. n° 5 (27/3/1824): 1. 
593. - Hipölito Unanue. '`Memoria del Ministro de Hacienda del Perü. Dr. D. Hipölito Unanue. al 
Congreso de 1825. en su sesiön de 14 de febrero de 1825". en Dancuart. 1: 259. 
594. - Gaceta del Gobierno, VI, n° 5 (27/3/1824): 1. 
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under the 1821 Trade Regulations. 595 Later in that year, on 6 June 1826, a second 
"Reglamento de Comercio" was issued, establishing a 5% export duty on 
"doblones" and dollars. Worked gold could be exported paying 4% of its value, 
considering 2 dollars for every "castellano"; whereas silver was charged at I3%, 
fixing its value at 6 dollars per mark. 596 In November 1833, another "Reglamento 
de Comercio" was issued, but it lasted very few months, being restored the 
previous one in March 1834. However, some articles were modified, establishing a 
difference between foreign and Peruvian vessels. While the latter could take silver 
or gold between two Peruvian ports without any payment, foreign ships were due 
to pay 1/2% on silver, either as bars or coins, and 1/4% on gold, for the same 
service. Foreign gold taken from one Peruvian port to another in a foreign vessel, 
should pay 1/2% if was already minted, and 1/4% if not. Export duties on Gold 
were lowered to 2%, and fixed on 6 reales per mark in the case of worked silver. 597 
During the civil between Orbegoso and Salaverry (1835), as the latter was 
at Lima, the former issued a decree on 21 May, authorizing the export of silver and 
gold in its primary form. However, on 9 October 1835, a new decree restored the 
prohibition to export plata pina and non minted gold . 
598 
On 3 September 1836, having been established the Peru-Bolivian 
Confederation, Marshall Santa Cruz issued a "Reglamento de Comercio" for the 
North Peruvian State, which was adopted by the south Peruvian State, fixing the 
following export duties: gold in coins 1%, in dust or already worked 2 reales per 
595. - Dancuart, 1: 267. 
596. - Ibidem, II: 81. 
597. - Ibidern, II: 208. 
598. - Ibidem, II: 224-225. 
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ounce; silver in coins 5%, worked 4 reales per ounce. Silver bars and "plata pina" 
were considered as non exportable 599 
The basic idea behind this policy, which was very similar in Peru and in 
Mexico, was to secure "the advantage of manufacturing into dollars the whole of 
the silver produced", 60° receiving in this process almost 11.5 % of it's value. That 
amount was increased with the already mentioned export duties, plus insurance and 
other expenses, in an additional 5%. 601 Obviously, a considerable number of 
merchants would try to avoid such a high taxation, by paying briberies to local 
authorities which were due to collect them. 
The local situation 
The first British naval vessel convoying treasure from Callao to England 
was the frigate Stantard, under Captain Fleeming, as early as 1811, taking on 
board almost 3'000,000 dollars, most of them belonging to local merchants. 
However, as already explained, the demand for this sort of service increased late in 
that decade, following the fate of the maritime war between loyalist and patriots in 
the South Pacific. The first shipment of treasure on a Royal Navy's vessel from the 
West Coast during this period was in December 1817, when the frigate Amphion 
received 20,000 dollars at Callao and 180,000 dollars at Valparaiso. 602 
Commodore Bowles, who was on board this vessel, reported to the Admiralty that 
599. - Colecciön de le_ves, decretos v 6rdenes publicadas en el Perü, desde say independencia en 
el ano de 1821, y abraza el tiempo desde el I° de enero de 1835, pasta 31 de diciembre de 
1837, Lima, Imprenta de Jose Masias. 1841, V: 346. 
600. - R. A. Humphreys, British Consular Reports on the trade and politics of Latin America. 
1824-1826, London. The royal Historical Society, 1940: 150. 
601. - Ibidem: 151. 
602. - Jones: 258. 
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he declined to receive non British-owned treasure, and attitude which was followed 
by Captain Shirreff, of the Andromache, in May 1818.603 
As mentioned in chapter two, albeit officially illegal, by late-1817 the 
Peruvian Viceroy was already granting permission to some British merchants to 
trade in Peru. Their presence at Callao and Lima was strongly critized by the vast 
majority of local merchants, represented by the Tribunal del Consulado. However, 
as the situation became worst for the loyalist, a growing number of them changed 
their mind, realizing that they could take advantage of the situation to expatriate 
their capitals. Commodore Bowles and Captain Shirreff's refusal to receive non- 
British owned treasure on their ships, led some local merchants to nominate British 
agents, who were to receive their remittances for the purchase of British goods. 
Two local merchants, Licarazo and Francisco Murrieta, seems to be the first in 
taking advantage of this possibility. In October 1819, they shipped 348,000 dollars 
on the Slaney, with full-knowledge and the approval of Viceroy Pezuela, who 
recorded it in his diary that it was sent to Rio de Janeiro to buy any kind of goods, 
paying duties as they were imported from Panama, and giving an advance of 
100,000 dollars. 604 A few months latter, in May 1820, another local merchant, 
Manuel Ortiz de Villalta, was mentioned amongst those sending money to Britain 
on the Tyne, which departed Callao with 844 boxes with specie, 3'008,513 dollars 
worth. 605 It seems that this treasure was really heavy, as 10 tons of iron ballast 
603. - Bowies a Croker. Creole, Buenos Aires. 15/3/1819. ADM 1/24. 
604. - Pezuela: 552. 
605. - Pezuela: 720. 
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were left at Callao Naval Arsenal, being lost in the following years as a result of 
the confusion occasioned by the Independence War. 606 
We were unable to identify the British merchant to whom the treasure were 
consignee in the two previous cases; however, in December 1820, when the 
Hyperion departed Callao with more than 1'500,000 dollars'607 two local 
merchants, Larraza and Mocrai, consigned their part to Anthony Gibbs, from 
London. Manuel Ortiz de Villalta was to appear again amongst those shipping 
money in this naval vessel, sending this time 50,000 dollars to a non-identified 
London house. 608 
By mid-1820, the Chilean Squadron, under Admiral Cochrane, had already 
gained almost total control of the sea-routes between Callao and Spain, creating a 
growing panic amongst local merchants at Lima. Consequently, since that time 
until the end of the war, they try every possible way to get their money shipped in a 
British men-of-war. In 1820 and 1821, we have found eight British naval vessels 
receiving treasure on board at Callao or Ancon, destined to Rio de Janeiro and 
eventually to Britain. It seems to be impossible to obtain the total figure of the 
remittances taken on board Royal Navy's vessels during these years. According to 
Charles Milner Rickets, British Consul General in Lima in 1826, in the period 
1819-1825, British men-of-war convoyed 26,9 million dollars from the West Coast 
of Spanish America, while a non-calculated amount was shipped by three North- 
American naval vessels and in merchant vessels, and something more was sent to 
606. - Hart to Brown. Creole, Rio de Janeiro, 30/8/1823, ADM 1/28. 
607. - Graham and Humphrevs: 322. 
608. - ADM 51/3214. 
_ý6 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
India. 609 John Stoddard Jones provides some information in Pounds Sterling. As a 
rate of 5 dollars a Pound, he calculates that from 1822 to 1825, a total figure of 
22'295,000 dollars were exported . 
610 
Even before San Martin occupied Lima, in July 1821, British merchants 
were already established in South Peru, trading with the loyalist and asking for 
naval support for the conveyance of their money. That was the reason why the 
H. M. S. Conway, called at Arica, Ilo and Mollendo in the first half of 1821. The 
amount of treasure received in those ports is unknown, but it was transhipped, on 
June 24, at Callao, to the Owen Glendower, which shortly after that departed for 
Valparaiso and Rio de Janeiro. 611 In the following months, British merchants 
established in other Peruvian cities, such as Trujillo, Piura, Casma and Pisco, and 
consequently shipments of treasure on British naval vessels between several 
Peruvian ports to Callao, Valparaiso, Rio or England, became a normal usage. 
As happened in Peru, British merchants also established themselves in other 
parts of the West Coast of America, and as early as 1822, the Pacific Squadron 
extended its visits to the coast of Mexico. 612 However, for several reasons, this 
service was very irregular beyond Peruvian and Chilean ports. When Rear Admiral 
Baker assumed the Command of the Station, in late 1829, realized that Captains 
stationed on the Pacific found the most trivial reason to sail round the Cape, 
609. - Rickets to Foreign Office. Lima. 27/12/1826. F. O. 61/8, P. R. O. Jones. 319. Humphreys 
(1940): 195. 
610. - Jones: 404. 
611. - ADM 53/249. ADM 50/151,26/5/1821. 
612. - Gough (1983): 420-421. 
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offering an inadequate service to the merchants. 613 To change that situation, he 
established the following policy. 
"(... ) a Ship should sail from Coquimbo for Rio Janeiro on the 25th of 
January, 25th of May, and the 25th of September every year; and that the 
Ship destined to the Coast of Mexico should sail for that port of the Station 
early in October, and to return to Coquimbo in time, either to take round 
the Collected Treasure, on the 25th of the following May, or to transfer 
what she might have on board to any other Ship appointed to that Service. 
When these Ships arrived at Rio Janeiro I was guided entirely by 
circumstances as to the mode of sending the Treasure on to England. 
Sometimes I sent it on by the Ships themselves, sometimes by other Ships 
or Packets. "614 
British merchants along Central America should be informed that this service will 
be regular, and a naval vessel would be sent to visit Society and Friendly Islands 
from time to time. 615 
In the 1830's, South Pacific waters became more and more safe, and 
despite continuous revolutions and civil wars, the conveyance of treasure declined 
in a progressive way. Merchant vessels gained in safety and, consequently, 
insurance drop and their freights became more attractive for British merchants. 
Furthermore, as one of them pointed out, "Most of the freight in specie is sent 
home in merchant vessels, to avoid the delay so frequently occurring in the 
transhipment in ship of war from one to other, as they may be required for other 
services". 
616 
Transhipment was really very frequent, and we were able to find quite a 
number of cases. In early times, one vessel was sent round the Cape with the sole 
purpose of convoying the treasure already collected by other men-of-war. That 
613. - Baker to Croker, 6Yarspite. Rio. 15/2/1830, ADM 1/32. 
614. - A Report of the present State and Duties of the South American Station. Baker to Croker, 
617arspite, Rio de Janeiro. 25/12/1832. ADM 1/40. 
615. - Baker to Croker, Warspite, 25/10 and 18/12/1829, ADM 1/32. 
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was the case of the Tyne, which sailed from Buenos Aires in August 1818, called at 
Valparaiso and Coquimbo, and arrived at Rio in January 1819; sailing once again in 
January 1820, calling at Valparaiso and Callao and returning to Rio in that August. 
Later in that decade, as a two-year service on the Pacific became the normal tour, 
treasure could be passed from one vessel to another, in order to reach the next one 
to depart for Rio de Janeiro. The brims sloop Alert served in the Pacific for three 
years, since 1828 until 1831, receiving from British merchants in Peruvian ports a 
total amount of 781,188.31 dollars, besides additional treasure collected on two 
tours to the Mexican coast and one to Panama, and several visits to Chilean ports. 
At least in four occasions, the already collected treasure was transhipped to 
another man-of-war, twice to the Forte (December 1828 and February 1830), and 
twice to the Seringapatam (September 1830 and March 1831), totalling 
392,677.56 dollars consigned to Rio and England. The largest part of the 
difference was shipped to Valparaiso, some other part from minor Peruvian ports 
to Callao, and 2,521.26 dollars taken on board on deposit, for security reasons. 
Once the Alert time of service in Peruvian waters elapsed, by August 1831, 
310,004 dollars were transhipped from the Clio and the Seringapatam, and just 
before sailing round the Cape, the Alert received 22,500 dollars from the Clio, 
which had been collected at Guayaquil and Paita. 617 
Each one of these transhipments was done in order to convoy the treasure 
in the following naval vessel departing to Rio. For this reason, it was not unusual 
another transhipment at Valparaiso or even Coquimbo. That is was happened with 
616. - Bowers II: 276-277. 
617. - ADM 51/3015. Returns of treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop Alert between 
1st of July and 9 December 1829; and between 29 December 1829 and 9 February 1830, 
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the Forte, in December 1828, and in both cases the Seringapatam received the 
Alert's treasure. It seems that the Forte transhipped the treasure to the Doris, 
which was the next vessel to depart for Rio. However, as this vessel was found 
unfit to cruise round the Cape, and finally was sold at Valparaiso, the treasure was 
transferred once again to another man-of-war, which probably was the Heron, 
sailing round the Cape only by late 1829. Obviously, in this particular case, 
merchants whose treasure was been convoyed suffered a considerable delay. 
Conveyance was not the only reason money was shipped on a British men- 
of-war. Security was another quite important one. It was already mentioned that 
the Alert received a certain amount of money in this condition, being charged at 
1.5% as it was to be shipped to another port in the South Pacific coast of America. 
This sort of shipments were far more frequent in unsettled times, and the very 
reason of this charge was the fact that it became a risky business to collect them 
from the shore. Against Admiralty regulations, boat parties were usually rewarded 
by the merchants for the risk taken in bringing specie off from the shore. 618 
As Barry Gough had studied, conveyance of treasure from the Mexican 
coast continue to be a profitable enterprise for British Captains for some more 
decades. Admiral Baker already realized that by 1829, considering that service was 
"usually attended by considerable advantages", to a point that the Commander-in- 
Chief himself nominated the vessel "as an incitement and a reward for zealous and 
correct conduct in the respective Captains"619 
ADM 1/32. Accounts of the treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop. 1lert between 
the 10th Februar, to 30 June 1830, and between 1st of July to 30 September. ADM 1/34. 
618. - Gough (1983): 427-428.432 note 41. 
619. - A Report of the present State and Duties of the South American Station. Baker to Croker, 
Warspite, Rio de Janeiro. 25/12/1832, ADM 1/40 
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In the Pacific coast of South America, the situation gradually changed, as 
already mentioned, being more frequent the use of merchant vessels. It seems that 
the establishment of a steam service between Panama and Valparaiso, by the 
Pacific Steam Navigation Company, in 1840, led British merchants to take 
advantage of the regularity of this service, instead of using naval vessels. 
Nonetheless, in the two previous decades, the Royal Navy provided a much 
valuable service, despite the difficulties involved in fulfilling its main duties in a 
usually unstable area. 
British Captains attitude 
In 1820, during the war for Independence, the British man-of-war Tyne 
convoyed 3'008,513 dollars or pesos, 620 the highest amount of treasure shipped in 
a British men-of-war from Peru in the period under research. The freight was 
75,213 dollars, half of it (37,606 dollars) had to be shared by Captain Gordon 
Thomas Falcon with the captains of the Andromache and the Slaney, who 
originally received part of the treasure at Callao. Commodore Bowles, Commander 
in Chief of the South America Station, received 18,803 dollars for this treasure, 
amount which will be increased during his period of command by the treasure 
taken in other naval vessels either form the Pacific and from Buenos Aires and 
Brazil. 
According to Admiral Seymour, Commander-in-Chief (1844-1847), for the 
period 1839-1843, the freight collected by the Pacific Station was 50,528 Pounds 
Sterling, placing it just behind the North American and West Indies Station. For 
620. - Pezuela: 720. 
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the same period, the Brazil Station collected 27,984 Pounds Sterling. 
621 If we use 
these figures as reference to previous years, we could consider that until 1837, 
when the Pacific squadron became a separate Station, the annual average freight 
received by the Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station was nearly 
3,900 Pounds Sterling. This amount of money was substantially more that their 
normal salaries and, consequently, that command became very attractive admiral's 
appointment. 
This very reason was to create some incidents between entering and 
departing Commanders-in-Chief, since they were entitled to receive a quarter of 
the freight while in command, a matter which was eventually referred to the 
moment of entering or departing the limits of the Station. 622 
However, those who were actually engaged in the task of convoying 
treasure and, consequently, receiving a more direct benefit from it, were naval 
captains. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, in some cases they were 
blamed for being "too much occupied with the business of `freight hunting' to be 
of much service to the various British communities. 623 This assert raised a basic 
question. Did British captains abandoned their duties for freight hunting? 
In several occasions along this dissertations we had mentioned that the 
most important duty British captains had to fulfil in the Pacific, as well as in several 
other places, was to offer protection to their nationals and their interest. To 
accomplish this task, they represented the British government until the appointment 
621. - Gough (1983): 432, note 27. 
622. - Ibidem: 425.428. 
623. - Wilson to Palmerston. 15/1/1834. PRO/F. O. 61/26. quoted from W. M. Mathew, 
The first 
Anglo-Peruvian Debt and its Settlement. 1822-49", Journal of Latin . 4inerican 
Studies, U. 
of Cambridge, 2,1 (1970): 85. 
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of British consular agents, supported them from thence onwards. As a number of 
British merchants established themselves in Peru, it became an important part of 
the Pacific Squadron's duty to support them by all available and legal means. Part 
of it was to provide enough security for the return of their treasure, by taking it 
from one place to another in naval vessels. Understandably, in unsettled times, 
merchants asked for a more close naval support, however, this support could not 
always be offered, since the extension of the area under the control of the Pacific 
Squadron was too big for the available number of vessels. These facts were the 
root of a number of complaints. In one hand, British commodores requesting for 
more vessels to be destined to the Pacific, and in the other hand, British merchants 
and consular agents, blaming British captains for not attending their particulars 
request of protection. Even when both parts had some reason on their claims, we 
have found no proof that British captains were only concerned with freight 
hunting. 
Obviously they took advantage of any possibility to receive treasure in their 
vessels, in some cases, by advertising as much as possible their departing date, as 
Captain Searle, of the Hyperion, did at Callao by late 1820, being able to receive 
more than 1'500,000 dollars on board. As the Chilean government considered that 
this treasure was actually owned by loyalists instead of British merchants, Searle 
was accused for having paid for "put public notice for all those -the Spaniards on 
Lima- could save their properties". Searle replied that all the remittances were 
addressed to Britain, and were owned by British subjects. 624 
624. - O'Higgins III: 222-223: IV: 158-159. Ga eta del Gehierno de Chile, III, n° 7 
(19/10/1821), n° 32 (16/11/1822). Denegri (1976a): 129-130. 
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As already mentioned, only British owned treasure could be shipped on 
British men-of-war. However, with local regulations being modified from time to 
time and with local and British merchants trying to avoid paying high export duties, 
British vessels began to receive non-authorized silver and gold. That is was 
happened at Callao in May and June 1821, when the Owen Glendower received 
silver pieces and "plata pina" from John Begg, 6'`5 and in July 1824, when the same 
merchant as well as Cochran and Company embarked dollars in the Tartar. 626 
Furthermore, it is possible to find some cases in which no British merchant 
was mentioned at all. That is what happened at Huanchaco, on 5 June 1824, when 
Agustin M. Andrade embarked several silver bars in the Tartar, valued 15,115 
dollars, consigned to Felipe Santiago del Solar, in Valparaiso, 627 and at Islay, on 13 
September 1830, when M. Pareja shipped 6,083 dollars on the Alert, consigned to 
Rufino Guido, in Callao. 628 Moreover, two years before, on 2 May 1828, at Islay, 
the last mentioned vessel received "plata pina" and dollars for a total value of 
15,786 dollars from the French merchant vessel Fulgar. 629 
Why British captains where ready to accept these kind of treasure on 
board? We could consider that freight was a temptation, but none of these cases 
involved an important amount of money. With the available information, we only 
can assume that they were linked in a non-explicit way to a British merchant. 
625. - ADM 51/3303. 
626. - Valparaiso. 18/9/1824, An account of treasure transhipped from H. M. S. the Tartar, 
Thomas Brown. Esquire. Captain, into H. M. S. the Aurora. Henry Prescott, C. B., Captain, 
for conveyance as Per Bill of Lading. Callao Bay. July 1824, ADM 1/29. 
627. - Ibidem. 
628. - Account of the treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop Alert between the 1st of July 
to 30 September 1830, ADM 1/34. 
629. - ADM 51/3015. 
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An additional problem was created when treasure was received without 
having paid export duties. As a British Commodore wrote in 1835, "high duties, 
monopolies, and prohibitions, produce the same effects as they do in other 
countries; and the gross corruption that prevails in every Departments enables 
merchants to evade the Laws. , 630 The first case was reported on February 1819, 
when the Blossom departed Callao with 3'000,000 dollars. Viceroy Pezuela 
strongly protested for this illegality, and Spanish naval boats were sent to exert a 
close control of the Blossom and the Andromache, which also was at the 
anchorage. Despite Pezuela's distrust on captains Hickey and Shirreff, they were 
not mentioned in the ensuing enquire. Instead of them, several influent personalities 
became involved, such as Pedro Abadia, factor of the Compania de Filipinas, and 
some British merchants and customs officials. 631 This case suggest that a number of 
British merchants, as well as local merchants, were ready to use every possible way 
to get their remittances in a British man-of-war without paying taxes. For this 
purpose, it seems that they would not hesitate in falsify papers, showing that they 
had already fulfilled every legal condition to export their treasure. 
Nonetheless, as already mentioned, in several occasions gold and silver was 
shipped in a form not properly authorized by the Peruvian government. That seems 
to happened in March 1834, when the boats of the U. S. schooner Dolphin were 
sent to shore at Chorrillos, a port not allowed to foreign trade and, consequently 
without a Customs Office. Tn that particular case, the Peruvian government 
complained to Consul General Wilson, having mistook that small schooner with the 
British frigate Dublin, under Captain Townshend. An incident followed this 
630. - Mason to Eliot. Blonde. Valparaiso, 27/1/1835, ADM 1/2211. 
631. - Anna. 146. CDIP, VIII (2): 354. 
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mistake, and Captain Townshend was to declare "that I consider myself, as well as 
every one of his Majesty Ships and Vessels, to be at full liberty to proceed to any 
part of the coasts of this country, and hold communications therewith, either by the 
boats, or otherwise, as may considered beneficial for the protection of British 
subjects, and their property". 632 
Already warned of this situation, when Rear Admiral Graham Eden 
Hammond took command of the Station, in September 1834, he instructed his 
subordinated captains not to receive any treasure on board without the intervention 
of the local Customs officials. Commodore Mason, who was in command of the 
Pacific Squadron since August 1834 until July 1837, followed very closely these 
instructions, and in spite of Captain Townshend's declarations, naval vessels under 
his command only received treasure in those ports already opened to foreign trade, 
such as Paita and Chorrillos, during the short time the latter was opened by 
President Orbegoso, in February 1835. When for some reason a man-of-war was 
sent to another port, previous consent from the Peruvian government, it was under 
strict orders not to receive any treasure on board. 633 
Even when Commodore Mason was very keen in observe these 
instructions, he did not hesitate in sending his own launch twice to the shore, 
during a revolution at Callao fortress, in January 1835, as the only available mean 
to save British merchants's properties at this port. Obviously, in such a critic 
situation, no export duties were paid, but it was an exception, since he had 
previously refused to use his boats for this sort of service. He even mentioned that 
632. - Townshed to Wilson. Callao 31/3/1834: enclosed in Townshend to Seymour, Dublin, 
Coquimbo. 11/6/1834, ADM 1/42. 
633. - Mason to Wilson, Blonde. Coquimbo, 9/7/1836; enclosed in Hammond a Wood. Dublin, 
Rio, 6/9/1836, ADM 1/36. 
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at least twice in the period he was in command of the Pacific Squadron, merchants 
had requested British captains support to take on board treasure without paying 
duties. First Captain Paget, of the Samarang, before August 1835, and afterwards 
commander Eden, of the Rover, in January 1836 refused complying with a request 
from the merchants to smuggle off money. As Mason stated in a report sent to the 
Admiralty, in January 1835, "smuggling in all articles does on from Peru to Mexico 
by the assistance of those who are appointed to prevent it (... ) but the Navy are not 
implicated in it, and in fact, since I have been out I have heard merchants reprobate 
officers as being too scrupulous" . 
634 
Nonetheless, it seems that in the following decades some naval captains 
became involved in clandestine operations in the Mexican coast, suggesting that 
they could have the same attitude in the Peruvian coast. According to Barry 
Gough, "The smuggling was known to captains and customs officers alike and in 
view of its benefits to both parties was carried on despite regulations to the 
, 
635 
contrary" 
The illegal conveyance of treasure had another kind of problems, since 
those who were ready to falsify papers to avoid paying export duties, were also 
ready to foolish British Captains. That is what happened to captains Searle and 
Mackenzie, of the Hyperion and Superb, when unknowingly took lead from 
Callao. As treasure was shipped on already closed and sealed boxes, with the 
owner's mark on it, the Captain's clerk recorded the number of boxes and the 
value declared by the shipper, stating that the boxes' contents was unknown. 
However, the Captain had to issue a bill of lading, promising to deliver the treasure 
634. - [bidem. Mason to Eliot. Blonde. Valpariso_ 27/1/1835, ADM 1/2211. 
635. - Gough (1983): 429. 
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supposedly received. In the case of Captain Mackenzie, following his arrival in 
Britain, he faced applications for "nearly one hundred thousand dollars, said to had 
been shipped at Lima, on board His Majesty's Ship Superb, but which never came 
on board". On July 1822, he wrote to the Admiralty on this issue, mentioning 
Sebastian Martin, o Morters, as the shipper "of this supposed treasure, and all the 
Bills of Lading hitherto presented to which my name has been forged, he appears 
to have negotiate, or sold" . 
636 
The Admiralty took good notice of this unfortunate event, and therefore 
prevented the Commander-in-Chief of the South America Station to alert their 
captains. It seems that this lesson was enough, as Captain Brown, of the Tartar, 
realized that a bill of lading for two boxed containing silver bars valued 2,047.5 
dollars, supposedly shipped by Cochran and C°, had been falsified by J. W. Hele, 
Captain's Clerk of H. M. S. Tartar. 6'' Furthermore, by 1826, "many captains 
refused to sign bills of lading specifying the weight of the silver or the number of 
dollars, on the grounds of their not being responsible for the amount inserted on it; 
and of their being only bound to subscribe conditionally, stating that the silver is 
said to weight, and that the dollars are said to be, so much or so many. "638 
As such a bill of lading would not be acceptable in a court of law as proof 
of shipment, it became a common use that "every bar of silver, every coin was 
examined and counted", 639 before being boxed and shipped. Both, the ship's 
636. - Mackenzie to Croker, London. 16/7/1822. ADM 1/2188. 
637. - ADM 50/147,24/10/1824. quoting a letter from Captain Barrow dated September 1. 
Valparaiso, 18/9/1824, An account of treasure transhipped from H. M. S. the Tartar. 
Thomas Brown. Esquire. Captain, into H. M. S. the. 4urora, Henry Prescott, C. B., Captain, 
for conveyance as Per Bill of Lading, Callao Bay, July 1824, ADM 1/19. 
638. - Humphrevs (1940): 152-153. 
639. - Gough (1983): 427-428. 
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carpenters and the counters, were paid for their work, as well as the boat party. In 
grounds of their own security, it seems that local merchants accepted to cover this 
non-regulated service. 
As already mentioned, the establishment of the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company, in 1840, provided British merchants a more frequent and regular service 
to Panama. Treasure and mail was taken in the steamers, under the direct 
protection of a naval party, being transhipped across the isthmus and sent by 
steamer to Britain. By the same time, the United States Pacific squadron had 
already increased its own commitment to conveyance of treasure, in direct relation 
with the importance of the North American investment in Peru. As early as 1836, 
Commodore Mason wrote in regard to this issue: "I can assert that the American 
Ships jo to Ports for freight where ours never touch, besides having had a 
schooner exclusively employed on that service for upwards of ten years. 640 
In essence, from 1811 to 1839, almost every single British naval vessel 
calling at Peruvian ports was involved in conveyance of treasure, affording security 
to British and local merchants during a period of revolution, national emergence 
and international conflicts. British merchants relied very much on naval vessels for 
the conveyance of their treasure, a naval duty which offered some reward but also 
involved a risk. As the area under the responsibility of the Pacific Squadron, later 
Pacific Station, was so vast for the available number of vessels, it became 
impossible to attend every single request. Moreover, as at some times naval 
captains refused to attend British merchants' request for illegal shipments, they 
were blamed by the latter as not paying enough attention to their protection. Even 
when some naval captains, officers of men, were actually involved in illegal 
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activities, they were only a few cases, very well-known and punished by the Royal 
Navy itself. For all these reasons, we conclude that conveyance of treasure was an 
effective way in which the British navy supported the establishment of British trade 
in Peru, as well as in other parts of Spanish America. 
To provide a better understanding of the role played by British naval 
vessels in this particular field, we have prepared a list of those particular man-of- 
war which were actually involved in it since 1811 to 1855. Based on this list we 
also include a graphic showing the value of the "Treasure convoyed by British 
naval vessels from, Peruvian ports" from 1811 to 1839. 
For this purpose we have used a considerable data to identify places, dates, 
names and amount of bullion exported or transported from one port to another. 
Treasure received on a man-of-war, was usually very carefully recorded, stating 
the port of embarkation and destination; the names of the sender, the adressee and 
their agents; and the composition of the treasure (gold, silver, bullion, etc). 
Unfortunately, not all these registers have survived, and therefore, we have used 
collateral sources, such as ship's logs, to complete the list includes as appendix to 
this chapter. Even so, there are several cases in which the information was 
unavailable, mainly due to japs in the register, and no departure port or even 
country can be discovered. In these cases, the single entry was "West Coast" or 
"Pacific". In other cases, when some urgent service called away the ship with the 
treasure on board, it was transhipped, and depending upon the situation this 
operation could be repeated more than once. 
640. - Mason a Elliot. Blonde, Vtipuaiso, 27/1/1835. ADM 1/2211. 
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Appendix 
List of naval vessels taking treasure on board 
year ship pesos 
1811 Standard 2'927,449 
1816 no mention 33,000 
1817 Amphion64I 100,000 
1818 Andromache6" 8 parcels with silver 
Transhipped to the Tyne at Valparaiso, in November 1818. 
1819 Blossom643 3'000,000 
Callao, on January 22, a number of boxes with pesos 
were transferred from the Andromache. 
1820 Slaney 
1820 Tyne644 
1820 Hyperion645 
1821 Andromache646 
1821 Superb" 
1821 Conway648 
1821 Owen Glendower649 
1821 Dauntless65o 
1822 Creole 6 '51 
1822 Conway 652 
348,000 
3'008,513 
1'500,000 to 3'000,000 
1'500,000 
3'000,000 
no details 
148,060.00 
several boxes with treasure for Oceania 
1'500,000 
3'000,000 
Plus half a million dollars received at San Blas. 6" 
641. - Bowles a Croker, Creole, Buenos Aires. 15/3/1819, ADM 1/24. 
642. - ADM 51/2131. 
643. - Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 53/140 
644. - Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3511. 
645. - Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3214. 
646. - Humphrevs (1940). 195. ADM 51/3012. 
647. - Humphreys (1940), 195. ADM 51/3445. 
648. - ADM 53/249. ADM 50/ 151.26/5/1821. 
649. - ADM 51/3303. It should be added 74 pieces of gold. 
650. - ADM 51/3144. 
651. - Humphrevs (1940): 195. 
652. - Humphrevs (1940): 195. ADM 53/249. 
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1822 Alacrity654 1'500,000 
Callao (April 13) 136,000 pesos; (June 4) received 
treasure, no details; (June 3) transferred treasure to the 
Doris; (Nov. 22) received treasure, no details; (Jan. 8) 
from the merchant Claudine 80,000 pesos. 
1823 Blossom6'5 2'700,000 
1823 Tartar6s6 15,000 
1824 Tartar657 149,001.50 
69 boxes at Callao, Huanchaco and Casma, transhipped 
to the Aurora in July 1824. 
1824 Aurora6s8 2'500,000.00 
1824 Fly659 11000,000.00 
Callao (November 14) 56 boxes with treasure to England 
1825 Tartar660 820,000 to 1'200,000 
1825 iWersey 
Callao (11/12) transhipped treasure to the Briton. 
1828 Ranger from the Pacific 11000,000 
1828 Volage from the Pacific 700,000 
1828 Blossom, from Mexico and Chile no details 
At least 82 boxes of treasure were received at Mazatlan. 661 
1828 Alert662 332,265.40 
1829-1830Alert663 364,106.38 
1829 Sapphire664 131,802 
1829 Heron665 73,953 
1830 Lightning from the Pacific566 500,000 
653. - Gough (1983): 421. 
654. - Humphreys (1940): 195. Tresure on board the Alacrity amounted 650,000 after Graham & 
Humphreys: 358 
655. - Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 53/141. 
656. - Tartar, Callao, 20/12/1823, ADM 1/29. 
657. - Valparaiso, 18/9/1824. An account of treasure transhipped from H. M. S. the Tartar, 
Thomas Brown, Esquire. Captain, into H. M. S. the. 4 urora, Henry Prescott, C. B.. Captain, 
for conveyance as Per Bill of Lading, Callao Bay, July 1824, ADM 1/19. Eyre to Croker, 
Spartiate. Rio de Janeiro, 25/8/1825, ADM 1/29. 
658. - Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 51/3027. 
659. - Humphreys (1940): 195. ADM 51/3175. 
660. - Humphreys (1940): 195. Entered Rio on January 31,1826 [O'Byrne: 134. ] 
661. - Gough (1983): 422. 
662. - ADM 51/3015. 
663. - ADM 51/3015. Returns of treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop Alert between 
Ist of July and 9 December 1829; and between 29 December 1829 and 9 February 1830, 
ADM 1/32. Accounts of the treasure received on board His Majesty's sloop Alert between 
the 10th February to 30 June 1830, and between Ist of July to 30 September. ADM 1/34. 
664. - Return of Treasure shipped on the Heron, enclosed to Baker a Croker. Warspite. Rio. 
25/1/1830. ALM 1/32. 
665. - Ibidem. 
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1830 Forte 667 
1830 Seringapatam668 
1830 Thetis669 
1831 Alert6'o 
1831 Seringapatam671 
1831 Eden from the Pacific672 
1831 Clio673 
1832 Volage from the Pacific674 
1833 Samarang from the Pacific 
1833 Tyne from the Pacific 
1833 Rattlesnake from the Pacific 
1835 Conway from the Pacific 
Includes 450,000 pesos received by the Challenger 
on Oceania and other ports. The difference was 
received at Mexico. 
675 
1836 North Start from Mexico6'6 
1836 Sparrowhawk from the Pacific 
1836 Rover from the Pacific67 
1837 Blonde from the Pacific678 
1837 Talbot from the Pacific679 
213914 
30513,50 
306,172.00 
216,5 79.00 
52,487.00 
547,000.00 
162,027.75 
1'000,000 
no details 
500,000 
no details 
1'900,000.00 
1'000,000.00 
330,000.00 
300,000.00 
1'200,000.00 
570,000.00 
666. - Baker to Croker, Warspite, Rio de Janeiro. 13/12/1830. ADM 1/34 
667. - A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's Ships on the South American Station, 
Thomas Baker, Esq, C. B., Rear Admiral of the White and Commander in Chief between 
the ist day of January and the 30th day of June 1830, ADM 1/33. 
668. - A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's ship Seringaparam between the Ist day of 
July and 30th day of September 1830, ADM 1/34. 
669. - An account of treasure received on board and delivered from in His Majesty's ship Thetis, 
A. B. Bingham Esq., Captain, between the ist day of October 1829 and the 30th day of 
June 1830, ADM 1/34. 
670. - A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's Ships on the South American Station, 
Thomas Baker, Esq, C. B., Rear Admiral of the White and Commander in Chief between 
the Ist day of January and the 30th day of June 1830, ADM 1/33 
671. - A return of treasure convoyed in His Majesty's Ship Seringapatam, between the Ist day of 
April and 30th day of June 1831, enclosed to Baker to Elliot, lVarspire, Rio de Janeiro, 
20/12/1831, ADM 1/37. Also Baker to Elliot, 6Warspire, Rio de Janeiro, 24/2/1832 & 
6/6/1832, ADM 1/38. 
672. - Baker to Croker, 6 Varspite, Rio de Janeiro. 22/4/183 1, ADM 1/35. 
673. - An account of Treasure received on board and delivered from His Majesty's Sloop Clio, 
John James Onslow Esquire Commander, between the Ist of July and 30th September 
1831: enclosed in Baker to Elliot, IVarspite, Rio de Janeiro, 10/12/1831. ADM 1/37. 
674. - Baker to Elliot, Warspite, Rio de Janeiro, 3/8/1832, ADM 1/39. 
675. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 25/8/1835, ADM 1/44. Hammond to Dawsoe, 
Spartiate, Rio de Janeiro, 11/3/1825, ADM 1/43. Gough (1983): 423. 
676. - Hammond to Wood. Dublin, Rio dc Janeiro, 29/8/1836, ADM 1/46. 
677. - Hammond to Wood. Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 7/5/1836, ADM 1/45. 
678. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 23/8/1837, ADM 1/48. 
679. - Hammond to Wood, Dublin. Rio de Janeiro. 22/4/1837, ADM 1/48. 
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1838 Cleopatra from the Pacific680 1'586,000.00 
1839 Harrier from the Pacific68' 800,000.00 
1839 Imogene from San Blas 1'641,158.00 
1842 Actaeon from Mexico 1'381,000 
1843 Champion from the Pacific 800,000 
1846 America from Mexico 2'000,000 
1848 Sampson 2'3 86,264 
Includes 1'941,000 pesos received in Mexi co by the Juno. 
1848 Grampus at San Bias 2'628,900 
1853 Thetis at Mexico 3'000,000 
1855 Brisk at Mexico 2700,000 
1855 Alert at Mexico 584,351 
1855 Havannah at Mexico 740,789 
680. - Ross to Wood, President. Callao. 12/7/1837, ADM 1/51. 
681. - Gough (1983): 422. The next entries are from the same source. 
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Graphic: Treasure convoyed in British Naval vessels from Peruvian ports. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Internal Affairs 
In previous chapters, we had seen how British naval captains stationed in 
Peruvian waters fulfilled their duties, since the creation of the South America 
Station until the collapse of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation. The most important 
task they had, all along that period, was to protect their nationals and to support 
and encourage the advance of British interest. However, Peru was not the only 
place they had to perform their duty, since the entire Pacific coast of America as 
well as several groups of islands in Polynesia, comprising almost half of the Pacific 
Basin, were also under their responsibility. If a modern navy had to perform a 
similar task nowadays, with the great help provided by modern technology, it 
would had to deal not only with a great number of states and cultures in such a 
large area, but also with a variety of logistic problems. 
Naval vessels of the period covered by this research were able to stay at 
sea for months if necessary, having a high degree of autonomy; however, they 
required a regular provision of fresh water and food, and a lot of maintenance and 
even an occasional access to shore facilities to remain efficient enough through the 
period they were destined to the Pacific. Under normal circumstances, a British 
colonial port could provide these support, but that was not the case of the Pacific. 
For the period under research, aside one or two naval vessel destined to Australia, 
the Pacific squadron was the sole British naval force in an Ocean in which Port 
? 56 
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Jackson was the single colonial port, far from the American coast and without 
enough resources itself All these difficulties were rarely seen and understood by 
landlubbers. But in spite of that, naval captains were able to attend "the endless 
chorus of demands from British merchants to show the flag in all major ports along 
the west coast". 
682 
Notwithstanding, as some of these merchants complained for not receiving 
enough naval protection, it would be proper to study the usual kind of internal 
problems the Pacific Squadron, later Pacific Station, had to deal with and how they 
could affect their effectiveness to perform their duties. It seems to me that these 
problems could be grouped in two major topics. One related to the number of 
vessels destined to protect British citizens and interest in an enourmes area in the 
Pacific, part of which was Peru; and the other one refered to the logistic difficulties 
that naval force had to face operating "baseless". This chapter will include an 
appendix providing a complete list of those British warships stationed or calling at 
the West Coast of South America during the period under research. 
British naval vessels in the Pacific 
In several opportunities, we had mentioned that the number of British men- 
of-war stationed in the Pacific was not enough to cover in a permanent form all the 
area in which they were due to protect their nationals and to promote British 
interests. As a matter of fact, during the period covered by this research, seventy- 
three British naval vessels sailed along the West Coast of America, sixty-two of 
682 John Bach, "Maintenance of Roval Navy vessels in the Pacific Ocean, 1825-1875", The 
_Wriner'sIfirror. vol_ 56, n' 3 (August 1970): 261. 
ý. 
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them as part of the Pacific Squadron or Station, six as surveying vessels, and 
another five calling in the area either on their way to another destination or in an 
specific mission. Even when some vessels of the last two categories called at 
Peruvian ports and were involved in promoting British interests, as was the case of 
the Standard, in 1811, the Dauntless, in 1821, or the Constitution, in 1835-1836, 
those which actually had that mission were in the first category. 
As six of these vessels were commissioned twice to the Pacific, we could 
properly consider a total figure of sixty-eight British naval vessels forming the 
Pacific Squadron or Station since 1813 until December 1839. Three of them did 
not called at Peruvian ports, but all the rest did it, with a variable length of time. 
We were able to prepare a list of all these vessels, alphabetically and 
chronologically ordered, with relevant information respect their stay in Peruvian 
ports. Using that information, we already presented a graphic showing the number 
of vessels stationed in the Pacific every 1 March since 1818 until 1839 (page 162). 
It also was possible to elaborate two other graphics showing how many days each 
one of these man-of-war stayed in Peruvian ports; and the comparison between 
their time of service in the Pacific with the time destined to Peruvian ports. These 
two graphics are in chronological order, and because the number of vessels 
involved it was impossible to show all their names. For this particular reason, these 
two graphics should be referred to the chronological list which is just before them. 
It is clear that the first group of British vessels sent to the Pacific (1813- 
1815) had a pure naval mission, under direct orders of the Admiralty, to chase 
enemy vessels and to protect British whalers. Peruvian ports were used only for 
refreshment and repairs, and most of their time in the Pacific was devoted to fulfil 
their main task. Even when the South American Station became partially involved 
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in this period, when the Cherub joined the chase of the Essex, in 1813, the Pacific 
remained out of its control. The Admiralty was to state this issue in 1813, when 
Captain Hillyar, of the Cherub, claimed the prize for the capture of the Essex, 
ratifying its previous statement (1811), when the Standard sailed to Chile and 
Peru, to take deputies and treasure to Cadiz. 683 
Things changed since 1817, following the establishment of a number of 
British merchants in Valparaiso and the risk that maritime war between the 
Viceroyalty of Peru and the newly independent Chilean government. Shortly before 
that, in December 1816, the limits of the South America Station were defined, as 
follows: "to the southward of the line and to the westward of the 3 0th meridian of 
west longitude". 684 No western limit was mentioned until 1820, when the East 
Indies and China Station was extended eastwards to the meridian 170° West 
longitude. In the meantime, since May 1817, attending to the fast changing 
situation on the West Coast of South America, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
South American Station extended his jurisdiction to that coast by sending a number 
of vessel round the Cape, a decision which was fully approved by the Admiralty. 685 
Within four years, the Pacific Squadron grew considerably, from one to six 
men-of-war, not taking into account the sloop Dauntless, from the East Indies 
Station, arrived in 1821. As most British merchants were already established in 
Chile and Peru, the squadron devoted most of its efforts to these two countries, 
only two of its vessels sailing to other parts of the Pacific: the Blossom, in 1818, at 
Mexico and the Northwest Coast, and the Andromache, in 1820, to Panama. Even 
b83 Dixon to Croker, . Jchile, Rio de 
Janeiro. 1/9/1814. ADM 1/22. Croker to Dixon. 
London. 12/12/1814, ADM 2/934. 
694 
- Admiralty Minute. London. 18/18/1816, ADM 3/88. 
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when the area under the Pacific Squadron comprises a number of Polynesian 
islands, no vessel was sent there. In the same period, the average length of time 
each vessel served in the Squadron was 290 days, one hundred of which were 
destined to Peruvian ports. 
In the next years, until 1828, an average of five British men-of-war were 
stationed in Peruvian waters yearly, not taking into account the short visit of the 
Blonde, in 1825, on her way to Polynesia. Up to this time, Chile and Peru remained 
as the most important part of the area under the squadron's protection; however, 
the significance of the Mexican trade grew, being visited by three men-of-war 
(Aurora, in 1824; Alacrity, in 1826; and Jaseur, in 1827). Two of these vessels 
called at Guayaquil, and other more visited the Colombian coast up to Panama 
(Mersey, in 1827). The average time of service in the Pacific squadron increased 
considerable to 24 months, nine of which were destined to Peruvian ports. During 
this period, the frequency of visits to Peruvian ports increased considerable, 
reaching its highest point in 1826, when British vessels totalized 902 days. It is 
possible to say that more than two British naval vessels were at some Peruvian 
port, all around that year. As this frequency drooped in the following years, some 
merchants as well as Consul General Wilson could compare and claim for lack of 
protection. 
The number of British vessels calling at Peruvian ports suffered a 
temporary drop in 1831-1832, as a logical consequence of the brig Hidalgo 
incident. However, within the next five years, that number was increased from 
three to eight naval vessels, besides six survey vessels. The average time of service 
685. 
- Bowles to Crokcr, _3mpnion, Buenos Aires. 24/5/1817, and Admiralty minute, London. 
25/8/1817, ADM 1/23. 
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in the Pacific was 17.5 months, remaining in Peruvian ports only 4.5 months, half 
of the time they used to stay in the previous period. It was clear that other parts of 
the Pacific became more important for the Squadron. Almost every year, a vessel 
was sent from Callao or Valparaiso to the Mexican coast, calling at Guayaquil, 
Panama, Nicoya and others ports in-between. Moreover, in 1830,1834 and 1839, 
the islands of Polynesia were visited by the Seringapatam, the Challenger, and the 
Sparrowhawk, respectably. Despite these facts, when the war between Chile and 
the Peru-Bolivia Confederation threatened British interests, British naval vessels 
increased their presence in Peruvian ports, up to eight of them in 1837. 
The number of vessels commissioned to the Pacific Station will be 
increased in the following years, up to sixteen, in 1847, and an average of twelve, 
at least until 1874. Since 1842, steam-ships were sent to the Station, helping old 
sailing vessels to attend an area which was defined in 1837, running from 170° 
West longitude to Cape Horn meridian, and from Behring Strait to the Antarctic 
Circle. 686 The western limit of the Station was reduced in 1866, "by the Meridian 
of 160° West longitude to 12° North latitude, thence along the Meridian 
Northward to Behring Strait", transferring to the Australia Station the control of 
the Phoenix, Samoa, and Friendly Islands. A further reduction was made in 1893, 
when the western limit of the Station became "the meridian of 149° 30' West longi- 
tude (Tahiti), from the Antarctic Circle to the Equator; thence along that line west 
to the meridian of 160° West longitude, thence on that meridian northward to 12° 
586 Parliamentary Papers 1847-1848 ((I) 1st part: 10-11, return of H. M. S. and vessels on 
different stations ... (1835-1848), 
Admiralty 17/3/1848. Parliamentary Papers 
"Accounts and Papers" 1867-1868 XLV, return of H. M. S. and vessels on different 
stations ... 
(1847-1867), Admiralty 16/3/1868. 
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North latitude, along that parallel to the meridian of 180°; thence on that meridian 
north to the shores of Asia". 687 
During the 1840's, Polynesia became the area of major concern for the 
Pacific Station, and in the following decades, when a naval base was established in 
Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, that part became important too. The Peruvian ports 
will continue to be visited by British men-of-war, with some degree of involvement 
in the local situation. But that time was far beyond the chronological limits of the 
present research. 
In general terms, we could see how the Pacific Squadron, later Station, 
redistribute its vessels to attend the areas were British interests were considered in 
peril by local situations. Any consular agent, as well as any merchant, will see his 
own part of the pie, considering himself as deserving most attention from naval 
captains; however, it was impossible to satisfy all their claims, and unless we could 
understand this issue today, we will continue to see this service through the eyes of 
a very partial witness. 
A "baseless" naval force 
Amongst the problems faced by the Pacific Squadron, and later by the 
Station, one of the most relevant was the lack of a well-equipped colonial port, 
with a naval depot and proper facilities to maintain its vessels and crews. During 
the period covered by this research, the nearest colonial ports were Port Jackson, 
in Australia, and Port Stanley, in the Falklands, both very far from the normal area 
of operation of the Squadron and most of the time unable to provide a good 
687 
.- 
Gough (1971): 246. 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
logistic support. Actually, at least in the first years of the South American Station, 
only Rio de Janeiro could provide this kind of support, at least in certain degree. In 
the following decades, Spanish authorities and afterwards independent govern- 
ments in the Pacific and in the Atlantic coast offered facilities ashore to the British 
vessels calling there. However, as the British men-of-war had often to act against 
local authorities, these kind of facilities became unavailable or at least unreliable. 
The establishment of naval facilities at Esquimalt, Vancouver, by 1848, gave 
partially relief to this situation, but since 1813 until 1839 several measures were 
adopted to cope with this kind of problems. 
Any vessel need maintenance, specially during long periods at sea, as well 
as men needed fresh food and water. When maintenance fails, accidents could 
happen, and when fresh food and water fails, crew members' health was affected. 
These basic issues were faced in different forms by British Commodores and 
Admirals stationed in the Pacific. Part of their duties as commanding officers was 
to kept naval vessels under their command in proper conditions. If they failed, the 
principal mission of the Squadron, offering protection to their nationals, could be 
seriously affected. It is our aim to discuss the way in which British captains in the 
Pacific fulfilled this part of their duties, at least in relation to Peru. 
Until 1866, when a 2000 tons capacity dock became available at San 
Francisco, it was impossible to conduct major repair works in the area under the 
control of the Pacific Station. In fact, the nearest docks were at China and India, 
and only available in the 1840's. This situation changed in 1868, when a large ircn 
floating dock, capable of taking 6000 tons dead-weight, entered in service at 
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Callao. 688 Nevertheless, when a vessel required urgent repairs, they were 
conducted in the best possible way. 
Until the independence of Chile, the West Coast of America only had two 
naval establishments: the Maritime Departments of Callao and San Blas. If the 
latter had some importance in the exploration of the Northwest Coast, its facilities 
were certainly reduced, being forced, from time to time, to sent its naval vessels to 
Callao for major repairs. Between 1813 and 1815, when the first group of British 
naval vessels were sent to the Pacific, Britain and Spain were allies against France. 
For this reason, they received a certain degree of logistic support at Callao Naval 
Arsenal. That was the case of the Racoon and the Indefatigable, in 1813 and 1815, 
respectively, who were provided not only with stores for their sails and rigging, but 
also with the help of carpenters and caulkers. 689 Obviously, the Arsenal had its own 
limitations, being unable to attend a similar request for the Tagus and the Briton, in 
December 1814.69° 
This kind of limitations was increased during the war for the Peruvian 
independence, forcing British captains to essay other possibilities, specially for the 
safe return to Britain. Already in 1814, Captain Black, of the Racoon was very 
conscious of this necessity, pointing it out on his report to the Admiralty, "Atlho, 
the Racoon bottom kept pretty tight, yet I think it right to proceed round the Cape 
during the summer months". 091 
°gg. - A. H. dc M. Expedientes Administrativos. Compania del Dique del Callao. Bach: 267 
689 ADM 51/2765,16/8/1813. ADM 51/2463. September to November 1815. 
690. 
- A. A. B. Expediciones a Indias, legajo 53 (1815), Vivero al Secretario de Marina, 6/6/1- 
815, n° 293, Lima. 1/12/1814. 
691 
- Black to Croker, Racoon, Lima, 30/8/1814. ADM 1/22. 
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At least since 1828, a survey was conducted before a vessel, with treasure 
of board, sailed from Valparaiso to the Atlantic. If some repair was needed, its 
departure could be delayed and even the treasure transhipped to another vessel. 
That happened in August 1828, with the Doris. As the works lasted for almost a 
year, the British Consul General in Chile obtained from that government a vessel 
for the Doris' crew. 692 At the end, as the works were conducted with severe 
limitations, they were finally suspended and the hulk was sold to the Chilean 
government, by early 1830.693 In the same year, the Sapphire arrived at Valparaiso 
from San Bias, with 600,000 dollars, having orders to proceed directly to Rio de 
Janeiro. However, Captain Coghlan, Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron, 
considered that urgent repairs were needed on the Sapphire, and transhipped the 
treasure to his own vessel, the Forte, sailing afterwards to Rio de Janeiro. 694 The 
repairs were conducted in a short time, and the Sapphire departed Valparaiso for 
Coquimbo and Callao almost one month later, to be involved in the brig Hidalgo 
incident. 
Even when some repairs could be done at Rio de Janeiro, they also had 
some limitations. In November 1823, for instance, the schooner Driven, from the 
Africa Station, arrived to Rio de Janeiro to be repaired. A survey was ordered by 
Admiral Eyre, Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station, being found 
that the repairs could be done. Even so, Eyre decided to sent her to Britain. 595 A 
similar decision was taken by Admiral Baker, in early 1832, when the recently 
commissioned dyne was sent to Britain to repair her damaged bow. In the next 
6y'` Otway to Croker, Ganges, Rio de Janeiro, 23/11/1828, ADM 1/31. 
693 
- ADM 51/3148. 
694 
- Baker a Croker. [Warspite, Rio de Janeiro, 14/4/1830. ADM 1/32. 
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year, Admiral Seymour took the risk of doing major repairs on the sloop Satellite, 
which had to be hove down with this purpose. The Admiralty was not very 
enthusiastic on doing this kind of works in foreign ports, and for this reason, in 
1837, when the Pacific Station was created, Admiral Ross was specifically 
instructed to "make only patch repairs on the station and to send all serious work 
home to Britain. "696 
The principal difficulty to provide a proper maintenance to British naval 
vessels stationed in the Pacific was the absence of adequate shore facilities and 
qualified workers. But they were also other problems. Timber could be available in 
several places, but as not shipyard was functioning during the period of our 
research, it was almost impossible to find it properly prepared for naval use. Naval 
supplies were even more difficult to obtain, and if available at all it was highly 
overpriced, normally in hands of British merchants. For this reason, these kind of 
supplies were normally provided directly from Britain, although there were 
exemptions to this rule, basically related to urgent repairs or to price opportunities. 
That actually happened in 1823, when Commodore Hardy instructed Captain 
Brown, of the Tartar, that "hemp has been purchased and made into small cordage 
and twine with advantage"; and in 1824, when an anchor from the "time of the 
Spanish rule, when ships of the line arrived at this port", was bought for the 
Cambridge at Callao, paying for it 1040 pesos. 697 
The problem of having a permanent provision of coal only appeared in 
1842, following the commission of the steamer Salamander. Even when it was 
695 Eyre a Croker, Spartiate, Rio de Janeiro, 7/1/1824, ADM 1/29. 
696. 
- Bach: 266-267. 
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beyond the chronological limits of the present research, it should be mentioned 
that, five years later, the 5th-rate Naiad arrived at Callao, to remain there as a 
floating depot until 1866,698 when a contract was signed with the Pacific Steam 
Navigation Company, to use the depots the company already had from Panama to 
Valparaiso. 699 
If facilities for the maintenance of naval vessels were a problem for the 
British Station, building up a regular system to procure fresh provisions and water 
was even more complicate and delicate. 
Since 18 13 until 1815, during the War with the United States, each man-of- 
war commissioned to the Pacific took on board as much stores as possible, sharing 
it with those already there. Such was the case with the Phoebe, Cherub and 
Racoon, who departed Rio bound for the West Coast in July 1813, each with seven 
months provisions, 700 and the Indefatigable, who entered Callao in December 
1814, with 2666 pounds of bread and 8 casks of beef for the Phoebe. 701 However, 
as in some cases they remained for longer periods than previously considered, they 
had to buy some provisions at Valparaiso or Callao. That happened in August 
1814, when the Racoon, under Captain Black, entered Callao already short of 
provisions, with bread for only four days, after a long period at sea. Black was able 
to refresh some supplies, although he mentioned that "wood is one article not to be 
procured at any price at Lima", sailing afterwards to continue on his cruise along 
697 
- Hardy a Croker, Creole, Rio de Janeiro, 23/8/1823, ADM 1/22. A. H. de M. Libro 
Copiador 847: 16/5/1830. 
598 
- Admiralty to Seymour, London, 6/l/1847, ADM 2/1601. ADM 53/5776-5777 
699Bach: 268-269. 
" Dixon to Croker, . Montagu. Rio de Janeiro, 12/7/1813, ADM 1/2 1. 
01. 
- ADM 51/267/j. ADM 51/2463. 
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the northern Peruvian coast in search for enemy vessels. Three months latter, the 
Briton and the Tagus departed Valparaiso for Callao, aiming to obtain at the 
Peruvian port some "species of provisions, particularly cocoa and sugar", which 
were unavailable at Chile. 702 
From 1817 until 1826, once a permanent squadron was stationed on the 
Pacific, supplies were sent from Rio de Janeiro to Valparaiso from time to time, 
using hired vessels. On their arrival at Valparaiso, the cargo was transferred to the 
British man-of-war there stationed, whose captain had to redistribute it amongst 
the other vessels of the squadron. Naturally, this system underwent several changes 
over the years, when British captains became more aware of local products and 
prices. Thus, at least since August 1823, the Squadron was instructed to obtain 
bread, flour and salted provisions at Valparaiso; and cocoa and sugar in Callao. 
Prices will change a little bit in the succeeding years, and by 1827, the Victualling 
Office had already compare them at England, Valparaiso, Callao and Rio de 
Janeiro. Even when in all cases coca, bread and sugar could be obtained at a 
lower price in England, the differences was so small that it not justify to ship them 
to the Pacific. For this reason, British captains in the Pacific Squadron were 
instructed in 1827 to buy cocoa and bread at Valparaiso, and sugar in Peru. It 
should be noticed that the differences of prices between the three South American 
ports were very important. For instance, cocoa cost almost twice at Rio de Janeiro 
than at Valparaiso, bread at Callao cost three times the Valparaiso's price; whereas 
sugar cost twice at Valparaiso. Local supply to British warships was mainly in 
°` Staines to Dixon, Briton. Valparaiso, 15,, 6/1O to 9/11/1814. Black a Croker, Racoon, 
Lima, 30/8/1814, ADM 1/22. 
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British merchants hands, at least until 1827, when especially chartered ships were 
dispatched by the Victualling Office, with stores and supplies to the Pacific. 703 
Since that year, one transport were due to sail from England every four 
months or two every six months with bread, beef, pork, spirit and other supplies, 
like clothes and medicines. In the latter case, one of the transport would be bound 
for Rio and the other directly to Valparaiso, where the Pacific Squadron gathered 
to receive the cargo. The total allowance of the South American Station, for 1827, 
was as follows: 704 
bread 369,000 pounds 
beef 4,324 pounds of 8th 
pork 8,648 pounds of 4th 
spirits 11,530 gallons 
flour 12,972 pounds 
peas 360 bush 
sugar 8,648 pounds 
cocoa 11,530 pounds 
tea 3,844 pounds 
coals 25 charcoals 
However, this service was not as regular as expected, and soon some 
delays happened. According to the schedule established in 1827, the following 
storeships were due to arrive to Valparaiso in the stated dates: Lord Wellington 
(20/2/1827), Baltic Merden (31/8/1827), Orestes (28/2/1828), Lord Wellington 
(31/8/1828) and Kains (20/2/1829). However, the second tour of the Lord 
Wellington was delayed for almost six weeks, a time in which the entire Pacific 
squadron was forced to remain at Valparaiso, not only affecting its normal duties, 
'03 Hardy to Brown, Creole, Rio de Janeiro. 30/8/1823, ADM 1/28. PRO F. O. 61/18,305. A 
list of the different prices paid for cocoa. sugar and bread at Rio. Valparaiso. Callao and 
England. in 1826-1827. ADM 1/31. 
'°a Victualling Office to Otwav, 7/7/1827, ADM 1/31. Transport vessels Fggin. Lord 
Wellington and Royal Sovereing are reported at Callao between May and June 1827 [El 
Teiegrafo de Lima from May 5 onwards ]. 
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but also producing a shortage of supplies. Moreover, as the Kaires was expected 
only fifteen weeks later, the Squadron would have to deal with an overstock of 
such a bulky commodity as bread . 
705 
As this particular kind of cargo deteriorated faster than others supplies, in 
1831, Rear-Admiral Baker reduced by half the amount of bread sent to the Pacific, 
the other half was to be obtained locally. Moreover, he authorized the Senior 
Officer of the Pacific Squadron to return any supply sent in excess, taking 
advantage of the two storehouses the Station had at Rio de Janeiro. 706 
Even when Baker's instructions alleviated some of the difficulties related to 
provisions, it was still a problem to concentrate the squadron at Valparaiso for the 
arrival of the storeship. A better solution could be to hire a storage place either at 
Valparaiso or at Callao, as the United States Squadron had already done, at Callao, 
in 1830.707 Taking this into account, in 1831, Captain Waldergrave hired a small 
storehouse at Valparaiso, an attitude which was provisionally approved by Admiral 
Baker, but instructing him to use the transport Arab as storeship once the hiring 
period of the storehouse had elapsed. 708 
Since July 1833, before that order could be carried out, Admiral Seymour 
began to sent the cargo to the Pacific Squadron by private freight, consignee to the 
Senior Officer or to the British Consul at Valparaiso. The first cargo supplied on 
05 
- Victualling Office to Otway, London, 7/7/1828; Otwav to Croker. Ganges, Rio de 
Janeiro. 11/10 & 4/12/1828. ADM 1/31. 
706 One storehouse was hired at Island Cobras, paying for it 1'200,000 reis yearly, and the 
other one was at Braganza. free of charge since 1815 until april 1831. when an annual 
payment of 1'000.000 reis was fixed by the Brazilian government [Bakers instructions 
to Captain Waldegrave, enclosed with Baker to Elliot. x/6/1831, ADM 1/35 ]. 
'07. 
- A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 847. 
-°S. 
- Baker to Croker. Warsvite, Rio de Janeiro, nov/1829, ADM 1/32. Baker to Elliot, 
Warspite, Rio de Janeiro, 5/6/183 1, ADM 1/35. 
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this condition arrived on the transport Columbian, in October that year, forcing 
Consul General White to hire another storehouse. 709 Even when Captain 
Townshend, Senior Officer of the Pacific Squadron, reported that from it was 
absolutely necessary to rent this second storehouse, paying 350 pesos yearly for it, 
the Admiralty only approved this decision in March 183 
Nevertheless, storing supplies on a foreign soil presented several problems, 
which were basically related to the control that local Customs exerted over the 
goods landed and stored for the British Squadron. To exercise it properly, Chilean 
authorities kept the keys of the storehouse, attending British Captains' request 
with a 24-hour previous notice and only between 1000 and 1500 hours. Obviously, 
this sort of limitation represented a serious problem for a naval force, which was 
increased by the poor knowledge of the location of the items stored, as no store- 
keeper was appointed to organize them. Finally, bad weather imposed restrictions, 
forcing British boats to remain aside their ships after a first trip, unable to return to 
shore for a second cargo, or to re-embark the party landed to handled the cargo. 
This situation might become even more complicated when urgent situations 
required a quick cargo, a, 'iappened in July 1837, during the war between Chile 
and the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, when the Imogene, under Captain Bruce, was 
instructed to take supplies at Valparaiso as fast as possible and sail back to the 
Peruvian coast. To accomplish that order, Captain Bruce hired a lighter and loaded 
it with all the necessary provisions within the hours allowed by the Customs, 
r9 
- Seymour to Townshen. Spartiate, Rio de Janeiro. 16/7/1833, ADM 1/41. 
10. Mason to Hammond, 4/9/1835 and admiralty Minute, London, 7/3/1836, enclosed with 
Hammond to Wood, Dublin, Rio de Janeiro, 17/12/183 5, ALM 1/45. 
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planning to use his own boats afterwards to take the supplies on board from the 
hulk. Unfortunately, bad weather intervened and the hulk sunk with its cargo. 
711 
Mainly due to this sort of problems, Rear-Admiral Ross insisted on the idea 
of a storeship, suggesting the use of a 10-gun brig, which would be able both to 
store supplies and to offer permanent protection to British subjects at Valparaiso. 
During the winter, that brig could be stationed at Callao, a place which could be 
reached more easily by the ships of the Station. An important point in favour of 
this idea was the rising cost of the Valparaiso stores, which increased more than 
twice, from £ 233.6.11, in 1836, to £ 553.4.2, in 1838. This price includes £ 50 for 
the Vice-Consul, £ 160 for the rent itself, £ 93 for opening charges, and 12' 0 for 
handling expenses. 712 Finally, in May 1844, the proposal of a storeship was 
accepted by the Admiralty and the 42-gun frigate Nereus was stationed at Valpa- 
raiso as a floating depot. She was to perform this duty until 1874.713 
Another source of problems was the supply of fresh water, especially along 
the Peruvian and Chilean coast, which are largely a desert. Until the late 1830's, 
fresh water was obtained directly from watercourses, but this system was very 
time-consuming and eventually dangerous, in unsettled times. Therefore, when a 
British subject, named Davis, built a watering tank at Valparaiso, British captains 
preferred to pay one dollar per ton of fresh water instead of taking the risk to sent 
a party to shore with that purpose. Even when this solution was satisfactory, it had 
a sensible cost, leading Admiral Ross to considered far more convenient to have a 
i' Bruce to Ross, Imogene. Callao. 3/10/1838; Broughton to Ross. Sarnarang, Callao 
8110/1838; both enclosed with Ross to Wood, President, Callao 11/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
-12. 
- Broughton to Ross, Sanrarang, Callao 8/10/1838, ADM 1/52. 
, 13. 
- Seymour to Admiralty, Collingwooci, Valparaiso 4/2/4846, ADM 1/556'.. 
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fresh-water deposit hired by the Pacific Station. "` Finally, the Nereus will give this 
service from 1844 onwards. 
Another problems which could affect the effectiveness of the Pacific 
Squadron were desertion and sickness. Even although both were present from the 
start of the Pacific squadron, it seems that desertion caused more difficulties than 
sickness, basically because it affected discipline and morale. In a general sense, first 
the Spanish and afterwards the Peruvian authorities provided as much assistance as 
possible to the British captains in their efforts to control both problems, pursuing 
deserters and allowing the landing of British sailors to recover their health. 
Desertion at Callao was not a monopoly of the British Squadron, as many 
similar cases were reported in the United States and French squadrons, as well as 
in merchant vessels arriving from different nations. However, since British men-of- 
war were admitted to Peruvian ports several years before any foreign merchant 
vessel, the first reports of deserters are to be found in naval records. In fact, the 
very first British naval vessels arriving at Callao, the Phoebe and the Racoon, in 
1814, suffered the desertion of five sailors. Local authorities helped both British 
Captains to recover their deserters, even allowing marines to be landed for their 
search. Moreover, they authorized the completion of the British crews by taking 
over some British sailors who were in jail and by allowing to enlist some others 
already released . 
715 
Following the Independence of Peru, the number of deserters increased 
considerably. This rise had several reasons, amongst them the great illusion the 
-14 Broughton to Ross. Sanrarang, Callao. 8/10/1838; enclosed with Ross to Wood, 
President, Callao 11/10/1838. ADM 1/52. 
'' ADM 51/2675. ADM 51/2765 
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Peruvian market offered to the establishment of British merchants, and the urgent 
necessity of able seamen for the mercantile marine and the newly formed Peruvian 
Navy. We had already seen how this last reason caused several problems between 
Peruvian and British naval authorities. 
Another issue in which British captains intervened was in the establishment 
of health facilities for British seamen at Callao. As any other port in the first half of 
the Nineteenth Century, Callao's health conditions were not very high. However, 
this situation became worst between 1824 and 1826, during General Rodil's 
resistance to the patriot's attempts to take the port. Mortality was great amongst 
loyalist and patriots, and a number of dead bodies remained unburied as late as 
1829, contributing to make less hygienic the local environment. 716 
Aiming to relieve the plight of their fellow countrymen who landed for 
sickness, in 1825, John McCullock, a British merchant based in Callao, began to 
offer medical care for British sailors in his own house. 717 This situation was further 
improved in 1827, when Consul Rickets requested permission from the Peruvian 
government to use the former Naval Hospital at Bellavista, which had been 
abandoned and partially destroyed during the war. Authorization was granted to 
use "a ward next to the garden, and even the garden itself', 718 and Dr. Sagan, a 
British physician, was appointed to take care of British seamen at that hospital, 
under McCullock's supervision. Other sources mentioned Dr. Logan, as an another 
716 McCullock to Townshend, enclosed with Townshend to Baker, Dublin Callao 22/8/1832; 
enclosed with Baker to Elliot. 10/12/1832, ADM 1/40. 
"'. 
- Idibem. 
71 S. 
- Vivero to the Minister, Callao. 5/11/18%9, A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 8 i7. 
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British physician involved in this humanitarian task . 
719 For each sailor admitted at 
the hospital, the British Consulate agreed to pay 14 reales daily, 8 of them (one 
dollar) for bed, food, medicines and cleaning; and the other 6 for the doctor sala; 
ry. 720 By the same time, the U. S. frigate Brandywine arrived at Callao from 
Panama with some men with dysentery. As his captain requested the same 
permission from the Peruvian government, the sick North American sailors were 
721 allowed to use another ward at the entry of the Hospital. 
Dr. Sagan died by mid-1830, just a few weeks after the brig Hidalgo 
incident. First Captain Bingham and afterwards Captain Waldegrave, being the sole 
British authority in Peru, tried to appoint another British physician to replace Dr. 
Sagan. However, as no one was inclined to work for such a low payment, Waldeg- 
rave decided that sick seamen should be treated on board the British naval vessel 
stationed at Callao, being transferred as many times as the vessels changed. As this 
situation could not last for long, taking into account the kind of service warships of 
the squadron were expected to fulfil, in April 1831, having requested permission 
from the Peruvian goverment, Waldegrave appointed Dr. Archibald Smith, a 
well-known physician, to take care of British sailors at the Hospital of Santa Ana, 
an institution destined for females since its creation in the Sixteen Century. The 
British ward was placed under the supervision of the above-mentioned John 
McCullock. A similar appointment was granted to Dr. Smith by the United States 
"ý. A. H. M. 1829, carp. 12. leg. 29, doe. 19 & 12). Waldebrave to Baker. Seringapatam, 
Valparaiso. 16/9/1831, ADM 1/37. Baker to Elliot, 6Varspite, Rio de Janeiro, 
10/12/1831 ADM 1/40. 
'20 Waldegrave to Baker, Seringapatam. Valparaiso, 16/9/1831. ADM 1/37. 
721 
.- 
Vivero to the Minister, Callao, 8/4/1830, A. H. de M. Libro Copiador 347. 
ý 
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consul, so both British and North-American sailors were placed under his care. 722 
In April 1833, on the arrival of Consul General Wilson, Mr. Barton was appointed 
Consul at Callao, being instructed to supervise the medical service at Santa Ana, 
and Dr. Smith was confirmed at his post. 723 
Waldegrave inspection the hospital in 22 August 1831, finding there four 
British and four North American sailors. In his report, he mentioned that in the 
period from May to August, ten British seamen were hospitalised, four of them 
died from asthma, hepatic abscess, syphilis and heart attack, while the other six 
suffered from dysentery, rheumatism and tertian. 724 
Callao was not the only place were this kind of service was offered. In 
1833, it was recorded that Charles Higginson, British Vice-Consul in Paita, 
undertook the care of those sailors landed for sickness from the great number of 
whalers calling at that port . 
725 However, we had found no evidence involving the 
Pacific Squadron with this particular service. 
In general terms, it is possible to say that British captains in the Pacific 
coped with the logistic problems related to operate in distant waters, without the 
support of a British naval base. Nowadays, it would be easy to criticise some of the 
measures adopted by the Admiralty, the Victualling Office, the Commander-in- 
'' - Waldegrave to Baker, . 
Seringapatam. Valparaiso, 16/9/183 1, ADM 1/37. 
723 Wilson to Smith, Lima. 14/4/1833; Wilson to Barton, 23/4/1833, P. R. O., F. O. 61/23. Dr. 
A..,. i.: L.. 1.7 0_...:. 1. I n... -., r:.:.... 1.. -.,. L ... '. IcA 0, ;r tuwLivatu JIIUUI 3pC. ni y.. LI CU 'VLiüs iii I &. i u. waiuiir5 a vvvn eaauuL. u Cl es u. I. W. - 
residence in Lima, and other parts of the Peruvian republic, London. Richard Bentley, 
1839.2 volumes. 
"' Waldegrave to Baker, Seringapatam. Valparaiso. 16/9/183 1. ADM 1/37. 
7". Wilson to Higginson, Lima, 27/4/1833. and Higginson's reply, Paita 6/5/1833; Wilson 
to Bidwell. Lima 20/3/1833, P. R. O., F. O. 61/23. 
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Chief of the Station or the Senior Officer of the Squadron; however, despite some 
failures and mistakes, the Pacific Squadron, later Station, was able to fulfil their 
main duty, which was to offer protection to their nationals. British merchants not 
only obtained protection but also some profits with the operation of the squadron, 
since they gained control of the local market of shipping supplies very shortly after 
Independence. 
As we had seen, Valparaiso became also the most important logistic port 
for the Pacific Squadron, mainly for being the first calling port in the Pacific 
arriving from the Atlantic, but also because the liberal policy of the Chilean 
government, attracted a great number of foreigners and their trade. Callao, which 
had been the most important port of the West Coast until Independence, capable to 
provide help to the British men-of-war calling there, was to loose part of that 
capacity in the 1820'. Only its better natural conditions and its relative central 
position, until the end of the period covered by this research, would retain there a 
number of British men-of-war. This situation changed in the following decades, as 
other parts of the Pacific increased their importance. 
Appendix One 
British warships stationed in the Pacific 
(1813-1839) 
This appendix includes all British naval vessels commissioned to the Pacific 
Squadron or Station, during the period covered by this research. It also includes 
_ii 
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five surveys vessels sailing in the area during the same period, as well as another 
two naval vessels calling in Peruvian ports on her way to other destination. 
This list provides several details for each vessel, in alphabetic order. 726 The 
first one, following the ship's name, is her rating according to the system adopted 
in 1792, which classified British warships in six rates, plus smaller vessels like 
schooners, sloops and gunboats, whose command was entrusted to Lieutenants. As 
part of the ship's rate, the total number of guns is presented in parenthesis (). The 
next detail is the tonnage, quoted in builder measurements or tons of capacity, 
which was the standard system up to 1873, when displacement tonnage was 
introduced. Finally, relevant chronological data is presented in brackets. It includes 
the date in which the ship entered and left British naval service, and other names 
before and after her service in the West Coast of South America. 
In a second paragraph, dates and ports visited by each one of the warship 
are listed. Dates are presented as the day/month of arrival, and date/month of 
departure (for instance 12/3 to 15/3 means that the vessel arrived on March 12th 
and departed on March 15th). When departure was on the day after arrival, a 
comma was used to link the days (for instance 12,13/5, means that the vessel 
arrived on May 12 and departed on the following day). 
Following the alphabetic list, there is another one, in chronological order, 
taking as reference the arrival to the first port on the West Coast until December 
1839. With this information we were able to produce the three enclosed graphics, 
which were already described at the beginning of the present chapter. 
,6- Details were taken from J. J. Colledge, Ships of the Royal . 
Vavv: an historical index, 
Newton Abbot, David & Charles. 1969,2 vois. 
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Alphabetic list 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
1. - Actaeon, 6° (26) 620 [1831-1889] 
Rio de Janeiro (31/5/1836) - Valparaiso (25/7 to 29/8) - Polynesia (3/10 to 
13/1/1837) - Valparaiso (2 to 10/2) - Callao (22/2 to 23/3) - Puna, Guayaquil 
(30 to 11/4) - Callao (30/4 to 16/6) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (6/7 to 2/11) - 
Rio de Janeiro (13/12/1837) 
2. - Alacrity, brig-sloop (10), Cherokee class, 236 [1818-1835] 
Rio de Janeiro - Valparaiso (22/11 to 14/1/1822) - Callao (23/1 to 12/6) - 
Valparaiso (30/6 to 21/9) - Arica (30/9 to 6/10) - Sama (8/10) - Quilca (10 
to 30/10) - Callao (3/11 to 8/2/1823) - Valparaiso (28/2 to June 1823) 
3. - Alert, brig-sloop (18), Cruiser class, 388 [1813-1832] 
Montevideo (19/1/1828) - Valparaiso (14/2 to 1/3) - Arica (10 to 14/3) - 
Iquique (18,19/3) - Cobija (26 to 28/3) - Arica (30 to 2/4) - Cobija (10 to 
13/4) - Arica (15 to 24/4) - Islay (26 to 8/5) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso, Cobija 
(27/5 to 20/6) - Iquique (22,23/6) - Arica (24/6 to 21/7) - Cobija (1 to 8/8) - 
Arica (14 to 25/8) - Islay (27 to 6/9) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Cobija (23/9 
to 29/10) - Arica (I to 15/11) - Islay (18 to 25/11) - Pisco (29 to 1/12) - 
Callao (2 to 4/12) - Puna (12 to 21/12) - San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (16/1 
to 19/3/1829) - Panama (20 to 25/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (28/5 to 29/6) 
- Callao (11/7 to 2/9) - Samanco (4 to 9/9) - Huanchaco (10 to 14/9) - 
Lobos de Afuera (15 to 18/9) - Callao (29/9 to 12/1/1830) - Valparaiso (9/2 
to - Callao (7/4 to 12/5) - Arica (12 to 20) - Callao (8/5 a 12/8) - Arica (28 
to 30/8) - Islay (2 to 13/9) - Callao (17 to 19/9) - Concepcion, Valparaiso, 
Cobija (11/10 to 7/11) - Arica (10 to 17/11) - Islay (19 to 1/12) - Paita (9 to 
14/12) - Huanchaco (23 to 26/12) - Callao (5/1 to 7/3/1831) - San Blas, 
Mazatlan, Guaymas (17/4 to 12/6) - Paita (12 to 16/7) - Callao ('31/7 to 5/9) 
- Valparaiso, Coquimbo (21/9 to 13/10) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/1831) 
4. - Amphion, 5° (32) 914 [1798-1820] 
Rio de Janeiro (24/8/1817) - Valparaiso (16/10 to 3/11) - Callao (12/11 to 
19/12) - Valparaiso (10/1 to 7/2/1818) - Rio de Janeiro (20/3/1.818) 
5. - Andromache, 5° (38) 1029 [French. Junon, 1799-1812, Princess Charlotte - 
1828] 
Rio de Janeiro (3/4/1818) - Valparaiso (23/5 to 25/6) - Callao (7/7 to 3/8) - 
Valparaiso (27/8 to 1/11) - Callao (11/11 to 14/2/1819) - Valparaiso, 
Talcaguano (6/3 to 19/12) - Callao (30/12 to 10/1/1820) - Panama, Quibo 
(9/2 to 16/3) - Callao (23/4 to 8/5) - Valparaiso (27/5 to 10/12) - Callao 
(20/12 to 7/2/1821) - Huacho (9 to 23/2) - Callao (25/2 to 9/4) - Valparaiso 
(28 to 9/5) - Rio de Janeiro (26/6/1821) 
6. - Aurora, 5° (38) 1083 [French Clorinde 1814-1815] 
Rio de Janeiro (23/5/1822) - Valparaiso (25/6 to 5/7) - Arica (19 to 21/6) - 
Callao (27/6 to 10/11) - Valparaiso (29 to 10/12) - Iquique (14/12) - Arica 
(15 to 18/12) - Quilca (20 to 29/12) - Arica (4 to 12/1/1823) - Callao (18/1 
to 28/8) - I. Hormigas - Callao (6/9 to 8/11) - Galapagos - San Blas (8/12 to 
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16/2/1824) - Puna (29/3 to 10/4) - Huanchaco (26/4 to 10/5) - Callao (20 to 
27/5) - Pisco (1 to 5/6) - Callao (7 to 4/7) - Valparaiso (20/7 to 10/10) - Rio 
de Janeiro (2 1/ 10/ 1824) 
7. - Rasilik, ketch (6) 161 [1822-1846] 
Rio de Janeiro (6/7/1835) - Valparaiso, Cobija (19/8 to 28/9) - Arica (1 to 
3/10) - Islay (6 to 14/10) - Cobija, Valparaiso (27/10 to 14/11) -Callao (23 
to 3/12) - Islay (16 to 6/1/1836) - Quilca (7 to 10/1) - Islay (12/1 to 20/2) - 
Arica (25 to 28/2) - Iquique (2/3) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Valdivia, Talcaguano 
(9/3 to 18/5) - Callao (26 to 8/6) - Paita (13 to 15/6) - Puna, Guayaquil, 
Panama, Tumaco (17 to 13/8) - Paita (16 to 19/8) - Huanchaco (26 to 28/8) 
- Callao (4 to 14/9) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Copiapo, Cobija (1 to 28/10) - 
Arica (31 to 2/11) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Copiapo, Coquimbo (11/12/1836 to 
12/4/1837) - Arica (16 to 11/5) - Valparaiso, Cobija (25/5 to 8/8) - Arica (15 
to 18/8) - Islay (21 to 23/8) - Cobija, Valparaiso (2/9 to 12/10) - Arica 
(15/10) - Islay (18 to 29/10) - Valparaiso, Copiapo, Cobija (24/11/1837 to 
21/2/1838) - Islay (1 to 6/3) - Callao (11 to 5/4) - Valparaiso, Huasco, 
Mejillones (30/4 to 13/5) - Arica (18 to 26/5) - Islay (29/5) - Cobija, 
Valparaiso (6 to 27/6) - Callao (8 to 18/7) - Pisco (22,23/7) - Arica (3 to 
5/8) - Pisco (12/8) - Callao (14/8 to 30/9) - Chilca (4 to 6/9) - Callao (7 to 
12/9) - Huacho (13 to 15/9) - Ancon (17/9) - Callao (18 to 23/9) - Cobija 
(9,10/10) - Arica (12 to 14/10) - Cobija, Valparaiso (24/10/1838 to 
4/1/1839) - Callao (13 to 16/1) - Huacho (17,18/1) - Casma (19,20/1) - 
Samanco (20,21/1) - Santa (22/1) - Huanchaco (23,24/1) - Santa (26/1) - 
Callao (31 to 5/2) - Huacho (7,8/2) - Callao (10/2 to 21/3) - Huanchaco (23, 
24/3) - Paita (25,26/3) - Cabo Blanco (27/3) - Puna, Guayaquil (28 to 6/4) - 
Paita (9,10/4) - Huanchaco (18 to 21/3) - Callao (27 to 29/4) - Cobija, 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (19/5 to 12/7) - Arica (22 to 24/7) - Islay (27 to 29/7) 
- Callao (3 to 6/8) - Huacho (7/8) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama (12/8 to 4/9) - 
Paita (25,26/9) - Valparaiso (20/10 to 25/11) - Cobija (I to 15/12) - 
Valparaiso (1 to 20/1/1840) - She will continue in the area until late 1843. 
8. - Blanche, 5° (46) 1074 [1819-1865] 
Rio de Janeiro (26/10/1825) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (7/12/1825 to 
18/3/1826) - Callao (28/3) - Huacho (30 to 4/4) - Callao, Chorrillos (7 to 
2/5) - Valparaiso (18/5 to 23/6) - Arica (2 to 12/7) - Quilca (15,16/7) - 
Callao (19/7 to 28/9) - Valparaiso (17 to 26/10) - Arica (4/11 to 9/12) - 
Quilca (16 to 22/12) - Valparaiso (16 to 24/1/1827) - Callao (3/2 to 14/3) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (11/4 to 28/5) - Rio de Janeiro (30/6/1827) 
9. - Blonde, 5° (46) 1103 [1819-1870, Calypso -1895] 
Rio de Janeiro (25/6/1834) - Valparaiso (6/8 to 15/8) - Callao (24 to 1/9) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Valdivia, Talcaguano (22/9 to 10/11) - Arica (18/12) 
Tslay (20/12) Callao (21 to 31/12) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (27/1 to 
5/2/1835) - Arica (11 to 13/2) - Callao (18/2 to 31/5) - Valparaiso, 
Concepcion, Coquimbo, Cobija (15/6 to 27/7) - Arica (30,31/7) - Islay (1 to 
5/8) - Callao (9/8 to 2/10) - Valparaiso (19 to 23/10) - Callao (3/11 to 
25/1/1836) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (22/2 to 4/3) - Arica (9,10/3) - Islay (11 
to 13/3) - Callao (19/3 to 19/4) - Arica (4 to 8/5) - Islay (9 to 15/5) - Callao 
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(19 to 29/5) - Valparaiso (18/6 to 29/9) - Arica 14,15/10) - Callao (21/10 to 
24/12) - Pisco (29 to 4/1/1837) - Callao (6 to 23/1) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, 
Cobija (16/2 to 11/4) - Callao (21 to 10/5) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (15/5 to 
20/7) - Rio de Janeiro (22/8/1837) 
10. - Blossom, sloop (18) 427 [1806-1848] 
Rio de Janeiro (10/3/1818) - Talcahuano, Valparaiso (3/5 to 13/7) - Callao 
(23 to 27/7) - Columbia river (1/10 to 12/10) - Monterrey (3 to 11/11) - 
Callao (16/1 to 14/2/1819) - Talcahuano (7/4 to 9/4) - Rio de Janeiro 
(21/5/1819) 
Montevideo (15/10/1821) - Valparaiso (22/11 to 25/11) - Callao (6 to 24/12) 
- Valparaiso, Concepcion (15/1 to 10/5/1822) - To de Janeiro (10/7 to 
2/1/1823) - Valparaiso (27/1 to 17/3) - Callao (28/3 to 13/4) - Quilca (30 to 
3/5) - Talcahuano, Valparaiso (26/6 to 20/9) - Iquique (30/9) - Arica (1 to 
10/10) - Quilca (13/10 to 14/11) - Callao (18 to 2/12) - Valparaiso (20/12 to 
21/1/1823) - Rio de Janeiro (5/3/1823) 
11. - Briton, 5° (38) 1080 [1812-1860] 
Rio de Janeiro (March 1814) - Valparaiso (21 to 31/5) - Callao (18/6 to 
28/6) - Paita - Tumbes, Santa Helena, La Plata, Salango, Galapagos - 
Otaheti, Marquesas, Pitcairn - Valparaiso (15/10 to 20/11) - Callao (29/11 to 
22/1/1815) - Juan Fernandez, Valparaiso (13/2 to 28/3) - Rio de Janeiro 
(27/4/1815) 
Montevideo (26/9/1824) - Concepcion, Valparaiso (13/11 to 16/3/1825) - 
Callao (27/3 to 17/4) - Chorrillos (17 to 2/5) - Callao (3 to 11/5) - Chorrillos 
(12/5 to 10/8) - Valparaiso, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (23/8 to 1/11) - 
Chorrillos (7/11/ to 11/12) - Callao (11/12 to 15/2/1826) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (10/3 to 3/4) - Rio de Janeiro (26/5/1826) 
12. - Cambridge, 3° (80) 2139 [1815-1869] 
Rio de Janeiro (12/3/1824) - Valparaiso (4 to 27/5) - Callao (8/6 to 26/10) - 
Ancon, Chancay (26 to 28/10) - Callao (28 to 15/11) - Chancay (15 to 
18/11) - Ancon (19 to 21/11) - Callao, Chorrillos (21/11 to 18/1/1825) - 
Huacho (19 to 22/2) - Chorrillos, Callao (25/2 to 16/4) - I. Chincha (23, 
24/4) - Quilca (5 to 11/5) - Arica (18 to 28/5) - Iquique (31 to 1/6) - 
Valparaiso, Talcahuano, Coquimbo (15/6/1825 to 26/1/1826) - Callao, 
Chorrillos (5/2 to 19/3) - Huacho (21 to 4/4) - Callao, Chorrillos (7/4 to 
28/9) - Salinas 29 to 10/10) - Callao, Chorrillos (12/10 to 9/12) - Valparaiso 
(28/12 to 8/2/1827) - Rio de Janeiro (22/3/182-7) 
13. - Challenger, 6° (28) 603 [1126-1835 wrecked on Chile] 
Papeete (26/12/1832) - Valparaiso (4i2 to 24/2/1833) - icio de Janeiro (6i4) 
- Spithead - Rio de Janeiro (21/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Cobija (16/2 to 
10/3/1834) - Arica (12 to 28/3) - Islay (29 to 23/4) - Valparaiso (8 to 13/5) - 
Callao (22 to 10/6) - Puna (16 to 19/6) - Polynesia - Valparaiso, Cobija 
(25/10 to 16/11) - Arica (20 to 4/12) - Islay (6 to 15/12) - Cobija, 
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Valparaiso, Coquimbo (26/12/1834 to 2/2/1835) - Rio de Janeiro (11/3) - 
Concepcion (19/5/1835) 
14. - Cherub, sloop (18) 424 [1806-1820] 
Rio de Janeiro (9/7/1813) - Galapagos (Sept. ) - Tumbes (4 to 14/10) - 
Galapagos (Nov. ) - Callao (3/12 to 11/1/1814) - Valparaiso (4 to 18/4) - 
Callao (28 to 1/5) - Galapagos, Polynesia (May to August) - Valparaiso 
(22/9 to 17/10) - Rio de Janeiro (28/11/1814) 
15. - Cleopatra, 6° (26) 918 [1835-1862] 
Rio de Janeiro (15/3/1837) - Valparaiso (10/5 to 2/6) - Callao (10/6 to 28/8) 
- Valparaiso (16 to 3/10) - Callao (11 to 23/10) - Paita (28/10) - Puna, 
Guayaquil (30 to 13/11) - Punta Arenas, Nicoya, Libertad, San Bias, 
Mazatlan, Guaymas (21/11/1837 to 1/5/1838) - Valparaiso (21/6 to 1/7) - 
Rio de Janeiro (4/8/1838) 
16. - Clio, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 389 [1807-1845] 
Montevideo (21/1/1831) - Valparaiso, Talcaguano, Cobija (28/2 to 26/6) - 
Arica (30 to 2/7) - Islay (5 to 17/7) - Callao (21/7 to 21/8) - Paita (25/8) - 
Guayaquil (26 to 4/9) - Paita (8,9/9) - Coquimbo (29 to 13/10) - Callao (22 
to 25/10) - Paita (29,30/10) - Panama, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas 
(6/11/1831 to 15/4/1832) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (3/6 to 28/9) - Rio de 
Janeiro (17/11/1832) 
17. - Conway, 6° (20) 451 [1814-1825] 
Valparaiso (19/12 to 27/1/1821) - Callao (5/2 to 1/3) - Valparaiso (18/3) - 
Arica (7 to 9/6) - Mollendo (14 to 19/6) - Callao (9 to 17/7) - Ancon (17 to 
1/8) - Huacho (3/8) - Chorrillos (8,9/8) - Valparaiso, Chiloe, Coquimbo, 
Totoral (28/8 to 25/11) - Callao (9 to 17/12) - Pacasmayo (20/12) - 
Guayaquil, Acapulco, San Blas (25/12/1821 to 15/6/1822) - Rio de Janeiro 
(1822) 
18. - Conway, 6° (26) 652 [1832-1861, Winchester -1871] 
Rio de Janeiro (March 1834) - Valparaiso (13/5 to 21/5) - Islay (1/6 to 1/7) - 
Arica (8 to 11/7) - Cobija (18 to 5/8) - Islay (10 to 17/8) - Cobija, Valparaiso 
(26 to 1/10) - Callao (9 to 16/10) - Tumbes (20,21/10) - Guayaquil, 
Galapagos, G. Nicoya, Realejo, San Bias, Mazatlan, Guaymas (22/10/1834 to 
23/4/1835) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (5/6 to 22/7) - Rio de Janeiro 
(23/8/1835) 
19. - Creole, 5° (36) 949 [1813-1833] 
Rio de Janeiro (1/2/1821) - Valparaiso (13/3 to 14/4) - Callao (22/4 to 30/4) 
- Valparaiso, Chiloe (16/5 to 31/7) - Arica (8 to 9/8) - Callao (15 to 26/8) - 
Ancon (27 to 1/9) _ Callao (2 to 8/9) - Anrnn (11 to 13/9) - Valparaiso (27/9 
to 28/10) - Mejillones (1/11) - Callao (8/11 to 11/2/1822) - Valparaiso (9 to 
28/3) - Rio de Janeiro (10/5/1822) 
20. - Doris, 50 (36) 870 [East Indianian Pitt, 1808-1830 sold in Valparaiso] 
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Rio de Janeiro (10/2/1822) - Valparaiso (27/4 to 19/5) - Arica (27 to 29/5) - 
Callao (4/6 to 23/8) - Valparaiso (14/9 to 16/10) - Rio de Janeiro 
(18/11/1822) 
Montevideo (21/1/1827) - Valparaiso (5/3 to 19/4) - Callao (30/4 to 5/7) - 
Valparaiso (6/8 to 10/10) -Mejillones (15 to 17/10) - Arica (20 to 28/10) - 
Pisco (31 to 2/11) - Callao (4/11 to 13/12) - Valparaiso, Juan Fernandez, 
Talcaguano, Cobija (9/1/1828 to 26/5) - Iquique (29,30/5) - Arica (1 to 
30/6) - Islay (7 to 19/7) - Pisco (21 to 25/7) - Callao (28 to 11/8) - 
Valparaiso (30/8/1828 to 18/2/1830) 
21. - Dublin, 3° (74) 1772 [1812-1826, reduced to (40) -1885] 
Rio de Janeiro (22/1/1832) - Valparaiso (8/3 to 21/3) - Callao (30 to 15/4) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo, (4/5 to 10/6) - Callao (27/6 to 23/8) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo, Talcaguano (9/9 to 20/11) - Callao (30 to 24/12) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (24/1/1833 to 18/3) - Callao (28/3 to 1/6) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (16/6 to 3/7) - Callao (10/7 to 21/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo 
(13/9 to 21/10) - Callao (30/10 to 12/12) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, 
Talcaguano (1/1/1834 to 24/2) - Callao (5/3 to 27/4) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (10 to 11/6) - Rio de Janeiro (20/7/1834) 
22. - Eclair, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 387 [1807-1831] 
Rio de Janeiro (22/2/1825) - Valparaiso (18/4 to 4/5) - Arica (12,13/5) 
Quilca (15/5) - Valparaiso, Chiloe (10/6 to 28/7) - Chorrillos, Callao (9/8 to 
20/10) - Pisco (25 to 29/10) - Arica (19/11 to 9/12) - Chorrillos, Callao (15 
to 31/12) - San Blas, Mazatlan, Acapulco, Puna, Guayaquil (7/2/1826 to 
28/5) - Huanchaco (10 to 15/6) - Casma (18/6) - Callao (26 to 20/7) - 
Valparaiso (2 to 6/8) - Iquique (19/8) - Arica (23 to 2/9) - Quilca (4 to 23/9) 
- Arica (1 to 14/10) - Quilca (16 to 22/10) - Pisco (25,26/10) - Callao (27/10 
to 20/12) - Valparaiso (18 to 24/1/1827) - Arica (1 to 18/2) - Quilca (27 to 
7/3) - Callao (11 to 1/4) - Rio de Janeiro (26/5/1827) 
23. - Eden, 6° (24) 451 [1814-18331 
Montevideo (28/6/1830) - Valparaiso (12/8 to 25/8) - Callao (3/9 to 
11/1/1831) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (8 to 26/2) - Rio de Janeiro (16/4/1831) 
24. - Electra, sloop (18) 462 [1837-1862] 
Rio de Janeiro (10/4/1839) - Valparaiso (10/6 to 2/7) - Islay (11 to 15/7) - 
Callao (20 to 24/7) - Realejo (8 to 3/9) - Valparaiso (18/10 to 9/3/1840) - 
She will continue in the area until early 1841 
25. - Fly, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 384 [1813-1828] 
Rio de Janeiro (26/5/1823) - Valparaiso (11 to 17/7) - Callao (24 to 17/8) - 
Valparaiso 
t(1LnUI7 
on to ot 11/1/1824) - 
Callao Callao 1'1 
t.:. 
1II/1 
1 I; 'I 
to - 19/t) - 
Valparaiso, 
7 
Coquimbo (11 to 28/5) - Quilca (9 to 23/6) - Callao (28 to 14/7) - Pisco (21 
to 23/7) - Quilca (21 to 3/9) - Valparaiso (29/9 to 30/10) - Callao (7 to 
15/11) - Chancay (15 to 18/11) - Quilca (7,8/12) - Callao (14,15/12) - 
Chorrillos (16/12 to 1/1/1825) - Valparaiso (27 to 14/2) - Rio de Janeiro 
(15/4/1825) 
. 
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26. - Fly, sloop (18) 485 [1831-1903] 
Rio de Janeiro (28/9/1837) - Valparaiso - Puertos Intermedios - Valparaiso 
(27/4 to 15/5/1838) - Pitcairn, Society and Friendly Islands - Valparaiso (Jan. 
to August) - Rio de Janeiro (16/9/1839) as flag ship 
27. - Forte, 5° (38) 1155 [1814-1844] 
Rio de Janeiro (23/6/1828) - Valparaiso (20/8 to 8/11) - Callao (18 to 10/12) 
- Valparaiso, Coquimbo (2/1/1829 to 29/6) - Callao (9 to 19/7) - Coquimbo, 
Valparaiso (4/8 to 21/11) - Mejillones (25/11) - Arica (28 to 2/12) - Callao 
(7 to 26/12) - Valparaiso (16/1 to 9/3/1830) - Rio de Janeiro (9/4/1830) 
28. - Harrier, sloop (18) 486 [1831-1840] 
Rio de Janeiro (5/1/1837) - Valparaiso, Cobija (9/2 to 6/3) - Arica (9 to 
11/3) - Islay (13,14/3) - Arica (17 to 1/4) - Islay (2 to 12/4) - Arica (19 to 
3/5) - Callao (9 to 13/5) - Arica (30/5 to 30/60 - Cobija (10/7) - Arica (16 to 
18/7) - Cobija, Valparaiso (19/7 to 21/8) - Callao (31/8 to 5/12) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (29/12/1837 to 11/1/1838) - Callao (21/1 to 1/7) - 
Pisco (4 to 9/7) - Callao (10,11/7) - Arica (28 to 31/7) - Islay (2 to 9/8) - 
Valparaiso (23 to 29/8) - Iquique (6/9) - Arica (7 to 9/9) - Islay (10/9) - 
Callao (13 to 19/9) - Guayaquil, San Blas, Mazatlan (25/9/1838 to 
17/1/1839) - Valparaiso (18/3 to 4/4) - Rio de Janeiro (5/5/1839) 
29. - Heron, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 387 [Rattle. snake, 1812-1831] 
Rio de Janeiro (1/I 1/1828) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (31/1 to 7/2) - Callao 
(15/2 to 20/3) - Valparaiso, Chiloe, Coquimbo (11/4 to 13/6) - Arica (20 to 
27/6) - Islay (30,1/7) - Callao (6 to 16/7) - Islay (11 to 19/8) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (8/9 to 17/10) - Rio de Janeiro (6/12/1829) 
30. - Hyperion, 5° (32) 978 [1807-1833] 
Montevideo (6/1/1820) - Valparaiso, Juan Fernandez (15/2 to 4/7) - Punta 
Coles (July/August) - Valparaiso (27/8 to 4/9) - Callao (13/9 to 12/12) - 
England (Feb. 1821) 
31. - Icarus brig- Sloop (10), Cherokee class, 234 [1814-1861] 
Buenos Aires (8/4/1819) - Valparaiso (8/5 to 3/10) - Rio de Janeiro 
(15/11/1819) 
32. - Imogene, 6° (28) 660 [1818-18' 1 Pearl, -1840] 
Rio de Janeiro (28/5/1837) - Valparaiso (15/7 to 8/8) - Polynesia (9/8 to 
9/12) - Valparaiso (2/1 to 6/2/1838) - Callao (15 to 22/2) - Valparaiso (18 to 
4/4/) - Callao (12/4 to 18/6) - Valparaiso (13 to 4/8) - Arica (13/8) - Callao 
(19 to 25/8) - Valparaiso (10 to 23/9) - Callao (1 to 8/10) - Puna, Guayaquil, 
Panama, iceaiejo, an Bias, Mazatlan, Guaymas (14/10/1838 to 22/1/5/1839) - 
Valparaiso (23/7 to 6/8) - Rio de Janeiro (19/9/1839) 
33. - fndefatigable, 30 (64) 1400 [1784-1795, reduced to (44) -1816] 
Rio de Janeiro (24/11/1814) - Valparaiso, Concepcion (30/1/1815 to 23/4) - 
Valparaiso (26/4 to 21/5) - Callao (1 to 19/6) - Callao (30 to 3/7) - Salango, 
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Galapagos (4/7 to Sept. ) - Callao (21/9 to 12/11) - Valparaiso (6/12 to 
25/1/1816) - Rio de Janeiro (13/3/1816) 
34. - Jaseur, brig- Sloop (18), Cruzier class, 387 [1813-1845] 
Rio de Janeiro (18/4/1826) - Valparaiso (18 to 21/6) - Callao (7/7 to 10/9) - 
Huanchaco (12,13/9) - Malpelo (17/9) - Puna, Guayaquil (18 to 28/9) - 
Paita (3,4/10) - Pacasmayo (11 to 16/10) - Huanchaco (18 to 23/10) - Santa 
(27 to 29/10) - Huacho (5 to 8/11) - Callao (11 to 9/12) - Valparaiso (10 to 
20/1/1827) - Callao (1,2/2) - San Blas, Acapulco (21/3 to 29/4) - Callao 
(14/6 to 10/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (6/9 to 6/10) - Rio de Janeiro 
(15/11/1827) 
35. - Menai, 6° (26) 449 [1814-1853] 
Rio de Janeiro (28/6/1827) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (6/9 to 5/10) - Arica (11 
to 13/10) - Callao (18/10 to 29/11) - Arica (26/12 to 2/1/1828) - Islay (4 to 
9/1) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso, Cobija (26/1 to 21/2) - Arica (24 to 14/3) - 
Islay (15 to 30/3) - Pisco (1 to 4/4) - Callao (5 to 10/4) - Valparaiso (27/4 to 
3/6) - Pisco (11 to 13/6) - Callao (15/6 to 1/12) - Cobija (23/12) - Arica 
(26/12 to 1/1/1829) - Islay (2 to 7/1) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (27/1 to 1/3) - 
Arica (10,11/3) - Callao (18 to 10/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (1/5 to 7/6) - 
Rio de Janeiro (21/7/1829) 
36. - Mersey, 6° (26) 451 [1814-1852] 
Rio de Janeiro (28/12/1823) - Valparaiso, Chiloe (13/2/1824 to 8/8) - Callao 
(18 to 20/8) - Samanco (22 to 25/8) - Huanchaco (26 to 31/8) - Pacasmayo 
(1 to 3/9) - Huanchaco (5 to 7/9) - Santa (11 to 13/9) - Casma (14 to 16/9) - 
Huacho (24 to 26/9) - Callao (30 to 8/10) - Quilca (22/10 to 3/12) - 
Mollendo (7,8/12) - Arica (14 to 18/12) - Quilca (20 to 30/12) - Callao 
(4/1/1825) Chorrillos (5 to 7/1) - Valparaiso (1/2 to 4/5) - Coquimbo (7 to 
10/5) - Chorrillos (19 to 31/5) - Quilca (22 to 9/7) - Valparaiso, Talcaguano, 
Coquimbo (29/7 to 29/9) - Arica (5 to 9/10) - Chorrillos (15 to 13/11) - 
Huanchaco (16 to 1/12) - Huacho (12 to 14/12) - Chorrillos (17/12 to 
26/1/1826) - San Francisco, Colombia (19/2 to 21/2) - Tobago (22 to 5/3) - 
Callao (1/4) - Huacho (3,4/4) - Callao (7/4 to 10/5) - Arica (31 to 16/6) - 
Quilca (19 to 29/6) - Callao (3 to 27/7) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (16/8 to 
29/9) - Rio de Janeiro (10/ 10/ 1826) 
37. - North Start, 6° (28) 501 [1824-1860] 
Rio de Janeiro (6/7/1835) - Valparaiso (25/8 to 22/9) - Callao (29/8 to 6/11) 
- Puna, Guayaquil, Nicoya, Libertad, San Bias, Guaymas, Mazatlan 
(12/11/1835 to 21/4/1836) - Valparaiso (17/6 to 22/7) - Rio de Janeiro 
(28/8/1836) 
'o n, . .. '1,. ., (1Qv ntzn r1Q )A 7nr i JV. - k-//GJ(GJ, oIJJ} `iV) -TVV L iwJj 
Rio de Janeiro (5/10/1839) - Valparaiso, Juan Fernandez (26/11/1839 to 
9/2/1840) - She will continue in the area until mid-1841 
39. - Owen Glendower, 5° (36) 951 [1808-1884] 
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Montevideo (14/12/1820) - Valparaiso (22/1 to 27/3/1821) - Callao (5/4 to 
28/4) - Salinas (28/4 a 1/5) - Huacho (2/5) - Barranca (4/5) - Callao (11 to 
18/5) - Ancon (18 to 30/5) - Salinas, Huacho (30/5) - Callao (6/6 to 14/7) - 
Valparaiso (13/7 to 10/10/1821) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/1821) 
40. - Phoebe, 5° (36) 926 [1795-1841] 
Rio de Janeiro (9/7/1813) - Galapagos (Sept. ) - Tumbes (4 to 14/10) - 
Galapagos (Nov. ) - Callao (3/12 to 11/1/1814) - Valparaiso (8 to 31/5) - Rio 
de Janeiro (27/7/1814) 
41. - President, 4° (52) 1537 [1829-1903, Old President - 1903] 
Rio de Janeiro (1/3/1838) - Concepcion, Valparaiso (3/4 to 29/5) - Callao 
(7/6 to 12/11) - Huacho (13 to 20/11) - Callao (21/11 to 10/4/1839) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (3/5 to 10/7) - Islay (5/8) - Callao (8/8/ to 11/12) - 
Canete (13 to 18/12) - Callao (20/12 to 31/5/1840) - She will continue in the 
area until early 1842 
42. - Pylades, sloop (18) 433 [1824-1845] 
Rio de Janeiro (17/7/1833) - Chiloe, Valparaiso, Cobija (15/9 to 26/10) - 
Arica (19 to 6/11) - Islay (8/11 to 15/12) - Juan Fernandez, Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (31/12/1833 to 27/1/1834) - Rio de Janeiro (13/3/1834) 
43. - Racoon, sloop (18) 426 [1808-1838] 
Rio de Janeiro (9/7/1813) - Galapagos, Columbia river, San Francisco (Sept. 
to June 1814) - Callao (10/8 to 20/9/1814) - Valparaiso (15/10 to 9/11) - 
Rio de Janeiro (1815) 
44. - Ranger, 6° (28) 502 [1820-18321 
Montevideo (3/11/1825) - Valparaiso (8/12 to 5/1/1826) - Chorrillos, Callao 
(14/1 to 6/3) - Valparaiso (24 to 6/3) - Rio de Janeiro (18/4 to 5/8/1827) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (3/9/1827 to 5/2/1828) - Rio de Janeiro (18/3/1828) 
45. - Rattlesnake, 6°(28) 503 [1822-1860] 
Montevideo (10/2/1832) - Concepcion, Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Copiapo, 
Cobija (18/3 to 29/6) - Arica (2 to 17/7) - Islay (22/7 to 22/8) - Valparaiso 
(10 to 23/9) - Callao (4 to 23/10) - Panama, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas 
(7/11/1832 to 23/4/1833) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (14/6 to 29/6) - Rio de 
Janeiro (27/8/1833) 
46. - Rover, sloop (18) 590 [1832-1845] 
Rio de Janeiro (14/10/1835) - Valparaiso (12/12 to 17/12) - Callao (28 to 
9/2/1836) - Valparaiso (1 to 26/3) - Rio de Janeiro (4/5 to 12/5/1836) - 
Valparaiso, Talcaguano (8/7 to 1/10) - Callao (9 to 27/10) - Puna, 
Juaya4U11, tNicvya, ncait; j U, LiUCILQU, jail liiaý, V[ Liaii, vuayiiia6 
(2/11/1836 to 2/5/1837) - Valparaiso (16/6 to 15/9) - Iquique (22,23/9) - 
Arica (24 to 26/9) - Islay (29,30/9) - Quilca (1 to 10/10) - Arica (17 to 
19/10) - Islay (23/10 to 23/11) - Valparaiso, Cobija (16/12/1837 to March 
1838) - Rio de Janeiro ( 1/5/1838) 
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47. - Samarang, 6° (28) 500 [1822-1883] 
Rio de la Plata (Nov. 1832) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (Jan. to 4/2/1833) - Rio 
de Janeiro (29/3 to 17/8) - Valparaiso (25/9 to 6/10) - Callao (19 to 22/10) - 
Panama, Acapulco, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (2/11/1833 to 25/3/1834) 
- Valparaiso (15/5 to 24/5) - Callao (4/6 to 25/8) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo 
(13/9 to 9/10) - Rio de Janeiro (20/11/1834) 
Rio de Janeiro (16/7/1838) - Valparaiso (28/8 to 6/9) - Arica (17 to 29/9) - 
Callao (26/9 to 12/11) - Huacho (14 to 20/11) - Callao (22 to 1/12) - Santa 
(3/12) - Samanco and Huanchaco (4/12) - Paita (7/12) - Puna, Guayaquil (9 
to 14/12) - Paita (17 to 21/12) -Huanchaco (28 to 1/1/1839) - Santa (4/1) - 
Callao (11 to 16/1) - Huacho (17/1) - Santa (20 to 26/1) - Callao (1 to 6/2) - 
Islay (21 to 28/2) - Puna, Guayaquil (11 to 14/3 - Callao (4/4 to 10/8) - 
Valparaiso (23/8 to 3/11) - Callao (13 to 16/11) - Valparaiso (5 to 7/12) - 
Mazatlan (16/1 to 28/1/1840) - She will continue in the area until July 1840 
48. - Sapphire, 6° (28) 604 [1827-1864] 
Rio de Janeiro (26/12/1828) - Valparaiso, Cobija (1/2/1829 to 21/2) - Arica 
(23/2 to 26/3) - Islay (28 to 4/4/) - Callao (8/4 to 19/7) - Puna, Guayaquil, 
Panama, San Blas, Guaymas, Mazatlan (26/8 to 23/12) - Coquimbo, 
Valparaiso (16/2/1830 to 30/4) - Callao (8 to 30/5) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo 
(l l to 28/6) - Rio de Janeiro (9/8/1830) 
49. - Satellite, sloop (18) 456 [1826-1849] 
Rio de Janeiro (6/8/1834) - Valparaiso (3/10 to 17/10) - Callao (26/10 to 
21/2/1835) - Santa (25,26/2) - Huacho (8,9/3) - Callao (12 to 14/3) - 
Chincha, Pisco (17 to 21/3) - Arica (2 to 9/4) - Islay (11 to 4/5) - Callao (7 
to 1615) - Arica (1 to 4/6) - Islay (7,8/6) - Arica (11 to 14/6) - Coquimbo (3 
to 5/7) - Arica (14 to 21/7) - Islay (22 to 8/8) - Arica (15 to 19/8) - Islay (23 
to 27/8) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (7/9 to 30/10) - Rio de Janeiro 
(5/12/1835) 
50. - Seringapatam, 5° (46) 1152 [1819-1873] 
Rio de Janeiro - Coquimbo, Valparaiso ( -13/2/1830) - Eastern Island, 
Vavao - Callao (25/7 to 18/9) - Talcaguano, Valparaiso, Coquimbo 
(8/10/1830 to 27/2/1831) - Callao (9/3 to 15/4) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, 
Concepcion, Cobija (30/4 to 4/8) - Arica (7 to 14/8) - Callao (20 to 26/8) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo, Talcaguano, Huasco, Copiapo, Cobija (12/9/1831 to 
13/1/1832) - Arica (16 to 18/1) - Islay (21 to 24/1) - Callao (29 to 22/2) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (17/3 to 19/4) - Rio de Janeiro (31/5/1832) 
51. - Blaney, 6° (20) 460 [1813-1838] 
Buenos Aires (24/3/1819) - Valparaiso, Concepcion (6/5 to 13/9) - Callao (22 to 29/9) _ Ancon (29/9 to 11/10) C ll. o (12/10 to 4/11\ V lp ,- 
to 
-if< --k k-1 iv iii -1 - ý, ct - `-i -v ý/ 1 1) - 
Valparaiso 
(3/12 to 29/2/1820) - Arica (8 to 11/3) - Punta Coles (14,15/3) - Chilca (27, 
28/3) - Pucusana (28 to 1/4) - Callao (2 to 19/4) - Valparaiso (17/5 to 1/7) - 
Rio de Janeiro (12/8/1820) 
52. - Sparrowhawk, brig-sloop (18), Cruizer class, 385 [1807-1841] 
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Rio de Janeiro (15/5/1835) - Valparaiso (11/7 to 16/7) - Callao (24 to 13/8) 
- Islay (3,4/9) - Arica (7 to 9/9) - Islay (11 to 15/9) - Coquimbo, Cobija (5 
to 13/10) - Iquique (14,15/10) - Arica (17 to 5111) - Islay (8 to 13/11) - 
Arica (17 to 24/11) - Cobija (3 to 5/12) - Iquique (6/12) - Arica (7 to 23/12) 
- Islay (24 to 4/1/I836) - Cobija, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (16/1 to 21/3) - 
Arica (30 to 1/4) - Islay (3,4/4) - Callao (8/4 to 15/6) - Coquimbo, 
Valparaiso (3 to 23/7) - Iquique (5/8) - Arica (8 to 10/8) - Islay (13/8) - 
Arica (16 to 21/8) - Islay (23 to 29/8) - Cobija, Coquimbo, Valparaiso (8/9 
to 26/10) - Rio de Janeiro - Spithead (23/12/1836) 
Rio de Janeiro (6/1/1839) - Valparaiso (2/3 to 6/3) - Callao (18 to 3/4) - 
Arica (19 to 21/4) - Islay (23 to 25/4) - Cobija, Valparaiso (10/5 to 1/7) - 
Polynesia (29/7 to 12/11) - Cobija, Concepcion (14/12/1839 to 19/2/1840) - 
She will continue in the area until July 1840 
53. - stag, 5° (46) 1,218 [1830-1866] 
Rio de Janeiro (1/5/1837) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (26/6 to 3/8) - Arica (15 
to 19/8) - Callao (24 to 5/9) - Valparaiso (21/9 to 23/5/1838) - Rio de 
Janeiro (28/6/1838) 
54. - Superb, 3-° (74) 1919 [1798-1826] 
Valparaiso (5 to 31/7/1821) - Arica (8 to 9/8) - Callao 15/8 to 5/9) - Ancon 
(5/7 to 22/9) - Callao (22/9 to 3/12) - Valparaiso (27 to 20/1/1822) - Rio de 
Janeiro (7/3/1822) 
55. - Tagus, 5° (38) 949 [Severn, 1813-1822) 
Rio de Janeiro (Feb. 1814) - Valparaiso (13/4 to 31/5) - Callao (18 to 28/6) - 
Paita, Tumbes, Santa Helena, La Plata, Salango, Galapagos - Polynesia - 
Valparaiso (15110 to 20/11) - Callao (29/11 to 22/1/1815) - Juan Fernandez, 
Valparaiso (18 to 28/2) - Rio de Janeiro (1815) 
56. - Talhot, 6° (28) 500 [1824-1896] 
Rio de Janeiro (5/2/1836) - Valparaiso (30/3 to 7/4) - Arica (14 to 16/4) - 
Islay (18 to 11/5) - Cobija (22 to 24/5) - Iquique (27/5) - Arica (28 to 2/6) - 
Islay (4 to 9/6) - Valparaiso (26 to 7/7) - Callao (20/7 to 26/11) - Huanchaco 
(29/11) - Paita (2 to 6/12) - Lobos de Afuera (9,10/12) - Lambayeque (10 to 
12/12) -Huanchaco (16 to 21/12) - Callao (1/1 to 2/2/1837) - Valparaiso, 
Coquimbo (20/2 to 16/3) - Rio de Janeiro - Spithead (19/6/1837) 
57. - Tartar, 50 (36) 949 [1814-1859] 
Rio de Janeiro (30/8/1823) - Valparaiso (4/10 to 10/10) - Callao (18/10 to 
21/1/1824) - Valparaiso (21 to 2/3) - Arica (9/3) - Quilca (18 to 4/4) - Callao 
(12 to 26/4) - Ferrol - Huanchaco (1 to 12/6) - Casma (15 to 21/6) - Callao innii - n, 1^7\ 10/0 - 'n/n\ 1i /1A "11 /1\ C",. _.,. .. __.. ý1- 7iv w -I//) - vWPM lSO k0/0 w =. L/7) - k-aiºav kti iv Lo i t. i i) - jaIIIauL, U 
(13/11) - Santa (15/11) - Huanchaco (16/11) - Huacho (26/11) - Callao (31 
to 14/12) - Ancon (16,17/12) - Chorrillos (19 to 23/12) - Panama, San Blas, 
Acapulco (11/1/1825 to May) - Huanchaco (15 to 29/6) - Santa (2 to 7/7) -. 
Huacho (14 to 16/7) - Chorrillos (18 to 5/8) - Pisco (11,12/8) - Valparaiso 
(5 to 28/9) - Rio de Janeiro (17/11/ 182 5) 
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58. - Thetis, 5° (46) 1086 [1817-1830] 
Buenos Aires (27/9/1829) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (13/11/1829 to 4/2/1830) 
- Callao (18 to 4/3) - Valparaiso (25/3 to 15/6) - Callao (24/6 to 5/8) - Puna, 
Guayaquil (19 to 21/8) - Callao (13/9 to 25/9) - Valparaiso - Rio de Janeiro 
(9/11/1830) 
59. - Tribune, 5° (36) 884 [1803-1832, reduced to (24) -1839] 
Montevideo (11/2/1830) - Talcaguano, Valparaiso, Coquimbo (18/3 to 1/5) - Callao (8 to 30/5) - Valparaiso (11/6 to 24/10) - Callao (2 to 6/11) - 
Huanchaco (9,10/11) - Paita (12,13/11) - Puna, Guayaquil, Panama, 
Acapulco, San Blas, Mazatlan, Guaymas (14/11/1830 to 19/3/1831) - 
Valparaiso, Coquimbo (20/5 to 9/6) - Rio de Janeiro (22/7/1831) 
60. - Tyne, 6° (24) 446 [1814-1825] 
Montevideo (24/1/1820) - Valparaiso (13 to 26/3) - Callao (6/4 to 2/6) - Rio de Janeiro (1/8/1820) 
61. - Tyne, 6° (28) 600 [1826-1862] 
Rio de Janeiro (20/12/1832) - Valparaiso, Cobija (12/2 to 6/3) - Iquique (7 
to 10/3) - Arica (11 to 16/3) - Islay (19 to 28/3) - Callao (31 to 5/4) - Cobija 
(27,28/4) - Arica (2 to 10/5) - Islay (12 to 23/5) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo, 
Huasco, Cobija (1/6 to 13/7) - Arica (19 to 2/8) - Islay (4 to 23/8) - 
Valparaiso (10 to 27/9) - Rio de Janeiro (18/11/1833) 
62. - Volage, 6° (28) 516 [1825-1874] 
Port Jackson, Sidney (6/1/1827) - Valparaiso (19 to 22/2) - Arica (3/3) - Quilca 5/3) - Callao (9/3 to 10/5) - Coquimbo, Valparaiso (26/5 to 17/6) - 
Arica (25 to 15/7) - Islay (18/7) - Quilca (19 to 27/7) - Callao (3 1/7 to 3 1/8) 
- Pisco (4 to 7/9) - Arica (24 to 30/9) - Iquique (19/10) - Arica (20 to 11/11) 
- Islay (14 to 24/11) - Pisco (27 to 30/11) - Callao (2/12 to 23/6/1828) - 
Valparaiso - Rio de Janeiro (Late 1828) 
Rio de Janeiro - Concepcion, Valparaiso (11/12/1831 to 27/2/1832) - 
Puertos Intermedios - Coquimbo (12/6) - Rio de Janeiro (28/7/1832) 
Surveying vessels, under the Hydrographic Office's orders 
1. - Adelaide, tender survey vessel () 95 [1827-1833] 
Rio de Janeiro - Chile (1829) - Rio de Janeiro 
2. - Adventure, transport (10) 314 [1809-1821 Aid, 1817 survey ship - sold at 
"vaiparaiso 1833] 
Montevideo (17/11/1828) - Chile - Montevideo (23/5/1830) 
Montevideo (6/12/1833) - Valparaiso (22/8 to ) 
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3. - Beagle, brig- Sloop (10), Cherokee class, 236 [1820-1863, survey ship 1825, 
WV7 -1870] 
Copiapo (2/6/1835) - Iquique (12/7) - Callao (19/7 to 30/8) - Galapagos 
(15/9) 
4. - Constitution, surveying schooner tender to the Beagle O [1835 - sold at 
Paita] 
Valparaiso (1835) - surveying Peruvian coast (August 1835 to June 1836) 
5. - Starling, schooner (4) 108 [1829-1844] 
Montevideo (11/4/1836) - Valparaiso (8/6 to 22/7) - Callao (9 to 16/8) - 
Puna, Guayaquil (22/8 to 28/12) - Garachina (26/1/1837) - Taboga (29/1 to 
16/3) - Realejo (9 to 12/4) - Libertad (14 to 22/4) - San Blas (25/5 to 29/5) - 
Mazatlan (3,4/6) - Oceania, Noutka, Sitka - San Blas (19/12 to 29/12) - 
Panama (17/2 to 22/2/1838) - Realejo (20 to 23/3) - I. Cocos (4 to 7/4) - 
Puna, Guayaquil (8 to 15/5) - Callao (16/6 to 29/8) - Paita (2 to 4/9) - Puna, 
Guayaquil (6/9 to 11/10) - Taboga (22 to 31/10) - Realejo (18/11 to 
9/1/1839) - Nicoya (18/1 to 22/2) - R. Pueblo Nuevo (28 to 8/3) - Panama 
(15 to 27/3) - Oceania, R. Columbia - 
6. - Sulphur, bomb (10) 375 [1826-1830, survey vessel - 1857] 
Valparaiso - Callao (7 to 16/8/1836) - Paita (21/8) -Ecuador, Panama, 
Central America, Mexico, Oceania, Columbia, California - Callao (3/6/1838 
to 8/8) - Canete (12 to 28/8) - Paita (2 to 4/9) - Ecuador, Centroamerica, 
Panama, Oceania, Columbia, California, Mexico (June 1840) 
Independent naval vessels calling at Peruvian ports 
1. - Blonde, 5° (46) 1103 [1819-1870, Calypso -1895] 
Rio de Janeiro (18/12/1824) - Valparaiso (4 to 19/2) -Juan Fernandez - 
Valparaiso (26 to 5/3) - Chorrillos (14,15/3) - Callao (16,17/3) - Oceania 
(6/5 to 18/7) - Valparaiso (7 to 22/19) - Concepcion (30/9 to 12/10) - 
Valparaiso (14/10 to 3/12) - Coquimbo (5/12 to 11/6) - I. Santa Helena 
(23/1/1826) 
2. - Dauntless, sloop (18) 423 [1808-1825] 
Sidney (2/8/1821) - Valparaiso (19/9 to 7/10) - Pisco (17 to 20/10) - Callao 
(22/10 to 16/11) - Supe (18 to 26/11) - I. Cristine and Dominique 
(2.33/12/1821) 
- Standar-1 ;° (64) 13 70 [17X2-19161 
Gibraltar (30/4/1811) - Valparaiso (25/7 to 12/8) - Callao (22/8 to 17/12) - 
Cadiz (27/4/1812) 
4. - Lightning, sloop (18) 463 [1829-1832, Larne -1866] 
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Buenos Aires (6/9/1830) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (12/10 to 29/10) - Rio de 
Janeiro (6/12/1830) 
5. - Tyne, 6° (24) 446 [1814-1825] 
Buenos Aires (11/8/1818) - Valparaiso, Coquimbo (4/10 to 19/11) - Rio de 
Janeiro (2/1/1819) 
Chronological list 
ship arrival on the departure from total days in proportion 
first port the last port days Peru 
Cherub 1/09/13 17/10/14 411 52 12,65 
Phoebe 1/09/13 31/05/14 272 49 18,01 
Racoon 1/09/13 9/11/14 434 41 9,45 
Tagus 13/04/14 28/02/15 321 64 19,94 
Briton 21/05/14 28/03/15 311 64 20,58 
Indefatigable 30/01/15 25/01/16 360 73 20,28 
Amphion 16/10/17 7/02/18 114 37 32,46 
Blossom 3/05/18 9/04/19 341 33 9,68 
Andromache 23/05/18 9/05/19 351 254 72,36 
Slaney 6/05/19 1/07/20 422 71 16,82 
Icarus 8/05/19 3/10/19 148 0 0,00 
Hyperion 15/02/20 12/12/20 301 90 29,90 
Tyne 13/03/20 2/06/20 81 57 70,37 
Owen Glendower 22/01/21 10/10/21 261 85 32,57 
Creole 13/03/21 28/03/22 380 129 33,95 
Superb 5/07/21 20/01/22 199 112 56,28 
Alacrity 22/11/21 1/06/23 556 265 47,66 
Blossom 22/11/21 21/01/23 425 95 22 35 
, Conway 19/12/21 15/06/22 178 66 37,08 
Doris 27/04/22 18/11/22 205 82 40,00 
Aurora 25/06/22 10/10/24 838 496 59,19 
Fly 11/07/23 14/02/25 584 189 32,36 
Tartar 4/10/23 28/09/25 725 252 34,76 
Mersey 13/02/24 29/09/26 959 294 30,66 
Cambridge 4/05/24 8/02/27 1010 586 58,02 
Briton 13/11/24 3/04/26 506 199 39,33 
Eclair 18/04/25 1/04/27 713 296 41,51 
Blanche 7/12/25 28/05/27 537 195 36,31 
Ranger 8/12/25 5/02/28 789 51 6,46 
r, QPT i Rin1ý i1) lrý c /10 /) 7 als 171 : f, nn 
Volage 19/02/27 1/10/28 590 407 68,98 
Doris 5/03/27 18/02/30 1081 177 16,37 
Menai 6/09/27 7/06/29 640 304 47,50 
Alert 14/02/28 13/10/31 1337 414 30,96 
Forte 20/08/28 9/03/30 566 85 15,02 
9i 
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo Peru and the British Naval Station 
Heron 31/01/29 17/10/29 259 60 23,17 
Sapphire 1/02/29 28/06/30 512 162 31,64 
Thetis 13/11/29 10/10/30 331 63 19,03 
Seringapatan 1/02/30 19/04/32 808 134 16,58 
Tribune 18/03/30 9/06/31 448 30 6,70 
Eden 12/08/30 26/02/31 198 130 65,66 
Clio 28/02/3 1 28/09/32 578 46 7,96 
Volage 11/12/31 12/06/32 184 0 0,00 
Tyne 12/02/32 27/09/33 593 74 12,48 
Dublin 8/03/32 11/06/34 825 300 36,36 
Rattlesnake 18/03/32 29/06/33 468 65 13,89 
Challenger 26/12/32 19/05/35 874 83 9,50 
Samarang 1/01/33 9/10/34 646 85 13,16 
Pylades 15/09/33 27/01/34 134 45 33,58 
Conway 13/05/34 22/07/35 435 49 11,26 
Blonde 6/08/34 20/07/37 1079 423 39,20 
Satellite 3/10/34 30/10/35 392 227 57,91 
Sparrowhawk 11/07/35 26/10/36 473 176 37,21 
Basilik 19/08/35 29/11/43 3024 532 17,59 
North Start 25/08/35 22/07/36 332 69 20,78 
Rover 12/12/35 1/03/38 810 109 13,46 
Talbot 30/03/36 16/03/37 351 234 66,67 
Actaeon 25/07/36 2/11/37 465 77 16,56 
Harrier 9/02/37 4/04/39 784 365 46,56 
Cleopatra 10/05/37 1/07/38 417 92 22,06 
Stag 26/06/37 23/05/38 331 16 4,83 
Imogene 15/07/37 6/08/39 752 88 11,70 
Fly* 1/12/37 31/08/39 638 30 4,70 
President 3/04/38 30/01/41 1033 659 63,79 
Samarang 28/08/38 31/07/40 703 241 34,28 
Sparrowhawk 2/03/39 11/07/40 497 29 5,84 
Electra 10/06/39 4/03/41 633 31 4,90 
Orestes 26/11/39 27/07/41 609 112 18,39 
* There is no information on the time the Fly remained in Peruvian ports, 
however, as she visited Puertos Intermedios, we had estimated 30 days. 
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Graphic one 
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Graphic two: 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
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Appendix Two 
Commanding Officers of British Naval Forces in the Pacific 
Comanders in Chief of the South America Station 
1819-1837 
Date of appointment 
Rear Admiral William Sidney Smith 25-01-1808 
Vice Admiral Michael de Courcy 18-05-1809 
Rear Admiral Manley Dixon 1812 
Commodore William Bowles 1816 
Commodore Thomas Hardy 1819 
Rear Admiral George Eyre 17-11-1823 
Rear Admiral Robert Waller Otway 15-10-1826 
Rear Admiral Thomas Baker'" 09-01-1829 
Rear Admiral Michael Seymour, " 12-04-1833 
Rear Admiral Graham Eden Hammond 16-09-1834 
Commodores of the Pacific Squadron 
Captain James Hillyar 1813-14 
Captain Thomas Staines 1814-15 
Captain John Fyffe 1815-16 
Captain William Bowles 1817-18 
Captain William Henry Shirreff 1818-21 
Commodore Thomas Masterman Hardy 1821-22 
Captain Frederick Earl Spencer February 1822 
Captain Henry Prescott July 1822 
Captain Thomas Brown October 1823 
Captain Thomas James Maling May 1824 
Captain John Gordon Sinclair March 1827 
Captain Coghlan (Francis Rogers ?) August 1828 
Captain A. B. Bingham November 1829 
2 Captain James Townshend replaced Baker during the second half of 1831, as the Admiral 
sailed to asurne the Command of the Cape Station. On December 1832 he finally departed 
from Rio. delivering the Station to Captain Tonwshend. 
`s. Admiral Seymour died on 9 July 1834, being replaced by Captain Tait until the arrival of 
the new Conunander in Chief. 
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Captain 
Captain 
Captain 
Captain 
William Earl Waldegrave 
James Townshend 
Francis Mason 
Thomas Ball Sullivan 
Comanders in Chief of the Pacific Station 
1837-1900 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Commodore 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Charles Bayne Hodgson Ross 
Richard Thomas 
George Francis Seymour 
Thomas Phipps Hotnby 
Fairfax Moresby 
David Price 
Henry William Bruce 
Robert Lambert Baynes 
Thomas Maitland 
John Kingcome 
John W. S. Spencer 
Joseph Denman 
George Fowler Hastings 
Arthur Farquhar 
Charles Farrel Hillyar 
Arthur Auckland Leopold 
Pedro Cochrane 
George Hancock 
Algernon Frederic Rous de 
Horsey 
Frederick Henry Stirling 
Algernon McLennan Lyons 
John Kennedy Erskine Baird 
S. Michael Culme-Seymour 
Algernon Charles Fieschi Heneage 
Charles Frederick Hotman 
Henry Frederick Stephenson 
Henry St. Leger Bury Palliser 
Lewis Anthony Beaumont 
Andrew Kennedy Bickford 
Peru and the British Naval Station 
July 1830 
March 1832 
August 1834 
July 1837 
04-09-1837 
05-05-1841 
14-05-1844 
25-08-1847 
21-08-1850 
17-08-1853 
25-11-1854 
1857 
05-05-1860 
31-10-1862 
-1863 
10-05-1864 
21-11-1868 
01-11-1869 
09-07-1872 
06-06-1873 
15-04-1876 
06-08-1876 
21-07-1879 
10-12-1881 
13-09-1884 
13-09-1885 
20-09-1887 
04-02-1890 
04-05-1893 
19-06-1896 
22-06-1899 
15-10-1900 
: 96 
Conclusions 
Along this research we had covered a very complicated period in Peruvian 
History, running from the last years of Spanish rule, coming through the 
Independence Wars, the first years of the newly formed Republic, its federation 
with Bolivia and the latter's aborted conclusion brought about by Chilean 
intervention. Each one of these episodes created a number of difficult situations for 
British captains, which may be considered as highly representative of the wide 
range of problems the British Naval Station had to deal with during the Nineteen 
Century, not only in Peru but also in other Latin American countries. In this sense, 
the trends that become evident in this study of this period could be of some help 
for those who eventually undertake further research on the British Naval Station's 
activities until its termination, in the beginning of this century, following the reform 
of the British Navy undertook by Admiral Lord Fisher; and for those scholars 
interested in the relations between Great Britain and Latin American countries in 
the last century. 
Framed by this situation, and also having to attend a wide variety of 
problems in a very large area in the Pacific, British captains showed great activity, 
doing every possible action to fulfil their main mission, which was to protect 
British citizens and interests. In general terms, they respected local regulations, an 
attitude which not always was recognized by the very unsettled Peruvian 
government, neither by local British merchants and consular agents. In fact, they 
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were even blamed for not behave as North Americans and French captains did, 
placing themselves above local regulations. 
As normally happened, even today, complains deserved far more attention 
than congratulations, and consequently, Foreign Office records had more of the 
former. With some few exceptions, current historiography had heavily relied on 
this kind of records, taking them at is face value in respect to the effectiveness of 
the Pacific Squadron. However, even when consular agents' reports reflected their 
point of view respect naval captains' activity in Peru, it should be remembered that 
they only represented a very small part of a larger area. In real terms, it would be 
impossible to satisfy each one of the British consular agents and merchants spread 
along the West Coast of South America, or in Polynesia. 
In this sense, the passiveness and underemployment of British Naval Forces 
in the Pacific accepted by current historiography, should be reviewed, in the light 
of the evidence provided by Admiralty records. Doing so, it will be possible to 
have a better general view of the effort done by the Pacific squadron and to 
understand some specific decisions, which affected their presence in Peru at any 
specific moment. 
Very closely related to this topic is the one concerning the number of vessels 
destined to the Pacific. A decision adopted by the Admiralty and, in some cases, by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station, it was basically referred 
to the relative importance given by the British government to the area. As no local 
naval force, neither any foreign squadron, but the single raid of the U. S. frigate 
Essex, matched the strength the British had in the Pacific, its importance to the 
British government should be referred to political, economic and even prestige 
reasons. In fact, since 1821 until 1839, there were an average of five British men- 
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of-war stationed in the Pacific, almost half the total strength of the South American 
Station. 
They sailed between three major zones: a) Chile and Peru, b) Mexico and 
Central America, and c) Polynesia. The length of time each British naval vessel 
remained in one of these zones, was also linked to the importance it had at any 
specific moment. For this reason, during the 1820's, most of the time spent in the 
Pacific was devoted to the coast of Chile and Peru, something which changed in 
the following decade, when British trade in Mexico and Central America increased 
considerable. Towards the end of the period covered by this thesis, Polynesia was 
visited with certain regularity, not only because British trade there increased but 
also due to the growing presence and influence of the French and North 
Americans, something which will increase in the following decades. 
In each one of these moments, the Pacific squadron acted accordingly to the 
importance given by their government to any specific zone. Obviously, there were 
some cases in which one of the zone was abandoned for a period of time, as it was 
impossible to cover the entire east Pacific with the available number of vessels. 
However, during the period covered by this thesis, Peru and Chile were the area in 
which British naval vessels remained most of the time, not only attending the 
protection of local British communities, but also for logistic reasons. 
One of the key elements to measure the importance of any specific area was 
the amount of British trade and investments involved there. As the Pacific was a 
new area to this sort of enterprises, being very unsettled until the 1830's, the 
presence of British naval vessels provided a valuable help for their merchants. A 
number of problems they had to deal with, could be solved by direct naval action 
or pressure on the local government, as was done several times in Peru, but there 
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were some others which could be far more complicated, as privateering or even 
piracy. British naval vessels played quite an important role to avoid these perils, 
convoying from one port to another, in the safest and cheapest possible way, the 
merchant's funds. 
As this service involved a payment from the merchants, it was the source of 
several complains. Some of them conceived that naval vessels should attend their 
remittances with priority, whereas other considered that naval captains were more 
concern in "freight hunting" than in offering protection to their nationals. It is 
impossible to deny that this sort of things actually happened, but that was not the 
general rule. In our opinion, this service proved efficient while it lasted, helping to 
the establishment of the British trade in Peru and in the Pacific. 
As the area became more safe, merchants found other ways to ship their 
treasure from one port to another, but this was a second step, impossible to 
achieve without the support provided in the first decades by the Pacific squadron. 
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